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Abstract 
The interpretations of the war of 1835 and the identity of the Fingo that were 
presented by the English settlers, have remained the mainstays of all 
subsequent histories. They asserted that the war of 1835 was the fault purely 
of 'Kaffir' aggression, that it was controlled by Hintza, the paramount chief, 
and that the ensuing hostilities were justifiable colonial defence and 
punishment of the Africans. The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony, it was 
claimed, was unconnected with the war. It was alleged that the seventeen 
thousand Fingo brought into the Colony in May 1835 were all Natal refugees who 
had fled south from the devastations of Shaka and the 'mfecane', and who had 
then become oppressed by their Gca1eka hosts. Both of these 'histories' need 
to be inverted. The 'irruption' of December 1834 was not unprovoked Rharhabe 
aggression, but the final response to years of the advance of the Cape Colony. 
Large areas of Rharhabe land had been expropriated, and their cattle regularly 
raided. Their women and children had been seized and taken into the Colony as 
labourers. The attacks were carried out by only a section of the Rharhabe on 
specific areas in Albany. The damage caused, and stock taken, was vastly 
exaggerated by the colonists. The Cape Governor , D'Urban, and British troop 
reinforcements arrived in Albany in January, and the Rharhabe were invaded two 
months later. D'Urban later invaded the innocent Gcaleka, took cattle, wreaked 
havoc and killed Hintza after he refused to ally with the Colony . The Fingo 
made their appearance at this moment. They were not a homogenous group . There 
were four categories within the term: mission and refugee collaborators (who 
were given land at Peddie and had chiefs appointed), military auxiliaries , 
labourers, and later, destitute Rharhabe seeking employment in the Colony. 
Only a small minority of the total Fingo were from Natal. The majority of the 
Fingo appear to have been Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children, captured by 
the troops during the war and distributed on farms in the eastern districts to 
ameliorate the chronic labour shortage . Thus, instead of the year 1835 being 
one of great loss for the eastern Cape, as claimed by the settler apologists, 
iv 
it was a catalyst to the economic development of the a,ea. All Rha,habe land 
was seized. to be g,anted as settle, fa,ms. Well ove, sixty thousand Rha,habe 
and Gcaleka cattle we,e captu,ed and dist,ibuted amongst the colonists. The 
secu,ity threat of the adjacent Rha,habe and the independent Gcaleka was 
,emoved. And a la,ge colonial labour supply was ensured. 
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Preface 
Throughout the work on my thesis I which has turned into a fairly critical 
assessment of the impact of the English in the eastern Cape in the 1830s, I 
have been haunted by two ghosts. The one is Grahamstown itself, where I am 
based, and which formed the pivot of events in 1835 and their subsequent 
cover-up. The other is that I am descended from 1820 Settlers and Wesleyan 
missionaries. But I believe firmly that hagiography does no good - the English 
settlers of the 1830s must be portrayed as real people, which includes the 
painful exhibition of their faults; history wie es eigentlich gewesen. 
I have a number of thank-you' s, the largest of which goes to Dr Julian 
Cobbing, who supervised this thesis, and to whom lowe a great intellectual 
debt. He is one of the most stimulating teachers I have met, and it was he who 
first brought my attention to the topics in this thesis. He regularly 
bolstered my interest, through polemics and by example. Jeff Peires, also a 
superb teacher, provided me with a good grounding and interest with his under-
and post-graduate courses on the Eastern Cape. He has been very helpful, 
especially in his comments on early drafts. 
I received very useful comments from Richard Bouch, Clifton Crais, Robert 
Shell and Robert Berold, for which I am very grateful. I am grateful to Ms 
S.Rowoldt for the use of her transcriptions of the diary of James Laing; and 
to Professor C.Hummel for the use of his transcriptions of the Diary of 
Kayser, as transcribed by Pastor Schwar. I acknowledge with thanks the 
University of the Witwatersrand Africana Library for the use of the collection 
of Royal Engineer Manuscript maps. The staffs at the Cape Archives and the 
Cory Library - and especially Ms S.Rowoldt and Mr J.Z.Vena in the latter -
were most helpful and efficient. Debi Brody of the Rhodes Cartography 
Department drew the maps very efficiently and quickly. I would also like to 
thank the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, and 
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the Institute for African Studie s , University of Cape Town, for the 
opportunity to present and discuss papers . 
I have three more personal debts: the first to my father, for his example of 
discipline and independent thought, and for kindling my historical awareness 
at an early age. The second is to Jurg Richner, fellow adventurer and a very 
determined historian. His company and interest made my research exciting, and 
his surprisingly unflagging confidence in me r egularly kept me afloat. And 
thirdly, to Janet, who never ceased to give support and believe in me. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
My attention was first brought to the topic of the 'Fingod during an 
undergraduate course on the 'mfecane'. Having read the central work on the 
Fingo,2 I was struck by the singular simplicity of Whiteside's descriptions of 
their history. Particularly noticeable were the inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies within Whiteside's work, and the way in which the subsequent 
historiography of the Fingo (small as it is) had retained the essence of his 
interpretation. Central to Whiteside's history is his claim that all Fingo 
were chased south from the Mzinyathi River in 'Northern Natal' by Shaka, 
whereafter they settled with Hintza and were rescued in 1835 by the British. 
My Honours dissertation, preliminary though it was, atempted to show the 
unreliability of Whiteside,3 and the inaccuracies in his work are outlined in 
chapters 1 and 4. 
This the sis arises in many respects from the work of Cobbing. 4 He has 
challenged the long-standing orthodoxy that the destabilisation in the 'Natal' 
and interior regions in the first four decades of the nineteenth century was 
caused by the 'mfecane', resulting from the rise of Shaka and the Zulu state. 
He proposes that 'African societies did not generate the regional violence on 
their own. Rather, caught within the European net, they were transformed over 
a lengthy period in reaction to the attentions of external plunderers. ,5 He 
replaces Afrocentric explanations for the disruption of the sub-continent with 
1 See Chapter 4, pp.132-3 for the reason why the term 'Fingo' is used in place 
of the modern term 'Mfengu'. 
2 [J.Ayliff] & J.Whiteside, History of the Abambo, generally known as Fingo 
(1912). 
3 A.C.Webster, 'Ayliff, Whiteside, and the Fingo 'Emancipation ' of 1835: a 
reappraisal', BA Hons Thesis, Rhodes University, 1988. 
4 J.R.D.Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', 
Journal of African History, Vol.Z9 (1988); Cobbing, 'Grasping the Nettle: the 
Slave Trade and the early Zulu' (Seminar Paper, University of Natal 
Pietermaritzburg, 1990). 
5 Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'. 
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an analysis of the labour-centred incursions of Portuguese slavers at Delagoa 
Bay t Griqua and Cor anna raiders in the Transorangia region, and expanding 
British control on the eastern frontier. The framework of this 
reinterpretation is revolutionary for South African history.6 His work is 
supported by Wright, who has concentrated on the Zulu and Natal.' Wright shows 
that the 'Zulu revolution' was not what the settler orthodoxy proposes. He has 
also demonstrated that A.T. Bryant's Olden Times in Zululand and Natal 
(London, 1929), has, in crucial areas, little historical value. This, and 
similar work by Wylie on the writings of Nathaniel Isaacs, display the poverty 
of empirical accuracy in vital ninteenth-century works." The writing of Robert 
Godlonton and Joseph Whiteside belong in a similar category (see chapter 1). 
Richner, Maloka and Gewaldhave recently re-examined the Transorangia region, 
with special reference to the activities of the Griqua and Coranna, and the 
'Mantatees' .9 Their conclusions are to a large extent supportive of the 
Cobbing proposals. The third area of European penetration - tha t of the 
British on the eastern frontier - is examined here. 
If Shaka and the Zulu were not the force behind the Fingo move, what was? Did 
they come from Natal at all? Who were these Fingo? Cobbing sketched a 
radically new explanation for their arrival. He proposed that most of the 
6 G.Hartley, 'Conversion at Kuruman: an analysis of the Kuruman mission, 1821-
1829', BA Hons Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1989, has questioned Cobbing's 
interpretation of Moffat's motives and actions at Mbolompo in 1823. 
L.Thompson, History of South Africa (1990) has made the only published attack 
on the hypothesis, dismissing it out of hand. 
7 J.Wright, 'Political Mythology and the Making of Natal's Mfecane', Canadian 
Journal of African Studies, Vol.23, No.2 (1989); and Wright, 'The Dynamics of 
Power and Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the late 18th and early 
19th Centuries: a Critical Reconstruction', Ph.D. Thesis, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1990. 
B J.Wright, 'A.T.Bryant and the "wars of Shaka'" (Seminar paper, University of 
Natal - Pietermaritzburg, 1990); D.Wylie, 'Utilizing Isaacs: One thread in the 
development of the Shaka myth' (Seminar paper, University of Natal 
Pietermaritzburg, 1990). 
9 J. E. Richner, 'The withering away of the .. lifaqane": or a change of 
paradigm', BA Hons Thesis, Rhodes University. 1988; E.T.Maloka, 'Missionary 
historiography and ethnography: Casalis, Arbousset and Ellenberger, and the 
history of 19th-century Lesotho', BA Hons Thesis, University of Cape Town, 
1988; J.B.Gewald, .nMountaineers H as Mantatees. A Critical Reassessment of the 
Events leading up to the Battle of Dithakong' , M.A. Thesis, State University, 
Leiden, 1989. 
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Fingo were Gcaleka and Rharhabe who had been seized during the war of 1835, 
which explained why the majority were women and children. This seizure had 
similarities to the raid at Mbolompo in 1828, where Ngwane were captured to be 
taken into the Colony as labourers. The Fingo were destined to solve the 
colonial labour shortage, and were 'supplied with a fictitious past' to 
disguise their illegality. This thesis takes these suggestions as a spring-
board. Are they accurate? 
The choice of topics for this thesis was between Fingo history per se, the 
Fingo as part of the evolving Cape labour system, or an analysis of the events 
of 1835, when they first made their appearance. I decided that without a full 
analysis of the war of 1835, which was a crucial and understudied turning-
point in South African history, the other topics would lack grounding. The 
research soon showed that the orthodox understanding of the war of 1835 needed 
extensive revision, and that this revision was closely tied to the identity of 
the Fingo. The historiography of the war is rooted, like that of the Fingo, in 
one settler-oriented work. In this case it was Robert Godlonton's A Narrative 
of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes (Cape Town, 1836), a particularly 
propagandistic work. He claimed that in December 1834 the settlers had been 
subjected to a massive, unprovoked attack by the 'Caffers' along the entire 
eastern frontier, which devasted large areas of the eastern districts. This 
was masterminded by the paramount chief Hintza, and the resulting war 
continued for nine months. The secondary sources have generally all been 
derived from this and similar interpretations, and I thus concentrated on the 
military records in the British Parliamentary Papers, the relevant official 
correspondence in the Cape Archives, Cape Town, and private diaries and papers 
in Cape Town and Cory Library, Grahamstown. Certain problems with this version 
of 1835 were revealed by this material: the immense power of the colonial army 
and the destruction it caused; the confusing evidence as to the Fingo 
movements in 1835, the unravelling of which became a primary aim of my 
researchi and the lack of source material in crucial areas, for instance with 
regard to settler losses in 1835, and the comparative numbers of Rharhabe 
deaths and losses, and above all, to the Fingo in general, and specifically 
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their use as labourers in the Colony. 
The results of my research indicated that the claims of Godlonton about the 
events and results of the war of 1835 needed to be inverted. The 'irruption' 
of December 1834 was clearly not 'unprovoked'. The Rharhabe 'O on the eastern 
frontier of the Cape Colony had for decades faced the advance of the Colony, 
suffering periodic attack, cattle loss and land dispossession. By the end of 
1834 they had had large areas of their land taken from them and given to Khoi 
and European settlers three times in fifteen months. An armed response was 
unavoidable. The attacks were carried out by the frontier Rharhabe over a 
short period, in two specific areas in the eastern settler district of Albany. 
The power of the Rharhabe attack, and the losses which the settlers suffered, 
were exaggerated both at the time and subsequently. The colonists retained 
military dominance in combat throughout. Colonel Harry Smith rode to Graham's 
Town in early January to take control of the military, and was followed by the 
Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and British troop reinforcements. In the 
following two months, while the British forces drove all Rharhabe out of the 
so-called Ceded Territory (the area between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers), 
D'Urban and Smith, in conjunction with the 'Graham's Town faction' (see 
Chapter 2), planned the invasion of the Rharhabe. 
Messages were sent to Hintza, paramount of the Gcaleka and Rharhabe ,11 
instructing him to ally with the Colony and attack the Rharhabe from the rear. 
D'Urban planned to attack the Gcaleka if Hintza refused to follow these 
demands. Nervous of the whites, Hintza first acceded, and then refused to 
betray his people. He was initially accused of contt"olling the December 
attacks, and then it was claimed that all the cattle stolen from Albany had 
been sent to him for safe-keeping. In fact, he had remained uninvolved in the 
hostilities, but had been sent Rharhabe cattle for protection, once the 
10 Comprising the people of Ngqika and Ndlambe, who occupied the land between 
the Kei River and the Colony. The main chiefs in 1835 were Ngqika' s sons 
Maqoma and Tyali, and Nqeno, Bhotumane, Siyolo, Mhala and Qasana. 
11 Although Hintza was paramount, he did not have political control over the 
Rharhabe chiefs, who were de facto independent (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
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Rharhabe had realised that they faced war, and were for ced to flee eastwards. 
The colonial invasion force gathered in March, and began its concerted attack 
on the Rharhabe at the beginning of April. Leaving half the army to continue 
attacking the Rharhabe in the Buffalo/Amatole Mountains area, D'Urban led the 
rest of the troops straight into Gcaleka territory in mid April, whil st 
Somerset led his division through eastern Ndlambe territory, destroying what 
he could, and seizing cattle and women and children . D'Urban's force camped at 
Butterworth - Hintza's old komkhulu - for ten days, while D'Urban demanded 
that Hintza come to him. The latter refusing to do so, for fear of capture. 
D'Urban then let his troops loose. In four days they seized twenty thousand 
cattle, and destroyed countless huts, crops and lives. Hintza had no option 
but to capitulate, and he was taken prisoner, signing a promise to produce 
fifty thousand cattle and one thousand horses. Two weeks later, D'Urban 
completed the two main tasks he had set: he annexed all land belonging to the 
Rharhabe, and brought seventeen thousand Fingo12 into the Cape. This provided 
the opportunity for extensive new grants of farm land for colonists, and 
plenty of labour to work it. 
Hintza was murdered on 12 May, during a colonial sortie into south-eastern 
Gcaleka and Bomvana territory, led by Smith. Smith returned after a week with 
a further four thousand cattle and one thousand Fingo. After May, the war 
began to wind down. Many thousands of cattle had been seized, thousands of 
labourers and large areas of land had been provided for the colonists, the 
Rharhabe had been punished and their livelihoods destroyed, and the Gcaleka 
had been attacked and the recalcitrant paramount chief punished. But groups of 
Rharhabe continued to resist. They had no choice - all their land had been 
taken from them, and they faced desolation and exile if they assented to 
D'Urban's plans. D'Urban was running out of money and patience. More 
importantly, he had disobeyed his orders from London completely, which were to 
bring peace to the frontier region and extend British control by means of 
12 The exact number of Fingo who entered the Colony in 1835 remains unclear 
(see Chapter 4). 
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treaties, not force of arms. He needed to secure peace soon in order to show 
that his actions could be acceptable and 'beneficial' to both colonists and 
Africans. 
Colonial patrols continued to burn huts and c rops and destroy Rharhabe 
logistical support. By August, O'Urban realised that he had to change his 
plans if he was to get peace. The annexed land, named the Queen Adelaide 
Province, was to remain British territory. But the Ngqika and Ndlambe, it was 
conceded, were to be permitted to remain in designated areas, subject to 
British law, and governed by white government agents with the aid of the 
chiefs, who were officially appointed as assistants. Although this was far 
from an ideal solution, the embattled Rharhabe chiefs accepted O'Urbans 
proposal, their decision spurred on by a mass onslaught by the colonial forces 
on their stronghold in the Amatole Mountains in August. Peace terms were 
officially agreed upon in September. This system did not remain in place for 
long, as the Colonial Office found O'Urban's actions abhorrent. Glenelg, the 
new Colonial Secretary, overturned D'Urban's decisions, returned the land to 
the Rharhabe and fired the governor. But the fact that the system lasted only 
a year must not detract from its intentions - the events of 1835 must be 
understood within the context of O'Urban's belief that he was creating a new, 
permanent dispensation for the colonists. 
How did the Fingo fit into these events? Given this revision of the events and 
results of 1835, and the intentions of the colonial authorities, the identity 
of the Fingo needs to be re-evaluated. Ayliff and Whiteside described the 
Fingo in simplistic terms . They said that all the Fingo were Bhele, Hlubi, 
Zizi, Ngwane and Reledwane - belonging collectively to the Mba - who escaped 
the devastation of Shaka's Zulus by fleeing south. Hintza welcomed them at 
first, but within a few years they became slaves to the Gcaleka. From here the 
seventeen thousand s urvivors were re scued from oppression by the British in 
1835, and were all settled at Peddie. This notion of all seventeen t housand 
Fingo having the same orgins, the same identity, the same purpose in the 
Colony, and all being settled in the same area around Peddie is untenable. 
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There were very distinct categories of people within the blanket term 'Fingo' . 
There was a group of African military auxiliaries who fought with the colonial 
army in 1835, and were given land near King William's Town after hostilities 
ended. There was also a group of collaborators. Some of these were refugees 
originally from Natal, but the majority were Thembu, Mpondo and Gcaleka from 
the Wesleyan mission stations east of the Kei River. These men, women and 
children - less than a thousand - were provided with land at Peddie in May 
1835. A second group, similar in constitution, was settled on the west bank of 
the Tyhume River in August. 
By October 1835, both groups were being identified as 'Fingo', despite their 
local and disparate origins. At no stage were there seventeen thousand Fingo 
at Peddie. In 1835 and 1836 there were on average merely six hundred Fingo in 
the whole region around Peddie, most of whom were local 'Caffers' . Certain 
loyalist chiefs were appointed by D'Urban to aid the white Fingo commissioners 
in controlling these heterogenous groups. They were not well accepted by the 
'Fingo', having no standing or real claim to leadership. 
The military and collaborator Fingo totalled approximately five thousand in 
1835. The majority of the Fingo who came into Albany in 1835, however, were 
labourers presented to farmers in the eastern districts to solve the serious 
labour shortage. For decades there had been a lack of labour in the Cape in 
general, and especially in the east. This was exacerbated by the inability of 
the Khoi, a patoralist people originally termed 'Hottentot', to provide 
sufficient labour, and by the emancipation of Cape slaves in December 1834 . 
Other Fingo moved into locations which were created outside the eastern Cape 
towns, the biggest of which were outside Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort. From 
here they were distributed on demand to farmers all around the district, and 
as far afield as Knysna and Cape Town. The Fingo numbers in these locations 
were boosted by an influx of Rharhabe throughout 1835 and 1836 . The 
devastation, especially of food, caused by the invading troops left many of 
the Rharhabe with the option between starvation and seeking employment in the 
Colony as 'Fingo'. 
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Was the arrival of the Fingo, which solved the labour crisis, mer e ly co-
incidental, as Ayliff claimed? The inversion of the orthodox understanding of 
the war of 1835 shows in particular the power of the Colony, and its ability 
to portray its actions as it wished them to be seen . Is it possible that the 
settlers had planned to obtain the 'Fingo' as a labour supply, before April 
1835? Why then create such an elaborate history for them? An unavoidable 
hypothesis is that most of the Fingo were captured to be taken into the Colony 
as labourers, There were many precedents for the capture of Africans across 
the colonial borders during commandos, and the Colony in 1835 was militarily 
well equipped to carry out such a procedure. The ratio of men to women and 
children amongst the Fingo was abnormally unbalanced,'J reflecting the trend 
amongst the labour-seizing commandos over the previous decades. Most 
importantly, there is clear evidence that colonial patrols were capturing 
Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children east of the colonial boundary from 
early April 1835. 
The evidence for 1835 indicates that there were thousands of 'Caffer' women 
and children being seized and sent to labour inside the Colony. The story 
explaining the Fingo as refugees, all settled at Peddie, is just not true . 
Whenever a group of Fingos moved within or outside the Colony in 1835 they 
were accompanied by a military patrol. Why, if not to guard them? There were 
thousands of Fingo labourers in the Colony by late 1835, but very little is 
said of them, and it is difficult to trace even one . Significantly, a list 
taken of Fingo indentured to Boers in Graham's Town in May, of which many 
copies we re made, cannot be found. The ac tivities of the troops have not been 
accurately detailed in the official accounts of the war. Why is this? The 
settler version of Fingo history is inaccurate . Again, why? 
The capture of labourers - in other words , slaving - was completely against 
Colonial Office policy, especially given the emancipation of the Cape's slaves 
in December 1834. The confused explanations of Fingo identity are 
13 See Chapter 4, pp . 153-5 and 160. 
9 
understandable if seen as part of an attempt to hide their true nature, for 
fear of censure and punishment from London. Given that Ayliff was an 
eyewitness to many events concerning the Fingo, and that he is demonstrably 
inaccurate in his representation of them, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that he was party to a cover -up. With the aid of D'Urban, he 
amalgamated aspects of the three Fingo identities into one 'history', removing 
all suspicious or illegal occurrences. This history was then applied to all 
people in 1835 who were termed Fingo. All Fingo were depicted as having come 
from Natal, fleeing the 'mfecane' , and later being rescued from the Gcaleka by 
the British, and all settled at Peddie. The very different sequence of events 
is outlined in Chapter 4. 
By re-analysing the war of 1835, the identity of the Fingo becomes clearer. I 
make no claim to having fully solved the identity of the Fingo, as - given the 
constraints of a thesis a wealth of anthropological and ethnographic 
material has not been used. This interpretation of the Fingo derives from the 
enigma and inaccuracies in the standard acounts of the movements of Fingo in 
1835, and the evidence that contradicts those accounts. The periods before and 
after 1835 still need to be reassessed. New questions have been posed and some 
have been answered, but the Fingo remain a complex and critical topic. The 
ramifications of this interpretation are enormous, and stretch throughout 
nineteenth-century South Africa history. 
This thesis rests on two parallel struts - the war of 1835 and the Fingo. 
Whilst they are two different topics, they are inseparably intertwined and can 
only be understood within the context of each other. This has led to 
structural problems within the thesis - should the events of the war be 
interwoven with the emergence of the Fingo, or should the entire war be dealt 
with separately? I decided that the thesis needed to be as chronological as 
possible, but that the concept of Fingo identity needed to be approached as a 
whole. Chapter two thus outlines the expansion of the Cape Colony until late 
1834, focussing on the dispossession of the Rharhabe and the attempts to solve 
the labour crisis. Chapter three deals with the Rharhabe response, and the war 
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of 1835 until early May, when the mass of Fingo first appeared. The Fingo are 
dealt with in Chapter four, and the rest of the war - its effect on the 
Rharhabe, its outcome for the colonists, and its later stages, form Chapter 
five. Chapter six shows how D'Urban's plans collapsed after 1835, and briefly 
outlines the methods of land expropriation . and labour extraction which were 
designed by the Colony until the 1850s. I begin with Chapter one - an overview 
of the most important literature dealing with the two topics, and the manner 
in which the settler interpretation of both retained its hegemony. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW 
The year 1835 was one of major importance, both for the settlers of the 
eastern di stricts of the Cape Colony and for the African population to the 
east of the Fish River. For most of the year, war was waged between the two 
groups over a large geographical arena, and with devastating consequences. 
This war has come to be known as the 'Sixth Frontier War'. During the war, 
'Fingos' entered the Colony I where they remained as labourers I military 
auxiliaries, and on land on the outskirt s of the Colony. There was a strong 
and vociferous group of settlers in Graham's Town, who firmly voiced their 
interpretation both of the events of 1835, and of the history of these people. 
This interpretation has remained a mainstay of South African history. 
The settler version of events is encapsulated in the work of Robert Godlonton, 
the chief architect and voice of settler opinion. l He claimed that war on the 
Colony was fomented and planned from early 1834 by the Rharhabe chiefs, under 
the leadership of Hintza. The Colony was then allegedly attacked 
simultaneously over the entire eastern frontier by over ten thousand Africans 
in December 1834. They overwhelmed all colonial resistance and gained control 
of the entire area between the Sundays and Keiskamma Rivers. 'Caffer' control 
was maintained for a month, during which time the districts of Albany and 
Somerset were l ooted and denuded of colonial stock, innumerable European homes 
were destroyed, and innocent settlers were killed. Governor D'Urban informed 
the London Colonial Secretary of State, Spring-Rice, in January 1835: 
I cannot adequately point out to you the devastation and horror 
which these merciless barbarians have committed, this fertile and 
beautiful Province is almost a desert, and the murders, which have 
gone hand in hand with this work of pillage and rapine, have 
1 Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafirs. 
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deeply aggravated its atroc ity.' 
The hostilities, according to Godlonton , were carried into Rharhabe territory 
in January 1835. In April the Gcaleka were attacked. Godlonton said that this 
was in punishment for their alleged involvement in the 'irruption', and he 
accused Hintza of hiding all the colonial stock that had been taken in 
December 1834. Hintza was shot whilst escaping from his captors, which the 
settlers explained as justice for his complicity in the 'irruption I I and 
subsequent duplicity in claiming not to be involved. Godlonton claimed that 
the settlers lost enormous numbers of stock, for which they were compensated 
with cattle taken from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, and grants of Rharhabe land. 
He alleged that the war of 1835 was 'a war of necessity, and not of choice' ,3 
and was deserved punishment for the 'unprovoked aggression' of December. 
Godlonton wrote largely in an effort to counter the accusations and censure of 
the London Colonial Office and concerned humanitarians. He claimed that 'the 
relative characters of the Kafirs and Colonists have been shamefully 
misrepresented' " by misguided philanthropists and that the colonists were 
innocent victims of a preconceived and merciless attack. He was supported in 
his interpretation by a phalanx of pro-settler writers, whose intention was to 
convince the Colonial Office and posterity of the innocence of the 
settlers in the war, and thus of their inalienable right to the spoils they 
received. Godlonton's book was written in 1835, and its purpose was to sway 
London into the retention of the annexed Rharhabe land between the Fish and 
Kei Rivers (the Queen Adelaide Province) . In the same year A.B.Brand, editor 
of the pro-settler newspaper, De Zuid-Afrikaan, published a similar summary of 
, British Parliamentary Paper (henceforth BPP) 252 (1835), p.132 , D'Urban to 
Spring-Rice, 21 January 1835. In 1812 Cradock used a l most the same de scription 
for the attacks on the Colony, which had s upposedly 'rendered desert the most 
fertile part of His Majesty's Settlement'; see Cape Town Gazette and Afric an 
Advertiser, 6 June 1812. 
3 Godlonton, Irruption of the Kafirs, p .229 . 
• Ibid. 
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the war, which seems to have been writ ten by D'Urhan. 5 That same year John 
Heavyside, chairman of the Board of Relief which tabled the losses settlers 
claimed to have suffered, also published his report on the war and its 
consequences for the settlers. The Wesleyan missionary William Boyce followed, 
providing a particularly conservative and inflammatory explanation of the war 
and its causes. Three years later D'Urban published a collection of public 
statements - memorials and petitions from colonists around the country, and 
explanations of 'Caffer' savagery - in support of his policies. 6 These pro-
settler histories , though popular, did not convince London, and the settlers 
were subjected to Colonial Office anger and criticism in the home press. This 
spurred on the settler apologists to reiterate their stance throughout the 
century. 
Cape writers until the twentieth century were without exception in favour of 
the settlers. J.C.Chase, a merchant and journalist, was a particularly staunch 
supporter of the set tIer cause . 7 John Mi tford Bowker, part of a large and 
influential settler family, took a particular liking to the attitudes and 
policies of D'Urban, and published similar views on the war. Sir Harry Smith, 
second in command of the forces in 1835, and Charles Brownlee, government 
agent and son of a prominent Wesleyan missionary, also aired their views 
- later. a Settler apologetics reached its apogee in the writings of George 
5 A.B.Brand, ' The Kaffir War of 1835' (1836). It exhibits D'Urban's style and 
apologetics. 
6 J.Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Proceedings of the Board of Relief for the 
Destitute' (1836); W.B.Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs, from 1834 to 
1838; with reference to the Civil, Political, and Religious Condition, of the 
Colonists and Aborigines' (1838); Sir B.D'Urban, 'Public Documents showing the 
Character of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's Administration of the Government of the 
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope ... 1834 to 1838' (1838). 
7 J.C.Chase, The Cape of Good Hope ; and Chase, Natal: a Reprint of all the 
authentic Notices (1843). See M.J .McGinn, 'J .C.Chase 1820 Settler 
Servant of the Colony', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1975, for a 
analysis of Chase , his beliefs and motives. 
and 
good 
a J.M.Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections from Important Papers' (1864); 
Sir H.Smith (ed . Moore Smith), The Autobiography of Lieutenant -General Sir 
Harry Smith, (1901); C.Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and Customs 
(1896). 
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Macall Theal and Sir George Co ry,9 although they were less obviously 
propagandistic than Godlonton. Cory, a Professor of Chemistry, was 
particularly defensive of the settlers, slating the liberal editor of the 
South African Commercial Advertiser, J ohn Fairbairn, for I a disposition to 
seize upon every trifling oc currenc e and to twist it into some proof of their 
[settler] misconduct towards the natives . .to Cory presumably felt that the 
many proven cases of settler misconduct were not worthy of mention, and would 
unnecessarily tarnish the settler reputation. In a short article in 1935, 
J.B.Ross took legitimate issue with Cory for his intentiona l calumny of 
Hintza. 11 Theal and Cory have been historiographically described as proponents 
of the Settler School,I2 recognisable for their portrayal of the settlers as 
bearers of Christianity and civilisation to the barbarous, threatening 
savages. Thus, nearly a century after Godlonton had written his book, his 
arguments remained fully accepted . 
Parallel to the embedding of the settler interpr etation of the war of 1835 
came the development of the history of the Fingo. The central work on the 
history of the Fingo remains The History of the AbaMbo, written in 1912 under 
commission of the Methodist Synod by a contemporary of Theal and Cory, Rev. 
Joseph Whiteside. 13 As Moyer said: 'Although some have interpreted the 
material differently or have embellished upon it, few have added more to our 
knowledge of the Mfengu'." Yet it is a book full of contradictions, 
exaggeration and myth, based marginally upon some of the writings of Rev . John 
Ay1iff (claimed posthumous l y as co-author), with an infusion of Victorian 
9 G.M.Theal, The History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872 (1920); Sir 
G.E .Cory, The Rise of South Africa (1919). 
10 Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p . 91. 
II J.B.Ross, 'The Fingo Slavery Myth', SA Outlook, July 1935, p . 134. 
12 C. Saunders , The Making of the South African Past (1988); K.Smith, The 
Changing Past: Trends in South African Hisorical Writing (1988) . 
13 Whiteside, History of Abambo . I have referred to this book throughout under 
Whiteside's name, as Ayliff wrote none of it, and was merely inaccurately 
paraphrased for a small section of it . 
14 R.A.Moyer, 'A History of the Mfengu of the Eastern Cape 1815-1865', Ph.D 
Thesis, London University, 1976, p.9. 
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conviction and imagination. 15 In his first two chapters, supposedly describing 
all the Fingo in Natal, Whiteside draws extensively from Casalis, who was 
describing the movements of the Ngwane, not the Fingo. 16 Many of his 
descriptions of the 'Mbo', and their numbers and movement, are adaptedfrom 
Scully's writing on the Hlubi and Ngwane. 17 we.iteside claimed that all Fingo 
were refugee members of the Hlubi, Zizi, Bhele, Reledwane and Kunene from the 
Mzinyathi River region in what is now north-western Natal, where they had all 
been part of what he called the Mbo tribe. Whiteside's history of the Fingo is 
rooted in the orthodox explanation of the 'mfecane' as the central factor in 
all African movement in the sub-continent in the 1820s and 1830s. 18 This holds 
that the rise of Shaka and the overwhelming military power which the Zulu 
state had in the late 1810s, resulted in the rapid geographical expansion of 
the Zulu, accomplished by sundry death and destruction. The orthodoxy asserts 
that Shaka killed between one and two million people; Whiteside claimed that 
he had killed enormous numbers of Mba. A small percentage of the survi vors 
managed to flee south along t he coast to Hintza, as refugees. 
Hintza initially welcomed them, Ayliff's version continues, but soon forced 
them into oppressive slavery. Ayliff was the missionary with Hintza at 
Butterworth, and Whiteside claimed that, as a result of Gcaleka antagonism 
towards Ayliff, 'the church erected for the Gcalekas was crowded at every 
servi ce by the Fingoes' .19 Ayliff was described as the 'Father of the 
Fingo',20 and the Fingo at Butterworth supposedly flocked to him for 
protection and to be converted. Whiteside claimed that it was Ayliff who 
organised the 'rescue' of these oppressed people from their Gcaleka overlords, 
15 Webster, 'Ayliff, Whiteside, and the Fingo "Emancipation" of 1835'. 
16 Whiteside, History of Abambo, chs. 1 and 2; cf. E.Casalis, The Basutos 
(English translation, 1861). 
17 W.C.Scully, 'Fragments of Native History', The State (1909), p.285. 
18 As outlined in J.D.Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: a Nineteenth-century 
Revolution in Bantu Africa (1966). 
19 Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.20. 
20 See for example Gedye's comment in Graham'S Town Journal 1875, on 'the late 
revered, now sainted John Ayliff', who 'is still remembered by many of the now 
aged Fingos as their father'. 
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and that when the colonial troops entered Gcaleka territory in April 1835, the 
same 16,800 surviving Fingo were rescued by the British and given land around 
Peddie in the Ceded Territory. The Fingo were so grateful that they became 
allies of the Colony and supporters of the Church and education; promises 
outlined by the Fingo chiefs in Peddie on 14 May 1835. 
The first 'history' of the Fingo was sent to O'Urban by Ayliff in May 1835, 
wherein he mentioned nine chiefs and the histories of the people. 21 As shall 
be discussed,22 these men were not all appointed later as Fingo chiefs by 
O'Urban, and few of the Fingo had the identity which Ayliff claimed for them 
all. From 1830 to 1837 Ayliff wrote a daily diary of his life in 
Butterworth. 23 In this diary, he made scarcely any mention of Fingo, which 
implies that he had little contact before 1835 with those people termed Fingo. 
Where he took the information for this first history is unclear. In August and 
September 1835, Ayliff wrote three articles for the Graham's Town Journal, 
providing a rough summary of 'Fingo history',Z4 that was to go into Whiteside. 
They are vague, sketchy articles; comments such as those on the dysentry and 
malnutrition at Peddie in 1835 were left out of Ayliff's more romanticised 
later versions. In 1851 and 1853 he wrote progressively more sophisticated 
'histories' of the Fingo, with a strong anti-Gcaleka tone. 25 A proportion of 
Whiteside's history - chapters 4 to 7 - was based upon the 1853 manuscript, 
and the rest was garnered from other sources. In these later essays, Ayliff at 
no stage wrote independently on Fingo history, despite his supposed 
familiarity with his charges. Oespite ninety pages of rambling about the 
destruction caused by Shaka, Ayliff concluded by saying that 'I am inclined to 
fear that the hellish practice of the slave trade thus begun on this [Natal] 
21 (Cape Archives) - hereafter (CA) - A519/2, Ayliff to O'Urban, 1 May 1835. 
22 See Chapter 4, pp. 145-8. 
23 (CA) A80, Papers of John Ayliff. The only part of this collection that has 
been used is his diary between 1830 and 1838. All subsequent references to A80 
allude only to the diary. 
24 Graham's Town Journal (hereafter GTJ), 20 August, 3 September, 17 September 
1835. 
25 (Cory Library - henceforth CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, c.1851; 
(CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History for Cathcart, Ayliff, c.1853. 
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coast, was the origin of those wars which have nearly produced the entire 
extinction of the African Tribes of this Continent' .26 In this manuscript 
Ayliff borrowed extensively from missionary journals, government and military 
literature, letters, and contemporary explorers, sometimes employing verbatim 
quotes in order to write the history of the F~ngo.27 
Ayliff is an unreliable source. He (and Whiteside) described the 'country of 
the Fingoes' as 'a country rich in pasturage and in wood, heal thy, well 
watered and abounding in game of all sorts .... The climate appears to be, 
generally speaking, temperate'. But this is an unacknowledged quotation 
directly from Arbousset, who had in fact been describing the country of the 
'Zula,.28 The missionary, John Edwards, wrote in 1836 about the 'Mantatees' , 
and how 'the accounts of their wars and bloodshed would affect the most hard-
hearted ... [and how] Thousands of human skulls strew the land. ,29 Ayliff 
borrowed these descriptions, but used them to describe the sufferings of the 
Fingo. Ayliff was also influenced by the lamentations of T.L.Hodgson on the 
savagery of Africa, and his hope that the English would bring civilisation and 
peace. Ayliff used the same phrases in his descriptions of the natural state 
of Africans and the tribulations of the Fingo.30 
Ayliff's computation of Fingo deaths in itself precludes him from 
consideration as a reliable source. He assumed without any basis that there 
were twelve Fingo tribes: a biblical derivative. He then estimated, 
arbitrarily, that there must have been sixty thousand in each tribe, thus 
26 (CL) PR 3826, p.l. cf. R.Drury, The Adventures of Robert Drury during 
fifteen years captivity on the Island of Madagascar (1807), p.442. 
27 In (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, Ayliff did not describe the 
movements of the Fingo in May in his own words. He merely transcribed Dutton's 
Notice, Ndabakazi, 3 May 1835. 
28 Arbousset & Daumas Narrative of an Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the 
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (1846), p.133; (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo 
History, pp.4-5; Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.2. 
29 The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, Vol.15, 1836, p.789, letter from Rev. 
J.Edwards, 17 March 1836. 
30 (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.5, makes specific reference to the 
4 August 1823 entry in Hodgson's diary; cf. R.L.Cope(ed) The Journals of the 
Rev. T.L.Hodgson (1977). 
19 
totalling 720,000 people. Basing his calculations on the number of Fingo in 
the Colony in 1835, he then seriously concluded that Shaka killed 690,000 
Fingo . 31 He described the Fingo as both poor oppressed servants, and as 
cunning, avaricious cattle owners in his later essays, which has remained a 
key contradiction within the orthodox history of the Fingo. 32 This 
contradiction is derived chiefly from the juxtaposition of poor labourer and 
wealthy collaborator constituents within the 'Fingo tribe', as well as the 
anachronistic imposition of the fears of European farmers about Fingo economic 
competition in the 1850s. Ayliff even misquoted himself. In the 1853 
manuscript, for instance, he described the ill-treatment of a girl whom he 
called 'Fingo' ,33 whom he had described as 'Caffer' in his diary.3' The 
propagandistic suggestion that the Fingo were Gcaleka slaves was first 
suggested by D'Urban,35 which Ayliff awkwardly wove into his 1853 manuscript. 
From his diary, where the Fingo do not appear, Ayliff moved to a brief sketch 
of Fingo 'history' in 1835, to these full-blown essays in 1851 and 1853 The 
history of the Fingo thus does not come from the eye-witness Ayliff, but 
evolved in enigma, myth and military propaganda, from which Ayliff himself 
copied. Yet Ayliff and Whiteside are still uncritically accepted as 
authorities on the history of the Fingo. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the histories of the war and the 
Fingo, which the settlers had created, were firmly entrenched. The settler 
view, both of the war of 1835 and the Fingo, has retained a continuity to the 
present, with the regular publication of justifications of settler actions and 
motives. The yearning for the lost power of the British, or the vested 
interests of genealogist descendents have produced a popular selective memory 
31 (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.5. 
32 The dichotomy between the 'poor' Fingo and the same 'Jews of Cafferland' is 
clear in (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History. 
33 (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history, p.46. 
3' (CA) A80, Diary of Ayliff, 6 August 1834. 
35 First pronounced by D'Urban, Government Notice, 3 May 1835. See J.B.Peires, 
The House of Phalo (1981), p.225; J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu (1930). 
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which barely resembles Albany of the 1820s and 1830s. 36 The exhibition of the 
faults of the settlers provided by contemporaries such as London Missionary 
Society (LMS) missionary James Read and the merchant Thomas Stubbs 37 have been 
disregarded or 'forgotten'. They are nothing like the hagiographica1 accounts 
produced subsequently, most of which retained the pro-settler biases of the 
1820s and 1830 s. Many twentieth century academics have also kept alive the 
settler view, as can be seen in Du Tait's uncritical acceptance of the 
propositions of Godlonton and Cory.38 
Afrikaner historiography between the 1920s and the 1970s has largely supported 
the settler history, partly because the enemies of the settlers were the 
enemies of the Boers, but also because settler racial philosophy coincided 
sufficiently with the burgeoning aparthied policies, E.H.Brookes, for 
instance, whose work had the sanction and help of J.B.M. Hertzog, felt that 
the disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province in 1836 - essentially the 
official British disavowal of colonial actions in 1835 'was a most 
unfortunate event, deferring all progress in the task of civilising the Native 
tribes for eleven years and merely postponing the inevitable task which all 
South Africa Administrators have had to fa ce. ,39 The confusion in Afrikaner 
historiography about 1835 and the Fingo is encapsulated in Five Hundred Years, 
an array of Afrikaner interpretations of South African history, edited by 
36 See for example M.Bell, They came from a far land (1963); A.W .Burton, 'The 
Highlands of Kaffraria' (1942); D.E.Rivett-Carnac, Hawk's Eye (1966); 
I .Mitford-Barberton, Comdt. Holden Bowker (1970); I .Mi tford-Barberton & V. Whi te, 
Some Frontier Families (1968). 
37 Read - for example in (CA) A50/4 and A1480 - made regular complaints about 
the greed of the settlers and the ill -treatment of the Africans on the 
frontier. Stubbs, in (CL) MS 7131, made a number of interesting, and 
derogatory, comments about the Graham'S Town residents. Compare, for instance, 
the difference between Stubbs' descriptions of George Wood, and the eulogistic 
biography of him - They came from a far land - produced by his descendent May 
Bell. 
38 A.D.Du Toit, 'The Cape Frontier: a study of Native Policy with special 
reference to the years 1847-1866', Archives Year Book (1954). 
39 E.H.Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1830 to the 
present day (1924) p.18 . This study reflects to quite an extent early 
twentieth century racial thought. 
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C.F.J. Muller. 40 Both topics are disregarded as unimportant. and a semi-
digested. abbreviated ve r sion of Godlonton' S Irruption of the Kafirs is 
produced. 
The manner in which the themes of Godlonton and Whiteside have remained 
central to Eastern Cape historiography is best portrayed in a brief 
chronological survey. E.A. Walker adopted the line of Godlonton, al though 
without his pyrothechnics." His summary claimed that the 'Caffe rs ' ravaged 
the country from Algoa Bay to Somerset East, and that Hintza masterminded the 
attacks, for which he was justly punished. D'Urban was allegedly unable to 
subdue the Rharhabe, and had thus to op t for a reserve policy. Walker showed 
confusion as to the identity and movements of the Fingo, and saw the topic as 
merely an unimportant aspect of 1835. 
W.M.Macmillan, whose focus rested chiefly on Rev. John Philip of the London 
Missionary Society, brought new insight to the events of 1835. '2 His 
parameters were rather narrow, but his empirical conce rn for sources 
illuminated the ill-treatment of t he Rharhabe on the frontier before 1835. For 
the first time, he suggested that there might be a different interpretation of 
1835 to that provided by the settlers. His empiricism reached also to his 
brief analysis of the Fingo, where he relied very little on Whiteside. He 
noted the incidence of Fingo labourers in the Colony, although this was 
unforunately subsequently disregarded. He suggested that the 'Fingo' were 
defectors who saw 'the advisability of being on the side of the big 
battalions'. D'Urban's role in stirring up Rharhabe-Fingo enmity as a divide-
and-rule strategy was also stressed. 
40 C.F.J.Muller (ed), Five Hundred Years (1974), pp.488-9. The fact that no 
attention is given to these two t opics both of importance for the 
development of South Africa - reflects on the historians . See especially the 
chapters by C.F.Kotze, 'A New Regime, 1806-1834', C.F.J.Muller, 'Conclusion: 
Factors which shaped the history of South Africa', and D.Ziervogel, 'The 
Natives of South Africa'. 
41 E.A.Walker, A History of South Africa (1929). 
42 W.M.Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton (1929), chs. 8-10, and Macmillan, The 
Cape Colour Question (1927), chs. 15-6. 
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J.Galbraith produced a review of imperialism three decades later.'J He shows 
the tension of interests between the British metropole amd its colonies, which 
is important in understanding the forces that led to 1835. As early as 1956, 
Le Cordeur in his M.A . Thesis showed Godlonton to be merely a propagandist." 
He made it clear that Godlonton's radical support for the settlers made him 
not only an unreliable witness. but a manufacturer of myths and leader of 
frontier opinion. But this crucial exposure was not applied to 1835, even by 
Le Cordeur. Godlonton was laid open as completely untrustworthy, yet his 
interpretation of the war remained accepted. 
The only study on 1835 in itself was produced by Seton. 45 He concentrated 
largely on the activities of the Wesleyan missionaries, but he took their 
interpretations of events completely at face value. This uncritical approach 
extended to his understanding of the war, which is simplistic and 
unimaginative. While his analysis of 1835 is detailed, it is really just a 
repeat of Godlonton. Orner-Cooper wrote at the same time, in the only attempt 
to encapsulate the 'mfecane' orthodoxy in a full book.46 Because the 'mfecane' 
orthodoxy assumes the Fingo as an integral part of the 'Shakan movements', 
Orner-Cooper was forced to include a description of their 'history'. But it is 
clear that he had difficulty in connecting the 'Fingo' in the eastern Cape 
with the rise of Shaka, as shown by the mere four pages allotted to this 
pillar of the 'mfecane'. He used Whiteside as his only source, and provided a 
confused summary as the explanation for the history of the Fingo." 
The first major attempt to understand the history of 'Nguni"S society from 
'J J.Galbraith, Reluctant Empire (1963). 
44 B.A. Le Cordeur, 'Robert Godlonton as Architect of Frontier Opinion', MA 
Thesis, Rhodes University, 1956. 
'5 B.E.Seton, 'Wesleyan missions and the Sixth Frontier War, 1834-1835', Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1962 . 
'6 Orner-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath. 
47 Ibid., pp.164-7. 
's See J. Wright, 'Poli tics, Ideology, and the Invention of the "Nguni" , 
(Seminar paper, University of Natal - Pietermaritzburg, 1983) for a discussion 
of the problems with this term. 
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'the other side' came from the anthropologist Monica Wilson.'9 Wilson felt 
strongly that 'the central theme of South African history is interaction 
between peoples of diverse origins, languages, technologies, ideologies, and 
social systems, meeting on South African soil', 50 although the emphasi s on 
interaction obscured her view of the European-African conflict tha twas 
occurring. She provides a lucid ove rview of the expansion of the eastern 
frontier and colonial society, and was supportive of the impact of the 
missionaries on African society, which she felt was generally positive . But 
the material on the 1830s is thin, and conspicuously absent is any analysis of 
the labour shortage in the eastern Cape. The descriptions of the Fingo and 
their origins are derived directly from Whiteside, which clouds the 
understanding of one of the important motives behind the expansion of the 
Colony . Saunders, in his call for further research on fr ontier interaction and 
African societies, emphasised the point which Wilson underplayed, that the 
Rharhabe attacks of December 1834 were an act of resistance to disposession, 
rather than one of aggression. 51 The African resistance on the frontier was 
blamed by settler historians for what was really British aggress ion. 
J. G. Pretorius took up from Macmillan with his extensive analysis of LMS 
activities in 1834-5 and the death of Hintza. 52 This is an important study, 
which shows D'Urban and Smith manufactured a cover-story for the death of 
Hintza.But he was hesitant to question D'Urban's explanation of the results of 
1835, and concluded that the war was waged essentially as Godlonton claimed. 
Research that deserves increased attention, on the other hand, is that of 
A. C.M . Webb, who concentrated on the economy of the English settlement and the 
49 M.Wilson t Reaction to Conquest; IThe Nguni People' and 'Co-operation and 
Conflict: the Eastern Cape Frontier' in M.Wilson & L. Thompson, A History of 
South Africa to 1870 (1986), first published as The Oxford History of South 
Africa (1969), Vol.l. 
50 Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa, p.31. 
51 C.Saunders, 'The Hundred Years War: Some reflections on African Resistance 
on the Cape-Xhosa Frontier' in D.Chanaiwa (ed) , Profiles of Self-Determination 
(1976), p.60 . 
52 J .G . Pretorius, 'The British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontie r , 
1834-1836', Archives Year Book, Vo1 . Z, (1988). 
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real financial impa c t of war on the settlers. 53 He shows convincingly that t he 
results of the war were not what Godlonton claimed them to be, and that the 
colonists were more powerful than acknowledged. Most importantly, he provides 
evidence that the stock lo sse s claimed by the settlers in 1835 were vastly 
exaggerated. The conclusion is not carried through, though , that Godlonton's 
version must be inverted and demythologised. 
The only full-scale study of the Fingo is the doctoral thesis of Moyer. 54 His 
examination of the pre-1835 Fingo period is little more than an uncritical 
expansion of Whiteside . Moyer noticed no inconsistencies in Whiteside, and 
rooted the Fingo firmly in the 'mfecane' orthodoxy. He thus automatically 
accepted Godlonton's version of the war, too. Moyer's explanations of the 
Fingo identity show numerous contradictions, resulting from his acceptance of 
these three mythologies: Godlonton, Whiteside and the 'mfecane'. He suggested 
that the motivation for the Fingo move into the Colony was a dissatisfaction 
with the pace at which incorporation with the Gcaleka was taking plac e, and 
their impression that the British would treat them as equals upon their 
arrival. 55 This hypothesis is rendered implausible by the fact that most of 
the Fingo were labourers, as Moyer also points out, and thus expected to be of 
inferior status. He did not differentiate between categories of Fingo within 
the term, but saw them as a heterogenous group with a particularly acquisitive 
and acculturative nature. This was ascribed to the destruction of their 
traditional and authority structures through the 'mfecane'. Because they 
lacked traditional chiefs, they found it easier to assume the economy and 
culture of the whites, and became archetypal peripatetic workers. 
53 A.C . M.Webb, 'The Agricultural Development of the 1820 Settlement down to 
1846', MA Thesis, Rhodes Univers ity, 1975, and Webb, 'The immediate 
consequences of the Sixth Frontier War on the farming community of Albany', 
South African Historical Journal, No . 10, (1978). It is surprising that this 
latter article has not been well utilised. It is an important contribution to 
the historiography . 
54 Moyer, . History of the Mfengu'. 
55 Ibid. , p.ll. 
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Whilst some of the problems of understanding Fingo movements in 1835 are 
addressed, the causes and intentions are not. Moyer makes the pertinent point 
that British tribalisation, added to Rharhabe antipathy, ' caused the Mfengu to 
evolve from a mere collection of peoples with remotely similar origins into a 
cohesive political community which rivalled in size [by the 1850sJ, if nothing 
else, neighbouring Cape Nguni polities. ,56 But he then suggests that 'Mfengu' 
was an economic term, denoting soc ia-economic status. which is in direct 
contradiction to his claim that it indicates a certain clan origin. Bundy 
suggested that the 'Xhosa' and Fingo had a client-patron relationship, and 
that in the 1830s the latter were recovering morale and group cohesion and 
were beginning to prosper, which in turn estranged them from their Gcaleka 
patrons. 57 Bundy's emphasis on the Fingo as a post-1835 economic force is 
important, but his acceptance of Ayliff' s complicated and illogical Fingo 
'Jews of Kaffirland' hypothesis, and the notion of a cohesive Fingo group 
before 1835, detract from his conceptions, 
The most recent study of Sir Benjamin O'Urban is that by J.C.S.Lancaster. 58 
The study is very detailed, especially with regard to O'Urban's handling of 
Cape finances and administration. But O'Urban's writing and claims were read 
uncritically, which led to the assumption of the settler explanations for the 
war and the Fingo, and a defence of O'Urban's policies. This let slip the 
opportunity for a close scrutiny of O'Urban's character and attitudes that are 
essential in understanding the events of 1835. Lancaster does not explain 
whether D'Urban' s actions in 1835 were rooted in his own conservatism and 
negrophobia, or whether he was just acceding to settler demands. There is 
little analysis of O'Urban's activities on the frontier and with the Fingo, 
and the enormity of these policies. 
A major contribution to the history of the eastern Cape has come from 
56 Ibid., p.16. 
57 C.Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (1979). 
58 J.C.S.Lancaster,'A Reappraisa10f the Governorship of Sir B.O'Urban at the 
Cape of Good Hope, 1834-1830', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1980 . 
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J.B.Peires, who has concentrated on the history of the Xhosa. 59 He provides 
a more detailed explanation of African society in the 1820s and 18309, and an 
analysis of the European penetration into African society on the eastern 
frontier. His emphasis on Gcaleka and Rharhabe culture and societal structures 
is of vital importance. But while the war of 1835 is described as one of 
devastation for the Rharhabe, the settler claims that Hintza masterminded the 
'irruption', that the settlers suffered enormous losses, and that the Colony 
was not overly destructive, are retained. He accepts the essential argument of 
Whiteside, but couches it in a better understanding of Xhosa society. Peires 
rejects D'Urban's falsity that the Fingo were slaves of the Gcaleka, and 
suggests instead that there was a type of class distinction within Xhosa 
society, whereby the Fingo had to undergo a period of servility and 
inferiority before being accepted into Gcaleka society. This, though, assumes 
that there was a distinct class and unified group of Fingo before 1835. Like 
Macmillan, he notes the importance of the colonial labour shortage, but does 
not pursue the theme. 
C.C.Crais has produced important analyses on the growth of the eastern Cape, 
socio- politically and economically.60 The description of white Albany in the 
1820s and 1830s in terms of class structure and conflict adds a new 
perspective to the settlement, although the terms of reference are narrow and 
insufficiently defined. His descriptions of the forces at work in eastern Cape 
society provide an essential context for the reinterpretation of 1835. Crais, 
though, has not explored the war and the Fingos, remaining largely dependent 
on the orthodoxies. 
59 J.B.Peires, House of Phalo, Peires, The Dead Will Arise (1989), and Peires, 
'The British and the Cape, 1814-1834',Ch.10, in R.Elphick & H.Giliomee, The 
Shaping of South African Society (2nd Edition, 1989). 
60 C.C.Crais, 'Gentry and Labour in Three Eastern Cape Districts, 1820-1865', 
South African Historical Journal, No.18, (1986), Crais, 'Some thoughts on 
slavery and emancipation in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1838' (Seminar paper, 
Slavery Conference at University of Cape Town, 1989), Crais, 'Ambiguous 
frontiers' (draft manuscript, 1989), and Crais, 'Beasts of Prey: Capitalism 
and Resistance in the Eastern Cape, 1828-1849' (Seminar paper, University of 
Cape Town, 1989). 
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The most recent work on the war is Le Cordeur's editing of the war journal of 
Charles Lennox Stretch. 6l This is a particularly useful work, for Stretch 
provided numerous examples of colonial mistreatment of the Rharhabe. Le 
Cordeur's thesis on Godlonton and his book on eastern Cape separatism centred 
on the power and errant propagandising of the Graham's Town faction, which is 
very useful in understanding how they manipulated frontier opinion and the 
descriptions of events on the frontier. But whi le Le Cordeur provides a 
succinct summary of the causes of the war in his latest work, he sidelines the 
role of the Graham's Town faction in 1835, and the power of expansionism 
emanating from Graham's Town, as a root cause of hostilities. He also 
underplays the essential dominance of the Colony and the destruction wreaked 
on the Rharhabe and Gcaleka. All this tends to reaffirm Godlonton's 
interpretation. He thus does not follow the logical conclusion of his earlier 
work: that Godlonton was a propagandist, and that his view of the war should 
be treated with great caution. 
It is clear, in conclusion, that the interpretations of the war and the Fingo 
presented by Godlonton and Whiteside still retain great power and credibility, 
and are reflected throughout South African historiography. The argument of 
this thesis is that neither Godlonton nor Whiteside is an authoratative 
source. The interpretation of events in 1835 offered in this thesis is based 
on a rejection of both works , because of their unreliability. The following 
chapter addresses the events leading up to the war of 1835, not as the 
settlers saw them, but as a sequence of land expropriations, and the search 
for labour to work the settler farms. 
61 Le Cordeur (ed), The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch (1988); see also Le 
Cordeur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism. 1820-1854 (1981) . 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ADVANCE OF CAPE HEGEMONY 
The war of 1835 was an integral part of decades of the colonial invasion of 
Rharhabe territory, and the colonists' search for a permanent labour supply. 
Initially, the area of most dispute was the Zuurveld - between the Sundays and 
Fish Rivers - which was appropriated by the Colony in 1812, and reappropriated 
in 1819. The advance of the frontier provided land for Boers and five thousand 
British immigrants in 1820, but simultaneously created a severe labour 
shortage. Before the 1830s, dispossession in itself was not enough to drive 
the Africans in the area to work as labourers on the colonial farms, and other 
methods had to be adopted. After a ban on African labourers in the Cape 
imposed in 1809, the colonists were forced to rely on slave, free black and 
Khoi labour . With only the latter available in the east, .legislation in the 
form of Hottentot Codes was passed to tie them to the colonial farms. These 
Codes - promulgated by Governors Caledon and Cradock in 1809 and 1812 -
stipula ted that Khoi either own land, which was forbidden to them in the 
Colony, or find employment with Europeans. Vagrancy clauses were included in 
the Codes, and were then extended in specific vagrancy ordinances that allowed 
colonists to force any Khoi they deemed 'idle' to labour for them. The 
vagueness of the wording meant that any Khoi in the Colony could be forcibly 
indentured by a colonist merely on the grounds of the European's claim that he 
was a 'vagrant'. 
But supplementary labour was needed by the 1820s, and this was provided by the 
increasing incidence of the seizure of Africans, mainly women and children, 
from beyond the Colony. This was highly illegal, both because the slave trade 
had been abolished in 1807 and it was thus illegal to capture labourers, but 
in addition because in terms of the 1809 proclamation, Africans were not 
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allowed within the Colony. Explanations for the arrival of these Africans were 
manufa ctured to appease the Cape and London authorities: farmers claimed that 
they were either 'apprentices'. as the 1812 Hottentot Proclamation allowed for 
the apprenticeship of orphaned or destitute child ren; alternatively they were 
described as 'Mantatees', with the mythical explanation that they were a tribe 
of refugees from the devastation of the 'mfecane'. Many of these workers were 
in fact seized by commandos beyond the frontier. The official duty of these 
patrols was the punishment of stock thieves, but they were used as well for 
the seizure of labourers. 
But by 1834 there was still an acute labour shortage in the eastern districts. 
It was exacerbated by the failure of Ordinance 49 (1828) to attract African 
labourers into the Colony. It was never expected that authoritarian colonial 
employment would be attractive to Africans, but the ordinance gave permission 
for Africans to be in the Cape. The crisis was worsened by the overturning of 
a vagrancy ordinance (which had been designed to force the Khoi into service) 
by London in 1834, and the imminent emancipation of the Colony's slaves. The 
situation had been heightened by the annexation of further territory in 1829, 
1833 and 1834. These evictions of Rharhabe from their traditional land were, 
by the end of 1834, the last straw in a long series of injustices suffered by 
them. Not only had the Colony been seizing labour for its new farms, but 
Rharhabe land and cattle were being systematically expropriated by the 
colonists. The mismanaged frontier administration, with its mil itant 
conservatism and heavy-handedness, merely worsened matters. The European 
advance was urged on by a powerful faction in Graham's Town that had extensive 
influence both throughout the eastern districts and with the colonial 
authorities. The decades leading up to 1835 were thus a period of virtual war 
by the settlers on the Rharhabe. The whites had the advantage of abundant 
access to weaponry that was i nfinitely superior to that used by the Rharhabe. 
In open conflict the Africans, no matter what their number, were no match for 
the guns of the Europeans. The Rharhabe chiefs tried numerous methods to 
placate and halt the whites, but none were successful. They co-operated with 
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the colonial legal and military system, they obtained missionaries to plead 
their cause, they parleyed with the frontier authorities, and tried to talk to 
D'Urban. But to no avail. By December 1834, the interaction of African 
dispossession, the colonial labour shortage, and European military penetration 
and dominance had left the Rharhabe chiefs only one option to retain their 
dignity, independence and land. Armed resistance was inevitable. 
The Cape Colony, which had begun merely as a Dutch East India Company 
refreshment station in the mid seventeenth century, began to expand northwards 
and eastwards in the eighteenth century. New socia l structures began to evolve 
as the trekboers moved through Khoisan territory, appropriating large tracts 
of land for farms and spreading the influence of the European monetary 
economy .. Towards the end of the century this ease of movement eastward was 
hal ted by the large Rharhabe settlements between the Gamtoos and Sundays 
Rivers. For the first (and only) time in African history, white colonists met 
a large mass of Africans along an extended frontier. Integral to this thesis 
is an explanation of the manner in which the colonial boundary moved 
progressively and inexorably eastward, bringing with it the incorporation of 
Africans within Cape society and the destruction of African independence and 
power. The expansion of the Cape is graphically portrayed by the simple 
observation that in 1770 the colonial boundary was the Gamtoos: by 1812 it was 
the Fish; by 1819 the Keiskamma: and by 1848 the Kei. In 1894 Pondoland was 
finally subjugated, leaving almost all of modern South Africa under white 
control. l 
In 1778 Governor von Plettenberg declared the eastern boundary of the Colony 
to be the Fish (Nxuba) River. This claim was repeatedly challenged: it made 
the Zuurveld - from the Sundays to Fi sh Rivers - an area of dispute for thirty 
years. 2 The open frontier of this period3 saw an inconclusive struggle for 
1 A clear overview of the way in which the white boundary progressed can be 
found in Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa to 1870, pp.252-3. See 
also Saunders, 'The Hundred Years War': Du Toit, 'The Cape Frontier: a study 
of Native Policy', p.2: N.C.Pollock & S.Agnew, An Historical Geography of 
South Africa (1963), ch.2. 
2 Peires, House of Phalo, p.54. 
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territorial dominance. The Dutch East India Company, the British in their 
first occupation and the Batavian government were content to allow matters to 
remain equivocal and no real support, militarily or politically, was given to 
what was essentially a sparse, nomadic Boer population. With the arrival of 
the British for the second time in 1806, there came a new attitude towards the 
frontier. A philosophy of racial separation across the frontier became 
official policy, and it was decided that the Khoi, slaves and free blacks were 
to serve all colonial labour needs. All Africans west of the Fish were to be 
forced out of the Colony, to be banished as foreigners. This was supposedly to 
reduce racial friction; but the reason why the Cape authorities should have 
decided to expel its ideal labour supply is yet to be adequately explained. In 
1812 the British army was introduced to the frontier for the first time, and 
with the demonstration of its superior weaponry its dominance was assured. 4 
There was a significant difference, though, between maintaining a full army 
for a short period and the continuous patrolling of the Fish River boundary 
that was now necessary. The Colonial Office could not afford to maintain a 
permanent force large enough to enforce the newly created frontier. Between 
1806 and 1834, as a result of the Napoleonic wars and British economic 
depression, Britain steadily decreased itsadministrativeand military force at 
the Cape, hoping that its annexations - like the Indian - would pay for 
themselves .5 
The Africans most affected by the advent of this new force in the area were 
the Rharhabe. Rharhabe had seceded from his brother Gcaleka in the late 
eighteenth century, and his land was divided between his grandsons Ngqika and 
Ndlambe. Ngqika and Ndlambe were the two main chiefs of the Rharhabe in the 
3 H.Giliomee, 'The Eastern Frontier, 1770-1812', Ch.9, in Elphick & Giliomee 
(eds), The Shaping of South African Society (1989), for a discussion of the 
concept of open and closed frontiers. 
, B.Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror (1986), provides an exposure of the 
methods of British colonial warfare and a very readable account of 1812 and 
the years until 1819. 
5 Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, pp.63-4. Stanley issued a warning - (CA) GH 
1/98, Stanley to Cole, December 1833 - that the Cape would be receiving less 
financial support, and detailed the areas in the Cape budget where expenditure 
was to be cut. 
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first three decades of the nineteenth- century." Their combined territory had 
stretched between the Sundays and Kei Rivers before 1811 . Gca1eka's grandson 
Hintza maintained control of the land between the Kei and Mbashe Rivers for 
this same period.' 
The relationship between Hintza and the Rharhabe chiefs is a very important 
one. The settler explanation of the war of 1835 rests to a large extent on 
their claim that Hintza must have been guilty of masterminding the attacks of 
December 1834, because he was the politically authoritative paramount, and the 
Rharhabe could not have acted without his permission (see Chapter 3) . The 
issue of whether Hintza was the political leader of a 'Xhosa nation' or not is 
thus integral to one's conception of the war. Hintza, as direct des c endent of 
Gcaleka, retained the theoretical paramountcy over all Gcaleka and Rharhabe 
followers. But was there a nation in the 1820s and 1830s1 Wilson challenged 
the assumption of a 'Xhosa' unity. She proposed that it had dissipated as 
early as 1817, when Hintza could not enforce his judgement on a disagreement 
between Ngqika and Ndlambe. 8 Each chief was essentially independent, and 
Hintza's authority was largely a cipher. 9 The colonial term 'Caffer' cannot 
be directly translated into 'Xhosa', a s the settlers, with their paranoia and 
misunderstanding of African society, applied the term arbitrarily to any 
African east of the Sundays River. The British were intent on finding - or 
imposing - a centralised 'Caffer' state with which to negotiate, and hence 
" Their people were described in terms of the chief's name. 
, Peires, House of Phalo, provides further detail on these societies. 
8 Wilson & Thompson, History of South Africa, p.11. See also J.H .Soga, The 
South-Eastern Bantu (1930), pp . 189-190 . 
9 Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.l, p.219, Comments of Brownlee on his 
visit to Hintza in 1822; see als o BPP 50 (1835), Report of Rutherford, 
De cember 1824, in whi ch Rutherford said that Hintza' s power was largely 
theoretical. J.E.Al exander, Narrative of a Voyage of observation among the 
colonies ... arid of a campaign in Kaffer-land. 1835 (1837), Vol.2, ch .22, 
reported that Hintza himself claimed to hold no sway over the Rharhabe. Soga, 
South-Eastern Bantu, pp.189-190, had the same view; see also W.D .Hammond-
Tooke, 'The 'other side' of frontier history: a model of Cape Nguni political 
process', in Thompson (ed), African Societies in Southern Africa (1969), 
p.239. Hammond-Tooke stresses that decisions in African society were consensus 
based, and that the paramount had no political authori ty over the other 
chiefs. 
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their recognition of Ngqika in lS17 as Rharhabe paramount, and Hintza as 
'Caffer' paramount. Hintza was not the political leader of a unified 'Xhosa 
nation'; ea ch chief was independent, and could make a choice on whether to 
fight the Colony or not. 
Because the border was unenforcable, the inhabitants of the Zuurveld before 
1S12 - the Ndlambe and some Ngqika - began to move back into the area now 
devoid of any substantial population. In lS19 a large colonial force again 
moved onto the frontier and evicted the Rharhabe, and the Keiskamma River was 
declared to be the colonial boundary, with the area between it and the Fish 
(the Ceded Territory) to be a neutral zone with no inhabitants. This 
enforcement of the Keiskamma as boundary alienated a good percentage of Ngqika 
land as well. For the Ngqika, this loss of land came as a shock, as Governor 
Somerset had recognised Ngqika as paramount of the Rharhabe in lS17, and they 
had sided with the British against Ndlambe in lSlS_9. 10 The British actions 
had in fact been intended to create fratricidal hostility between the Ngqika 
and Ndlambe, and to divide the African opposition. 
In order to ensure the closure of the frontier and the retention of the 
Zuurveld as colonial territory, five thousand British settlers were placed in 
lS20 in the Zuurveld, which had been renamed Albany . For the Rharhabe, apart 
from the land loss, the imposition of a boundary, which was a foreign concept, 
undermined the traditional practice of fission to alleviate intra-clan 
tensions and population growth. Previously, if more land had been needed, 
herds and families were merely gathered and moved . Rivers and geographi cal 
formations had never before delineated hegemony. There had been no 'private 
property' or legally defineable farms. 
10 Ngqika 's relationship with the Colony was complex. He wanted British 
support, and they wanted to create a stooge chief to undermine Rharhabe unity; 
see J.B.Peires, 'A History of the Xhosa c.1700-1S35', MA Thesis, Rhodes 
University, 1976, p.1SS; M.Oloyo, 'The Cape Eastern Frontier in the Early 19th 
Century', Seminar paper, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1972. 
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The simultaneous penetration of missionaries and European culture formed an 
important part of this process of colonisation. ll The mission impact is 
succinctly pinpointed in an East African saying: 'When the white man came 
here, they had the Bible and we had the land; now we have the Bible and they 
have the land .. 12 For the missionaries, Christianity was inseparably bound up 
with an acceptance of European culture and values. Converts on the stations 
were expected to indicate their acceptance of Christianity ·by rejecting 
traditional customs and beliefs, and by wearing clothes and working for wages. 
The chiefs allowed the establishment of missions in their territory in order 
to have a means of conununication with the Colony.13 But the missionaries 
specifically attacked the power of the chiefs, who controlled the religious, 
political and social order. Conversions could only follow the destruction of 
the very framework of African society.14 
The impact of an expanding Colony, with its concommitant dispossession of the 
indigenous people, lies at the root of interracial conflict for the period 
under study, and cannot be overly stressed. Critical to the permanent 
hostility on the frontier was the issue of who was able to control access to 
land, and its distribution. The annexation of Rharhabe land and its 
apportionment to settler farmers left the Africans with few options. They were 
forced either to evacuate their homes and move eastwards, or, after 1828, 
become servants to the new land-owner, or move into the Colony to search for 
11 There is not room for a detailed analysis of the missionaries and their 
impact. N.Majeke (Dora Taylor), The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest 
(1952), is a seminal work which started the debate on a previously 
uncontroversial topic. See also D.Williams, When Races Meet (1967), and 
D.Williams, 'The missionary personality in Caffraria, 1799-1853: a study in 
the context of biography', Historia, (May 1989). Possibly the best critique of 
missions is J.Cochrane, Servants of Power (1987) ch.2. 
12 K.West, 'Theorising about Imperialism: a Methodological Note', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History (Jan 1973), p.154n. 
13 Williams, When Races Meet, p.60 notes that the Thembu chief Vusani requested 
a missionary in order to be able to summon British military commandos, having 
seen what they could do; Satchell, in (CA) GH 34/5, Satchell to Smith, 29 
April 1835, says that Faku refused to let him leave in April 1835, as he said 
that he could not be without a representative. 
14 See Peires, House of Phalo, chs.3 and 4. 
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work and subsistence. From the 1810s the eastern Cape economy expanded 
rapidly, and while the district economies of Graaff-Reinet, Uitenhage and 
Somerset were based on pastoral farming, Albany's (and especially Graham's 
Town) grew as a result of inland trade, the vast majority of which was with 
the Africans. There was an increased export demand for meat, hides, tallow, 
horns. ivory and ostrich feathers from around 1827. in which the eastern 
traders specialised. The African trade thus stimulated the Albany economy, but 
this gave support to the calls for expansion into new territory.1 5 The 
superiority of European military technology ensured that the Rharhabe could 
not defend their land losses, and to this was added the fact that many of the 
settlers, abandoning agricultural for pastoral farming, took inordinately 
large areas for farms, resulting in the expulsion of the indigenous population 
and providing a tempting target for cattle raids. Cattle-owners in the 
Zuurveld area required access to large areas of land because of the need for 
seasonal transhumance between the sweet and sour veld, but the colonists 
rejected the African practice of communal grazing by claiming sole ownership 
to land. This automatically deprived the Rharhabe of access to large tracts of 
grazing, which affected their economy drastically.16 
The effect on the Rharhabe of the expansion of the Colony is clearly described 
by Dundas, civil commissioner for Albany, in 1827. He described the aboriginal 
character as essentially amiable and enterprising, 'but the Caffres, who, from 
the circumstances of having for many years past been brought into collision 
with the frontier Boors, have assumed a more warlike character than by nature 
belongs to them. 017 Alberti, the ' traveller in the early part of the century, 
had stressed that the attitude and actions of the Africans would be determined 
by those of the colonists, and that the security and cattle theft in a region 
15 S.D.Neumark, Economic influences on the South African frontier (1957), 
ch.12; Webb. 'Agricultural development of 1820 Settlement', ch . 3. 
16 Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography. pp.70-2. 
17 BPP 252 (1835). pp.14-5. Dundas to Secretary to Government. Plasket, 10 
April 1827 . 
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was dependent upon the attitude of the colonists. 18 The Scottish settlement 
of Glen Lynden on an exposed spot on the Baviaans River, for instance, seldom 
lost any cattle because it had good frontier relations. 19 
Three issues provided the main fodder for colonial-African disputes : land, 
labour, and security. Agar-Hamilton, in his study on the Voortrekkers, 
identified the twin problems of the Boer 'Native Question' of mid-century 
north of the Orange as being similarly land and labour and the exploitation of 
the indigenous population by the whites. 20 European settlers continually 
demanded increased land grants, and the extension of the 'frontier of 
civilization'. The seizure of their land in turn undermined the livelihood 
and security of those Africans living closest to the Colony, and it was these 
groups whose responses threa tened the Colony. These responses, which came 
usually in the form of cattle-raiding, were often exaggerated and usually 
linked to the attempts by colonists to obtain workers and exert their 
authority. This continued throughout the century : the last message of the 
Thembu chief Mtirara in 1850 to his people was a disillusioned plea for them 
to move eastwards, as the Colony would forever complain of lost cattle which 
led inevitably to war, the loss of life, the capture of cattle, and the 
annexation of their land. 21 
Since its inception, the Cape Colony had had a labour shortage, and this 
remained a perennial problem. Van Riebeeck attempted to indenture the Khoi, 
but by 1657 resorted to slavery as a more viable alternative, and slave labour 
became the backbone of the Cape economy from that time until the early 
nineteenth century.22 The increase in white farming and the blossoming of the 
frontier economy from the late eighteenth century began to outstrip the slave 
18 L.Alberti (Trans. W.Fehr), Ludwig Alberti's Account of the tribal life and 
customs of the Xhosa in 1807 (1968), ch.21. 
19 J.Cappon, Britain's Title in South Africa (1901), p.288. 
20 J.Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers (1928), p.169. 
21 (CL) MS 17,119, Oral Testimony of E.G.Sihele, Trans. T.Tisani, p.38. 
22 R.Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape Slavery: other forms of labour' (Seminar 
paper, Rhodes University, 1989). 
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supply. and many of the trekboers mov ing into the eastern districts were 
unable to afford slaves. 23 A new avenue of cheap labour had thus to be found. 
The abuse of the commando system on the nor thern and eastern fr ontiers in the 
18 th century led to the se izure of more persons to supplement the work force. 
With the abolition of the maritime slave t r ade in 1807, the Cape looked again 
to the Khoi, attempting to control their movements and availability as a work 
force via the so-called Hottentot Codes of 1809, 1812 and 1817. 24 These laws 
demanded, inter alia, that all Khoi have a fixed place of abode. But as they 
were not allowed t o own land in the Colony, the options were to live on a 
mission institution, leave the Colony, or become labourers on a farm. 25 This 
turned the majority of Khoi immediately into illegal squatters , who could 
legally be forced by Europeans to become labourers. 
The Caledon Code of 1809 paved the way for the creation of a master-servant 
relat ionship between the colonis ts and Khoi. This was progressively 
strengthened into the 1820s, with the allowal of child apprenticeship and the 
disallowal of land grants to the Khoi. The legislation on 'apprentices' and 
'vagrants' lent itself to exploitation by the colonists, who could not openly 
defy Colonial Office regulations. They had to enforce labour within the 
framework and protection of the officially-sanctioned structures and laws. The 
apprenticeship regulations of 1812, which allowed for the apprenticeship - in 
other words, for the forced retention - of orphaned or destitute children 
until the age of eighteen, were exploited, as the landdrosts who were 
empowered to prosecute exploitat i on of the legislation were the same who 
benefitted from it. 26 The term 'apprenticeship' had none of its traditional 
2J R.Elphick & V.C.Malherbe, "The Khoisan to 1828", ch.1, in Elphick & 
Gil i omee, Shaping of SA Society (1989); Crais, 'Some thoughts on Slavery'. 
24 For the text of the Hottentot Proclamations, see BPP 503 (1837), pp.166-8. 
Of importance is the preface to the 1809 Code: 'It is necessary that the 
Hottentots should have an encouragement for preferring en t ering the servi c e of 
the inhabitants to leading an indolent life, by which they are rendered 
useless both for themselves and the community at large.' 
U H.A.Reyburn, 'Studies in Cape Frontier history', The Critic, Vol.3. No.1, 
October 1934. 
H Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.493. 
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connotations of learning a trade, with the employer's educational and social 
obligations; it was applied merely as a legal cover for child labourers. A 
child could easily be captured and described as an orphan; there could be no 
record of his real history. Agar-Hamilton showed how this system of 
'apprenticeship' was adopted by the eastern Cape Boers, where it had been 
learnt from the British in the l820s and l830s. They carried it to Natal and 
the Boer Republics north of the Orange River. As he put it, most of the 
colonists saw it 'as merely a veil required by an unintelligible convention to 
cover the exploitation of child labour,.27 
Vagrancy legislation resulted from the claim by colonists that vagrant Khoi, 
San or Africans were threatening colonial security. They demanded that these 
people be employed by colonists or else removed from the colonial boundaries. 
The regular explanation for the legislation was that it would teach the Khoi 
the 'dignity of labour', improve their moral character, and remove the danger 
of vagrancy. The notion of vagrancy hardly involved security at all, but was 
an attempt (usually successful) to force the aboriginal population into 
labour. 28 A 'vagrant' was defined as a non-European who did not possess land 
or a job. As the indigenous population was denied property ownership, the 
majority were automatically 'vagrants'. 'Vagrancy' remained a useful method of 
enforcing labour: Cole in 1831, and Wade in 1833, when showing concern about 
the colonial labour shortage, proposed vagrancy laws as the best method of 
solving the problem. 29 
Philip's objection to the Hottentot Codes was that they led to the 
27 Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, p.17!. He exposes many of the euphemisms 
employed in labour seizure, and the way in which the practices of the 1850s 
had very distinct roots in the l820s and 1830s. 
28 (CA) LCA 6, Comments of Philip, June 1834, and Campbell, 4 July 1834. The 
latter said that a vagrancy ordinance would force the Khoi to work, to the 
benefit of the wealthier settlers. Fairbairn's disapproving views on vagrancy 
laws are in H.C.Botha, John Fairbairn in South Africa (1984), pp.97-l04. 
Analyses of the intentions of vagrancy ordinances are provided in Macmillan, 
Cape Colour Question, ch.16; Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.SOl . 
29 Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.234. 
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maltreatment of the Khoi and the destruction of a free labour for c e. The 
colonists were quite happy with the law for the same reasons. 30 But for all 
the attempts to enforce a Khoi la bour force, they still resisted servi c e and 
could not meet the colonial labour needs. In consequence the emphasis began to 
shift towards the natural area for labour procurement - the large African 
population across the frontier . With a bluepri~t for subjugation and labour 
extraction proven on the Khoi, the Colony was set to create a similar process 
with the Africans. 31 
The commando system was a powerful method of enforCing white authority, 
augmenting stock numbers, and seizing labour. It was first introduced in the 
Colony in the late seventeenth century to control Khoi incursions,32 but by 
the nineteenth century it was being frequently abused in arbitrary, 
destructive raids for cattle and labour on the Africans and Khoisan. Mayhem 
accompanied these raids: Maynier, for instance, quoted a Boer who had seen 
over three thousand San killed on the commandos he had attended between 1803 
and 1809. 33 By the time the British took over, the system allowed for the 
summoning of a commando by the local Field Cornet upon the reporting of stock 
theft, and the following of the trail to the nearest kraal across the border, 
whereupon up to ten times the number of cattle reported stolen were seized. 
The victim - usually innocent of any crime - was left to demand compensation 
from the perpetrators through the chief. Any resistance to a patrol resulted 
in the burning of the kraal and the death of its inhabitants. The on l y access 
to justice which the Africans had was the local military officer, who was 
often the leader of the offending party.3. 
30 S.Newton-King, 'The labour market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828', ch.7, in 
S.Marks & A.Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-industrial South Africa (1980), 
provides seminal work on labour and the attempts to control the Khoi during 
this period. 
31 Elphick & Malherbe, 'Khoisan to 1828 ' , p.43. 
32 For the growth of the system see I.D.MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South 
Africa (1937), ch.6 . 
33 BPP 50 (1835), pp.29-30, Maynier to Commission of Enquiry, 1825. 
3' A summary of the system can be found in (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 
April 1834; BPP 279 (1836), p.62, Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 Dec 1835. For 
descriptions of its injustices see (CA) GH 1/97 p.68, Stanley to Cole, 27 
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The avenues for abuse of the system were numerous. There was no method of 
checking the honesty of the plaintiff; there was little control on the 
destruction caused ; and the number of cattle seized could not be verified. 
Stockenstrom thought little of a Boer oath, and estimated that 'nine out of 
ten would make a false oath to get cattle,.35 Examples abound of these l ega l 
commandos becoming mere opportunities to plunder. Pringle and Huntley 
complained of Colonel Some rset's disastrous attempt in 1825 to punish Neuka (a 
Ngqika) for stealing cattle, when he led a secret commando which mistakenly 
attacked the innocent Bhotumane and then another chief, killing people and 
taking cattle. J6 In June 1830 a commando under Somerset and Stockenstrom 
raided the kraal of the Ndlambe chief Sekou in search of colonial cattle. 
Despite finding no evidence of any, they seized all his cattle and 
subsequently shot him and six of his unarmed men. 37 A commando in March 1833 
took a hundred cattle from Tyali - who was innocent - which were then 
distributed amongst the members of the patrol, and not to Collett, whose 
cattle the commando had been formed to fetch. 38 Commandos were not restricted 
to the frontier region; Somerset periodically sent patrols almost to the Kei 
River. 3' The complaint of the chiefs was that they were seldom consulted about 
cattle theft, and that before they had a chance to find the offender, a patrol 
had seized cattle randomly from their imizi.'o 
The English settlers denied taking part in commando raids into Rharhabe 
territory, blaming all atrocities on the Boers.'1 But, while the commandos on 
the northern frontier consisted chiefly of Boers and Khoi, on the eastern 
frontier the English settlers and the colonial military regularly instigated, 
November 1833; BPP 50 (1835), pp.175-7, Moodie, December 1823; Lancaster, 
"Governorship of D'Urban" , ch.5 . 
35 BPP 503 (1837), p.167, Read to Philip, 17 June 1834. 
36 BPP 50 (1835), pp . 183-4, Pringle to Commission of Enquiry, January 1826. 
37 T.Pring l e, Narrative of a Residence in South Africa (1835) , pp.325 -6 . 
38 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833. 
3' BPP 503 (1837), p.151, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 September 1834. 
'0 (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 18 34; Ibid., Read to Fairbairn, 27 
June 1834. 
'1 W.Shaw (ed W.B.Boyc e), Memoirs of the Rev. William Shaw (1874) , pp.164-5. 
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joined and led retributive patrols across the border. There was more common 
ground between the Dutch and English settlers than has been acknowledged. 
Whilst London dep lored the regular abuse of the commando system, it could not 
afford the strict policing of the entire frontier. The only method of offe ring 
the 'adequate protection' demanded by the colonists, was to allow the 
colonists to defend themselves with the commando system, and a bl~nd eye was 
turned to patrols until the 1820s. 
But commandos were not used only to seize cattle and subdue the Africans; they 
were exploited to seize labour for the co l onists. In the first few decades of 
the nineteenth century, the practice o f seizing labour became more and more 
common, and by 1835 there was a long-standing precedent of illegal 
transfrontier raids, and the capture of men, women and children to work on 
colonial farms. 42 Commandos were particularly effective in this regard. In the 
eastern districts between 1786 and 1795, over 2,504 Khoi were killed by 
commandos, and at least six hundred and sixty-nine (mostly children) were 
forced into servitude. 43 Newton-King has shown how commandos were being 
employed to seize San on the northern borders of the Graaff-Reinet district in 
the late eighteenth century, most of whom were women and children. 44 The 'war 
captive' labourer population in 1798 was twice the size of that of the slaves. 
Maynier was ordered in 1792 to encourage the taking of African prisoners on 
commando to be distributed as labourers in Graaff-Reinet or sent to Cape Town: 
and after the 1792 war 'captive women and children were distributed among the 
farmers .... This was the normal condit i on of things throughout the district of 
Graaff_Reinet,t45 On a commando in 1793, ' a c onsiderable number of prisoners, 
42 The practice of labour seizure on commando continued for decades. In 184 0 
a corrnnando of Natal Boers atta cked the Bha ca and captured cattle and many 
women and children, explaining unconv incingly that these captives were taken 
by thei r Mpondomise allies, and tha t the Boers were outraged at the idea . They 
then 'aprenticed' most of them; see G. M.Theal, The Republi c of Natal and the 
Origin of the present Pondo tribe (1961), pp . 19-20. 
43 Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery', p.11. 
44 S.Newton-King, 'The Enemy Within' (Seminar paper, Slavery Confe rence, 
University of Cape Town, 1989). 
45 Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p . 7. 
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men, women and children had been taken' .46 Stockenstrom in 1817 showed concern 
at the increasing number of San children being captured and placed in service 
in the Colony, with the explanation of 'civilising them' .47 In Graaff- Reinet 
in 1824, there were eight hundred and twenty-five San apprentices, a number of 
the children officially recognised as having been forcibly indentured. 4s Those 
seized by commandos until the early nineteenth century were largely Khoisan. 
But the failure of a colonial Khoi workforce under legislative enforcement was 
equalled by the ineffectiveness of physically co-erced Khoi labourers. 
Colonists increasingly began to see Africans as an alternative. 
The necessity for the Colony to have a substantial labour force, and the 
problems incurred in a shortage have always, until recent years, been 
downplayed by South African historians. Without sufficient manual labourers, 
the colonial economy was hamstrung. By the nineteenth century manual work was 
considered the work only of slaves or the indigenous population, and was 
regarded as demeaning for white men. 49 The intention of the 1820 Settler 
scheme was to create a buffer in the recently-depopulated 2uurveld, by 
settling a mass of Englishmen between the Rharhabe and the Colony.5o It would 
also help to allevia te Britain's economic problems and unemployment. The 
authorities hoped to create a self-sufficient 'little England' in the Cape, 
complete with English class structure and labourers. A small percentage of the 
settlers were second-string aristocrats who were placed in charge of settler 
parties. The majority of the immigrants were labourers who were indentured to 
these leaders in Britain. By 1823 though, this scheme was collapsing, as the 
indentured English workers found the ease of access to land more attractive 
46 G.M.Theal, Records of the Cape Colony (1904), Vol.25, pp.386-7. 
47 BPP 50 (1835), p.56, Report of Stockenstrom, 1817; see also Ibid., pp.29-30, 
Maynier's replies to the Commission of Enquiry in 1825. 
48 BPP 50 (1835), P .144; Elphick & Malherbe, 'Khoi san to 1828'. 
49 The main work on early race relations is MacCrone, Race Attitudes. See also 
M.Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in South African historiography', ch.2, 
in Marks & Atmore, Economy and Society; R.Elphick & R.Shell, 'Intergroup 
relations: Khoikhoi, settlers, slaves and free blacks 1652-1795', ch. 4, in 
Elphick & Giliomee, Shaping of SA Society (1989). 
50 Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.80. 
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than servitude. 51 Many of the settler farmers were dogged by ineptitude, and 
for the successful the wheat product proved uncompetitive on the European 
import market, and could not match the western Cape harvest. 52 There was thus 
a movement of settlers to urban areas, and at the same time an increase in the 
number of settler farms. 53 
Thus, instead of easing the labour shortage, the settlers (who were prohibited 
slave ownership) exacerbated it, and the Khoi labour force remained 
inadequate. 54 Using the case of domestic workers, Cock has shown how the 
settlers began with indentured white servants, moved to Khoi, and by 1825 were 
depending on Africans, and specifically Mantatees or Tswana. 55 Three hundred 
English labourers were transported to the Cape in 1825, destined for Albany, 
but remained in Cape Town after offers of higher pay. The Cape Town merchant, 
Thomas Carlisle, attempted to ship out white labourers for indenture as there 
was a high demand for them, but his scheme failed after this first diverted 
shipload. The Cape administration explored the possibility of subsidising the 
immigration of unemployed Britons, as well as orphans, but the settlers were 
wary of white labourers after the failure of the 1820 scheme. African 
labourers were more accessible, more malleable and their wages were far 
lower. 56 
From 1809 African labourers were illegal in the Cape. 57 The government began 
51 I.E.Edwards, The 1820 Settlers in South Africa a study in British Colonial 
Policy (1934), p.151. 
52 Neumark, Economic Influences, ch.12. 
53 Webb, "Agricultural development of 1820 settlement", ch.2. 
54 Ibid.; Edwards, 1820 Settlers, p.15l; Reyburn, 'Studies in Cape Frontier 
History', The Critic, Vol.3, No.1, October 1934. 
55 J.Cock, Maids and Madams: a Study in the Politics of Exploitation (1980), 
ch.6. 
56 For discussion on the labour shortage and comments on white labourers and 
comparative salaries, see the evidence to the Conunission of Enquiry of 
Carlisle, Pringle, Shepperd, White, Francis, Ellis, Eaton and Thompson in BPP 
404 (1826), pp.87-91, 226-8; and BPP 550 (1827), pp.144-9. 
57 J.S.Marais, The Cape Coloured People (1957), p.183; see also BPP so (1835), 
pp .168-9, for Somerset's proclama tion of 1822 restating the prohibition of 
intercourse. 
45 
to become more lenient in its policy of frontier separation. and allowed a 
permanent trade fair at Fort Willshire in 1824, which attempted to control 
commercial and racial intercourse while retaining the strict pass system. 58 
The Commission of Enquiry into Immigration in 1826-7 found the evidence of all 
its Cape witnesses unanimous on the issue that the Cape was suffering from a 
crippling labour shortage , specifically in Cape Town and the eastern areas, 
and that this was retarding agricultural production and the development of the 
Colony. In 1827 a questionnaire was sent to all civil conunissioners for their 
views on the legalisation of African labourers in the Colony. The response was 
unanimous: allow Africans to work in the Colony, but maintain strict controls 
and impose vagrancy laws for both them and the Khoi. 59 The discussions made 
clear the intense lack of labour in the eastern districts, and the urgent need 
to solve it. 6o 
The disruptions and devastation in the interior of South Africa in the 1810s 
to 18305 provided a welcome source of labourers, exploited by farmers and 
patrols. In 1825- 6 large groups of Mantatees and Tswana refugees began moving 
into the Colony from around the Transorangia region, most of whom were 
indentured as labourers. Robert Hart said that it was well known that the 
people 'generally denominated Mantatees are a mixture of various tribes from 
the interior who took refuge from their enemies in the Colony in the year 
1826,' and who were distributed as labourers. 61 This distribution of Mantatee 
labourers was performed by the Cape government. When the settler Phillips in 
Albany applied to the government in 1825 for labourers, he was provided with 
Tswana, called Mantatees. 62 His wife explained how there had been a terrible 
~ Peires, 'British at the Cape', p.48S. For the figures of the fair in 1824, 
see BPP so (1835), p.190. 
59 BPP 252 (1835), p.10, Bourke to Bathurst, 30 June 1827 passed on the 
suggestion. The responses are in (CA) AC 11, Appendix to minutes of Advisory 
Council, 1833, and BPP 252 (1835), pp.11-14. Elphick & Malherbe, ' Khoisan to 
1828' have analysed them. 
60 BPP 252 (1835), p.17. Cuyler, Landdrost of Uitenhage wrote to Secretary to 
Government, Plasket, on 19 February 1827, for instance, that 1,000 workers 
could be immediately indentured in his district. 
61 (CA) 1!AY!8!86, Robert Hart to Campbell, 11 June 1835. 
62 Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 Settlement', p.111. 
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shoctage of labouc, and how Afcicans fcom the intecioc had been dciven south 
by men who attacked them and took them prisoners. 'Government at length 
detecmined on bcinging them down hece [Gcaham's Town] and di stcibut ing them 
amongst us as servants', she added. 63 
Acting-Govecnoc Boucke i n 1827 obsecved that thece wece large numbers of 
refugees moving south from the interior into the Colony where they were placed 
on farms. 6' Although some may have been escaping Sotho attacks, most of these 
people seem to have been moving to escape the attentions of Griqua and Coranna 
slave raider s in the Orange River area. The Caranna were raiding as far south 
as the Hangklip (modern Queenstown) area in the 1830s. 65 Many of the Mantatees 
who came to work in Albany in the 1820s had moved south because they were 
being regularly attacked by raide rs who took many prisoners. 66 The official 
explanation for a group of Tswana who entered the Colony in 1824, was that 
they had come to beg for food. Philip said that they had actually come in 
search of their children who had been abducted by Bergenaar s, and 
'apprenticed' - in other words sold - to farmers. 67 This makes it clear that 
raiders were seizing labourers from across the colonial frontier, and were 
then calling them 'Manta tees' and describing them as refugees whom they were 
rescuing. 68 
Cobbing, Richner and Maloka have shown convincingly the power of the Griqua 
raiders, who operated virtually the entire length of the Orange in the 1820s, 
seizing cattle for themselves, and people to be so l d into servitude in the 
63 A.Keppel-Jones (ed), Phillips, 1820 settler : his letters, pp.252-3, Mrs 
Phillips to Mrs Lee, 27 November 1835. The machinery of this labour movement 
remains unstudied. 
6' BPP 252 (1835), pp.21-3, Bourke to Gode rich, 15 October 1827; see also (CA) 
LCA 6, Appendices to Legislative Council minutes, Letter from Campbell, 4 July 
1834. 
65 (CA) AC 11, Appendix to minutes of Advisory Council, Campbell to 1, 29 June 
1833. 
66 Keppel-Jones, Phillips, 1820 Settler, pp.252-3, Mrs Phillips to Mrs Lee, 27 
November 1825. 
67 J.Philip, Researches in South Africa (1828); quoted Cobbing, 'Mfecane as 
Alibi' . 
68 Cobbing, 'Mfe cane as Alibi'. 
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Colony.69 Maloka provides evidence of raids on the Sotho by Europeans and 
Griqua. where Sotho were forcibly seized and taken into service in the 
Colony . 7o The general destabilisation resulted in an inc rease in the number 
of 'Fetcani' raids. 'Fetcani' wa s, according to Campbell. 'the term usually 
given to all unknown tribes' who raided in the 1820s and 1830s, usually armed 
with guns. He described an instance in 1833 when a group of armed Tswana 
raided the Winterberg Thembu, and were called Fetcani by their victims. These 
raiders, though, were usually Sotho . 71 Like most terms of the period, 
'Mantatee' is a complex term, as it was used at t he same time to refer to 
raiders ,72 refugees from raiders, and captives - the latter two usually Tswana 
or SothO. 73 A myth evolved describing the Tlokwa as Mantatees, The Tlokwa were 
supposedly set on a marauding course by the devastations of the Zulu 
'mfecane' , a myth which blamed the Zulu for depopulating the Orange Free State 
and causing the destabilisation which actually resulted from European and 
para-European labour raiding. 74 Mantatees were in reality refugees who moved 
into the Colony in search of subsistance,75 or captives labelled as such to 
disguise their illegality. 
69 Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'; Richner, 'Withering away of "lifaqane" '; 
Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography'. 
70 Maloka, 'Missionary hisoriography and ethnography', p.92, 
71 (CA) AC 11, Campbell to 1, 26 June 1833 wrote of Bechuana Fetcani. BPP 252 
(1835), pp.21-3, Bourke to Goderich, 15 October 1827, describes Fetcani 
attacks in September 1827, where he claimed that up to 7,000 Sotho were 
raiding the Thembu, and attacking the Rharhabe as far west as the northern 
Tyhume River. Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', p.67, says 
that Fetcani were Sotho and Ngwane raiders. Warner, in (AM) SM 2067, History 
of Rev . J .C.Warner, described a Fetcani raid at Clarke bury , where women and 
children were taken. These Fetcani were Bhaca. The term 'Fetcani' its 
origins and meanings - needs to be researched. 
72 Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', p.94; Richner, 
'Withering away of "lifaqane K ', p.19 . 
73 Evidence for Tswana 'Mantatees' , (CA) AC 11, Ziervogel to Campbell; (CA) 
1/AY/1/4, Goosen, 17 October 1835; AC 11, Campbell to 1, 29 June 1833. For 
Sotho 'Manta tees' see Maloka, 'Missionary historiography and ethnography', 
p.99 . Richner, 'Withering away of "lifaqane'" has analysed the identity of the 
'Mantatees' at Dithakong in 1823. He suggests that the term arose par t ly as a 
result of commercial compet ition between the Thlaping and Maidi, and from the 
nonspecific European fear of the unknown. 
74 Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi'. 
75 As described in (CA) LCA 6, Evidence of Campbell, 4 July 1834 . 
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'Mantatees' were a possible solution to the labour problem, but the ban on 
African labourers had to be lifted to enable the source to be exploited. Thus 
in 1828 came paired legislation. 7• Ordinance 49 ensured a replacement labour 
supply, allowing for the invitation of potential transFish workers through 
magistrates and colonial agents; and Ordinance 50, in response to 
philanthropic agitation, officially though not practically, freed the Khoi 
from servitude. The effectiveness and impl ementation of Ordinance 50 (which 
has been hailed by many as a watershed of liberal values) was never thereafter 
enquired into by the Colonial Office, which assumed that the 'Hottentot 
Question' had been dealt with. Macmillan pointed out that whi l e technically 
freeing the Khoi, Ordinance 50 made no provision to provide them with l and; it 
thus failed t o bring about any improvement in the i r condition, and they were 
left with the same di l emma - but fewer employment options - t hat the Hottentot 
Codes had created. 77 The implementation of Ordinance 49, though, was 
problematic, as few people outside the Colony would voluntarily choose badly-
paid employment. As Campbell, Civil Commissioner for Albany, said, they would 
come only if they had no option, whether forced by war and destitution or co -
erced by the Colony. 78 It was widely recognised that the implementa tion of 
Ordinance 49 by itself would have little impact on t he labour problem, as it 
was a purely theoretical invi ta tion. Yet it was passed, and provided the 
legislative protection for labour seizure. 
Why was Ordinance 49 passed, and what were its implications? Macmillan was the 
76 For the text of these ordinances see the declarations of Bourke in June 
1828, in BPP 50 (1835) , pp.171 - 3; and BPP 252 (1835), p.20. M.E.Dona1dson, 
'The Council of Advice at the Cape of Good Hope', Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes 
University, 1974, ch.8, shows their interdependency, and with the intended 
vagrancy ordinance . 
77 Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p.226; see also L.C.Duly, 'A Revisit with 
the Cape's Hottentot Ordinance of 1828', in Kooy (ed), Studies in Economics 
and Economic History (1972); Elphick & Malherbe, pp.46-8, 'Khoisan to 1828'; 
Newton-King, 'Labour market of Cape Colony'; Peires, 'British at the Cape', 
p.486. 
78 (CA) AC 11, Campbell to Bell, 12 July 1833. Stockenstrom advanced precisely 
the same argument in February 1827 when questioning the ability of Ordinance 
49 to provide labourers; see BPP 252 (1835), p.13, Bourke to Bathurst, 30 June 
1827. 
49 
first to see it as 'first and last a labour law, intended to meet a loudly 
voiced need. ,79 But he saw it as a vague and unassertive excursion by a 
military government, which was not strictly applied. Newton-King suggested 
that Ordinance 49 resulted from a realisation of the inefficacy of a forced 
labour system, and the decision to promote a free labour alternative. The two 
laws were facet-s of the same intention to produce labour, and were an 
important milestone in state regulation of the colonial labour market. 80 
Cobbing suggested further that the labour shortage in the Cape remained 
critical throughout the 1820s, despite the influx of individuals and small 
groups . 81 Bourke thus requested that 'whole tribes' be invited into the 
Colony through Ordinance 49. 
Was there a labour shortage before 1828, and did it continue to 1835? Was the 
legislation in response to an influx of Africans, 82 was it attempting to 
induce an influx, or was it merely the legal cover for the seizure of workers? 
And was the state intervention in the legislation obstructionist, or acceding 
to settler demands? There was clearly a severe labour shortage before 1828, as 
Newton-King shows. This was despite the influx of 'Mantatees' in 1825 and 
1826. Of the Mantatees, some were captured labourers, some were Tswana looking 
for their captured children, and others were Tswana dispossessed by the 
dislocation of the Griqua raiders. But they made little real difference to the 
labour situation, especially in Albany, as their numbers were too few in ratio 
to the demand. 83 If 1828 was the transition from 'forced' to 'free' labour, 
why did patrols continue to seize labourers in the early 1830s, and why did 
the colonial troops capture so many 'Fingo' in 1835. 84 There is little 
evidence of an influx of labourers in the years immediately following 
Ordinance 49. The elision of the categories 'whites' and 'free blacks' in the 
79 Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.67. 
80 Newton-King, 'Labour market of Cape Colony', pp .192-200. 
81 Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.495, 501-2. 
82 As suggested by Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.486. 
83 See Appendix 2: 'Population statistics of the Cape Colony', p.227, which 
provides an analysis of the potential labour supply in the 1830s. 
84 See Chapter 4, pp.153-8. 
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population records in the Cape Blue Books 1829 to 1836 makes it impossible to 
calculate the number of Africans in the Colony in these years, and therefore 
the exact impact of Ordinance 49, Estimates of the continued labour shortage 
must be based on the many settler calls for labourers. 85 In the early 1830s, 
Albany colonists were complaining even louder than previously about the 
shortage. Those Africans who did enter the Colony did so usually to barter, 
not to work. The laws could not solve the labour problem, something the civil 
commissioners specifically mentioned in 1827 and 1828, but they could provide 
legal permission for African labourers to come into the Colony , It was a 
measure, provided by the Cape authorities, which allowed for African labourers 
in principle. It made no provisions as to how the labour was to be attracted; 
and this gave the colonists scope to exploit it in the same way that they had 
exploited the legislation on 'apprentices', 'Mantatees' and 'vagrants'. 
'Manta tees , continued to enter the Colony and supplement the work force. 
Campbell noted in 1833 that there was much commotion in the interior, with 
great numbers of Bechuana being 'attacked by Corannas and Bastards, who are 
provided with arms and ammunition, and consequently easily subdue and 
slaughter them. ,86 O'Reilly commented in Cradock in 1833 on the incredible 
number of Mantatees coming into the district, and the attacks on them in the 
northern areas by Coranna. 87 The 'Mantatees' formed a large proportion of the 
work force in Somerset and Graaff-Reinet in the mid-1820s to mid-1830S, 88 
until the 'Fingo' took their place after 1835. 89 There were eighty-four 
85 See Chapter 4, pp.148-9 . 
86 (CA) 1/AY/9/7, Campbell to 1, 12 July 1833; (CA) AC 11, Campbell to 
Secretary for Government, 12 July 1833. 
87 (CA) CO 2742, O'Reilly to Campbell, 8 July 1833. 
88 (CA) CO 2749, lists of passes and contracts issued; Donaldson, 'Council of 
Advice', ch.8. 
89 The change can be seen in the lists of passes and contracts granted to 
foreigners in 1834 and 1835; see (CA) LCA 7, Appendices to Legislative Council 
minutes. For the period July-December 1834, four of the seventy-five issued 
were to Fingo, and the rest to Mantatee. For the same period a year later, 
forty-three of the fifty-nine were Fingo. Most of these Fingo had Dutch names, 
given to them either on registration, or during previous indenture. 
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Mantatees - a majority of the work force - in the district of Bathurst in 
1833. 90 
The capture of Africans for labour was not limited to the northern frontier, 
and Peires and Donaldson give evidence of the regular practice of capturing 
Xhosa. 91 In 1818, Rharhabe offered captives to white farmers, in exchange for 
European commodities. 92 Philip described an instance in 1820 when Ngqika women 
and children, who had settled on the Fish after moving from the Kat, were 
fraudulently contracted to Boers in Uitenhage (on the understanding that they 
were being taken home), whilst their men were sent to Robben Island. 93 On his 
arrival in Port Elizabeth in 1820 Pringle saw a number of Rharhabe women and 
children who were to be placed in servitude in punishment for allegedly having 
crossed the colonial boundary.94 Thomas Stubbs recalled how a large number of 
Rharhabe women, who had come to collect clay at Clay Pits near Graham's Town 
in 1822, were seized by the neighbouring settlers, taken to Graham's Town and 
hired out to farmers. 95 Around the turn of the century, and especially after 
1807, there was a massive increase in the slave population, which can be 
explained only in terms of a large-scale secret slave trade and the 
supplementation of the slave population with Africans from commandos . 96 There 
was an internal slave market at the Cape. Crais estimates that approximately 
five hundred to seven hundred and fifty people were enslaved from beyond the 
colonial borders between 1807 and 1834,97 although this figure seems far too 
low. Shell shows that there were five thousand prize Negroes slaves 
confiscated by the British from Portuguese and French ships - who had been 
90 (CA) LG 7, Population returns, Bathurst, 1833. There were 35 males and 49 
females . 
91 Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', pp.101, 170; Donaldson, 'Council of Advice', 
p.341. 
92 Crais. I Ambiguous Frontiers', p. 2 . 
93 Philip, Researches in South Africa, Vol.1, pp.191-2; Pringle, Narrative of 
a Residenc e, p.lS, describes a similar incident. 
94 T.Pringle, African Sketches (1834), p.133. 
95 Cock, Maids and Madams, p.199. 
96 Crais, 'Some thoughts on slavery' i Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape slavery'. 
97 Crais, • Some thoughts on slavery', p .15. 
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diverted, and were working in the Cape in 1800-1840. 98 
The ba t tIe of Di thakong resul ted in workers for the Colony. At lea stone 
hundred and seventy-nine women and children were seized as labourers and sent 
as far south as Graaff-Reinet. 99 The same occurred at Mbolompo in 1828, under 
the guise of aiding the Gcaleka and Tembu - the British officially seized 
twenty-five women and sixty-four children, some of whom were given to 
officers, and the rest distributed as workers in Fort Beaufort. 100 The actual 
total was higher, as a large number of women and children ended up in Graham's 
Town, where they were redefined as Fingo. 10l In 1831 Bigge, commissioner of 
inquiry at the Cape, showed concern at the continuing illegal slave trade with 
the 'Caffers' . 102 Boers were still getting slaves clandestinely from the 
interior in 1833. 103 Pringle complained in 1834 that British troops and 
settlers attack the Africans 'and carry the children into captivity,.104 
The twin motor of labour seizure - the expansion of the frontiers - was 
continuing apace. Territorial aggrandizement must be seen in tandem with the 
creation of labour policies. The increase in European farming land exacerbated 
the already acute labour shortage, and at the same time Rharhabe dispossession 
created possibilities of exploitative actions and legislation (vagrancy laws 
or commandos) in the 1830s. A preoccupation with labour was thus regularly at 
the root of legislation or actions euphemistically ascribed to security or 
land issues. The interlinking of the three issues is presented in Read's 
assessment of the increasing abuse of the commando system in 1833 : commandos 
were increasingly raiding from the innocent, in the hope of agi ta ting the 
Rharhabe into a mass response. This would then provide the justifiable pretext 
98 Shell, 'Adumbrations of Cape slavery'. 
99 Richner, 'Withering away of Itlifaqane tl •• p.8; see Cabbing, 'Mfecane as 
Alibi', for a reinterpretation of the events at both Dithakong and Mbolompo. 
100 (CA) 1jAY/8/18, Bell to Campbell, 24 June 1829. 
101 Moyer. 'History of the Mfengu', p.605, Evidence of Jacob Tunyiswa. 
102 Duly, British Land Policy, p.146. 
lro (CA) co 2744, Campbell to 7, June 1833. 
104 Graham's Town Journal, 4 September 1834, Letter from Pringle. 
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for seizing their land (and women and children) and augmenting the reduced 
Cape Corps for increased security. 105 
The intention of the colonial authorities, and one that was repeatedly 
employed in later years. was to form concentric buffer zones around the 
colonial frontiers, by using allied or collaborator indigenous groupings as a 
cushion between the white colonists and the Africans. The two colonial 
frontier regions under the greatest security risk in the 1820s to 1850s were 
the Koonap to Tyhume Rivers area (from where the Ngqika were expelled in 1819, 
1829,1833,1834,1835 and 1847), and the lower Fish below Trompetter's 
Drift. l06 Their vulnerability bothered the authorities, who set up a 
settlement in the upper Kat River valley in 1829 to cover the first 
region, l07 and Stockenstrom proposed a similar settlement for the Gqunukhwebe 
(who were unofficially allied to the Colony) in the Ceded Territory below 
Trompetter's Drift. lOB Somerset recommended in 1833 that farmers be placed 
in the Ceded Territory between this drift and Fort Willshire ,109 the area 
where in 1835 one of the groups of Fingo were placed. It was only in June 
1838, when the Fingo and Gqunukhwebe were received together as Briti sh 
subjects, that the region was cemented into a reasonable buffer. 110 
The insult of Somerset's theft of Ngqika land in 1819 was but the first for 
the Ngqika. From 1823 the Ceded Territory began to be settled by both Rharhabe 
and colonists. In 1829 i t was decided that the Rharhabe should again be driven 
105 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833. 
106 These were the areas of most hostility in December 1834. Even in 1850 they 
proved i nsecure , and it was the military villages in the Tyhume River valley 
which were first attacked - see Peires, The Dead Will Arise, p.11. 
107 Analyses of the Kat River Settlement are limited. Crais, 'Beasts of Prey' 
summarises the progressive dispossession and destruction of the Settlement in 
the 1830s and 1840s, and T.Kirk, 'Progress and Decline in the Kat River 
Settlement, 1829-1854', Journal of African History, Vol.14 (1973) , deals 
mainly with the lead up to the rebellion of 1851. But work still ne eds to be 
done on the early settl ement. 
lOB J .M. Urie, 'A Critical Study of the Evidence of Andries Stockenstrom before 
the Aborigines Committee in 1835', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1953, p.186. 
109 (CA) GH 1/96, Somerset to Cole, June 1833 . 
110 Boyce, I Notes on South African Affairs' I P .109. 
54 
back. In August 1829 Maqoma was evicted from the traditional seat of Ngqika 
power, in order to make way for a buffer Khoi settlement on the Kat River, a 
tributary of the Fish. The expulsion was a set-up, as Stockenstrom had 
previously advocated the removal of the Ngqika and their replacement with 
Khoi. A pretext was thus manufactured. The Graham's Town civil authorities 
alleged that Maqoma had ill-treated and malici ously attacked a group of Thembu 
in the Winterberg. The Thembu group in question had left the Thembu paramount, 
Vusani, after a dispute and settled at the foot of the Katberg in the mid 
1820s, En route they were chased from Hintza's country for misconduct, and 
were attacked by raiders (either Sotho or Griqua) from the north-east. They 
remained troublesome, stealing cattle from Maqoma' s people, the English 
settlers on the Baviaans River, and the mission there. It was a Thembu group 
under Galela that was chiefly to blame, and after they attacked and killed 
Bawana, a minor Thembu chief, Maqoma intervened and confiscated Galela' s 
cattle as punishment. The Thembu complained to the colonial authorities, and 
Campbell took charge of the investigation. Despite the obvious unreliability 
of Galela's evidence and Maqoma's good reason to punish him, Campbell decided 
that Maqoma was the unjustified aggressor, and that he should therefor forfeit 
his territory. Surprisingly, Maqoma subjected himself to this colonial 
decision and left his land, leaving only the LMS missionary James Read to 
argue his case in 1833. 111 The Kat River Settlement which was then set up was 
comprised largely of retired soldiers and mission Khoi, with their families, 
and it took off almost immediately, with the rapid development of irrigation, 
agriculture and houses. 112 
ill The Thembu evidenc e falacious though it was - can be found in the 
interview with Bawana and Galela in (CA) LG 9, pp.151-5, 21 March 1831. 
Campbell's investigation is outlined in LG 9, pp.143-9 Campbell to Bell, 27 
March 1829. The official version of the expulsions is given in BPP 252 (1835), 
pp.42-3, Cole to Murray, 14 June 1829; Maqoma's version is presented in (CA) 
A50/4, Read to Philip, 1 April 1833. See also A.Stockenstrom (ed Hutton), The 
Autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stokenstrom (1887), Vol.1, pp.305-311; 
Urie, 'Critical Study of Stockenstrorn evidence'. Peires, House of Phalo, p.89, 
suggests that Maqoma's intention was to increase his hegemony and subjugate 
the Thembu. 
112 BPP 252 (1835), pp.55-6, Report of Judge Menzies, September 1830; Kirk, 
'Progress and Decline'. 
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In J uly 1832, Colonel Henry Somer set, offi cer commanding the fr ontier, left 
for England, and in his absence, Colonel England took charge. Co-inc iding wi t h 
thi s wa s the start of a series of Rharhabe expul s ions which, although 
dis c uss ed in previous s tudies I ha s no t rec eived sufficient emphas i s. The 
Ngqika l and was earmarked for settler farms. An effort wa s made in 1832 t o 
remove Tyali from the Mancazana River (a tributary of the Tyhume River) area, 
but without success. In late 1833, there began a period of aggression against 
the Rharhabe sub-group, the Ngqika, now led chiefly by Maqoma and TyalL l 13 
D'Urban admitted that the war of 1835 was long brewing, but that central to 
Rharhabe dissa t isfaction was the ' ill-advised measure, of expelling the 
tribes, c ompo s ing the family of Gaika, Tya1i and Maqoma from the grounds they 
had so long held on the Chumie, in Oct. and Nov. 1833' .11' On 1 September 
1833 Tyali was forced to move from his seat on the Mancazana River east to the 
Tyhume Peak area; and in November Maqoma and Tyali were driven out of the Gaga 
River area, and across the Keiskamma. Nqeno and Bhotumane were also driven out 
or" their lands lower down in the Ceded Territory at the same time. This was 
accompli shed by a series of British military patrols, with canon and many 
troops, who burnt a large number of huts and crops, as well as seizing cattle. 
England, who supervised the expUlsions was disappointed at the lack of 
resistance offered by the Rharhabe, who left the area almost without a murmur, 
as he had hoped to use his military might . He was thus very rude when Chalmers 
visited him to enquire of the reasons for the dispossession . 115 
On Somerset's return in January 1834, he allowed Tyali and Maqoma to return to 
the Gaga River (also a tributary of the Tyhume) to graze and reap the harvest, 
but they were driven out again by troops on 5 March, when Tyali burnt his 
crops himself in anger and frustration. Their bleak position, with the onset 
of winter without crops, was further aggravated by the fact that the area to 
113 For a clear description of the evictions see (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn; 
Chalmers to Stretch, 21 November 1833, in U.Long, An Index to Authors of 
Unofficial, privately-owned manus cripts relating to the History of South 
Africa 1812-1920 (1947), pp.81-4. 
11' (CA) A519/20, p . 159, D' Urban to Hay, 24 March 1835. 
115 (CA ) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 De cember 1833 . 
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which they were expelled - around the Keiskamma - was subject to frequent 
droughts, one of which occured in 1833_4 . 116 The Colony regularly performed 
expulsions during times of drought; this resulted in maximum Rharhabe 
retaliation, and would give reason for dispossession. Maqoma l17 in 1829 was 
driven into one of the plac es most affected by the drought of that year; the 
expulsions of 1833-4 took place during a drought; and in both 1845-6 and 1849-
50 there were again prolonged droughts, which added to the resulting 
violence. liS Maqoma in 1834 was not given a reason for his expulsion, and 
this fuelled his anger at the theft of his land as he was under the impression 
that he was entitled to all the land around the Tyhume. 119 He moved to the 
valley of the Keiskamma, settling just south of modern Middledrift . The 
victims of this expansionism were understandably unhappy, and Nqeno's people 
especially agitated for the retrieval of their land and cattle. It was Maqoma, 
the one who was to receive the blame of the colonists for causing the 
hostilities of 1835, who attempted to instil calm in the region and return 
colonial cattle,120 although he was unable to prevent an increase in colonial 
cattle theft. 
Maqoma, the right-hand son of Ngqika, was regularly the victim of persecution 
and expansion. He was regarded by the authorities either as a potential 
116 BPP 503 (1837), p.1l3, Somerset to Campbell, 5 March 1834; (CA) A50/4, Read 
to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833. 
117 The life of Maqoma, and his relations with the Colony, is in need of a full 
study. He faced the onslaught of colonialism for most of his life, 
symbolically ending life as an alcoholic, like his father Ngqika and brother 
Sandile, see Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, pp.175-7. 
liB Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.201; Pollock & Agnew, Historical 
Geography, p.80. (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833 wrote that it 
was to be expected that cattle raiding would increase as a result of the 
drought. See M.D.D.Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique 1823-1831', Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 1988, for a comparative study in Mozambique of the 
social tension produced by drought . 
119 See Maqoma's complaints to Read in (CA) A1480; Peires, 'History of the 
Xhosa', p. 206; Pringle, Narrative of a Residence, p. 336 . Philip wrote to 
D'Urban on Maqoma's behalf to ask if the Tyhume area belonged to him, see (CA) 
A519/1, p.68, Philip to D'Urban, 18 January 1835. 
120 Chalmers to Stretch, 21 November 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial 
manuscripts, pp.81-4. The local Field Cornets corroborated his compliancy with 
the Colony, see BPP 503 (1837), p.134, Somerset to Dutton, 20 June 1834. 
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trouble-maker, or as a wealthy and powerful leader who needed to be 
subjugated, much like Hintza, Ndlambe and other royal victims of colonialism, 
Apart from his expulsions in 1829, 1833 and 1834, he suffered many commando 
raids. In December 1823 seven thousand of his cattle were taken and some of 
his men killed; and in November the following year he lost four hundred and 
eleven cattle and two peace envoys. Both raids were led by Somerset. In 
October 1833 Maqoma defied a military ban to attend a meeting of the London 
Missionary Society at the Kat River Settlement with Read, and was 
ignominiously arrested and removed during the meeting by troops, who further 
insulted him with the offer of alcohol.121 Read's versions of Maqoma' s 
actions and attitudes are always diametrically opposed to those provided by 
the colonial authorities. Was Maqoma a real threat, or a scape-goat with good 
land? Read is an accurate witness, far more so than Campbell and the Graham'S 
Town faction. His complaints about the treatment of Maqoma are almost 
certainly well-founded. Maqoma always tried to please the Colony: he did not 
condone cattle-raiding and was quick to reimburse settler losses; he was 
interested in Christianity; he did not oppose his dispossession; he always 
employed the official channels to protest; and he even let prisoners free in 
1835 to show his leniency. But all this was to no avail. 
The Rharhabe faced a powerful, influential group of settlers across the Fish 
River, whose economic interests demanded the subjugation of the African 
population and the extension of the Colony. There were divisions within the 
Cape Colony at large, between east and west, and within the eastern districts. 
The Boers in Somerset, for example, bore little resemblance to the English 
around Bathurst . Even the missionaries were divided, as the LMS and Glasgow 
Missionary Society missionaries with their exclusively indigenous missions and 
tertiary educations had very different agendas to the more apostolic 
Wesleyans . 122 Yet there was an underlying unity amongst most of the eastern 
121 Pringle, Narrative of a Residence, pp.311, 321-2, 331-4. 
122 Williams, IMissionary personality in Caffraria', provides a very useful 
comparative analysis of the backgrounds of the LMS, GMS and Wesleyan 
missionaries east of the Fish, and the impact it had on their philosophies and 
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colonists in the 1830s, which was to give ris e later to demands for autonomy 
and self-government .123 
The expansionist rhetoric of the settlers was in direct opposition to the 
policy of the Colonial Office in London, which wished no extension of its 
responsibilities. The settlers regularly laid the blame for frontier unrest on 
what they claimed was a 'vacillating border policy' held by the Colonial 
Office ,! 24 They proclaimed that this, plus the 'moral state and predatory 
habits of the Caffres' exonerated the settlers of all blame for conflict, Yet 
Colonial Secretary Stanley's intervention on Ordinance 99 in 1833 (see below) 
and his successor Glenelg's in 1836 on D'Urban's annexation of the Queen 
Adelaide Province (see Chapters 3 and 6) indicate that the stated Colonial 
Office policy was being maintained that of keeping peace, Rather than 
expensive military expansion, London favoured a tranquil and slow extension of 
authority, which would be less harmful to home opinion and coffers, and as 
effective, The Cape government, appointed and briefed by London, had 
nevertheless to placate settler demands, and thus had a fine line to tread 
between pandering to colonial interests and maintaining official sanction. 
The chief eastern Cape interest group was that voiced by the 'Graham's Town 
faction' ,125 Its objectives were propounded through the media of Robert 
Godlonton and the administrative control of Duncan Campbell, with the support 
of the Wesleyan missionaries William Boyce and William Shrewsbury , and the 
merchants Moodie, Chase, White, Meurant and others,126 As land-owning members 
strategies. 
123 J .L . Stead, 'The Development and Failure of the Eastern Cape Separatist 
Movement', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1974; Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape 
Separatism. In BPP 279(1836), pp .58-9, D'Urban to Aberdeen, 21 June 1835, 
D'Urban requested the removal of government from Cape Town to Uitenhage in 
1835, or the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor there. 
124 BPP 252 (1835), pp . 137-142, Shaw to Aberdeen, 7 April 1835. C.S.Grieve, 
'The Policy of His Majesty's Government towards Europeans beyond the Colonial 
Borders, 1830-1846', MA Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1924, expands upon 
this theme . 
125 It was Stretch who first referred to this group as 'the faction'. 
126 The members of this group, and their precise power and role, need closer 
scrutiny. 
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of the ri s ing Albany mercantile class , they used their influence to ensure the 
conservative, harsh legislation aimed at labour and se curity . It wa s they who 
provided the impe t us for most of the events that led to the war of 1835. And 
it was their demands which D'Urban met. 
Campbell and Godlonton were the r eal driving fcrces behind the Graham's Town 
faction . The instigator of the destructive and unnecessary policy of eviction 
was Civil Commissioner for Albany and Somerset, Duncan Campbell. Campbell was 
the most outspoken proponent of expansion. He had an intense dislike for the 
'Caffers', a dislike that was increased by an attack on his farm on 26 
December 1834 . 127 It was he who countermanded Somerset and insisted on the 
expulsions of November 1833 and March 1834. 128 Read described him as the 
sworn enemy of the Rharhabe, who was leading public opinion and official 
policy towards the removal of all Africans from the Ceded Territory , and its 
resettlement with colonists .129 In mid 1834 he proposed a tightening of the 
commando system, and suggested a large raid on the Rharhabe in the coming 
summer months. 130 This is what happened (see below). 
Godlonton reflected settler views and demands through his editorship of the 
Graham's Town Journal . 131 The newspaper was sensationalist in the extreme. 
and regularly distorted facts in favour of the settlers , to the point of 
intentional inaccuracy. Godlonton was conservative, dogmatic, intolerant and 
self-assured, earning the nickname 'Moral Bob' for his belief in his own 
opinions as moral absolutes. He saw the African population as perfect fodder 
for the colonial labour shortage, and even suggested the installation of a 
127 (CA ) LG 13, pp.192-3. He claimed that he l ost £204 worth of sheep and 
household goods. 
128 BPP 503 (1837), p.104, Campbell to Bell, 27 February 1834; (CA) 1/AY/9/19, 
Campbell, 20 April 1834; (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p .41, Campbell, 7 June 1834; Le 
Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.164, n.41. 
129 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833; 1/AY/9/7, p.146, Campbell 
to 7, 27 February 1834. 
130 (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.185, Campbell to 7, 1 July 1834. 
131 Le Cordeur, 'Robert Godlonton as Architect' i A. L. Harington, 'The Graham's 
Town Journal - its founding, early history and influence', South African 
Historical Journal, No.1 (1969) . 
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treadmill in the Graham's Town gaol. His writing was particularly 
propagandistic and he concentrated on vilifying and dehumanising the Africans, 
in his endeavour to provide legitimation for colonisation. The Journal had a 
media and information monopoly on the eastern frontier in the 1830s, and not 
only reflected settler opinion, but formed it. 132 
Rev. William Shaw, head of the Wesleyan missionaries at the Cape, felt that 'a 
more truly respectable and worthy community than the first settlers in Albany 
never existed.,lJ3 The settlers portrayed themselves in this vein, as 
courageous, honourable bearers of civilisation to the savage. Jame s Read, the 
LMS missionary with a Khoi wife and liberal views, was regularly at 
loggerheads with the settlers and their policies. In his view 'the Graham's 
Town people are the most infatuated blind Bigots in the world,.ll4 The real 
attitude of the Europeans is reflected in J.M.Bowker's statement in 1844 to a 
meeting of frontier farmers, advocating ' that the Africans should be treated 
like the Springbok which had been all but exterminated by the white man, much 
to European benefit .135 The general view of the Colonists towards the 
Africans was that they were untrustworthy and irreclaimable savages. They were 
regarded as a type of untermensch, 136 which made them automatically guil ty 
of any action which the settlers claimed they had committed. 
The settlers strove to justify their possession of power with moral and legal 
arguments. Their presence was represented as necessary for the spread of 
'civilisation'. The terminology employed on the frontier exhibits the settler 
differentia tion between 'good' might and 'bad' violence. 137 The 'Caffers' 
132 Harington. 'Graham's Town Journal', p.22. London dismissed the paper as 
parochial nonsense, without realising the extent of its power. 
133 Shaw, Memoirs, p.140. His memoirs were edited by Boyce, a conservative 
reactionary. 
134 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833. 
135 Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and selections' I p.125. 
136 Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'; Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.499-500. 
137 For discussion of the political use of violence and its imbedding in 
societies, see K.W.Grundy & M.A.Weinstein, The Ideologies of Violence (1974), 
ch.2. 
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were constantly described as unenlightened. barbarous or treacherous, and any 
act (whether justified or not) cOIlUllited against a colonist fell under the 
derogatory labels of 'raid', 'depradation' or 'theft'. Yet precisely the same 
actions performed by colonists were described as 'punitive actions', 'patrol', 
'seizure' or 'recovery of cattle'. Because the settlers maintained political -
and media - hegemony, they were able to impose a moral differentiation 
between the actions of those for and against settler interests. 
The extent of the unquestioning support for the Graham's Town faction, which 
gave a platform to Campbell's views, can be seen in the petition against the 
more liberal Cape Town-based South African Commercial Advertiser edited by 
John Fairbairn, whom Godlonton accused of presenting a biased view of the 
frontier and attacking the settlers. In his editorial of 27 December 1834 
Fairbairn criticised the unnecessary violence of the Sparkes patrol of 2 
December (see below), and the applica Hon of a bad frontier sys tem. Only 
twenty-five copies of the paper were sent to Albany, but Godlonton 
immmediately inflamed the people of Graham'S Town against Fairbairn, 
misrepresenting his complaints as a personal attack on the settlers. He 
gathered a petition of 355 signatures, few of whom had even read the offending 
paper.!3B There was a continuous battle between the Advertiser and the 
Journal over events and policy on the frontier. Fairbairn offered the evidence 
supplied by his father-in-law, Philip, Thomas Pringle, Read and sympathetic 
missionaries, and Godlonton reflected the arguments of Campbell and the 
Graham'S Town faction.!39 
A problem inherent in the structure of both the Cape government and the local 
13B Botha, John Fairbairn, p .109. Fairbairn wrote a letter to the GTJ on 23 
January 1835 to apologise if he had wronged anyone. 
139 James Read (Snr) has been taken as a crucial witness in this thesis. 
Unfortunately most of his papers and letters were destroyed along with those 
of Philip in 1931, in the Wits University Library fire, destroying important 
information on frontier activities. Macmillan, the only historian to have had 
access to these papers before they were destroyed, argued (see Cape Colour 
Question, pp.136-8) convincingly for the honesty and reliability of Read's 
evidence. The same cannot be said for that of Campbell. 
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frontier administration was the abundance of military men. who had no qualms 
in resorting to force. 140 The Cape governors from Cole to Maitland were all 
military men who had fought together in the Iberian Peninsular in the 
Napoleonic wars. Campbell was a retired military captain, and Somerset and 
England had little accountability for their military structures. Lord Glenelg, 
Colonial Secretary in London in 1835, blamed the long-standing tension on the 
frontier on the overbearing control by the Albany military authorities, who 
had virtually instated martial law well before 1835, and lacked communication 
with Cape Town. 141 Colonel England contributed to the military mismanagement 
and aggressiveness. The Rharhabe were particularly incensed with Armstrong, 
third in command, and 'they were heard to say [on 25 December 1834] they only 
wanted him and Col . Somerset' .142 Campbell and Somerset, as heads of the 
civil and military authorities of Albany (both of whom D'Urban complained were 
incompetent l43 ), had an ambivalent personal relationship but essentially 
allowed the abuse of their structures to aid the settlers. 
Colonel Henry Somerset was a prominent figure, although he was generally 
regarded as an incompetent fool who obtained his position through nepotism 
when his father, Lord Charles Somerset, was governor of the Cape .144 He 
claimed Maqoma as a particular friend, 145 allowing him back to the Gaga River 
area in January 1834. Not surprisingly, Maqoma did not feel the same way . It 
was Somerset who organised the attack at Mbolompo146 and the expulsion of 
Maqoma in 1829, as well as many severe commando raids on him . The power 
exhibited by the British in 1828 was obviously noted by the Africans. When the 
140 Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.119. 
141 (CA) GH 1/108, Glenelg to Stockenstrom, 5 February 36. But, given the co-
operation between the Cape authorities and Albany in 1832-4, Glenelg seems to 
have misunderstood the militancy of the Cape Town authorities . 
142 (CA) A50 14, Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835. 
143 (CA) A519/18 pp.97, 102, D'Urban to Bell, July 1835. 
144 (CA) A519/1, p.63, D'Urban to Bell; Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p.2l. 
Compare this to Rivett-Carnac's hagiographical biography of Somerset, Hawk's 
ill· 
' 45 Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p . 203; Pringle, Narrative of a residence, 
pp . 331-3. 
146 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833; Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', 
pp.501-3 . 
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missionaries wished to stop Faku fighting against the Thembu and Mpondomise in 
1838, they reminded him 'of the fate of Matiwane in 1828', whereupon he ceased 
fighting and moved eastwards immediately in case a commando was sent against 
him. 147 Somerset's name , ac cording t o Philip, consequently caused fear 
amongst the Rharhabe, and he regularly led patrol s against them. 1'8 The 
chiefs complained of him specifically in December 1834, 149 although in 
November 1833 they were so despairing of Colonel England that they asked for 
Somerset's return, despite their dislike for him.150 Somerset's insensitivity 
and violence on the frontier was one of the root causes of the war of 1835. 
Of significance is the role of the Cape government on the frontier . 
Nineteenth-century Cape history has often been seen by settler historians as 
a battle between the colonists and backward colonial authorities. While the 
occassional hostility between the two is evident (as with the battle between 
the Albany settlers and Lord Charles Somerset in 1823-4) the authorities were 
often more concerned for the welfare of the settlers than has been credited 
them. Governor Cole (1829-1833) was very sympathetic towards the settlers, and 
it was he, with the urgings of Campbell, who pushed the Colonial Office in 
1829 for the granting of the Ceded Territory to colonists for settlement. 151 
This began the five-year concerted pressure on the Rharhabe to move east of 
the Keiskamma, a policy pursued by three consecutive governors: Cole, Wade and 
D' Urban. Macmillan commented that Cole (like D'Urban) was a very ordinary and 
uninspired governor, but because he tried to please settler opinion, he was 
regarded as good. and has been ever since. 152 Le Cordeur summarised Cole' S 
administration as 'essentially negative and military: a policy of patrols, 
147 Theal, Republic of Natal, p .15. 
148 (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. 
149 BPP 503 (1835), pp . 49-50, Chalmers to Somerset, 31 December 1834; 
Ibid . , p.48, Maqoma to D'Urban, 1 January 1835, where Maqoma said 
Somerset was to a large extent to blame for the frontier tensions. 
150 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833. 
and 
that 
151 BPP 252 (1835), pp.42-3, Cole to Murray, 14 June 1829. This policy was 
taken further in 1831 when Goderich suggested the settlement of colonists in 
the Ceded Territory. 
152 Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, p.66 . 
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commandos and reprisals.' 153 
Cole's concern for settler welfare is emphasised by his reaffirmation of 
Macartney's vaguely phrased commando legislation of 1797 in Ordinance 99 of 
June 1833, which allowed for military patrols across the Fish. 15' This 
ordinance extended and legalized the practices common in the area already. The 
Ordinance was passed because of the complaints of just two field-cornets, and 
passed through the legislative process unusually quickly. 155 The fact that 
Stanley, Secretary for State and the Colonies in London, disallowed the 
ordinance in late 1834 because of its potential for abuse 156 emphasises the 
unanimity of the Colony - administrative, Boer and Briton - in protecting its 
own interests and designs on the land and labour of the Africans. Of great 
importance is the fact that the implementation of Ordinance 99 co-incided 
precisely with the attempts in September 1833, ordered from Cape Town, to 
clear the Ceded Territory of all Rharhabe. This implies that the Cape 
government was involved in the expansion of the eastern frontier, against the 
orders of London, and in response to settler demands. 
The expUlsions of 1833-4 were ordered by Wade ,157 who was acting-governor 
from August 1833 to early 1834. His orders came as a result of settler 
complaints. Wade had warned in August 1832 that if Tyali's people gave any 
resistance to patrols they would be expelled from the Mancazana River area. 
Captain Doyle recommended to Colonel England on 21 June 1833 that Tyali be 
expelled because of alleged depredations of his people .158 Reports show, 
153 Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism, p . 46. 
154 For the details of Macartney's ordinanc e and Cole's explanation for 
Ordinance 99 see BPP 252 (1835), pp . 60-6, Stanley to Cole, 27 November 1833; 
(CA) EC 286, Annexures to Executive Coun c il minutes, 1834-6, Debates on the 
ordinance. 
155 The complaints came from Graaff-Reinet, see (CA) AC 10, Appendix to minutes 
of Advisory Council, pp.277-280; see (CA) AC 3 for the Advisory Council 
debates. 
156 ( CA) GH 1/97, p.68, Stanley to Col e , 27 November 1833. 
157 BPP 252 , p . 103, D'Urban to Spring-Ric e, 14 October 1834; (CA) A1 480, Philip 
to Buxton, 1 May 1835; J.Milton, The Edges of War: A History of Frontier Wars 
(1983), p . 99. 
158 BPP 503 (1835), p.95, Capt. Doyle to England, 21 June 1833 . 
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though, that they took only seven catt le in that month. Major Cox and 
Lieutenant Jervis sympathised with Maqoma a few years later and the treatment 
he had received in 1833 and 1834, blaming Wade for it. Stretch c laimed that 
England had been hesitant to act on Wade's orde rs in late 1833 to expel the 
Ngqika, and had waited for two months before carrying them out. 159 But given 
England's history of frontier violence it is unlikely that he would have 
hesitated to perform orders to evict the Rharhabe again. Wade, in his short 
term as governor, showed particular concern for the colonists. He assured 
slave owners that before the final apprenticeship of slaves in 1838, he would 
ensure the passing of legislation 'for securing a sufficiency of labourers to 
the Colony'. 160 
D'Urbari arrived with a specific brief to control the violence of the 
commandos, and maintain friendly relations with his Rharhabe neighbours .161 
But he immediately went against his orders and suggested to Somerset in August 
1834 that Nqeno be forced out of the Ceded Territory and replaced by 
Gqunukhwebe. 162 There was thus a significant level of government interference 
on the frontier over an extended period, despite the official hands-off 
policy. 
By 1834 an untenable situation had been reached . On the western side of the 
Fish was a powerful group of settlers, with a clear leadership and aim, intent 
on extending their land. They were supported by a Cape government with a 
history of intervention on behalf of the settlers. The new governor D'Urban, 
who was distinctly militarily orientated though no t yet fully conversant with 
19 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.59, 127 . 
160 Macmillan, Cape Colour Quest ion , p.234. Peires 'History of the Xhosa', 
p.204, notes that Wade employed a particularly harsh frontier policy. He fully 
supported the settlers and attacked Stockenstrom in 18 37 at the Aborigines 
Commission of Enquiry. There has not yet been any analysis of his policies and 
actions in his brief spell as Acting-Governor. 
161 (CA) GH 1/97, p.68, Stanley to D'Urban, 27 November 1833. D'Urban began 
this policy by signing a treaty with Andries Waterboer in December 1834, but 
in 1835 he completely departed from the policy. 
162 Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.108. 
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the attitudes of the Cape, was concerned in 1834 more with the slavery 
emancipation legislation, and solving financial and administrative crises in 
Cape Town. July saw the implementation of the administratve staff cuts at the 
Cape, and the trimming of its budget in the attempt to make it financially 
viable. i63 D'Urban's biggest challenge lay in the emancipation of the Cape's 
thirty-eight thousand slaves, with an estimated value of nearly £3 million, 
that was to ensure the freedom of all slaves by 1838. The western Cape 
depended completely on slave labour; and in the eastern districts, although 
Albany - where the settlers were not allowed slaves - would hardly be 
affected, the act was potentially disruptive. Somerset and Graaff-Reinet in 
1833 had 1,756 and 2,247 slaves respectively.i64 
The potential effect of emancipation is difficult to assess, as the mere act 
of emancipation did not give any higher social or economic status to the 
slaves, and few had much option but to remain in the Colony and find 
employment after 1838. But for the Colony as a whole there was to be a 
transition from a slave to a 'free labour' economy, and it had now to find a 
new source of labourers. One of D'Urban's duties was to form a Legislative 
Council, with a majority of colonists, which afforded some colonial 
representation in the legislature. The Council generally reflected the 
concerns of the colonists. It spent most of its time in 1834 with a proposed 
vagrancy ordinance, which was intended further to tie the Khoi and free blacks 
- including the soon-to-be-released slaves - to the farms to counter the loss 
of potential labour with emancipation. It was supported clamourously by the 
Colony,i65 and was passed with the dissent of D'Urban. It was disallowed by 
Spring-Rice in London who recognised the intention to secure and exploit a 
i63 For an analysis of Cape finances and the problems which D'Urban faced see 
Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', pp.60-90. 
i64 (CA) CO 53/57, Lists of Slaves in Cape Colony, June 1833. 
i65 See the numerous petitions and requests during 1834 in (CA) LCA 6, 
Appendi ces to Legislative Council minutes. The Advisory Council was discussing 
a vagrancy ordinance as early as February 1832, see (CA) AC 3, Minutes of 
Advisory Council. 
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labour supply.166 The Colony was thus faced in the mid-1830s with the 
critical problem of developing new methods of labour extraction and 
enforcement to ensure the stability of its economy. 
To the east of the Keiskamma was confusion and anger. Dispossession and the 
enforcement of boundaries had caused overpopulation and overgrazing in the 
frontier areas, and the Rharhabe chiefs were decidedly threatened by the white 
penetration. Armed, mounted patrols of British soldiers, English settlers and 
Boers had caused fear and destruction for the past twenty years, with their 
arbitrary justice and superior weaponry. Read outlined the callousness of 
Colonel England and many of the officers and soldiers on the frontier, 
portraying the despair of the Rharhabe chiefs at the lack of communication and 
injustices to which they were subjected. 167 Ecological forces also played 
their part. There was a particularly severe drought which lasted from 1833 to 
early 1835,168 which devastated grazing and caused food shortages. Pollock 
and Agnew stressed that while the colonists were able to find new grazing the 
Rharhabe were overcrowded and had no access to alternative pasturage. 169 
The year 1834 began with the arrival of the new governor, D'Urban. But for the 
Rharhabe it was a year of increasing frustration and concern, as they 
attempted to stop the settler expansion through appeals to missionaries and 
the authorities. January 1834 saw the return of Tyali and Maqoma's people to 
the Gaga River area to graze and attend to their crops. Within two months they 
were evicted by Colonel England and his troops and forced into the drought-
stricken regions of the Keiskamma. Large areas of Maqoma and Tyali' s land 
between the Kat and Tyhume Rivers were then immediately apportioned to retired 
white soldiers. Cattle raiding on the settlers consequently increased, carried 
166 (CAl LCA 6, Comments of Philip, 1834. 
167 (CAl A50j4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833. 
168 Laing at Burnshill made mention in his diary throughout 1834 of the lack 
of rain, grass and food, and the dying calves . See also GTJ, 3 July 1834; 
Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography. p.80; P.J.van der Merwe, Die 
Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boere voor die Groot Trek (1937), p.286. 
169 Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p.80. 
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out in retribution and in search of food. The frontier chiefs for some reason 
credited John Philip with great influence in the colonial government, equal 
even to that of D'Urban, especially in land matters. 170 Maqoma complained 
about the expulsions in 1833 and his people's loss of grazing land and 
corn.'7' Philip thus organised a meeting in June 1834 for the chiefs to voice 
their complaints. He had heard many colonial complaints of theft and unrest on 
the frontier in early 1834, but said that he found no evidence of it on his 
visit. l72 
The chiefs believed thereafter that D'Urban would be visiting them, and cattle 
raiding decreased for the following three months. D'Urban later claimed that 
he had told Philip to negotiate with the chiefs on his behalf .173 D'Urban 
told Spring-Rice that he had begun his brief of forming new treaties with the 
chiefs, as instructed by Stanley, and had told them of his friendly intentions 
through Philip.'7' But apart from his treaty with Adam Kok in December 1834, 
D'urban seemed to have no intention of being peaceful. By October there had 
been no change in the situation. The Rharhabe were still barred from their 
lands, and the young men of the Rharhabe were agitating for retribution 
against these invaders who took cattle and land, burned huts and killed 
people. Some of Tyali's people had moved back across the Tyhume, and some of 
Nqeno's across the Keiskamma, in a search for pasturage and food. 
On 17 October D'Urban ordered Somerset to clear all the land west of the 
Tyhume for further white settlement, although he made a concession that 
170 BPP 503 (1837), p.80, Evidence of James Weir. 
171 (CA) A1480, Maqoma to Philip, 18 November 1833; Ibid., Maqoma to Philip 
(interpreted by Clark), 12 April 1834. 
172 (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835 . 
173 (CA) A519/4, p.104, Beresford to D'Urban, 17 March 1836. BPP 538 (1836), 
p.268 indicates that Philip did carry a message from D'Urban to the chiefs . 
Philip, BPP 252 (1835), pp.117-9, denied that he was aware of D'Urban's 
policy. 
17' (CA) GH 23/11, pp.93-4, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 5 May 1835. 
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Rharhabe be allowed to graze in the area temporarily during the drought .175 
But Campbell wanted no African presence whatsoever, and patrols were sent out 
to attack Tyali and Nqeno. One of the patrols provoked a response from a group 
of Nqeno's men, but he apologised. Somerset himself then led a series of 
extemely destructive patrols along the Tyhume and Gaga Rivers throughout late 
October and November. Philip described how the British troops had laid waste 
to twenty miles of Ngqika crops and huts .176 The British violence continued 
to escalate through November and December. On 2 December Ensign Sparkes led a 
patrol against Tyali and seized the chief's own cattle, a severe insult to his 
dignity. Tyali's men followed the patrol and in the ensuing scuffle, Sparkes 
was wounded in the arm.l77 It is incredible that Somerset could have placed 
a teenaged ensign - who had 'no experience as an officer, and very little 
sense,178 - in charge of a cross-border raid at so tense a period. 
Severe retribution for the wounding of Sparkes was called for by the 
authorities. A patrol was sent against Tyali under Lieutenant Sutton on 12 
December. This patrol was intentionally confrontational and again took Tyali's 
cattle. Again, incensed young men - armed with spears - followed the mounted 
patrol to retrieve the chief's cattle. Sutton claimed that these men wantonly 
attacked his official patrol, and that he restrained his men until it was 
necessary to defend themselves. Given the arrogance, power and history of 
atrocities of these young frontier soldiers it is far more probable that 
Tyali's explanation was correct. His view was that this was yet another unjust 
175 (CA) LG 9, pp.229-235, D'Urban to Somerset, 17 October 1834. Somerset in 
August refused Tyali's request that he be allowed to cultivate and graze in 
the Ceded Territory. D'Urban, BPP 503 (1837), pp.145-7, D'Urban to Somerset, 
15 August 1834, said that Tyali, but not Nqeno, may do so. Campbell, BPP 503 
(1837), p.157, Campbell to Bell, 31 October 1834, was again unhappy with this 
arrangement. 
176 (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. Philip gives a very clear picture 
of Rharhabe confusion and anger at the arbitrary and destructive actions of 
the Colony. D'Urban's explanations of the causes of the war in BPP 503 (1837), 
pp.56-7, D'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1836, bear little resemblance to reality. 
177 For the misguided nature of the Sparkes patrol, see BPP 503 (1837), pp.158-
160; (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835; Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, 
p.172; C.Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life, 'The Old Peach Stump'. 
178 BPP 503 (1837), p.160, Somerset to D'Urban, 12 December 1834. 
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and violent attack. The group of men went after the patrol calling for the 
release of the cattle. In return they received a hail of bullets. '79 Among 
those wounded was a minor Ngqika chief, Xhoxho. While the extent of his head-
wound was exaggerated, the chiefs and their people were incensed at the 
colonial disrespect for royal dignity. African society acknowledged that 
chiefs were not to be harmed or treated as ord~nary men, but the colony had 
regularly disregarded this important belief.'80 
Somerset had in the meantime on 5 December given an ultimatum to Nqeno to 
remove his people from the Ceded Territory. 181 By this stage there was an 
unusually high number of wandering, hungry people in the frontier region. 
Laing remarked in mid December that he had never seen the frontier so 
disturbed. '82 Somerset reported on 18 December that Tyali' s people had 
increased cattle theft after the Sparkes and Sutton patrols, and were trying 
to graze in the Mancazana area. He asked if he could take a patrol to teach 
them a lesson. '83 By 20 December Somerset had driven all Nqeno's people 
living in the Ceded Territory between Fort Willshire and Line Drift over the 
Keiskamma .'84 The Rharhabe began to react violently in groups the following 
day - the 21 December, the supposed start of the 'irruption'. It is hardly 
surprising that the Rharhabe reacted in December; what is astonishing is that 
it had taken so long. 
179 (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. Sutton tried to exonerate 
himself; see Heavyside, "Abstract of Board of Relief", pp.88-9n. Compare 
Cory's removal of all colonial guilt for the patrols in Rise of South Africa, 
Vol.3, pp.55-60. 
180 Peires, House of Phalo, p.93j Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir life, 
pp.320-7; Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.172. Even Sutu, the colonial ally, was 
angry about it; see (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, 19 December 1834. 
181 BPP 252 (1835), p.119, Somerset to D'Urban, 5 December 1834. 
182 (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, 17 December 1834; BPP 503 (1837), 
pp.156-7, Letters to Campbell from: Tomlinson, Koonap, 15 September 1834, Nel, 
Kat, 24 September 1834, Collett, Koonap, 20 October 1834; (CA) A519/1, p.43, 
Hudson, 19 December 1834, offered his help with the ' present unsettled state 
of affairs on the frontier'. 
183 BPP 252 (1835), p.120, Somerset to D'Urban, 18 December 1834. 
184 BPP 503 (1837), p.161, Somerset to D'Urban, 20 December 1834. 
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When one conside rs the litany of injustices which the Rharhabe chiefs dictated 
to Chalmers on 31 December 1834 as the reasons for hostilities, it is 
difficult to see December 1834 as the start of a ' war'. In 1829 Nqeno's son 
had been shot dead by a patrol after being fal se ly accus ed of ca ttle thef t. No 
compensation had been forthcoming. In 1830 a disarmed chief, Sekou, was shot 
dead without compen sat ion . When an officer fr om Fort Will shire was wounded 
while taking cattle from Nqeno, on the other hand, two hundred cattle were 
demanded in compensation. In the Xhoxho affair the soldiers fired six times 
before assegais were thrown, and then Somerset refused to discuss the 
incident. When Somerset returned from Britain he had enforced the Tyhume as 
boundary, which was closer to the Fetcani. D'Urban had failed to visit the 
frontier as had been promised. The land 'beyond' the Fish belonged to the 
Ngqika. The Rharhabe had always returned colonial cattle and thieves. Whites 
travelled through Cafferland with guns whilst armed Africans in the Colony 
were imprisoned. Patrols took the cattle of the innocent. Ngqika had been an 
ally of the British. And the British had committed three major offences -
they had wounded and killed a chief, taken away land, and seized the cattle of 
a chief . 185 For all this the Rharhabe demanded compensation, as it had been 
demanded of them. 
185 BPP 503 (1837), pp.49-50, Chalmers to Somerset (for the Rharhabe chiefs), 
31 December 1834. 
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Chapter 3 
THE WAR OF 1835 
An outbreak of extensive hostilities was, by 1835, long overdue. The Rharhabe 
had been pushed to the limits of their patience by a colony - driven by a 
beligerent, negrophobic faction in Graham's Town - which had the power to 
expand. Read warned in December 1833 that 
There have been a number of the most aggravating circumstances 
possible, and every method contrived to agitate the Caffres with 
a view we think to have a pretext to take more land from them. l 
The opportunity to continue the eastern Cape expansionism arose in December 
1834, when a few thousand Rharhabe launched a two-week spate of raids on the 
Albany farmers . The 'war of 1835',2 as defined in the official parameters, 
began on 21 December 1834, and ended with the peace treaties of 17 September 
1835. The war has been defined as the period between the attack on the Colony 
by the Rharhabe and their final subjugation. 'War' is an imperfect European 
term which does not accurately describe the local conflicts, guerilla-style 
warfare, and hazy chronological boundaries of events in the eastern districts. 
The year 1835 must be seen, not in isolation, but as part of a continuous 
chain of expansion eastwards by the Colony, marked by endemic violence in the 
form of cattle-raiding, land expUlsions and deaths, interspersed with periods 
1 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 7 December 1833 . See also Wilson & Thompson, 
History of South Africa (1986), p.252. 
2 A recurring problem has been how to refer to the conflict of 1835. The 
original pejorative denotation 'Sixth Caffer War' has disappeared, but its 
replacement, 'Sixth Frontier War', is also unacceptable. It is merely a 
numerical aid for schoolchildren to remember a series of altercations . The 
Unity Movement's suggestion of renaming the frontier conflicts the 'wars of 
dispossession', whilst accurate, is too emotive. Describing it in terms of 
someone's name (as with Nxele and Mlanjeni) emphasises just one aspect of the 
war . The 'war of Maqoma' emphasises the aspec t of dispossession; the 'war of 
D'Urban' stresses the power of the whites; and the 'war of Hintza' is monument 
to the murder of the paramount. But none is sufficiently descriptive. I have 
thus opted for the politically and socially neutral term of 'War of 1835'. 
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of increased aggression (the ·wars'). Cattle-raiding by the Rharhabe was as 
widespread in late 1835 as it had been in the period of official hostilities. 
Each of the conf licts had different specific objectives, different alliances 
and different protagonists. but should all be seen as stages in a larger 
conflict. The limitation of the dates of the war is an artificial one, based 
on the official British dec larations, and is integral to the settler 
conception of the war. 
The 'war' was in fact decl~red by the Colony, long before 1835. The response 
of the Rharhabewas not the start of a war, but part of one which had been 
begun by the Europeans before 1835. The aggressive actions of the British from 
1811 (outlined in Chapter 2) were nothing less - to the Rharhabe - than 
notification of their intention to control and expand the frontier region. In 
the specific context of 1835, the previous five years had provided a 
continuity of violence that would inevitably goad the Rharhabe into response. 
In 1829 Maqoma's land was taken away and given to Khoi to form the Kat River 
Settlement, and to white soldiers between the Kat and Koonap Rivers. In 
October 1833 Maqoma, Tyali, Bhotumane, Nqeno and Qasana's people were driven 
eastwards. Again in March 1834, Maqoma and Tyali were evicted from the new 
land and driven east. European settlers were immediately placed on their land, 
including on Maqoma's home near the Koonap. And again in November and December 
1834 the colonial troops attacked Tyali and Nqeno, burning crops and huts, 
wounding a chief, and forcing them off their land for the third time in 
fourteen months. All of this was aggravated by increasing patrols and 
violence, and the seizure of women and children to work in the Colony. Not 
surprisingly, it was the people of Maqoma, Tyali and Nqeno who made the 
counter-attacks in December 1834. The response of the frontier Rharhabe in 
December was not a surprise mass attack. It was a desperate attempt to halt 
the settler advance. The settler interpretation has been rooted in the claim 
that the war began on 21 December 1834, which places the blame for hostilities 
firmly on the Rharhabe. The real war - the . irruption' - came, rather, in 
March to May 1835, when the colonial forces invaded the Rharhabe, Gcaleka and 
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Bomvana. 
Robert Godlonton, in his book Irruption of the Kafir Hordes - written in late 
1835 as a vindication of the colonist s , epito~ises the settler view of 1835. 
This version of events is that a war on the Colony was fomented, masterminded 
and planned from early 1834 by the Gcaleka paramount chief Hintza, with the 
Rharhabe chiefs Maqoma and Tyali providing the vehicle of destruction. The 
attack on the Colony was carried out, according to Godlonton, simultaneously 
over the entire eastern frontier by massive numbers of 'Caffers', who quickly 
subdued what colonial resistance there was, and caused immense havoc for a 
month, gaining control of virtually the entire Ceded Territory and Albany -
the area between the Keiskamma and Sundays Rivers. 3 Godlonton claimed that the 
area all the way up to the Sundays River was infiltrated by 'Caffers'. 
Heavyside, chairman of the Board of Relief, alleged that the entire area south 
of Graham's Town between the Fish and Sundays Rivers was controlled by the 
Af~icans, and stripped of cattle.· These allegations were supported by the 
imaginative creations of people such as April, a captured Tswana man, who 
claimed in February that Hintza and the Rharhabe chiefs had intended to kill 
all colonial farmers, seize Graham's Town in a night attack, and reward their 
Khoi supporters with grants of land in Albany.5 
The arrival of Smith in early January and the British troop reinforcements 
managed to stem the savage tide, this version continues, and the 'war' was 
then reversed and carried into Rharhabe territory. D'Urban visited the Gcaleka 
in late April, and demanded back the colonial cattle which he claimed the 
Gcaleka had hidden. As punishment for their involvement in the planning and 
initial stages of the attack, fifty thousand cattle and a thousand horses were 
demanded in compensation. Soon thereafter Hintza proved his duplicity by being 
shot whilst escaping from custody. The 'war' was seen as deserved retribution 
3 This view is encapsulated in Brand, 'KafEr War of 1834-5', and Cory, Rise 
of South Africa, Vol.3. 
• Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief', p.22 
5 (CAl LG 9, pp.127-8, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 21 February 1835. 
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for the 'unprovoked aggression' of December, but the Rharhabe and Gcaleka 
cattle seized during hostilities were regarded as insufficient compensation 
for settler losses in comparison with those stolen from the Colony. The 
annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province (the area between the Fish and Kei 
Rivers) was thus seen as a legitimate seizure of land forfeited by the 
Rharhabe in consequence of an aggressive attack,6 and the restitution of this 
land to the Rharhabe by Glenelg in 1837 was met with indignant protests. This 
version of events was held vigourously by the settlers, who seem to have felt 
genuinely hard done by. The essence of this interpretation has remained 
unchanged for the past century and a half. 
The evidence suggests that the causes and results of 1835 were deliberately 
inverted by the settler apologists, and a very different explanation is 
presented. The counter-attacks of December 1834 and early January 1835 were 
undertaken by a minority of disgruntled Rharhabe, who attacked specific areas 
and farms in Albany in groups, rather than in a mass onslaught on the entire 
frontier.' They took cattle (although nothing like the number claimed), burnt 
selected farmsteads, and killed twenty-five men, leaving women and children 
alone. It was not a mindless and unprovoked attack, but the understandable 
response to decades of colonial encroachment, aggression and injustice. It was 
not a mass 'Xhosa' response, planned well in advance by conniving chiefs, and 
masterminded by the paramount Hintza. It was a series of attacks by some of 
the frontier Rharhabe (on a smaller scale than 1819) who, after the settlers 
put up such a weak initial defense, were joined by many of the eastern 
Ndlambe. The participating Rharhabe chiefs, Maqoma, Tyali, Bhotumane, Nqeno 
and Qasana, did not wish a major confrontation with the militarily superior 
Europeans, but wished to bring to the attention of the whites their anger at 
their situation. They were pressurised by their people, who wished to make a 
stand after bearing the brunt of colonial expansion for two decades. 
6 BPP 279 (1836), p.44, Shrewsbury to D'Urban, 16 January 1835. 
7 Webb, 'Immediate consequences of Sixth Frontier War', p.38. 
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As Read noted above, the colonists often hoped that the Rharhabe could be 
goaded into a response if they were sufficiently pressurised. An armed 
reaction from the Africans would then give the settlers legitimate reason to 
invade and subdue them, and appropriate more land and cattle. The settlers had 
always to keep one eye on the Colonial Office, which would refuse to sanction 
anything it deemed illegal or unjust, and the colonists had always to remain 
within the bounds of what they could justify or claim by law. The responses of 
December proved the perfect pretext for the seizure of land and cattle, the 
removal of a dangerously independent paramount chief, and the solving of the 
colonial labour shortage. The initial shock of the 'irruption' had subsided by 
mid January 1835. By the end of the month, however, O'Urban and Smith had 
planned to annex the land west of the Kei, to invade the innocent Gca l eka if 
they refused to co-operate, to invade up the coast past the Mbashe River, and 
to introduce the 'Fingo' into the Colony. 
By mid January the Europeans had regained control of most of the territory 
west of the Keiskamma River, and the Rharhabe warriors were retreating from 
the Ceded Territory. D'Urban and British troop reinforcements arrived between 
13 and 23 January, not to protect Albany, but to carry the war into Rharhabe 
territory and claim their spoils. D'Urban, who had only been in the Colony for 
six months, was a conservative, officious, military man, who was firm in his 
belief in asserting military control. He found the Graham's Town faction very 
radical, but their views co-incided sufficiently with his own for him to 
provide the land, 
initial threat of 
exaggera ted by the 
labour and mili tary dominance which they demanded. The 
the Rharhabe and the damage they caused was greatly 
colonists, who wanted British financial compensation. 
O'Urban supported the settler version, as it justified his actions, which were 
completely against Colonial Office policy. The settlers also managed in this 
way to portray themselves as victims. 
O'Urban also took the opportunity to invade and subdue the Gcaleka, from whom 
he took twenty thousand cattle and many women and children. This action (apart 
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from the illegal labour seizures, which were kept secret) was excused to the 
Colonial Office by accusing Hintza of masterminding all the hostilities, of 
providing men to aid the Rharhabe, and of keeping all the colonial cattle that 
were allegedly sent to his country. Hintza, however, did not plan the attacks, 
and he was rather nervous of the power of the Colony. He moved to the Amava 
area on the upper Tsomo River in late lB34, in order to be close to a group of 
Boers to whom he had granted land. As discussed in Chapter 2, the notion of 
him as leader of the 'irruption' purely because he was paramount of the 
Gcaleka and Rharhabe, ignores the independent and fragmented nature of the 
society. There was no 'Xhosa nation' over which he presided, and his 
paramountcy was largely nominal. He was prepared to accept and safe-guard the 
thousands of Rharhabe cattle that were sent to him, and to the Thembu past the 
Mbashe River. The Rharhabe sent their own - not colonial - cattle to him, and 
they had taken few enough colonial cattle as it was. D'Urban thus set him up, 
with supposed evidence of his help in stock theft, as the leader whom he could 
legitimately invade and punish. The fact that the Gcaleka were unjustly 
invaded (as Glenelg pointed out), and that Hintza was killed in the process, 
was thus sidelined. 
The first incident in the Rharhabe response was on 21 December 1B34, when a 
group of Ngqika killed a Boer farmer, Stephanus Buys, on his farm a t the 
junction of the Kat and Koonap Rivers. For the ten days to the end of December 
the Rharhabe managed to infiltrate most of Albany east of Graham's Town. 
Patrols of a few hundred men attacked farms, chiefly in the Koonap and lower 
Albany regions. The Fish river was in flood on 22 December and impassable near 
Fort Brown. 8 This alone would have made a mass onslaught of the type like 
Somerset's panicky estimates of ten to twenty thousand Rharhabe simultaneously 
attacking along the length of the Fish River quite impossible. Delport 
described in February how he had been attacked at his farm near the Fish River 
8 (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of H.J.Halse. Halse is not generally a reliable 
source, but is corroborated on this point by J.B.Scott, 'The British soldier 
on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1BOO-1B50', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Port 
Elizabeth, 1973, pp.1B7-190. 
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on 23 December by one thousand 'Caffers', and how he and his thirteen year old 
son, whose gun did not work, had held them at bay." Stories like this 
abounded, and it is upon these fictional accounts that the settler version of 
1835 is based. This example, though, is important in showing that the settler 
claims that the Rharhabe intended to wipe out Albany and all the settlers were 
incorrect. One man could not hold off any group - whatever size - seriously 
intent on slaughtering all whites. The aim of the Rharhabe was not settler 
annihilation; it was essentially retributive livestock-raiding. They also 
wished to retrieve their land. The parties of the first two weeks seem to have 
consisted regularly of a hundred or more men, but by mid-January they had 
shrunk to an average of about ten. Retief's report in mid-January and 
Ziervogel's in April shows this size to be the norm for cattle-raiding. 10 Such 
groups posed little real threat to the armed colonists but were elusive and 
frustrating for the patrols. 
The settlers huddled in Graham's Town in December with the Graham's Town 
Journal decrying the savagery of the 'irruption'. It claimed hysterically that 
the 'Caffers' had control of most of Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage, and that 
reinforcements were urgently needed. 11 People in Graham's Town first heard of 
the attacks on 22 December, although it took up to a week for the farmers in 
the outlying areas to hear of events and to move into town. Bathurst was 
attacked on 25 December and by the following day, when almost all of the 
cattle in the area had been taken, most of its inhabitants had fled to 
Graham'S Town. 12 The people of Salem followed suit on 28 December l3 after an 
attack which took most of their cattle. Graham's Town was a mass of paranoia. 
" (CA) 1!AY!8!86, Evidence of Delport, 23 February 1835. 
10 (CA) 1!AY!8/86, Report of P.Retief, 16 January 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Report 
of Ziervogel, 8 April 1835. 
11 The hyperbole of the Journal is demonstrable, for instance, in its claim 
that the Ferreira brothers were attacked by 150-400 Rharhabe; see Graham's 
Town J ournal 19 January 1835. Goldswain, who was in the area, numbered the 
attackers at ten; see Long, The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, Vol.l, p.76. 
12 (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B.E.Bowker, p.6l. 
13 Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.74-8 provides a quaint view of events in 
Salem. 
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The population blockaded itself inside Church Square, with the church acting 
as military headquarters and ammuni tion dump, 14 and rumours of impending 
a t tack abounded. There were numerous claims of set tIer near-dea ths i their 
validity, though, is doubtful, considering the small number of total European 
deaths and the size of the protecting force. The exaggeration of the threat 
was later employed to heighten the 'savagery' of the 'Caffers', and provide 
the moral justification for European domination. It is unclear quite why the 
people of Graham's Town were so paranoid in December, considering the 
effectiveness of the colonial patrols throughout December and January (see 
below). Was there really a sense of threat? The colonists' situation was not 
helped by the incompetence of Colonel Somerset, who had abandoned his frontier 
positions at Fort Willshire, Kat River Post, Gualana and Caffer Drift on 29 
December and returned to Graham's Town, leaving Fort Armstrong to be burnt. ls 
All forts on the frontier, apart from Fort Beaufort and Hermanus Kraal, had 
been abandoned and sacked by the Rharhabe by late December,I6 although within 
six weeks almost all had been re-established. 
The raiding bands were controlled and organised by the Rharhabe chiefs, less 
from personal vendettas than to placate their young warriors who seem to have 
been itching to fight the Colony.17 For many years Maqoma and Tyali, ultra 
wary of the power of the whites, had handled the frontier authorities with kid 
gloves. Virtually no resistance was given to the evictions of 1829, 1833 and 
1834, and the chiefs to a great extent enforced the demands and laws of the 
Colony. It is possible that they were playing a double game - unofficially 
supporting cattle-raids in exchange for a percentage profit and innocently 
returning some of the cattle and a 'thief' to ingratiate themselves with the 
14 See Ibid., pp.78-84, for a description; also Heavyside, 'Abstract of the 
Board of Relief', pp.13-14. 
15 (eL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, 5 January 1835; (CA) A50/4 Read to 
Fairbairn, 18 January 1835. 
16 Scott, 'British soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp.195-6. 
17 This interpretation is also presented by Macmillan, Bantu. Boer & Briton, 
pp.125, 127; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.93-4; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, 
p.16. 
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settler authorities. But it seems more likely that they (especially Maqoma) 
were doing their utmost to contain ca ttle theft, for fear of re ta liatory 
patrols. 18 This attitude was not adopted by the Rharhabe people, who 
understood only that the Co l ony was seizing their land and cattle. The chiefs 
faced a possible mutiny, if some sort of retaliation wa s not allowed. Tyali 
thus wrote to Somerset, asking him to ' use your power, and cause me to pay for 
my people's folly', in order to stave off the violence he could foresee. 19 A 
colonial show of strength would convince the Rharhabe that retaliation was 
impossible . The Rharhabe chiefs remained always in constant contact with each 
other. 
The settler apologists argued that the attack must have been planned well in 
advance, but this assumes that it was a large, concerted attack, whi ch it was 
not. There was presumably some talk of standing up to the Colony in late 
1834, given the situation and Rharhabe anger, but there seems to have been no 
definite or discussed plan . It appears that the chiefs were trying to avoid 
hostilities if possible. As shown, tension had mounted throughout the frontier 
region in November and December. The Sparkes and Sutton patrols, with their 
cattle seizure from innocent people and the expulsion of Tyali's and Nqeno's 
people from the Ceded Territory in mid December, proved the last straw and 
made war inevitable. D'Urban was annoyed that he had not been warned of the 
impending attack, protesting that the organising of an invading force the size 
claimed by Campbell could not have been hidden. The fact that the missionaries 
noticed nothing until 19 December implies that it was a spontaneous and rapid 
mobilisation in self de fence. Philip, with the agreement of Read, Brownlee and 
18 Read continually protested Maqoma' s innocence and a cce ptance of colonial 
wishes; see (CA) A50/4, Read to Philip, 1 April 1833; A50/4, Read to 
Fairbairn, 7 December 1833; (CA) A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 13 April 1834 ; 
A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835; A1480, Read to Fairbairn, 27 June 1835. 
Peires, "History of the Xhosa", p . 205n. notes that between 1823 and 1829, 
there were virtually no reports of cattle theft by Maqoma's people, and tha t 
he was making an effort to stop the theft of the other chiefs . He s t ill bore 
the brunt of the accusations of cattle theft; see al so Peires, House of Phal o, 
p.90. 
19 BPP 252 (1835), p.123, Tyali to Somerset, through Chalmers, 20 December 
1834; see also Peires, House of Phalo, pp.93-4. 
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Ross, argued that there was no evidence of a concerted or lengthy plan, but 
that it was just an automatic reaction to colonial actions. He believed that 
Somerset had tried to clear himself of blame for causing the hostilities by 
claiming that the reaction had been long premeditated. The missionary diaries 
reflect no untoward plans or movement until mid-December. 20 
Some groups were so bent on revenge that they acted against the orders of the 
chiefs in late 1834 . 21 One, for instance, killed the trader Warren at Kayser's 
mission station on 23 December. 22 Maqoma was annoyed with this, having 
promised protection to Kayser. After Kayser had complained of the threatening 
attitude of some of his men, he had given a strong warning to all the 
neighbouring kraals. 23 Chalmers was told that Maqoma's proposals of peace were 
not obeyed 'because the Caffres were not under one head; and that they often 
did what they pleased, and break the promises made by their chiefs' . What 
these comments emphasise is the lack of central planning and (to an extent) 
the ill-discipline that was a natural accompaniment to attacks that were 
spontaneous and angry. 
Why did the Rharhabe attack where they did? The two main areas intended for 
attack were that centring on the . Koonap River - a tributary of the Fish, 
north-east of Graham's Town, and that south of Graham's Town, breaching the 
lower Fish south of Trompetter's Drift. These two regions contained relatively 
dense colonial populations, the former chiefly Boer and the latter English . 
Heavyside's list of attacks in his Relief Board report shows that the majority 
of attacks in December 1834 were carried out on Boers in the Koonap area . In 
1830-1 farms had been issued to one hundred discharged white military 
personnel between the Koonap and the Fish (the area vacated by the Ngqika in 
20 (CL) Diary of Kayser; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing; (CL) MS 9037 Minutes 
of Presbyterian Mission Meetings, p.304, Report of Bennie; Ibid., pp.300-1, 
Report of Chalmers . 
21 BPP 503 (1837), p. 87, as told to Chalmers by Jan, a Caffer, 17 January 1835. 
22 (CL) Diary of Kayser, 23 December 1834; (CL) MS 16,579 , Diary of Laing, 24 
December 1834; Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Board of Relief'. 
23 (CL) Diary of Kayser, 26 December 1834. 
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1819) to act as an additional buffee. In Maech and Apeil 1834 thiety - eight 
faems next to the Koonap weee sueveyed and allotted to colonists by Campbell: 
one of them compeised eighty hectaees of Maqoma's old umuzi. 24 It was they who 
were attacked, for reasons not difficult to comprehend. 
In the last week of Decembee and the fiest days of Januaey, raiding bands of 
up to a few hundred attacked farms, aiming usually at faemers who had ill-
treated labourers or were on Rharhabe land. A number of the attacks were led 
by Rharhabe fluent in English or Dutch. One such group attacked near Enon in 
early Januaey. All its members had lived in the area at some time, and some of 
them on the Enon mission station. 25 They were returning to the land they had 
lost. The fact that they spoke a European language implies that they had had 
lengthy contact with the Colony, probably as labourers. In an attack on the 
Koonap eegion on 5 March, where the Rharhabe took two hundred sheep, most of 
the participants spoke Dutch. 26 William Shaw and the Southeys were attacked 
on their farms on the lower Fish by a group of Rharhabe led by Kosani, a 
former servant of the Southeys.27 There was collaboration from the colonial 
labourers as well: April, a Bechuana servant of Howse and Sheffield described 
how some of Nqeno's men (ten of whom had guns) attacked the farm where he was 
working and took the cattle: all but four of the thirty-five Khoi and Bechuana 
workers aided the raiders and returned across the Fish with them. 28 The 
'irruption' was the result of resistance to European domination, and the 
seizing of the opportunity to regain lost property and dignity. 
24 (CA) LG 7, Bell to Commissioner-Geneeal, 1834: (CA) LG 587, pp . 179-180. See 
(CA) Maps M1/2451-3 for distribution of farms and the number of Boer farmers 
on the Kat and Koonap. 
25 (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of October, Bechuana, 8 January 1835. 
26 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Vaughan to Campbell, 5 March 1835. Goldswain in Long, 
Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.71-4 described an attack on 27 December near Salem 
where all the Rharhabe spoke Dutch. 
27 (CL) MS 7131, Stubbs reminiscences, p.26. 
28 (CA) LG 9, pp.110-123, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 19 Febuary 1835 . 
Stephanus Buys, the first man to be killed, had been warned by h i s servant 
(who was from Bhotumane's people) of an impending attack Heavyside, 
'Abstract of the Board of Relief'. 
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It was only really Albany that was affected. The focus of aggression fell to 
quite an extent upon the trans-Fish traders and Koonap River Boers, although 
there were reports of Rharhabe raids as far north as the Kray River in the 
Graaff-Reinet district. 29 Ziervogel, Civil Commissioner for Somerset, reported 
in mid-January that the area around the Koonap and Baviaans Rivers had been 
devastated, and after initially grouping in laagers, most of the inhabitants 
had abandoned the region. 3o Campbell made a dire report on the state of the 
eastern districts in general. 31 Most of the farmers from the Koonap area 
gathered at Tarka in the Winterberg Mountains,32 Again, the extent of the 
damage was overstated. In his report from the Kaga River near the Koonap in 
early January, Ziervogel stated that the area of the Baviaans, Karega and Kaga 
had suffered a few minor attacks, and that there were traces of many Rharhabe 
across the Fish, but that few cattle had been lost. 33 This report makes 
nonsense of his later statements of large-scale devastation in December. It 
describes few attacks and stock losses, and makes it clear that Boer patrols 
were in control and that the Somerset whites were paranoid. 
Yet this description of relative peace and the military dominance of the 
colonial forces took place in precisely the area and period which Godlonton 
claimed was most affected by the 'irruption'. Halse gives a colourful - but 
apocryphal - story of his dangerous mission to the town of Somerset with the 
mail. surrounded all the way by marauding Rharhabe . 34 The Field Commandant for 
George and Uitenhage reported that all farmers in the Bushmans River area (the 
second region of attack) had deserted and that five to six thousand cattle had 
29 (CA) CO 4381, Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner to Campbell. 31 December 
1834. 
30 (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 17 January 1835. 
31 (CA) CO 4381, Campbell to D'Urban, 2 January 1835. 
32 (CA) 1/AY/8/55, van Wyk to Campbell, 12 January 1835. 
33 (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 4 January 1835. 
34 (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse. Halse wrote his memoirs in the 1870s 
for his grandchildren. His facts and chronology are regularly incorrect - cf. 
his conflicting report on a ski rmish at Bushman's river in January in Long, 
Index to Unofficial manuscripts. p .164, F . Rex to father. 16 January 1835. 
There is no reason to believe his assertions of a massive Rharhabe presence in 
the lower Somerset district, but hi s account does emphasise the panic of the 
farmers unnecessarily deserting their homes in the area. 
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been taken and houses burnt, whilst patrols in the area had killed eighteen 
Rharhabe. 35 But van Wyk on 1 January corroborated Ziervogel's evidence that 
the Rharhabe were gathered chiefly in the Ceded Territory, and that few were 
in the Colony.3" It is clear that many of the areas which the settlers claimed 
were stricken and devastated by the Rharhabe were not so. 
The attacks were aimed at specific Boer farmers and certain Khoi collaborators 
who had given cause for anger,37 rather than colonists as a whole, and were 
seldom carried out on military stations . The unsuccessful onslaughts on Fort 
Willshire on 29 January and Fort Armstrong on 19 February were exceptions. 38 
Rademeyer was a Boer who lived near the Kat River, but who had always treated 
his Rharhabe servants well. When hostilities broke out he (and his oxen and 
cattle) went unmolested and was protected until he and his family were safe. 39 
Traders across the Kei had regularly been the cause of Rharhabe anger, because 
of their attitudes and methods of trading. 4o Read complained in 1833 of the 
behaviour of the traders and the disputes which they regularly caused. He was 
concerned that the close links between the traders and Wesleyans would 
adversely affect the growth of the missions. 41 Traders regularly disregarded 
the laws of African society, and their status as foreigners who needed to 
respect Rharhabe custom and authority. They flaunted their access to the 
colonial militia, and often deceived customers. But the traders, while subject 
35 (CA) CO 4381, Report of Field Cornet, Bushman's river, 1 January 1835. 
3" (CA) 1/AY/8/55, van Wyk to Campbell, 1 January 1835. 
37 As noted in (CA) A519/1, pp.47-9, Chalmers to Armstrong, Chumie, 1 January 
1835. One of the Boers killed on the Koonap in December had wantonly killed a 
Rharhabe man in 1834 - (CA) 1/AY/9/62. The man had been looking for a relative 
on the Boer's farm and the drunken Dutchman had accosted him and killed him in 
front of his house, where he was having a party. It was this type of behaviour 
which probably caused retributive Boer deaths in the 'irruption'. 
38 At Fort Willshire six men were killed and all its cattle taken; see Scott, 
'British soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier', p.196. 
39 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.117. 
40 As noted by Laing in his diary, (CL) MS 16,579, entries for 22 December 
1834, and 6 January 1835, 
41 (CA) A50/4 Read to Fairbairn, 12 April 1833. 
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to aggre ssion in 1835. were not slaugh tered wholesale as claimed by Godlonton. 
Warren was killed at Kayser's mission, and Rogers (who knew his murderers 
personally) near the Tyhurne. But Marks (near Tyhurne). Bourne (near Buffalo) 
and Eules (near Kei) were all allowed to escape. 42 Their escapes were 
attributed to miracles. but this assumes that the Rharhabe had intended t o 
kill all whites. 
There were four stations where Europeans gathered: Wesleyville. Beka. 
Burnshill and Clarke bury . Again. the idea tha t they needed to be rescued 
implies that all Europeans were in danger. but there is no evidence of the 
dire need for protection in any area. It must be stressed that the intention 
of the Rharhabe was not to challenge or overthrow the Colony; it was to seek 
revenge and bring to the attention of D'Urban the situation they were in. 43 
They wanted talks, not war. Philip told Buxton in May that the 'conduct of the 
Caffers towards us for months past is no more than a simple reaction of [sic] 
a system we have been carrying on against them for many years past .. 44 This 
'system' was the entire frontier policy of dispossession and commandos. The 
chiefs attempted to get Somerset to talk to them on 21 December (the day the 
counter -a ttacks began) about the evictions of Tyali and Nqeno (although 
Chalmers alleged their intention was to entice him into an ambush) and then 
began a brief period of retaliation for colonial injustices. These included 
the seizure of Rharhabe land and the imposition of an unnegotiated boundary by 
means of guns, the regular seizure of cattle by patrols. and the death of 
forty-four Rharhabe in the past few years. inCluding three royal members. 
without any compensation; all of which was succinctly explained in a letter to 
42 Heavyside. 'Abstract of Board of Relief'. (CL) MS 16.579. Diary of Laing. 
entry for 1 August 1835. corroborates Marks' story. 
43 (CA) A519/1. D'Urban papers. pp.257-8. Report of T.Shepstone, 13 May 1835; 
Shepstone described how the messengers sent to Maqoma and Tyali in May 
returned to say that they had begun hostilities to force D'Urban to come to 
the frontier. They would then be able to sit with him and Some rset and discuss 
their grievances, and he would understand the cause of their conduct; cf. (CA) 
A611/5. Papers of George Southey, where Southey makes precisely the same 
statement. Peires, House of Phalo. p.146 stresses that hostilities were 
intended to be limited, in order to force settlement of their grievances . 
44 (CA) A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 May 1835. 
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Somerset from the chiefs on 31 December." After ten days of fighting, the 
chiefs called for peace. 
Of the la r ge number of Africans ea st of t he Fish only a small minority joined 
in the attacks. At no stage in the hi sto ry of the eastern frontier was there 
African co-ordination such that a concerted attack could be made on the 
Colony , This was largely due to the independence of each chief, and the 
absence of unity or 'Xhosa' cohesion. Each chief was faced in 1835 with a 
choice of whether to oppose or support the Colony, The key Rharhabe 
participants were two sons of Ngqika, Maqoma and Tyali, who were acting as 
regents until the child heir, Sandile, became chief of the Ngqika.'6 They were 
supported in 1835 by most of the Ngqika chiefs, except Tenta and Matwa, who 
took refuge in Graham's Town and were given land at Tyhume after hostilities, 
They also had the support of the western Ndlambe of Mhala , Siyolo and Qasana; 
by the Mdange of Bhotumane; and by the Mbalu of Nqeno,47 The important common 
denominator amongst these groups is the fact that they (especially Maqoma and 
Tyali) had borne the brunt of colonial expansion and aggression. They had lost 
their land to the foreigners and had reason to react. Mqhayi (brother to 
Mdushane and Mhala) , and Tshatshu of the Ntinde (who had close links with Read 
and Philip, and was taken to London in 1836) encouraged their people not to 
raid,'8 but split their people in the process, Tshatshu had to join Phato after 
his brother and followers joined the Ngqika. '9 The eastern Nd1ambe were 
initially neutral, and the Gcaleka and Winterberg Thembu remained so, 
The delineation of sides is not so simple though . The eastern Nd1ambe began to 
take part in hostilities after December 1834, as indicated by a gun found on 
" BPP 503 (1837), pp.49-50, Chalmers to Somerset, dictated by Caffer chief s, 
31 December 1834; (CL) MS 16,579, Laing diary, entry for 26 February 1835. 
'6 See Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir life, p.306 for their respect ive ages 
and the structure of the r egency. See too (CL) MS 16,579. Laing diary, entry 
for 22 December 1835, where Laing mentions rumours that they were trying to 
consolidate their power before Sandile came of age . 
• 7 See Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', appendix. 
'8 (CA) CO 4381, W.Shepstone to Campbell. 2 January 1835. 
49 Brownlee, Reminis c ences of Kaffir life, pp . 27-31, 
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one of Gasela's men in September, which had been taken from a soldier in the 
Fish River bush.50 There were even some Fingo who fought with Gasela. The 
awkward position of the chiefs is well demonstrated by the case of Deacon, a 
trader on the Gonube River in Mhala's territory, who was warned on 24 December 
of an approaching Rharhabe commando, and sought refuge with a local chief. He 
and two other Englishmen were sent to Mhala where they were well treat ed for 
sixteen days. Long debates were held over their fate, as Mhala's counci llor s 
and people wished to kill him - an idea which Mhala resisted. Mhala was 
particularly concerned about the power of the Colony, and he eventually sent 
them to safety at Mount Coke. 51 This example exhibits the complexities of 
delineating sides and opposition in 1835. Mhala was hesitant to attack the 
Colony outright, but his councillors and people set to with a vengeance, and 
he was able to do little to control events. 52 He did, though, punish some of 
his people who were stealing cattle. 
African groups who chose to be loyal to the Colony played an important part in 
augmenting colonial strength, and in decreasing the motivation of the Rharhabe 
resistors. The Mpondo and Thembu and the majority of the Gqunukhwebe allied 
with the Colony, and a number of them proved very useful in fighting for the 
British. Phato, chief of the Gqunukhwebe, whose people totalled only seven 
thousand five hundred,53 and who had for a long time owed allegiance to the 
Rharhabe, played a Janus role in 1835. Phato off icially sided with the Colony, 
placing - on Smith's insistence - his brother in c ustody in Graham's Town as 
hostage for his people's good behaviour. 54 He supplied approximately twelve 
hundred fighting men,55 and was rewarded afterwards with land. The extent of 
the land that was given to the Gqunukhwebe after the September peace treaties 
50 (CL) MS 951, War diary of T.H.Bowker, 5 September 1835. 
51 (CA) I/AY/B/B6, Report of T.Deacon, 4 February 1835. 
52 For Mhala's atitude see also the evidence of I/AY/B/B6, Fingo prisoner, 
Graham's Town gaol, 22 February 1835 . 
53 BPP 503 (IB37), p . 9, Census of Caffer tribes, October 1835 . 
54 (CA) A519/1B, pp.40-1, D'Urban to Bell, 6 February 1835. 
55 Milton, The Edges of war, p.126. This book, written by a professor of law, 
is a most useful work. It outlines the advance of the frontier very clear ly, 
and provides a succinct summary of life in the eastern Cape. 
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was decided on in mid 1835, and discussed with Phato and Khama on 14 July. 56 
But Ap~il, a Tswana spy on Nqeno, claimed that he saw stolen colonial cattle 
at Phato's k~aal in late Feb~ua~y (a claim which D'U~ban disregardedl. 57 Phato 
also aided the Rharhabe, and British arbitration was needed at the end of the 
year to solve a dispute between Phato and Nqeno, as the latter said that Phato 
refused to give him back the cattle he had sent to him for safekeeping during 
hostilities. 58 In 1846 Phato actually fought against the Colony, but in 1835 
he made a clear decision to opt for the more powerful Europeans. His choice 
earned him land, cattle and temporary colonial protection, and anger from the 
Rharhabe. 59 
Stubbs claimed that it was Mqhayi - who loudly supported the Colony in 1835 -
who organised an attack on farms on the west bank of the Fish on 26 December 
1834. The Shaws' cattle were taken and John Shaw killed; Mqhayi then kept 
Shaw's gun. 60 It is unclear quite what role Mqhayi played in late 1834, but 
he quite possibly took advantage of the situation to take cattle, and reversed 
his allegiance upon realising the power of the Colony. D'Urban singled out the 
Fingo, the Gqunukhwebe, Mqhayi, Tshatshu, Sutu and Sandile, and Nonube and 
Siwane in 1836 for special protection, for their help during 1835. 61 The 
56 (CAl A519/17, p.96, D'Urban to 1, 14 July 1835. 
57 (CAl LG 9, pp.121-6, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 19 February 1835; see also 
LG 9, pp.129-135, where Jonas made a similar claim, and said that Phato 
ordered all the colonial cattle to be slaughte~ed, so that they would not be 
found. See too LG 9 p.101, Bowke~ to Campbell, 11 Feb~uary 1835, whe~e Bowke~ 
claimed that Phato was stealing cattle f~om the settlers and b~inging them 
into G~aham's Town, pretending he had inte~cepted Caffe~s. In LG 9, p.108, 
Richa~d Southey p~oduced simila~ evidence of Phato's involvement in Decembe~ . 
58 See the ~eco~d of a~bit~ation in (CAl LG 9, pp. 138-141. 
59 Pei~es, 'The British and the Cape' argues that Shaw used his influence to 
pe~suade Phato not to join the attacks. His decision, though, was more one of 
expedienc e. 
60 (CLl MS 7131, Stubbs ~eminiscences, p.125. (CAl LG 9, pp.129-135, evidence 
of Jonas, corroborates Mqhayi's involvement in raiding; see also LG 9, p.105 , 
W.Southey to D'U~ban, 16 Feb~uary 1835, whe~e Southey felt that there was 
enough evidence to prove that Mqhayi killed his b~other. Dugmore, (CAl GH 
19/4, pp.995 -6 , Dugmo~e to D'U~ban, 19 June 1835, protested Mqhayi's complete 
innocence in 1835. 
61 (CAl A519/11, pp . 102-3, D'U~ban to Stockenst~om, 13 October 1836. 
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collaborators were made to work for their rewards though. In response to 
requests for land and cattle from Phato, Tshatshu and Mqhayi in June, D'Urban 
insisted that they had been useful but had not yet done enough. Phato had to 
bring in Maqoma and Tyali; Tshatshu had to 'show himself more zealous', and 
Mqhayi had to get hold of Nonube and Siwane . 62 
The 'irruption' ~as thus carried out by a minority of dispossessed and angry 
Rharhabe. Their resolve to attack was strengthened by the apparent willingness 
of the Kat River Settlement and colonial Khoi to join them,63 after the Khoi 
dissatisfaction at the proposed vagrancy ordinance in late 183464 which sought 
further to limit Khoi freedom and access to land. This general Khoi 
collaboration failed to materialise, although a small number of digruntled 
Khoi, whose guns and knowledge of colonial weapons and tactics were of great 
help, joined the Rharhabe. Campbell had complained, prior to 1835, that the 
Rhoi in the Settlement had become too friendly with the Rharhabe. Some 
Africans even settled there, and it was providing a gateway through the 
colonial boundary for settler traders and armed Africans without passes. 65 In 
the early part of the war, Khoi were specifically exempt from Rharhabe 
raiders, and the Africans encouraged them, as fellow sufferers, to join the 
attackers. 66 Instead, many of the Khoi formed an integral part of the colonial 
force, as auxiliaries and in the Kat River Legion. 
The Rharhabe were surprised at the Khoi co-operation with the whites and 
Tyali, aggrieved that they had not at least remained neutral, told Tshatshu 
that he intended to punish them. 67 The Settlement was abandoned in early 
January because of the threat of attack, and its inhabitants moved to Fort 
62 (NA) A96, T.Shepstone diary, entry for 4 June 1835. 
63 (CA) LG 9, p.120, Bechuana spy to Campbell; BPP 503, (1837), p.81, Extract 
from journal of Rev. Bennie; Ibid., p.87, Statement of Rev. Chalmers, 19 
January 1835 . 
64 (CA) A50/4, Hottentot Meeting, Graham's Town, 5 August 1834. 
65 (CA) CO 2742, Campbell to 1, 20 December 1833. 
66 (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of October, 8 January 1835. 
67 (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of 
James Laing, entry for 30 December 1834. 
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Adelaide, under Armstrong. With the Rharhabe reaction in 1834 came a number of 
disturbances on the north-east boundary of the Colony as well, where there 
were no concerted attacks, but sporadic cattle-raiding. A number of 'Mantatee' 
labourers in the Somerset region took the opportunity in the general confusion 
to escape from their masters, taking cattle with them for good measure. 
Macoan. a Mantatee chief living between the Kraai and Orange Rivers had, by 
June 1835 a number of colonial cattle, taken from the Koonap River area . 68 
Many Mantatees acted by themselves, or in collaboration with other Africans, 
on occasions throughout 1835. 69 
But the chiefs had lost control of some of their people : the roving bands 
continued to raid for cattle and attack, against the orders of their chiefs. 
Laing felt that they were prevented from destroying all stations only by the 
orders of the chiefs. 7o Maqoma, who had been influenced by the missionary 
Ross, and was attracted to Christianity and European alcohol,7l was especially 
concerned with the safety of the missionaries, providing protection for Laing 
in December against Rharhabe attack and contemplating sending his family to 
the mis sion for safety. 7Z Sutu (Sandile' smother), living near Burnshill 
mission station, on several occasions rescued whites and protected them . 73 
Maqoma called the LMS missionary Kayser to him in early January, to assure him 
that the chiefs had given orders tha t no missions be molested,74 and a group 
raiding near Enon in early January said they had express orders not to touch 
68 (CA) I/AY/8/55, Report of Ziervogel from Somerset, 26 June 1835. 
69 For example, (CA) I/AY/8/55, Greyling t o Campbell, Brak River, 31 January 
1835; 1/AY/8/55, Oosthuyse to Campbell, 16 January 1835; 1/AY/8/55, Erasmus to 
Campbell, Kaga Post, 18 January 1835; (CA) A519/1, pp.233-8, England to 
D'Urban, 7 May 1835; (CA) CO 2756 provides information on their movements near 
the Kraai River in June 1835. 
70 For example, (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entry for 12 January 
1835. 
71 Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', Appendix. The Diary of Kayser shows that he 
attended services at the Knapp's Hope mission fairly regularly; see entry for 
5 January 1834 . 
7Z (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entries for 27 December 1834, 31 
December 1834. (CA) A519/2, p . 181, shows that Maqoma issued orders that 
William Shepstone must not be touched. 
7) (CA) A50/4, Read to Fairbairn, 18 January 1835. 
74 (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of James Laing, entry for 7 January 1835. 
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missions, Khoi or women and children. 75 There were regular rumours that all 
missions had been burnt; but while many were ransacked after their desertion, 
few were torched. Ayliff had a panicky view of events. In late December he 
told Davis, his colleague at Clarkebury, that all the traders between the Fish 
and Kei had been murdered and their property seized, and that all but two 
mission stations had been destroyed and the missionaries killed. 76 
It was the young warriors, such as the rogue group described by October in 
e~rly January,77 who occasionally boasted of their intentions to destroy the 
Colony. Samuel Prins, a Khoi servant who with October had been captured with 
this band, added the melodrama tic claim of these young men that' the Fish 
river was stinking from the number of people they had killed', and that they 
would continue fighting for three years. 78 This was clearly an empty boast, 
designed to frighten or impress their captives. Some young men were so 
confident that they asked Chalmers to look after their women and children 
while they went to the salt pans near Port Elizabeth to construct their new 
imizi and huts. 79 It is ironic that the hyperbole of these men, so similar to 
the exaggerations of Graham's Town, supported the settler propaganda that 
excused their own dispossession. 
For the Rharhabe to defeat the Colony was never a possibility.aD The 
defensiveness of the Rharhabe tactics are made clear in the methods of attack: 
merely ten colonists were killed between 21 and 31 December. There were ten 
75 Long, Index to Unofficial Manuscripts, p.163, F.Rex to his father, 9 January 
1835. 
76 (CA) A558, Journal of Davis, entry for 29 December 1834. He was incorrect; 
cf. (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835, Bailie commented on how 
nice the Butterworth mission was looking. 
77 (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of October, 8 January 1835. 
78 (CA) CO 4381, Evidence of Prins, 8 January 1835. 
79 Heavyside, 'Abstract of the Board of Relief', p.10n., Letter from Chalmers. 
aD The military dominance of the Colony had been asserted in 1812 and 1819, and 
in the latter year Nxele led a force of over ten thousand Rharhabe in an open 
attack on Graham's Town. Seven to eight hundred were. killed in one day; see 
Scott, 'British Soldier on the Eastern Cape Frontier', p.118; Peires, House of 
Phalo, pp.143-5; Maclennan, Proper Degree of Terror, ch.23. 
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thousand whites in the districts of Somerset and Albany,81 with a troop for ce 
of under a thousand and thousands of experienced burgher commandos . With a 
population of about fifty thousand Ngqika and nine thousand Ndlambe, 82 the 
Rharhabe chiefs had t he potential manpower of less than ten thousand men if 
all participated. Five thousand African warriors in small groups, armed with 
spears, could be no match for two thousand British soldiers and trained 
colonists, mounted and armed with guns. William Shepstone wrote from 
Wesleyville at the beginning of January that the anger with the Colony, and 
desire to raid, was fading, but that: 'It is said these young chiefs [Maqoma 
and Tyali) are in a kind of despair already regretting their folly and even 
those who are now commiting depradations do it in a kind of despair of ever 
healing a breach so wide'. Shepstone stressed that the raids did not enjoy 
complete support amongst the Rharhabe, and that a concerted colonial attack 
would 'strike terror into all the disaffected - and confirm the peaceable, . 83 
By early January the raiding parties of the Rharhabe had diminished 
considerably . 
Regular patrols of settlers (the Corps of Volunteers) were organised around 
Graham's Town from 24 December. These achieved success in shooting Rharhabe, 
but were generally ineffective in retaining stock theft. Burgher commandos 
began rapidly to be amassed and mobilised, and by 1 January there were two 
hundred burghers ready at Graaff-Reinet . 84 The Beaufort Levy was formed, made 
up of the farmers, with their servants, whose farms on the Fish and Koonap 
Rivers had been destroyed. 85 Settler history seldom acknowledges the presence 
of non-whites in the army, although they formed a large contingent of the 
force. The patrols used in the early stages of hostilities consisted regularly 
81 (CA) LCA 38, Population census of Eastern Districts, 1837. 
82 BPP 503 (1837), p . 9, Census of Caffer tribes, October 1835; in (CA) LG 605, 
pp.1-122, November 1835, Boyce, Southey and Kidd numbered the Ndlambe at only 
7,00 0 . 
83 (CA) CO 4381, W.Shepstone to Campbell, 2 January 1835. 
84 (CA) CO 4381, Civil Commissioner of Graaff-Reinet to Campbell, 1 January 
1835. 
85 (CA) A519/10, p.68. 
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of a majority of Khoi. 
The colonists were effective in military contacts from the outset, which was 
not surprising, given their weapons superiority. Burgher parties under Piet 
Retief killed one hundred and thirteen Rharhabe in the Winterberg area between 
24 December and 10 January, 86 and Somerset was fairly successful in his 
attacks on the Bushmans River. 87 A typical example of European dominance in 
direct confrontations occurred on 24 December when a party of eleven Boers 
went to aid a farmer near the Kat River . They were confronted by a large group 
of Rharhabe, who sent a hundred and fifty men onto the attack; whereupon the 
Boers grouped and fired repeatedly, killing seventy-five men without suffering 
even a wounding. This pattern was very common, although the number of Rharhabe 
involved was sometimes exaggerated. Despite this, the Rharhabe took two 
thousand cattle from around the Boer laager on Greyling' s farm in the 
Winterberg that night. 88 The raiding parties were not always so lucky: a group 
of Rharhabe who took two hundred cattle at Kaga, north-west of Graham's Town, 
on the night of 11 January were caught the following day and fourteen were 
killed. 89 With the arrival of Smith came the real organisation and planning 
to inflict damage on the Rharhabe, rather than just patrols. It marked the 
real 'irruption' - that of the colonial forces across the Fish River. 
Colonel Somerset received Maqoma's offer of peace on 3 January, but deferred 
a decision on it by replying that he was unauthorised to answer. Again, it was 
Campbell, supported surprisingly by the liberal GMS missionary from Tyhume, 
Chalmers, who objected to any cessation of hostilities so early, and who 
insisted that Somerset reject the offer so that the Colony could gather its 
forces. 9o By 7 January Colonel Harry Smith - confirmed supporter of violent 
expansion and later Governor of the Cape - had arrived, and there was no 
86 (CA) 1jAYj8j86, P .Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835. 
87 (CA) CO 4381, Report of Colonel Somerset, 16 January 1835 . 
88 (CA) 1jAYj8j86, P.Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835. 
89 (CA) 1jAYj8j55, Erasmus to Campbell, 12 January 1835. 
90 (CA) CO 4381, Campbell to 1, 2 January 1835; (CA) A519j1, pp.47-9, Chalmers 
to Armstrong, 1 January 1835. 
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chance of peace for the Rharhabe . Harington has described clearly Smith's 
rneglomania and self-delusions, as well as his belief in the intrinsic 
superiority of Europeans." Smith's argument for rejecting the offer of pea ce 
was that the chiefs were not honest as hostilities had not ceased,92 and that 
the aggression must be punished. He intended to take the opportunity to 
destroy the Rharhabe and get more land and labour. By the time his reply 
reached Tyali on-15 January, the latter had fled into refuge after his imizi 
had been burnt. The reason for the continuation of some raiding has been 
explained, but Smith's second point epitomises colonialism. If the victim of 
expansion retaliates in any way to the onslaught on him, the imperial power 
may quite legitimately 'punish' him. 
Upon his arrival in Graham'S Town, Smith removed the unnecessary barricades 
around the town and immediately began to plan the punishment of the Rharhabe. 
He had at his disposal upon his arrival a total of 835 men of the Royal 
Artillery, Royal Engineers, 75th Regiment and Cape Mounted Rifles, that were 
scattered around the military posts of the Eastern districts,·J as well as an 
ever-increasing number of Boers, and settler volunteers in groups such as the 
Mounted Burghers of Albany, the Corps of Guides and the Bathurst Volunteers. 
There were also Khoi auxiliaries. He was advised occasionally by Cuyler, a 
veteran of the frontier.' 4 By mid January he had sent patrols of between fifty 
and two hundred burghers, British troops, settlers and Khoi against Nqeno and 
Tyali, killing thirty of Nqeno's men, two of his brothers and a son,'5 and 
setting fire to all the huts in the Tyhume valley.·6 Major Cox burnt Tyali's 
own umuzi (situated where modern Aukland is) on 14 January, although Tyali was 
in a hiding place twelve miles from the mission station. He also secured the 
9' A.L.Harington, Sir Harry Smith - bungling hero (1980). See also Milton, 
Edges of War, pp.132-3. Smith's summary of the war - BPP, 503 (1837), pp.29-35 
- provides a good example of his outlook. 
'2 BPP 252 (1835), p.133, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 21 January 1835 . 
• J See Scott, 'British Soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', p.194, for the troop 
distribution on the frontier in 1834-5. 
'4 Milton, Edges of War, p . 113. 
'5 BPP, 252 (1835), p.134, Smith to D'Urban, 18 January 1835 . 
• 6 (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of the GMS, p.307. 
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safety, for the colonists, of the Zuurberg Mountains and upper Bushmans River 
areas . 97 It had never been the chiefs' intention to remain there, and the 
number of Rharhabe who entered the area was minimal . 
By 14 January Smith had planned a concerted attack on Rharhabe, as well as 
Gcaleka, territory that would 'produce a lasting impression upon those Caffres 
who may survive the war,.98 This idea, similar to the campaign of 1819, but 
much more extensive, was adopted after discussions with D'Urban . It was not 
secret: Piet Retief, for instance, suggested in mid January that the heavy 
retributive commando which he had been told of should not last too long, as 
the three months in 1819 had been tedious. 99 By 23 January an additional 472 
British troops of the Royal Artillery and 72nd Highlanders had arrived in 
Graham's Town from Cape Town, and D'Urban had arrived to direct operations. It 
must again be stressed that this massive force was not intended for defence or 
even just to punish the offending Rharhabe. It was intended for the 
subjugation of all the Ngqika and Ndlambe, and for the invasion of the 
Gcaleka. At this stage most of the Rharhabe had been driven out of the Ceded 
Territory and those who were left were concentrated in the almost impenetrable 
bush of the Fish River banks and in the Amatole Mountains. By mid January, the 
Rharhabe around the Keiskamma sources were fleeing en masse .100 The chiefs t 
aware that they faced settler invasion, were preparing their people for 
defence. Few raids were being carried out, apart from a number in the Bathurst 
region, and the main concern by this stage for the Rharhabe was how to defend 
themselves against the colonial patrols. 
The Rbarhabe depended largely upon traditional weapons and manoeuvres in their 
9) BPP 252 (1835), p.134, Smith to D'Urban, 18 January 1835; (CA) A519/18, 
pp.40-1, D'Urban to Bell, 6 February 1835; Scott, 'British Soldier on Eastern 
Cape Frontier', pp.198-9. Harington, Sir Harry Smith does not think that these 
areas were secured. 
98 G.M.Theal, Documents relating to the Kaffir War of 1835 (1912), pp.10-14, 
Smith to D'Urban, 14 January 1835. 
99 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, P.Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835. 
100 (CL) Diary of Kayser, 15 January 1835. 
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fighting, although they were beginning to use European techniques and guns. In 
1818 they had had few guns,101 but by 1835 had built up a small collection, 
which increased during the hostilities . A group of seventy Rharhabe, armed 
with guns and mounted on horses, were seen in early January; 102 but there 
were merely one hundred to two hundred guns in total in the possession of the 
Rharhabe. By August they were able to amass a force of three hundred armed and 
mounted men. 103 Many of the Gcaleka, for instance, were barely acquainted 
with, and scared of, guns ,104 but they began to acquire them soon after 
1835. 105 There was a constant settler trade in fire-arms with the Rharhabe 
that produced a sizeable revenue .106 Some Graham's Town settlers continued 
supplying guns to the Rharhabe even in 1835; Holden Bowker claimed that James 
Howse was still selling fire-arms in February.107 The effectiveness of most 
of the guns was limited, as traders usually sold inefficient and obsolete 
muskets, and the Africans were not trained in weaponry. Gunpowder was still 
being sold across the border of the Graaff-Reinet disrict in July, at a rate 
of a cow for two cups, so a law was passed against it in that month. lOB 
Patrols were sent out from Graham's Town continuously in January to the 
frontier regions and across the Fish into the Ceded Territory . In early 
February, Colonel England was ordered to clear the Fish River bush of all the 
Rharhabe gathered there. His attempt was hampered by the difficulty of the 
terrain, the smallness of the colonial force, and his decision to desert his 
troops and report to Graham's Town. The Fish River follows a winding course, 
with high outcrops on either side of the river, separated by a flat valley of 
a few hundred metres. Throughout the valley and on the hills overlooking it 
101 D'Urban, in BPP 279 (1836), D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 27 Febuary 1835, said 
that the Rharhabe had no guns. Peires, House of Phalo, indicates that the 
Rharhabe possessed firearms as early as 1818. 
102 (CA) 1/AY/9/7, Campbell to 1, 2 January 1835. 
103 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.120. 
104 As described in (CA) A983, Memoirs of the Kafir War - Caesar Andrews, 14 
May 1835. 
105 Peires, House of Phalo, pp . 116- 7 . 
106 Ibid., pp.156-7. 
107 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 14 February 1835. 
108 (CA) A519/17, p.19, Notice of Campbell. 
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there is thick, thorny scrub which provides perfect places for defence and 
hiding. The area in the bush of most activity in 1835 was that south of 
Trompetter's Drift, where Nqeno and Qasana had lived. After England's attempt, 
Smith planned and led a large offensive on the Fish River between Trompetter's 
and Committee 's Drifts, where Bhotumane, Qasana and the old, sickly Nqeno l09 
(who had been living just south of Fort Willshire since 1833) were based. This 
bush provided perfect protection for the nearly two thousand Rharhabe 
there llo and their guerilla-style warfare, and hampered the British, who were 
unused to such confined quarters. 
Because of its proximi t y to the Colony, and the need to destroy this strategic 
stronghold, the area had to be controlled by the British. The Khoi 
auxilliaries, who seem to have willingly provided canon fodder, proved most 
useful in this close combat, and their clothes and skin were shredded by the 
large thorns in the bush . III Phato, the Gqunukhwebe chief now siding with the 
British, joined Smith there with two hundred men. 112 Smith was unable to win 
a decisive victory1l3 and the bush remained a refuge for bands of resistors 
throughout the year. 114 There were a large number of Rharhabe there in late 
March,I15 and twenty-one Rharhabe were reported killed in action there on 12 
September. 116 The British suffered their heaviest casualties of the year in 
the bush in February, but made enough advance to drive most of the chiefs into 
the stronghold of the Amatole Mountains. The preponderance of Khoi deaths 
illustrates the methods of warfare employed, the Khoi auxiliaries invariably 
forming the vanguard of attack. 
109 Information on Nqeno is to be found in Theal, Documents relating to the 
Kafir War, p.50, D'Urban to Bell, 5 February 1835; and Brownlee, Reminiscences 
of Kaffir life, pp .3 28-333 . Nqeno was about seventy-five years old in 1835 . 
110 Information of Louis Arnoldus in May in Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, 
p . 63. 
III (CA) A983, Memoir s of Caesar Andrews . He was complimentary about the vigour 
of the Khoi . 
112 (CL) MS 951 , Diary of T. H.Bowker, 14 February 1835 . 
113 See (CL) PR 356 3 . Reminiscences of Henry James Halse. 
11 4 Le Cord eur, Journal of Stretch, p.112. 
115 (eL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 26 March 1835. 
116 BPP 503 (1837), p.258, Moultrie to D'Urban, 12 September 1835 . 
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O'Urban spent February and March in Graham's Town preparing for the massive 
advance into Rharhabe and Gcaleka territory in April and May. The time spent 
for this was similar to that spent in preparation for the advance of the 
troops in 1819, when Col. Willshire led the British and colonial forces well 
into Rharhabe land, and the land west of the Keiskamma River was annexed as 
the Ceded Territory. Caesar Andrews, aide to D'Urban, reported that the delay 
was caused by the outfitting of the KhoLI17 In late February D'Urban wrote 
to Bell, who had been left in charge of the government in Cape Town, that 
almost all the Rharhabe who had attacked the Colony seemed to have moved 
beyond the Buffalo River and to the sources of the Kei, where he intended to 
'visit' them. liB D'Urban's information made it clear that most of the 
Rharhabe men were in the Amatole and that it was the women and children who 
had moved towards the Kei. The fact that the majority of labour seizures in 
1835 were women and children probably underlines D'Urban's real reason for 
following the fleeing Rharhabe into Gcaleka territory. Did he not move east of 
the Buffalo chiefly to collect labourers? 
The settler view of the war, which was endorsed, supported and in many 
respects created by D'Urban, gives the impression that the army operations of 
April and May were relatively haphazard, and that the invasion of Gcaleka 
territory in particular was a decision of the moment, as was the 
'emancipation' of the Fingo and the annexation of the Queen Adelaide Province. 
These three events, though, were the specific objectives of the colonial 
forces, and were in fact performed as part of a meticulously-planned and 
carefully conducted campaign. There has been a long-standing proposal that 
D'Urban was a tame foil to the energy and expansionist ideas of Smith, to whom 
has often been attributed the motivation and ideas behind the waging of the 
war. 1l9 Lancaster's study of O'Urban makes it clear, as does the evidence of 
this thesis, that D'Urban was a strong controlling figure, who regularly 
117 (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 20 April 1835. 
lIB (CA) A519/18, p.51, D'Urban to Bell, 27 February 1835. 
119 See for example B.J.Barnard, "n Lewensbeskrywing van Majoor Henry Douglas 
Warden', MA Thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1943, ch.2. 
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checked Smith's carelessness and over-exuberance. It was he who was the source 
of the planning of 1835. '20 Smith in 1847 acknowledged that it was D'Urban's 
ideas that he was following when he annexed British Kaffraria, the same area 
which D'Urban had annexed. 
By 22 February D'Urban had finished the plans for the invasion, as they were 
carried out. This specifically included an attack on Hintza and on the Bomvana 
and as far north as the Mbashe River '2l (see below). Khoi levies were formed 
into two provisional battalions to accompany the invading force as infantry 
auxiliaries, When it was advertised in January that Khoi were needed for 
fighting the response was extensive, possibly because of the hope of reward . 
Four hundred Khoi were enrolled from colonial volunteers in March; they were 
to be used in the first line of defence of the Colony.122 Smith was impressed 
by the Khoi, saying that 'more spirited, gallant and able fellows in the bush 
I never saw, capable of bearing the greatest fatigue, and for future 
operations this force cannot be too much augmented. ,123 They were always 
effective. The heroic stand of Rademeyer's Boer patrol against overwhelming 
odds in the Fish River bush in early March, as reported by the apologists,I24 
is described rather differently by Stretch, who took his information from an 
eye-witness. Simmons of the 72nd, described how the Boers were particularly 
cowardly, and that it was the accompanying Khoi who fought and defeated the 
Rharhabe. 125 Throughout February patrols of soldiers and farmers were sent 
into the Ceded Territory and western Rharhabe territory with the promise of a 
can of grog for each dead African. 126 The intention was now to launch a 
120 Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban'; see also Cory Rise of South Africa, 
Vol.3, p.241. 
121 Outlined in BPP 279 (1836), pp.26-7, D'Urban's Orders, 22 February '1835. 
See also footnotes below 98 and 181. 
122 BPP 279, pp . 24-5, D'Urban to Glenelg, Enclosure No.2, 22 March 1835. 
123 Quoted in Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p.24. George Rex to father, 7 May 
1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.169, had similar praise for 
the Khoi. Stretch - in Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.55 - noted that the 
Khoi were always placed first in the firing line. 
124 Graham's Town Journal, 15 May 1835, General Notice 13 May 1835; Godlonton, 
Irruption of Kafirs, pp. 238-9. 
125 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.35-7. 
126 (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse. 
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concerted attack on the Amatole/Buffalo region, with a sizeable attack on 
Hintza and the people past the Kei. 
The colonial force gathered in late March in four divisions of around eight 
hundred men in each. Each took up a position along the Ceded Territory; the 
total force comprised over three thousand armed men, including four hundred 
regular British soldiers. 127 A further two thousand troops and settlers 
remained to defend the Colony against the remote possibility of an attack. 128 
The 1st Division under D'Urban and Smith gathered at Fort Willshire, the 2nd 
under Somerset at Tyhume, the 3rd under Cox at Fort Beaufort and the 4th, 
consisting only of Boers and led by van Wyk, met at Tambookie Vlei. The 4th 
Division moved north-east in order to surround and attack Ntaba ka Ndoda (the 
highest peak in the Buffalo Mountains range) from behind; for the following 
two months their brief was to patrol the Amatole Mountains and the area north 
of' the mountains in order to control the northern section of Rharha be 
territory. The 3rd Division was intended to maintain pressure on the Rharhabe 
in the Amatole and Buffalo Mountains and surrounding flats, whilst the 1st and 
2nd formed the thrust of the attack against the eastern Ndlambe and Gcaleka. 
Smith began with a patrol attack on the Amatole on 29 March, where they took 
twelve hundred cattle. 12' The advance of the other three divisions commenced 
on 31 March. The 1st Division stretched impressively over five miles. IJO The 
force gathered at the Debe Flats two days later, and began with a concerted 
attack on the Rharhabe stronghold in the Buffalo mountains surrounding Ntaba 
127 Ibid., pp . 199-200. The invasion force consisted of 396 British troops, 358 
settlers, 761 Khoi auxiliaries and 1639 Dutch burghers . It seems for some 
reason that the number of Khoi used in the army was deliberately understated . 
Stretch, Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.55, said that there were 2,100 Khoi 
auxiliaries. Andrews, (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, also said that 
there were over two thousand Khoi . 
128 BPP 279 (1836), p.12, Return of the Forces upon the Eastern Frontier, 19 
March 1835 . 
12. (CA) CO 4381, Smith to D'Urban, 29 March 1835 . 
130 (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 31 March 1835; cf. (CL) MS 1272, 
Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835. 
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ka Ndoda .131 Here for the first time the Rharhabe witnessed the 
destructiveness of a canon. The chief. Nqeno. apparently just escaped death 
from a shell.I)Z The Thembu and Gcaleka had seen canon in action at Mbolompo 
in 1828, so it s existence and powe r were known. Holden Bowker commented on t he 
luxuriance of the vegetation across the Keiskamma and how good it would be f or 
sheep farming. 1)) This wa s just what D'Urban's intentions for it were. 
After December 1834 the Rharhabe had generally stopped raiding and declared a 
truce. Some groups of raiders continued to take colonial cattle against the 
orders of the chiefs. There was an attack on the Koonap River area on 5 March 
where two thousand sheep were taken;13' but raids were increasingly directed 
at survival and stealing food. The patrols of January showed them that there 
was to be no immediate peace. and from January women and children fled to the 
Amatole Mountains and the Fish River bush and east of the Buffalo River .135 
Maqoma sent his wives, children and cattle to Hintza's land for protection. 
Mo'st of the Rharhabe cattle were sent to the coast between the Buffalo and 
the Kei Rivers or beyond the Kei for safety against the patrols. Streams of 
Rharhabe cattle flowed into Gcaleka land in the first few months of 1835 to be 
kept under Hintza's protection. Information given to Stretch in mid August was 
that Bhotumane and his people, and Maqoma's cattle, had been sheltering north 
of the Mbashe for some time. 136 This was contradicted by Maqoma's messengers, 
who said that Bhotumane had remained in the Amatole Mountains . 137 Stretch is 
131 (CA) A983,Memoirs of Caesar Andrews , 2 April 1835. 
132 Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage, Vol.2 pp . 82-3. 
133 See (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.C.Bowker, entry for 31 March 1835; and (CL) MS 
1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835, for descriptions of the beauty of the 
country. The colonists commented regularly on the beauty and verdance of the 
pasturage east of the Fish in 1835. These same areas now form the modern 
homelands of Ciskei and Transkei - overpopulated, overgrazed and irreparably 
damaged . The eco logical comparison is a severe indictment of the government's 
'homeland' policy. 
13. (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Vaughan to Campbell, 5 March 1835. 
135 (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, 13 January 1835; (CA) CO 4381, Brownlee, 
Station on the Beka River, 6 March 1835; CO 4381, D'Urban to Campbell, 13 
April 1835. 
136 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.123. 
137 (CA) A5l9/27, pp.65-70, Information of Fingo women, King William's Town, 
23 July 1835 . 
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correct about Maqoma's cattle being sent east, but Bhotumane seems to have 
remained behind. It is probable that many of these cattle were to be taken by 
the troops as alleged stolen colonial cattle. A Tswana spy described how Nqeno 
was warned of the approaching British and how his people and cattle moved from 
the Keiskauuna to the Buffalo in one day while he, being sick, remained 
concealed in the Keiskamma bush.l38 The women and children increasingly 
became the focus of colonial aggression, as the troops attempted both to 
destroy the morale and logistical support of the men who continued to fight 
and to capture labourers. 
Despite the continued paranoia of the settlers about Rharhabe attacks inside 
the Colony, there were very few raids after January, and those that took place 
were chiefly to gather food to replace the rapidly-diminishing Rharhabe 
supplies .139 There were a few groups in the Bathurst and Kat River areas 
raiding for cattle for survival, an occurrence exaggerated by the Graham's 
Town settlers .140 Possibly the biggest Rharhabe victory occurred on 6 March, 
when Trompetter's Drift was attacked and the camp and ferry across the Fish 
destroyed and eight colonial men killed. 141 Even while the main body of the 
colonial force was advancing eastwards, a few scattered raids occurred within 
the Colony, largely in the lower Somerset and lower Albany areas. Ziervogel 
reported that a total of twenty-three horses, fifty-five oxen and one hundred 
and thirty-eight cattle were stolen from the Goba/Kaga area north-west of 
Graham's Town in April, by parties of approximately ten. 142 Colonel England, 
who had been left in charge of the defence of the Colony, noted in April that 
there had been no body of Rharhabe entering the Colony south of Graham's Town, 
and only a few individuals in the north; and some cattle were stolen along the 
138 
139 
140 
(CA) LG 9, pp.124-6, Evidence of April, Bechuana. 
(CA) A519/1, pp.190-2, Stretch to D'Urban, 24 April 
Ibid. 
1835. 
141 Scott, 'British Soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp.198-9. 
142 (CA) I/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 15 April 1835. 
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Koonap River .14) In May there were a number of thefts in the Bathurst 
area. 1" In early May it was claimed that a few cattle were still being 
stolen near Graham's Town. I45It is at least as likely that they had strayed. 
There was no real threat to the Colony throughout 1835. 
The effectiveness of the combined troop attack on the Buffalo Mountains on 2-7 
April 146 drove the chiefs Maqoma, Tyali, Nqeno, Bhotumane, and Qasana and 
most of their people north-west to the more inaccessible shelter of the 
Amatole, and the kloofs of the high banks of the Keiskamma River behind Ntaba 
ka Ndoda .147 Most of the Rharhabe, whether involved or supportive of the 
raids or not, were forced to take refuge with their chiefs or flee eastward in 
the face of the indiscriminate destruction of the colonial troops. Stretch 
described how most of the imizi in the Amatole and Buffalo areas were 
virtually deserted, and how 'they [the Rharhabe] appear excessively terrified 
and at our approach fled to the bush leaving their cattle in our 
possession ... without evincing the least dispossession to oppose us. ,148 They 
had good reason to be scared: the advancing colonial force was 'burning and 
destroying everything that came their way'. In some places only the women were 
left. 149 An unusual occurrence, considering the normal attitude of the 
authori ties, was Goldswain' s claim that D 'Urban threatened on 3 April to 
court-marshall him for setting fire to Rharhabe huts. 150 If this is true, it 
143 (CA) A5l9/1, pp.159-164, England to D'Urban, 9 April 1835. The Graham's 
Town residents, though, remained jittery throughout 1835. Stubbs, (CL) MS 
7131, p.33, describes an invasion scare in mid-year when hundreds of settlers 
were trying to cram into the barricaded church. 
144 (CA) AS19/1, pp.262-S, England to D'Urban, 14 May 1835. 
145 As claimed by Frederick Rex to his sister, Graham's Town, 7 May 1835, in 
Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.169. 
146 For a clear picture of these events see (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar 
Andrews. 
147 (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban to I, 13 April 183S; see also P.H.Butterfield (ed.), 
Peace and War on the Frontier 1828-183S: the Journal of Ma jor William Cox 
(1982), entries for 12 April - 31 May 1835. 
148 (CA) AS19/1, pp.190-2, Stretch to D'Urban, 24 April 1835. 
1<9 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.46, 49. This was not a new method of 
warfare - it had been employed by Graham in 1812 and Willshire in 1819, as 
described in Maclennan, Proper Degree of Terror, ch.1S. 
150 Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, p.92, entry for 3 April 183S. 
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departed from the general strategy of burning Rharhabe fields, grain and 
dwellings . 
The dominance of the European weaponry was cle .~rly demonstrated in the attack 
on Ntaba ka Ndoda on 5 April. Despite the fact that the Rharhabe held the 
upper reaches of the rocky outcrops the troops stormed the area in a matter of 
hours, leaving dead strewn everywhere. Holden Bowker recorded that the 
Rharhabe had only four guns . 151 Barnard described the attack in clear 
detail ,152 but concluded surprisingly that it was not particularly 
successful, as most Rharhabe escaped and only minimal cattle were taken. This 
view is in stark contrast to the eye-witness accounts of Andrews, Alexander, 
Shepstone, Halse, Bowker and D'Urban, who describe a complete masac re. The 
Khoi leader Louis Arnoldus (a deserter from the Cape Corps who had joined the 
Rharhabe) was captured, as was his elephant gun, and he proved a useful source 
ot" information. 153 Despite his plea-bargaining for acquittal in return for 
information, he was executed a few weeks later, after he had told all he knew 
about Maqoma and hi s actions . 15' There are conflicting reports on the results 
of the attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda, but at least four thousand Rharhabe cattle 
were taken,155 and Stretch felt that many more could have been gleaned had 
Smith not been so impatient to attack. 156 
There was a second combined attack on the ravines of the upper Buffalo River 
on 9-10 April, in an attempt to trap Rharhabe escaping from Ntaba ka Ndoda . 
Cox and his 3rd Division were left to continue the onslaught on the Debe I 
151 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H . Bowker, 7 April 1835. Goldswain, who is a le s s 
reliable witness, thought that they had many more guns; see Long, Chronicle of 
Goldswain, p.92 . 
152 Barnard. 'Lewensbeskrywing van Warden'. ch.2. 
153 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.63. Arnoldus' role and fate are de s cribed 
well in Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2, pp.82-5. 
15' See (NA) A96, Papers of Theophilus Shepstone: diary for 1835, entry for 7 
April 1835~Shepstone describes the capture of Arnoldus and his gun. He makes 
it clear that the British had always intended to hang Arnoldus. 
155 BPP 279 (1836), p.28, Dutton, Official Notice, 3 April 1835, where it was 
claimed that fifteen thousand were taken. 
156 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.52. 
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Buffalo Poorts/ Buffalo mountains area, while the other divisions moved into 
other areas. The Boers of the 4th Division, having joined in the onslaught on 
the Buffalo, were then sent back to concentrate on the Tyhume, Amatole and 
northern region. The 2nd Division set off down the Buffalo River to the sea, 
collecting cattle and corn, and seizing women and children, torching huts and 
killing Rharhabe as they went. 157 They arrived at Butterworth via this 
circular route on 20 April, although suffering motivational and logistical 
problems .158 Despite this, they managed to capture seven thousand cattle and 
kill seventy-two Ndlambe .159 The 1st Division had in the meantime moved 
straight towards Gcalekaland, crossing the Kei on 15 April. This was much to 
the consternation of the resident Gcaleka160 who had until this point, 
according to D'Urban, been neutral in the 'war,.161 Two days later the troops 
camped outside Butterworth, near the old komkhulu of Hintza. 
The reasons for D'Urban's invasion of Gcaleka territory have never been 
questioned. More importantly, the events of late April have seldom been 
regarded as an invasion. The settler version :was that D'Urban's attack on 
Hintza was justified retribution for Hintza' s role as mastermind of the 
Rharhabe 'irruption'. The assumption critical to this explanation - tha t 
Hintza was the politically authoritative paramount, and must therefore have 
been in charge - has already been shown to be incorrect. 162 Each of the 
Rharhabe chiefs had independence to make their own political decisions. Why 
did D'Urban attack Hintza? Barnard suggested that, 'die werklike motief vir 
die skielike vyandigheid teen die Gcaleka-opperhoof was 'n sug na goedkoop 
militere roem, 'n onversadigde beeste-honger en boweal, die noodlottige beleid 
157 See for example, (CA) A519/1, pp.151-3, Somerset to D'Urban, 
1835; (CA) GH 19/4, D'Urban to Somerset, 8 April 1835; A519/1, 
Somerset to D'Urban, 20 April 1835. 
158 (CA) A519/1, pp.177-180, Somerset to D'Urban, 17 April 1835 . 
159 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, 18 April 1835. 
160 As described in (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, Butterworth, 
1835. 
161 BPP 503 (1837), Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 December 1835. 
162 See Chapter 2, pp. 33-4 . 
7-8 April 
pp.18s-7, 
18 April 
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van uitbreiding en anneksasie.· 163 Peires suggested that D'Urban's intention 
was merely to take Hintza's cattle as a 'soft option'. rather than deal with 
the Rharhabe in the Amatole . 164 But the reasons are more complex than either 
of these interpretations. He is still regarded as an African hero. who was 
maltreated by the whites. 165 Hintza's situation needs to be understood within 
the context of his relations with the Colony in the previous decade and a 
half . 
According to Willshire. Hintza was involved in the hostilities of 1819. The 
colonial forces moved right up to the Kei in October of that year. and Hintza 
was summonsed to appear before Willshire; but he sent his brother. Burhu. in 
his place because he feared capture. 166 White traders began trading east of 
the Kei on a regular basis in the early 1820s. A mission - Butterworth - was 
set up near Hintza's umuzi by Shrewsbury in 1827. Hintza was at first unhappy 
with the idea when suggested in 1826. but by the following year was prepared 
to accept one; he remained suspicious of the missionaries. however. In 1828 he 
had joined the British and Thembu at Mbolompo in defeating the Ngwane. where 
he witnessed the fire-power of the British. which re-inforced the wariness he 
had of them which he had exhibited in 1819. He had since refrained (unlike the 
Thembu and Mpondo) from entering into even a casual alliance with the Colony. 
preferring to retain his autonomy. Colonial power was a threat. and when a 
commando attacked a settlement on the Buffalo River in 1829. there was much 
consterna tion in Butterworth ,167 
163 Barnard. • Lewensbeskrywing van Warden'. ch. 2. Translation: • the real 
motive for the sudden aggression against the Gcaleka paramount was a desire 
for cheap military fame. an insatiable cattle-hunger and above all. the urgent 
calls for punishment and annexation.' 
164 Peires. House of Phalo. p .109. 
165 See for example the speech given by Nelson Mandela on his release from 
prison in 1990: '1 greet the traditional leaders of our country. Many among 
you continue to walk in the footsteps of great heroes like Hintsa ... •• The 
Daily Despatch. 12 February 1990. 
166 Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser. 23 October 1819. 'News from the 
frontier n • 
167 S . Kay. Travels and Researches in Caffraria: describing the character, 
customs, and moral condition of the tribes inhabiting that portion of Southern 
Africa (1833). p.302 . 
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John Ayliff replaced Stephen Kay, who had taken ove r at Butterworth for a 
year, in 1830. He was enthusiastically met by Hintza' s councillors, wi th 
enquiries as to the health of the English king and offers of help and co -
operation. 168 Hintza invited him around to his komkhulu soon after his arrival, 
presented him with a white ox (a symbol of respect), and for two years the two 
lived amicably. During Ayliff's entire period at Butterworth, Hintza allowed 
him occasionally to preach to large gatherings at the royal komkhulu, and he 
was unhampered in his itinerant prozelytising. 169 From 1832, though, Hintza 
began to become upset with Ayliff's challenges to his authority, although each 
outburst was followed by an apology and a gift. Hintza was trapped. He needed 
Ayliff, not as a spiritual guide, but as a source of European commodities and 
guns, and to mediate with the Colony.l70 But he was being undermined by him 
at the same time. '7l Unfortunately for Hintza, his missionary was not like 
Read, who argued regularly in support of his chief. Ayliff was unquestionably 
pro-Colony. 
In the following two years Hintza became increasingly uneasy, with the 
evictions of his Rharhabe neighbours. By mid 1834 Ayliff was becoming a 
problem for him. Coupled with this was the colonial outcry over the murder of 
the trader Purcell in July 1834, just east of the Kei, for which Hintza was 
blamed for indirect responsibility. Hintza showed surprising deference to 
168 For examples of his welcomes, see (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 7, 
8, 10, 26, 27 October, and 6 November 1830. 
169 (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of the AGMs of the Wesleyan Methodist Preachers in 
the Albany District, Report of Ayliff, 1831, where Ayliff stressed Hintza's 
friendliness and the freedom given to him. Three of Hintza's daughters were 
attending Mrs Ayliff's sewing lessons; see also (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, 
entri es for 9 and 10 November 1830, for Ayliff's preaching at Hintza's 
komkhulu and the latter 's respect for the service. On 8 December 1831, Ayliff 
commented that Hintza 'saluted me in his usual friendly way'. 
170 In (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entry for 29 October 1830, Hintza quite open ly 
said that he wanted a missionary purely to tell the Colony of his good 
behaviour. His request to Ayliff for guns was refus ed, see entry for 12 June 
1833. 
171 In (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 24 August 1832, 30 March and 9 
September 1833, 2 March and 11 July 1834, Ayliff stated clearly that his 
intention was to undermine Hintza and divide the Gcaleka. He accepted converts 
to the station on condition that they 'renounce the bad practices of the 
Caffirs', see entry for 28 June 1831. 
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colonial laws, and fear of the authorities; when, for instance, a Khoi man was 
killed in his country in 1832, he got Ayliff to write to Graham's Town to 
apologise. He showed much concern for the colonial authorities in 1834 after 
the death of Purcell, urging Ayliff to write a full report of his efforts to 
find the murderer. 172 
Anti-Hintza feeling in Graham's Town was becoming increasingly strident, led 
by the Graham's Town Journal. By September 1834, he decided to move further 
from the Colony, northwards to the Amava area on the upper Tsomo River, a 
tributary of the Kei. The trader Rowles complained in December that Hintza had 
become aggressive towards whites in late 1834, and that after he moved to the 
Amava his people mistreated the traders .173 Hintza was moving closer to the 
group of Boers in the area, to whom he had granted land 174 (on the Thembu 
border), and away from any colonial threat. These Boers, among them Louis 
Trichardt, were strongly anti-British, and had moved out of the Colony with 
their slaves in protest at the Cape regulations on the treatment of labourers. 
They adopted much of the Gcaleka mode of life, and during 1835 supplied arms 
and ammunition to the Rharhabe and encouraged continued fighting against the 
Colony.175 D' Urban later argued that this move proved Hintza' s involvement, 
as he was moving to the Amava to be in better communication with Maqoma in the 
Amatole .176 But Hintza moved northwards to the Amava area six months before 
172 (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries for 13 March 1833 and 6 August 1834. A 
white trader, Hanger, shot a Gcaleka man at the Knubo River in 1830, but 
Hintza waited for the colonial authorities to punish him, see entry for 6 
December 1830; see also entry for 21 March 1832 for further examples of his 
submission to colonial law. 
173 BPP 503 (1837), pp.212-3, Deposition of John Rowles to resident magistrate, 
17 December 1834. 
174 This is also Stretch's opinion, see Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.59. 
For descriptions of these Boers, see Peires, House of Phalo, p.118; Peires, 
'The British and the Cape'. 
175 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.120; (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, 
entry for 1 September 1835; Peires, House of Phalo, p . 94. cf. Smith's comments 
on Trichardt in (CL) MS 2033, Correspondence of D'Urban: Boer emigration, p. 
31; and BPP 503 (1837), p.34. In (CA) A519/3, p.19, Ziervogel to Campbell, 30 
September 1835, the Somerset civil commissioner describes a patrol sent out in 
September to capture Trichardt. He escaped and became a legendary Great Trek 
leader and exalted Afrikaner nationalist figure. 
176 (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban to Campbell, 13 April 1835. 
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Maqoma moved into the Amatole, which was a defensive, not offensive position. 
More importantly, Hintza specifically asked Ay1iff to move with him on a 
number of occasions,l77 He needed the missionary for protection, and to 
communicate with the Colony. 
Then in December 1834 came the 'irruption' . The first person to implicate 
Hintza in the attacks was Campbell. He decided on 23 December that Hintza was 
responsible. He had no evidence at all - the first attacks had only just begun 
- but he wrote to D'Urban immediately to assure him of Hintza's complicity . 
D'Urban received the letter on 5 January 1835, and in turn sent the same 
message to Spring-Rice in London. 178 Campbell insisted again on 2 January 
that there were chiefs other than those of the Ngqika and Ndlambe involved, 
and that Hintza was masterminding it all. 179 But there is ample evidence that 
he had no role on what for him was a distant frontier 180 and was, instead, 
the victim of British aggression. 
Read wrote to Philip on 5 January to say there was no reason to believe that 
Hintza had anything to do with Tyali, a belief which was echoed by Piet 
Retief . 181 According to William Shepstone, Phato sent a message to Hintza in 
late December to inform him of the hostilities, which Hintza had not heard 
of .182 When Piet Uys called in at Hintza' s umuzi on 15 January on his return 
from Natal, Hintza stressed that he had played no part in the hostilities . 183 
177 When he moved to the Amava area initially in September 1834, Hintza asked 
Ayliff to accompany him on two occasions, see (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, entries 
for 3 and 7 September 1834. When Ayliff moved to Clarkebury, he threatened to 
attack the Thembu for 'stealing' his missionary, see (CA) A80, Ayliff diary, 
3 March 1835. 
178 (CA) GH 23/11 p.94, D'Urban to Spring-Rice, 5 January 1835 . D'Urban noted 
that his information was based on Campbel l 's no t e of 23 December 1834, which 
reached D'Urban on 5 January 1835. 
179 (CA) CO 4381, Campbe l l to D'Urban, 2 January 1835 . 
180 Stressed in (CA) A519/ 1 , p.67, Read to Philip ; and Alexander, Narrative of 
a voyage, Vol.2, p.42. 
181 (CA) A519/1 , p.67, Philip to D'Urban, 18 January 1835; (CA) 1/AY/8/86, 
P. Retief to Campbell, 16 January 1835. 
182 (CA) CO 4381, W.Shepstone to Campbell, 2 January 1835. 
183 Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol.2 pp . 42-3; (CA) A558, Journal of Rev. 
W.C . Davis, entry for 17 January 1835. 
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Laing said, iconically, that Hintza was being attacked by 'Fetcani' fcom the 
east, and that he sent men in eacly Januacy to ask foe Ngqika suppoct against 
these attacks. 184 Platjie, a prisoner at Somerset, claimed upon first 
questioning in February that he was a Gcaleka who had joined the invasion. He 
later acknowledged that he was an Ndlambe who had come to steal sheep in eacly 
January, but whose group had been shot by Boecs, He admitted that Tyali had 
instiga ted the wac, that Nqeno' s people commi tted most murders, and tha t 
Maqoma, Bhotumane, Mqhayi, Mhala and othec Ndlambe were involved, but not 
Hintza. He added that all stolen cattle were sent to the Buffalo (not the 
Kei) .185 
The trader Richard Walker in Butterworth claimed in February that thousands of 
colonial cattle were streaming into . Hintza's country, and that the Gcaleka 
were moving to the Amava to make space for the Rharhabe .186 How it was 
possible for Walker to distinguish between colonial cattle, and Rharhabe 
cattle being sent to Hintza for safe-keeping is unclear. In times of hostility 
cattle were often sent to a neighbour for safe-keeping. Hintza sent his cattle 
to the Thembu in 1819, and in 1835 Nqeno sent his to Phato. Four thousand 
cattle arrived in Graham's Town on 17 April, very few of which were colonial, 
which supports the assertion that few colonial cattle were taken by the 
Rharhabe. But Godlonton distorted the explanation. He claimed that it showed 
that the Gcaleka had sent all the colonial cattle further eastwards. This, he 
said, was reason enough to continue taking cattle from the Rharhabe. and to 
attack the Africans further east. 187 Saga also suggested that the reason why 
cattle had been moving eastwards in early 1835 was that the Rharhabe were 
sending their cattle to Hintza for protection from the colonial raids. 188 
D'Urban arrived on the frontier, and was faced with a decision about Hintza. 
18' 
185 
186 
187 
188 
(CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 13 January 1835. 
(CA) I/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 1 February 1835. 
BPP 503 (1837), p.214, Statement of Richard Walker, 9 February 
Graham's Town Journal, 17 April 1835, Godlonton editorial. 
Saga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.174. 
1835. 
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Campbell remained emphatic that Hintza was guilty, and he and Smith were 
strongly in favour of as much expansion as possible. Further, an independent 
paramount with apparent control of a huge area to the immediate east of the 
Colony's boundaries was a potential threat to colonial hegemony that could not 
be allowed to remain. 1S9 But if Hintza could be pursuaded to ally with the 
Colony, much military cost would be saved. Ayliff and Davis thus went to 
Hintza on 15 and 16 January to find out what his attitude towards the Colony 
was. He treated them in a kindly way, assured them that he had only friendly 
intentions towards the whites, and gave them an ox as a token of 
friendship. 190 This, at the time when he was supposedly master-minding a 
concerted attack on the Colony. With the positive response of the 
missionaries, van Wyk was sent in January, and again in February, to test 
Hintza's atU tude towards the Colony. Smith's order was to urge Hintza to 
attack the Rharhabe from the rear. 191 In early February Hintza acceded to the 
colonial demands, and offered a thousand men to fight the Rharhabe .192 But 
he soon vacillated. The Rharhabe were his people: how could he attack them? 
More importantly, if the Rharhabe were defeated, the colonial boundary would 
become the edge of his own territory, and he would suffer in the same way they 
had. Whatever the reason, Hintza did not wish to be involved in the 
hostili ties .'93 
D'Urban was prepared for non-compliance with his demands. While he was making 
plans in January and February for the invasion of the Rharhabe and the 
annexation of their land, he also made plans for asserting authority over 
lS9 Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, saw D'Urban' s intention as destroying Xhosa 
cohesion. 
190 (CA) A558, Journal of Davis, entry for 17 January 1835. 
191 BPP 503 (1837), p.213, van Wyk to Smith, 25 January 1835; Ibid., p.213-4, 
Smith to van Wyk, 1 February 1835. 
192 BPP 503 (1837), p.214, van Wyk to Smith, 12 February 1835. 
193 van Wyk, in BPP 503 (1837), pp.215-6, van Wyk to Smith, 12 February 1835, 
suggested that Hintza was weighing up which side to join; and Bonatz, Ibid. 
503 (1837), p.180, Bonatz to Armstrong, 3 March 1835, told Armstrong that a 
similar rumour persisted; Armstrong, Ibid. 503 (1837), p.216, Armstrong to 
Smith, 13 February 1835, suggested that they encourage Hintza to join them, 
with a show of strength. 
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Hintza by attacking him, if nec essary.194 It is less than co-incidental that 
Ayliff left Butterworth for Clarkebury in February, precisely at the time at 
which D'Urban and Smith were formulating their plans to attack Hintza. O'Urban 
had not finally decided to attack the Gcaleka, but had left room for Hintza to 
become an ally, like the Mpondo. He must eithe= be a clear supporter of the 
Colony or subjugated. But Hintza chose to retain his independence. He was very 
worried about the advance of the Europeans, and was trying to halt them before 
his territory. Christiaan Muller, one of van Wyk's Boers, spoke to Hintza in 
February, who was confused as to why some Boers were fighting and others (his 
allies on the Tsomo) were not. He offered the restoration of all Boer cattle 
in three days if they would stop.'95 
Before Hintza was attacked, D 'Urban intended to have him surrounded by 
colonial allies. Hintza's position was endangered by his immediate neighbours, 
the Thembu and Mpondo, with whom relations in the previous decade had been 
unstable .'96 Ngubengcuka (or Vusani), the Thembu chief, had not returned 
Hintza's cattle after they had been sent to him for safe-keeping during the 
war of Ndlambe in 1818/19, when the British attacked the eastern Ndlambe. 
Hintza had then allied with the Bomvana, who had recently moved south, in a 
war against the Thembu, and a few years later had taken cattle from the Thembu 
whilst they were fighting their neighbours, the Bhaca. 197 In 1830 Ngubengcuka 
died and Vadana took over as regent for Mtirara. He was particularly pro -
194 Macmillan, Bantu. Boer and Briton, p.110; also cf. Chapter 3 above, 
footnotes 98 and 121. In (CA) CO 2756, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 January 1835, 
Campbell suggested that D'Urban annex all the land up to the Kei . D'Urban 
replied that he agreed, and thought that Natal should be annexed at the same 
time. 
195 BPP 503 (1837), pp.216 - 7, Armstrong to D'Urban, 21 February 1835. 
196 Hintza also had a long-standing dispute with his brother, Burhu; see Kay, 
Travels and Researches in Caffraria, p.502; and (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar 
Andrews, 2 and 17 May 1835; and BPP 503 (1837), pp.226-230, Ayliff to D'Urban, 
19 June 35. 
197 Kay, Travels and Researches on Caffraria pp.269-270; see (CL) MS 17,119, 
Testimony of E.G.Sihele on Thembu, for a description of relations between the 
Thembu, Gcaleka, Bhaca and Bomvana in the 1820s and 1830s, although the 
chronology is vague . See Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.194 for the 
slightly changed alliances in 1832 . 
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British and retained the casual alliance forged with the Colony in 1828. 198 
The Mpondo had sided with the Thembu against the Gcaleka in the cattle 
dispute. and they too had an alliance with the Colony. Ayliff had visited Faku 
in October 1834 (claiming he saw thirty thousand warriors there), presumably 
in order to lay the foundations for an alliance. Ayliff was in close contact 
with the Colony and between July 1834 and February 1835 had 'a very lengthy 
correspondence with the Government authorities,.199 He was informing them of 
the movements of Hintza and his neigbours. 
In February the Wesleyan missionary Davis was sent to Faku and Vadana to 
secure the support of the Mpondo and Thembu against the Gcaleka from the 
east,20D virtually surrounding Hintza. 201 H.F.Fynn, who had visited Faku on 
various occasions, was sent in March, via Port Natal. to remain with Faku, in 
order to ensure that he attack the Gcaleka. 202 Hintza probably did not 
realise the extent of the forces against him, but by April it was too late to 
ca'pitulate. It is unclear when D'Urban finally decided to invade Hintza, but 
it was probably when van Wyk returned from visiting Hintza for the third time, 
in March, to say that Hintza did not appear to be willing to side with the 
British. 
War was officially declared (the European convention which the Colonial Office 
recognised, but which was meaningless to the Africans) on Hintza only On 24 
198 See (CL) MS 17,119, Testimony of E.G.Sihele, p.65, where Sihele describes 
Vadana's attitude towards the Colony. 
199 (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo History, Ayliff, 1853, p.19. 
200 BPP 279 (1836) p.17, D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 35; (CA) A558, Journal 
of Davis; Theal Documents relating to the Kaffir war, pp.71-3. 
201 (CA) A558, Journal of Davis, entry for 8 October 1835. Alliances were 
particularly fluid, and soon after Davis left Clarkebury in May and Hintza 
surrendered, a body of Sotho with horses and guns attacked Vadana. Faku, 
accompanied by a white man (possibly Fynn) subsequently attacked the Thembu 
three times that year without success. 
02 Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, vol.2, p,46; see also D.G.L.Cragg, 'The 
relations of the AmaPondo and the colonial authorities (1830-1886)', D.Phil. 
Thesis, Oxford University, 1959, p.38. In (CA) A519/17 p.111, D'Urban 
congratulated Faku on being such a good ally. H.F.Fynn regularly appears - he 
was given 110 pounds for 'secret service' work in 1835, which D'Urban refused 
to explain to Glenelg, see A519/29 p.102. 
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April. But by that time an invasion force of one and a half thousand colonial 
troops, with guns and canon, had been camped in the heart of Hintza' s 
territory for ten days. The crucial question is what so many fully armed 
troops were doing in foreign territory for so long? O'Urban only described 
Hintza's supposed collaboration, as a reason for war, much later in 1835 . When 
he declared war on 24 April, the stated reasons were that: Hintza had not 
replied to the messages sent with van Wyk from O'Urban in February and March 
demanding that Hintza ally with the Colony and supply warriors to fight the 
Rharhabe; the trader Purcell in 1834 and colonist Armstrong in April 1835 had 
been killed; and violence had been committed against Ayliff and British 
traders . For this, compensation of one thousand horses and fifty thousand 
cattle was demanded. z03 
None of these complaints is valid. O'Urban's demand that Hintza ally himself 
with the Colony against his people was unacceptable for him;204 Hintza had 
sent the murderer of Purcell into the Colony and Armstrong had been drunk; and 
Ayliff exaggerated his own danger, with no reason for Hintza to be involved. 
Glenelg was, not surprisingly, confused as to why D'Urban attacked Hintza, as 
D'Urban had written to him in March to say that Hintza had nothing to do with 
the hostilities, and that the war would be over in a month. 20S A month later 
O'Urban led his troops in an attack on the Gcaleka, hundreds of kilometers 
beyond the colonial border. He then repea ted Campbell's claims of late 
Oecember that Hintza had caused the whole war . 
D'Urban now needed to convince Glenelg that the invasion of Hintza had been 
justifiable and necessary . Evidence was collected to prove Hintza's 
involvement in the war . Taken at face value, it seems to implicate him in the 
hostilities. Z06 The chief evidence for Hintza' s involvement comes from April, 
203 BPP 279 
204 BPP 503 
20S BPP 503 
206 BPP 503 
pp.53-5. 
(1836) , 
(1837) , 
(1837) , 
(1837), 
pp.33-6, O'Urban's statement to Hintza, 29 April 35. 
p.213, van Wyk to Smith, 25 January 1835. 
Glenelg to O'Urban, 26 December 1835. 
pp.212-244; see also Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, 
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a Tswana servant who had joined Nqeno' s men in December 1834 after they 
attacked the farm where he worked. He claimed that Hintza had sent a huge 
number of men into the Colony and controlled hostilities, had ordered Maqoma 
and Tyali to attack Fort Willshire, and that all colonial cattle were sent to 
his country for safe_keeping. 207 It is enlightening to note that D'Urban 
regarded April's informa tion very selectively. That condemning Pha to was 
claimed to be false, whilst that implicating Hintza was highlighted as 
correct. 
In 1836 Tyali, Maqoma, Nqeno and an 'anonymous chief' blamed Hintza for 
instigating the war, and this evidence has been paraded as irrefutable proof 
of his participation. But this evidence, and especially that of the 'anonymous 
chief' who said that Hintza planned the war from mid 1834, cannot be seriously 
considered. The Rharhabe chiefs all repeated to Smith that Hintza was 
deceitful and deserving of death, that the British were justified in all that 
they did in 1835, that little damage was caused by the Colony, and that their 
'people are now very happy; never were so happy as now; we have all faith in 
Smith, and love him with all our hearts. ,208 These statements were taken by 
Smith in the military head-quarters in King William's Town, from men he had 
conquered and humiliated, and probably co-erced. If all the blame could be 
laid at the feet of the dead Hintza, the Rharhabe chiefs might be able to get 
land or provisions concessions from the British. It was also precisely the 
sort of support which he and D 'Urban needed to defend themselves against 
Glenelg (see Chapter 6). 
The advance into Gcaleka territory in April involved the strongest section of 
the colonial force - only half was left to fight the people (the Rharhabe) who 
were hostile to the Colony. This huge force of over fifteen hundred men camped 
menacingly in the middle of the Gcaleka, next to Hintza's old komkhulu. The 
207 (CA) LG 9, pp.llO-123, Evidence of April, Bechuana, 19 February 1835. 
208 BPP 503 (1837), pp.23l-2, 234, 237, Depositions of: 'a great chief', 23 
April; Maqoma, 28 April; Tyali, 4 May; and of Nqeno, 23 May 1836. 
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Butterworth mission had not been burnt, contrary to Ayliff' s fears. 209 They 
were officially only on a mission to talk to Hintza, but were the troops not 
collecting cattle and women and children already? The Gqunukhwebe chief Phato 
and a contingent of his men arrived in Butterworth on 17 April to 'share in 
the captured cattle', although he was then sent back to fight the Ndlambe. 210 
Hintza continually delayed seeing D'Urban, who was personally supervising the 
invasion; he was naturally suspicious of such a large force which threatened 
him. He remained near the Tsomo River with most of his peoples' cat tle. 
Inebriation seems to have been the order of the day amongst the colonial 
invaders in Butterworth; alcohol resulted in two deaths. Corporal Kelly fell 
over a cliff in his drunken stupor, and the settler, Armstrong, was killed 
after he wandered from camp in a similar state. 211 D'Urban then claimed that 
the latter had in fact been a messenger on his way to the Colony, and his 
death was named as the official pretext for war. On 24 April D'Urban declared 
war on Hintza, after having been camped in his territory for ten days, and 
large-scale pillage began. D'Urban needed an official reason to explain his 
presence in alien territory, and to be able to cover the seizure of 
I Fingo' .212 
The troops moved rapidly north towards Hintza's headquarters near the Tsomo 
Mountains, accompanied by two hundred and fifty military Fingo. They adopted 
a zig-zag course as they collected cattle and burnt huts and crops. At the 
same time Captain Warden attacked the Gcaleka from Clarkebury in the east with 
five thousand Thembu under Vadana (who wanted British aid against Ncapayi and 
209 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 17 April 35; see also (CL) MS 
1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 35; and Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, 
Vol.2, ch.21, describes how the Khoi with the colonial forces destroyed 
Ayliff's garden. The mission was only burnt after the murder of Hintza. 
210 (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 17 April 35; (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to 
Jardine, 18 April 35. 
211 For descriptions see (eL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 13-24 
April 1835. Shepstone, (NA) A96, Shepstone diary, entry for 27 April 1835, 
blamed Armstrong's death on his drunkeness. 
212 See Chapter 4. 
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Hintza) and a few Sotho, seizing about four thousand cattle,21J while 
Somerset remained with his men in Butterworth to co-ordinate the cattle and 
Fingo brought in. By the time D'Urban arrived back at Butterworth on 1 May, 
Somerset had all the Fingo collected and in a military camp on the Ndabakazi 
River between Butterworth and the Kei. Ayliff and the missionaries then joined 
the military camp on 3 May, having had nothing to do with the collection of 
the Fingo. The missionaries were brought back from Clarkebury, where they had 
gathered in late April, by Warden and his troops, with five hundred followers 
from their stations. 214 By April 1835 Vadana was concerned that he had 
seriously alienated the Gcaleka and would suffer later, and asked the British 
for promises of protection. 215 Faku's offer of men to attack the south-
eastern Gcaleka was not taken. 216 
The area between the Tsomo and Xolobe Rivers tributaries on the upper 
reaches of the Kei - and west of the Kei, was then systematically stripped of 
cattle by the 1st Division, now split up into smaller units to obtain more 
booty. Most of the inhabitants seem to have deserted their huts (which were 
set alight) and fled either to Hintza in the mountains or west across the Kei. 
Most of their cattle were sent north-east of the Tsomo, or down to the coast 
and east across the Mbashe River. Hintza just escaped capture in the Tsomo 
mountains on the 26th, but by the 28th the soldiers were wreaking such havoc 
that Hintza capitulated and came to D'Urban's camp under a truce. D'Urban had 
promised him safety if he would come in to talk. But D'Urban reneged on his 
word: Hintza's retinue was disarmed irmnediately and the chief was made a 
213 Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vo1.3, p.137; Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, 
Vol.2, p.140, says that there were two thousand Thembu, and that they were 
hesitant to fight. 
214 The identity of these 'Fingo' is crucial to this thesis. It is dealt with 
in Chapter 4. 
215 BPP 503 (1837), p.226, Davis to D'Urban, 21 April 1835. D'Urban intended 
to alienate the Thembu and Gcaleka, which was why he forced Va dana and Faku to 
join him against Hintza, see (CA) A519/1, pp.197-200, Warden to D'Urban, 26 
April 1835. 
216 BPP 279 (1836), pp.30-3, Dutton, Official Notice, 27 April 1835. Faku 
presumably wanted a chance to get cattle. 
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prisoner on 28 April.2l7 
Apart from the fifteen thousand cattle (twenty thousand according to 
Andrews 2lB ) seized and innumerable huts burnt, Hintza was forced to sign an 
agreement to provide the Colony with fifty thousand cattle and one thousand 
horses, half immediately and the rest within a year. D'Urban claimed that this 
was in just compensation for the colonial cattle stolen by the Rharhabe and 
placed under Hintza's care. Where he derived this figure from is unclear. 
Hintza had no option but to agree, knowing that it was an impossible feat, but 
fearing death if he refused. According to D'Urban, of the ten thousand cattle 
taken by Smith in the Tsomo mountains, only about a hundred were identified as 
colonia1. 219 If D'Urban could only find a hundred, how could he countenance 
claims of a hundred and ten thousand stolen? D'Urban forced Hintza to send 
messengers to Maqoma and Tyali so as to force them to accept the peace offered 
on 6 May by Warden and Cox. He complained that Hintza had in fact warned them 
not to deal with the British, as he had been made a prisoner. While it is 
possible that Hintza did warn them, the case provides another example of the 
over-estimation of Hintza's power; he certainly did not have the control to 
order the cessation of hostilities. 
The movement of troops into Gcaleka territory did more than disrupt the area: 
it seems to have precipitated a civil war amongst Hintza' s people. When 
D'Urban crossed the Kei on his way to Butterworth, he was met by a large group 
of people willing to co-operate with the Colony in exchange for land. To the 
first group he promised the land around Peddie (which belonged to Qasana's 
Ndlambe) in exchange for a thousand men. These men were then used as 
2\7 (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 2 May 1835; (NA) 96, Shepstone diary, 
entries for 27 and 28 April 1835 . Hintza had little reason to trust his 
captors - Driver offered to speak to D'Urban on Hintza's behalf in exchange 
for a horse, and when he received it, told Hintza that he would urge his 
hanging, see (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 7 May 35. D'Urban 
claimed, incorrectly, that Hintza stayed of his own free will, see (CA) GH 
19/4, D'Urban, Official Notice, 10 May 1835. 
21B (CA) A983, Memoirs of Caesar Andrews, 30 April 1835. 
219 BPP 279 (1836), pp.30-3, Official notices, 27 April 1835. 
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intelligence gatherers on Gcaleka movements, as messengers, cattle herds, foot 
soldiers, and to collect cattle and women. They were rewarded with land at 
King William' s Town after hostilities ended . The second group (the Clarkebury 
group), who arrived in Butterworth at the start of May, were tho se fr om the 
mission stations who had chosen to support the British. They were given land 
at Peddie and Tyhume supposedly as a buffer for the Colony. The third group 
were taken, either voluntarily or involuntarily, into the Colony to labour. 
All three groups were called Fingo (see Chapter 4) . The Gcaleka population was 
estimated in 1837 to number eighty thousand220 (although this is probably too 
high) so that a split of seventeen thousand people from the chief's control 
(twenty percent of his people) would have been a major upheaval. The animosity 
between the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, and the collaborators did not abate; it led 
to regular assaults on the land which had been taken from the Rharhabe and 
turned into Fingo locations, and until recently it fuelled election disputes 
in modern Ciskei. 221 
Three important events, which had been planned already, occurred ten days 
later. On 9 May Somerset and his 1st Division set off for Graham's Town with 
approximately seventeen thousand Fingo, most of whom were women and children; 
and the following day D'Urban announced the annexation of all the Rharhabe 
land, which he named the Queen Adelaide Province. 222 At the same time Smith 
set out with a patrol of three hundred and fifty men, accompanied by Hintza, 
with the intention of seizing cattle. Precisely why he took Hintza with him is 
unclear. Whilst D'Urban wrote that it was Hintza who suggested the patrol in 
order to get the cattle from his people, Harington has shown that it was 
Smith's idea and motivation, and that Hintza accompanied him because he had 
220 Estimated population on 'Map of the Eastern Frontier. .. and the Kaffir 
tribes', 18 March 1837, in the unaccessioned collection of Royal Engineer 
Manuscript maps, Wits Africana Library. 
221 See Anonymous, 'Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnic ity in the Ciskei', in L. Vail 
& L.White (eds), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, (1989), for a 
description of the way in which Lennox Sebe manipulated and created Fingo 
myths in order to retain power in the 1980s. 
222 Proclamation, 10 , May 1835. He later increased the boundary in the north-
eastern area to the Stormberg on 16 June 1835, and again on 14 October 1835. 
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been threatened with removal to Robben Island, and with the confiscation of 
his land. 223 It is vital to note that the reason given by D'Urban and Smith 
for the patrol was that it was intended only to collect the fifty thousand 
cattle which Hintza had agreed to give them; none of which had yet arrived . 
They explained it as a momentary decision, based on the failure of the Gcaleka 
to meet their agreement. But this patrol. like the annexation. was planned in 
February.224 What were D'Urban and Smith up to? 
The patrol moved rapidly, and by 12 May was at the Nqabara River (halfway 
between the Kei and Mbashe). Here Hintza was shot in cold blood by George 
Southey and his body was mutilated after he had attempted to escape from his 
captors. 225 The removal of his ears had a precedent - Halse spoke of the 
rewards (normally a can of grog) given by Smith in March to Boers who were 
able to produce Rharhabe ears as proof of death. 226 Southey's actions were 
commended in the Official Notice,227 to which Glenelg later objected. A cover 
story was thereafter created by Smith,228 after Dr Campbell in Graham's Town 
had informed Philip and Buxton of the deed, and a Commission of Enquiry had 
been appointed. All stood to lose if the truth were exposed, and the witnesses 
223 (NA) A96, Shepstone diary, entry for 10 May 1835; CAl A983, Memoirs of 
Caesar Andrews, 10 May 1835; Harington, Sir Harry Smith)p.42. 
224 BPP 279 (1836), pp.26-7, D'Urban's Orders, 22 February 1835. 
225 Debate has arisen over the death of Hintza. Shepstone, (NA) A96, Shepstone 
diary, entry for 17 May 1835, says that Hintza cried for mercy. Hintza had 
been disarmed and shot three times - how could he be a threat? His mutilation 
and death are described by Stretch - see Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, 
pp.94-6; and (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse. See also Pretorius, 'The 
British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier' , for a full 
investigation; and Peires, House of Phalo, pp.111-2; and J.Naidoo, Tracking 
down historical myths (1989). 
226 (CL) PR 3562, Reminiscences of Halse. 
227 BPP 279 (1836), pp.48-51, Report of Smith to D'Urban, 18 May 1835. 
228 (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse pp. 31-2. Halse told Dr Ambrose 
Campbell of the events, who in turn told Philip. But Halse went into the 
interior before he could be subpoenaed to the Commission of Enquiry into 
Hintza's death. 'All the other witnesses being well primed, denied any 
knowledge of the mutilation, and the enquiry came to an end, much to the 
annoyance of Dr Campbell who tried, but could not revive it after my return. ' 
Glenelg, in BPP 279 (1836), p.1l5, Glenelg to D'Urban, 3 February 1835 
corroborates Halse's story. See also Peires, House of Phalo, pp.111-2. Smith's 
cover-up is clear. All the official evidence thus needs to be viewed with the 
utmost suspicion. 
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to the commission were rehearsed to swear that Hintza had been aggressive, had 
run away, and had been killed in self -defence when about to attack his 
pursuers. 229 Naidoo's hesitant suggestion that the death of Hintza was 
planned by O'Urban and Smith is not far_fetched. 230 It is in many ways the 
logical explanation for an event which was so patently surrounded by lies, and 
which would be quite within the context of the re-interpretation offered here. 
Naidoo almost withdraws his accusation, as he finds it 'almost inconceivable' 
that Smith and O'Urban - responsible colonial officials - could engineer the 
killing of a chief. Yet these are the men who lied on numerous occassions 
about their actions, and who perpetrated possibly the biggest cover-up in 
South African history. 231 
By 13 May Smith had reached the Iqora River, half-way between the Mbashe and 
Mtata, in his quest for cattle. This was described by the authorities as 
Gcaleka territory where cattle could be taken to settle the debt owed by 
Hintza. The area was actually populated by the Bomvana, who were allied to, 
but separate from the Gcaleka. 232 The Bomvana had settled between the Mbashe 
and Mtata Rivers under their chief Gambushe in the early 1820s. 233 During the 
Thembu-Gcaleka cattle dispute (see above) they allied with the Gcaleka, and 
had nothing whatsoever to do with the hostilities of December 1834. 
The death of White, one of the participants on the commando with Smith , on 14 
May reflects the entire spirit of 1835. His memorial plaque in the Cathedral 
of St. Michael and St. George in Grahamstown describes his death as part of a 
229 After the war, preference was given to the Southeys, the Bowkers and 
Theophilus Shepstone for land in the newly annexed territory, for their 
support in the cover-story and for other duties, see Galbraith, Reluctant 
Empire, p . 120. 
230 Naidoo, Tracking down historical myths, pp.80-1. 
231 Chapter 4 deals with the extent of their cover-up, specifically with regard 
to the Fingo. 
232 Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol.2, p.190, although he confuses the 
Bomvana with the Thembu. Cragg, 'Relations of the AmaPondo', p.40, says that 
there were also Thembu there. 
233 P.A.Cook, Social Organisations and Ceremonial Institutions of the Bomvana 
(1931), pp.2-7; (CL) MS 17,119, Oral testimony of Sihele; Wilson and Thompson, 
History of South Africa (1986), p.177. 
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heroic effort to defend the Colony against the barbarous attacks of the 
Caffers. He was in fact over three hundred kilometers from the border of the 
Cape, and part of a force invading a perfectly innocent people, which took 
thousands of cattle and pillaged and burnt as it went. He was surprised and 
killed away from the camp, while carelessly sketching the topography of the 
Mbashe valley . This was merely a day after Hintza had been murdered. In 
White's case the Colony was unarguably the aggressor without cause, but the 
apologists inverted the situation and gave the forces the moral high ground. 
Smith's mission lasted a week. The soldiers 'rescued' a thousand 'Fingo' ,234 
and then returned to D'Urban at the newly-formed Fort Warden, just west of the 
Kei. Thus, in a neatly-planned campaign which was rapidly executed, D'Urban 
had moved over the Kei, taken thousands of cattle and 'Fingo', destroyed crops 
and huts, murdered the Gcaleka chief, and removed the threat of the 
independent Gcaleka. The infliction on the Gcaleka is reflected in the two 
hundred cattle sent to D'Urban by Sarhili and Burhu on 10 January 1836. This 
was all they could afford to pay of D'Urban's demanded fifty thousand. The 
reasons given were that they had lost thousands of cattle in 1835, and that 
driving the Gcaleka cattle into the mountains for safety had killed the 
calves. The fact that a strip of Gcaleka land up to Butterworth was then given 
to the Colony in lieu of cattle indicates the seriousness of their situation. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the settler view of the war of 1835 is 
completely untenable, and should be inverted in most details. There was no 
massive 'irruption' in December 1834. There was a series of counter-attacks by 
a percentage of the Rharhabe, on certain areas, with no intention to overthrow 
or annihilate the settlers. It was not as destructive as the settlers claimed, 
and their own losses were exaggerated. Further, it was not 'unprovoked' or 
surprising. It was a part of an ongoing war between the Colony and the 
Rharhabe, in which the settlers were the chief aggressors. It was the reaction 
234 See Chapter 4, pp.157-8. 
123 
to a lengthy period of dispossession and despoliation. The start of the 'war' 
was not the Rharhabe response, but the colonial decision in January 1835 to 
invade the Rharhabe, confiscate their land and extract labourers in the 
process. Hintza was also ordered to join the Colony, and was invaded because 
he refu sed. The biggest army in contemporary African history was employed. It 
marched easily through Rharhabe terr itory, devastating whatever it passed. In 
Apri l the 1st Division crossed the Kei and captured Hintza, continuing its 
destruction and cattle-theft. By May the Colony was in a strong position: 
militarily dominant, with new territory and a labour supply in the Fingo. 
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Chapter 4 
THE FINGO THEIR IDENTITY AND MOVEMENTS IN 1835 
The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony was the most important event of the 
year 1835, and the one most shrouded in mystery . The orthodoxy on their 
appearance and history is rooted in Whiteside's work of 1912, which was 
derived partly from the writings of Ayliff and D'Urban, and largely from 
contemporary mythology.' The thrust of his argument was that the Fingo of 1835 
had moved south-east from 'north-western Natal', and finally into the Colony. 
This movement was generated firstly by the devastations of Shaka in the Natal 
region, and then by their ill-treatment at the hands of the Gcaleka, who 
turned them into slaves. Ayliff claimed that the Fingo numbered 16,800 and 
were all refugees from Natal. He claimed further that all belonged to the 
Hlubi, Bhele, Zizi and Reledwane and that they moved voluntarily en masse from 
Butterworth to Peddie in May 1835, where they settled. Some offered their 
services as soldiers in the colonial army. Their settlements covered half of 
the Ceded Territory, where most became peasant farmers, and they acted as a 
useful buffer between the Colony and the Rharhabe. 
As is the case with the most powerful myths, Whiteside's version is based, in 
certain respects, on truth . There were indeed a few men in 1835 who were 
called Fingo, who were Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhele or Zizi, and who came originally 
from the Natal area. There was a Zizi man in the Colony in February 1835 who 
was called Fingo, who said that he had moved south along the coast; he had 
lived with the Mpondo from 1825 to 1828, with Hintza until 1832, and with 
, See Chapter 1, pp . 15-19 . 
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Mhala subsequently. Z Stephen Kay found a few small groups of Fingo living 
amongst the Thembu in 1829 and 1830, who occupied a semi-servient position.' 
In 1837 the Fingo chiefs said that the Fingo were wanderers, some of whom had 
settled with Hintza before 1824. They had earned cattle through trade with the 
Gcaleka, traders and missionaries, and bartered Mpondo ivory at Fort 
Willshire. 4 There were Fingo who settled at Peddie, and there were Fingo who 
fought for the · army. Aspects of Whiteside's interpretation are thus in 
specific cases verifiable. 
But these cases were the exception, not the rule. Even in these examples there 
is not one person who moved from the Mzinyathi River region away from Shaka, . 
down through the 'Transkei' and to Butterworth where he became a slave and 
converted to Christianity under Ayliff, from where he was rescued by the 
British and remained permanently at Peddie. Yet this was the route and history 
claimed for every single Fingo. Of the many thousands of people termed Fingo 
iri 1835, I have been able to trace a total of merely a few hundred who were 
Hlubi, Bhele, Zizi or Reledwane. Of these there is only one case of a man 
arriving in the Colony via a slow coastal route - the one quoted above. The 
contemporary sources are virtually unanimous that those Fingo who came into 
the Colony from any distance, were directly from the interior - the Caledon 
River region. There was a group of a thousand men who were employed in the 
army in 1835 and were called Fingo, but their true identity remains enigmatic . 
And there was a settlement of Fingo at Peddie, but it was nothing like 
Whiteside's description. At its most populous - in May 1835 - it had fewer 
than a thousand inhabitants, most of whom soon left. Most importantly, the 
majority of the people at Peddie were Thembu, Mpondo and Gcaleka, who were 
only called Fingo after they arrived at Peddie. These were not successful 
peasant farmers; they were small, antagonistic groups who had sought 
protection with the Wesleyan missionaries and who clustered around the safety 
2 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Graham's Town gaol report, 22 February 1835. He had joined 
a raiding party of Mhala' s men in December 1834 and was stranded in the 
Colony. 
, Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, pp.133-4. 
4 (CA) A519/7, pp .101-4, Statement of Fingo chiefs, Bowker to D 'Urban, 5 
September 1837. 
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of Fort Peddie, and had to be supplied with provisions by the British. 
Whiteside is thus dramatically inaccurate in the most crucial aspects of his 
description of the Fingo and their identity in 1835. 
The orthodoxy is dis tor ted in two vital respects. Firstly, Whiteside's 
interpretation is patently oversimplified, which led to the covering up of the 
fact that there were different categories of people within the term 'Fingo', 
and the assumption that all Fingo met Whiteside's description. Secondly, 
thousands of Fingo became labourers in the Colony in 1835. These labourers 
spent no time in Peddie (or Natal), but were channelled immediately onto 
settler farms throughout the eastern districts from May. A list was taken in 
May, detailing the names and farms of Boers who received labourers, and the 
number of Fingo allotted to each. The fact that there were Fingo labourers, 
let alone that there were thousands of them, is not dealt with in the Fingo 
orthodoxy. Why is that? Perhaps the most startling fact to emerge about 1835, 
which has not hitherto been noticed, was that the colonial troops were 
capturing Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children during the invasion across 
the Keiskamma River after April 1835. 5 
Who were the Fingo? Four types of Fingo can be pinpointed in 1835: military 
auxiliaries; mission and refugee collaborators; colonial labourers; and 
destitute Rharhabe seeking employment. None of these seem to have had 
interaction with Shaka, and their move into the Colony was rooted in the 
growth of the Colony and its power, and its explosion in January 1835. The 
Fingo were not a homogenous group who moved into the Colony together, and each 
group had different motivations and characteristics. 
There were people called Fingo scattered, as individuals, families or groups, 
over much of the area between the Sundays and Umzimvubu Rivers before 1835. In 
1827 the traveller Cowper Rose described a group of refugees gathered around 
5 The first suggestions that labour seizures were being performed in 1835 came 
from Julian Cobbing, in lectures at Rhodes University in 1987, and in 'Mfecane 
as Alibi', p.5l4. 
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Butterworth, who were called Fingo.6 William Shaw described them in June 1827 
as 'Africans of several distinct nations, who, in consequence of wars and 
commotions ;in the interior, have been scattered and driven from their native 
countries, and have sought refuge in the country of Hintsa, who has treated 
them kindly, and allowed them to settle among his people.' He noted that some 
came 'from the neighbourhood of the Portuguese settlements on the east coast', 
in other words from the vicinity of Delagoa Bay.7 A month later William 
Shrewsbury claimed that there were five to six thousand Fingo at Butterworth, 
all of whom had been 'subdued by Chaka,.8 Given subsequent evidence, 
Shrewsbury's estimate of Fingo numbers is probably too high. Shaw's evidence 
is crucial in three respects, which contradict Shrewsbury and Ayliff. He says 
that some Fingo moved originally from near Delagoa Bay. He stresses that 
Hintza treated them well, as custom dictated for strangers. And he notes that 
they came, not from the coast, but from the interior. 
If Whiteside was correct about the Fingo moving along the coast, they would 
have had to move right across and through 'Natal', for which there is no 
evidence. But there is much material to show that those Fingo who were 
refugees, came from the interior - the modern Orange Free State and western 
Lesotho region. Ayliff mentioned on a number of occasions that the Fingo were 
refugees from wars in the interior. 9 Brownlee met a group of people at 
Hintza's kraal (Butterworth) in 1822 who had been there for a number of years. 
He assumed that they were Bechuana or Damara, as they came from north-west of 
La ttakoo . 10 The wars of the interior, reported Kay in 1829, had forced 
destitute refugees to the south, where they had been accepted by the Xhosa and 
Thembu. They were good iron smelters, like the Tswana. He found a Fingo hamlet 
east of the Mbashe River whose leader was an isanuze of Vusani, and who had 
6 C.Rose, Four Years in Southern Africa (1829), pp.93-5 . 
7 The Report of the Wesleyan-Methodist Society. for the year ending December. 
1827 (1828), p.42, Letter from W.Shaw, 19 June 1827. 
8 Report of Wesleyan Society, p.45, Letter from W.Shrewsbury, 12 July 1827. 
9 (eL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history; (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of 
Ayliff . 
10 Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol . 2, p.219; cf. Philip, Researches in 
South Africa, Vol.2, ch 10. 
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been driven there by war in the interior . 11 Somerset said in 1833 that the 
Fingo came from the north; that they had lived with the 'Goes' north of the 
Bastards, and had been driven south into the Golony.12 In October 1835, Judge 
Menzies, while travelling through the districts of Albany, Uitenhage and 
George, found 'many "Natives of the Interior of Africa", called, or calling 
themselves, Fingoes ,.13 
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of Cobbing - that there was a 
movement, amongst others, from Delagoa Bay (away from slavers), into the 
Caledon area, and then south after Griqua attacks. These 'wars of the 
interior' were not fratricidal holocausts generated by Shaka and raiding 
bands. It was the dislocation which resulted from the penetration of Griqua 
and Coranna slavers and raiders that produced the upheavals in the 
Transorangian interior referred to. Movement in the interior had been dictated 
partly by intra-African hostility, but largely by European penetration in 
search of forced labour. Portuguese slave traders and their African middlemen 
had begun to have a major impact on the Delagoa Bay/northern Natal hinterland 
from the 1810s.14 This increased disruption forced weaker groups - such as the 
Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhele and Zizi on the Mzinyathi and upper Tugela Rivers - to 
move, while the stronger groups like the Zulu and Dlamini Swazi were able to 
grow as defensive states. Components of the weaker groups moved south-west 
into, amongst other places, the Galedon River area, attempting to escape the 
disruption caused by the slave raiding. But here again there was no safety, as 
by the early l820s bands of armed Griqua and Goranna raiders were penetrating 
the area from the west, in search of women and children to be captured and 
sold to colonial farmers as 'apprentices' or 'Mantatees,.15 
II Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, pp.133-4, 293-4. 
12 (CA) GH 1/97, p.125, Report of Somerset. It is not clear to whom Somerset 
was referring, but is likely to have been the Ghoya, who were in the northern 
'Orange Free State' area. 
13 (GA) 1/AY/8/24, Judge Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835. Original stress. 
14 Gobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.504-7; and Gobbing, 'Grasping the Nettle', 
pp.8-19. 
15 See Chapter 2, pp.46-7. 
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A similar collision again occurred, and from here there was a gradual flow 
moving south throughout the 1820s. They moved individually in different 
directions, to settle with varying acceptance among the peoples from the 
Thembu to well into the western parts of the Colony, and were called 'Fingo '. 
Those who moved south into African polities were incorporated within them with 
varying status. Almost all Fingo who moved to the Colony became labourers. 
Civil Commissioner Campbell in 1834 described how 'within a few years back a 
great influx of Bechuanas, Fingos, Mantatees, and other native tribes have 
been driven upon the Colony by the devastating wars of the interior, thus 
affording a valuable supply of servants, who are esteemed as herdsmen and 
shepherds, beyond what the Hottentots ever were, and who have superceded them 
in these situations in the District of Albany, and very generally in the 
District of Somerset a1so,.16 
The earliest documentation of a Fingo that I have found was in 1824, and by 
the mid 1830s they were to be found scattered throughout western Rharhabe 
territory. There were 'Fengus' at Pirie mission station in 1824,17 who had 
come from the north where they had been dispossessed by Mantatees. In this 
case Zizi refugees were surprisingly elided with Mantatees, with specific 
differentiation between them and 'Fengus'. By 1833 there were one hundred and 
twenty Fingo at the Kat River Settlement,I8 and Fingo nearby with Bawana of 
the Winterberg Thembu. 19 Laing spoke of Fingo living near Anta on the upper 
Keiskamma, and in the Gaga and Buffalo River areas in 1832. 20 Two Fingo 
families, attached to Matwa and expelled from the Mancazana River area with 
the Ngqika in 1833, decided to move to Burnshill mission. 21 Kayser, at Knapp's 
Hope Station near Burnshill, made a few references in 1834 to Fingo who came 
16 (CA) LCA 6, D.Campbell, 4 July 1834, in reply to Philip's complaints about 
the proposed vagrancy bill. 
17 (CL) MS 2642, Letters of Mrs Ross, April 1824. 
18 (CA) 1/AY/9/7, p.38, Population of the Kat River Settlement, 7 June 1833 . 
There were also 426 Tswana. 
19 (CL) MS 17,119, Testimony of Sihele, p.35. 
20 (CL) MS 16, 579, Diary of Laing, entry for 18 September 1833; (CL) MS 9037, 
Minutes of Presbyterian Meetings, pp.261, 280. 
21 (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of Presbyterian Meetings, p.261, Report of Laing. 
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to his mission or worked for him, one of whom had to be given permission by 
Maqoma to stay with him. as he had es caped punishment.» 
The only group to have maintained cohesion in the move southwards was the 
Ngwane. who were attacked by the British in 1828 at Mbolompo.>3 In his 
movements into the Caledon and then south over the Drakensberg, Matiwane had 
gathered refugees. who became part of his doomed state and assumed the Ngwane 
identity. A clear case of the elision of the terms Fetcani, Ngwane and Fingo 
occurred in 1829, when two Fingo came to Butterworth to be married by Kay. The 
man had been with the Mantatees at Dithakong, whereafter he fled south-east 
and joined the Ngwane in the Caledon area, whom the woman had already joined. 
This group of Matiwane's was then forced south by the Griqua dislocation in 
the area, and was scattered by the British at Mbolompo.24 Precise 
classification of groups in the 1820s and 1830s is impossible, as each group 
contained refugees and disparate members. It must be stressed that the couple 
in question did not see themselves as Fingo until they came into contact with 
whites in 1829, and their original identities are unknown. 
Many of the Ngwane captured in 1828 were taken to Graham's Town involuntarily, 
from where they 'were distributed amongst the farmers in the Graham'S Town 
District. From there they were distributed amongst the Fingos on the border 
and in the Eastern Cape.' They were then redefined as Fingo. 25 An Ngwane woman, 
who called herself Fingo, took refuge at Morley in 1829 after she had been 
taken by a Thembu man as his wife-cum-servant. 26 Umjojo, a Fingo in the 
Graham'S Town gaol in February 1835, described himself as an Ngwane who had 
joined the Thembu in 1831, and had moved to the Ndlambe chief Gasela the 
22 (CL) Diary of Kayser, 19 and 22 February, 12 April, 31 May, 25 July. 4 
August, 11 September, and 17 October 1834. 
23 Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.500-3. 
24 Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, pp.299-300. 
25 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.605, Evidence of Jacob Tunyiswa. See also 
Bird, Annals of Natal, Vol.1, p.123, Evidence of H.F.Fynn to Native 
COllUllission. Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.165n. interviewed an old 
Ngwane man who called himself Fingo, and who gave a brief synopsis of Ngwane 
history, and described all Ngwane as Fingo. 
26 Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, p.333. 
131 
following year. He and three other Fingo had then formed part of a raiding 
group of nine who attacked the Colony in December 1834. The other Fingo had 
gone to the Kat River Settlement and he, for some reason, had given himself up 
to the Field Cornet at Daka's Flat. 27 Ayliff's obfuscation of Fingo identity 
is reflected in his contradictory claim that all Fingo were chased south from 
Natal by the Ngwane, and the terms could be interchanged to show that the 
Fingo were attacked by the Fingo, or that the Ngwane were chased south by 
Hngo. 
It is possible that some of the pre-1835 Fingo were Rharhabe dispossessed in 
1812 or 1819, who had moved east for protection, or Thembu and Gcaleka 
displaced after the 'Fetcani' raids from the Mokhoteli (Sotho) in the 1830s. 
It is also likely that a number of Fingo were Gonah (a Khoi group), who had 
been driven east by the expansion of the Colony. The settler Captain Bailie 
described the Fingo in Butterworth in 1835 as semi-European. 28 Ayliff 
described in detail the history and character of the Gonah in his notes on the 
Fingo, and the fact that they were living in substantial numbers around 
Butterworth, placing surprising emphasis on them. 29 Nowhere else are they 
mentioned. The year 1835 provided the turning point for the Fingo: the name 
was applied to the thousands of Africans of disparate backgrounds who joined 
the Colony as military auxiliaries or labourers, or who were settled in the 
Ceded Territory. These groups, along with the pre-1835 Fingo, had little to do 
with each other, despite their joint false history, but were welded into a 
'tribe' in the nineteenth century, a history which in turn was welded into the 
general 'mfecane' theory. 
The etymology of the term 'Fingo' remains elusive. 'Mfengu', the word used to 
describe the Fingo in modern historiography, is assumed to derive from the 
27 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Statement of Umjojo, Graham's Town gaol, 22 February 1835. 
28 (CL) MS 1272, Bailie to Jardine, 18 April 1835. 
29 (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff. The Gonah suffered greatly from the 
expansion of the Cape. Sparrman found them living between the Gamtoos and 
Sundays Rivers at the start of the nineteenth century, from where they moved 
progressively eastwards, later joining the Gqunukhwebe, and then adopting 
Rharhabe culture and lineage. 
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verb . ukumfenguza I. meaning to wander about seeking service I .30 This 
supposedly alluded to the social status of all the Fingo. But if, as Whiteside 
claimed, the British had saved the Fingo from poverty amongst the Gcaleka and 
given them all land, why should they need employment, and why should they be 
destitute wanderers within the Colony? The missionary Laing at Burnshill was 
virtually the only person to use a derivatine of this term contemporarily .31 
'Mfengu' only became standardised in the 1960s as an Africanisation of 
'Fingo', and the term 'Fingo' has thus been retained in this thesis, as the 
anglicised word for a British creation. 'Mfengu' should not be used to refer 
to nineteenth-century Fingo. 
Two alternative contemporary definitions of the word 'Fingo' are instructive. 
A 'Caffer' dictionary of 1857 defines 'iFingo' (pl. amaFingo) as meaning 'to 
force, urge,.32 This would co-incide with the idea that most of the Fingo were 
forced into the Colony to work. It also has a Latin form, having a literal 
meaning of 'to form/shape, or to alter/change (with the intention of 
untruth) I, and a figurative meaning of Ito form by instruction, or to 
contrive/invent,.33 Latin was known by a number of missionaries, and the first 
occurrence of the term Fingo known to me was on the Pirie mission in 1824 (see 
above). There is a recurring relationship, whereby where there were Fingo 
there were missionaries. It is not impossible that 'Fingo' was the term 
applied by missionaries to those who came to the stations; which was then 
bastardised and adopted as the name for a created tribe. The object of the 
missionaries was to 'form' or 'alter' the Africans. Were those who did alter 
called Fingo? Still. the term 'Fingo' is both misleading and unclear, and more 
research is necessary to establish its precise roots and meaning. 
The first amalgamated group of Fingo to appear in 1835 was that which acted as 
military auxiliaries. According to D'Urban, upon the 1st Division's arrival in 
30 Whiteside, History of Abambo. p.15. 
31 He used variations of it in 1833 and 1834. See (CL) MS 9037, Minutes of 
Presbyterian Meetings, p.261 - 'Umfengu"; and p.280 - 'Amafengu'. 
32 J.L.Dohne, A Zulu/Caffer Dictionary (1857). 
33 C.T . Lewis & C.Short, A Latin Dictionary (1966). 
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Butterworth, nine hundred and seventy 'Fingo' warriors were offered by the 
Fingo chiefs to help in the fighting. These Fingo were used in the army for 
the rest of 1835 . Of those used in Gcaleka territory, fifty were sent to 
Clarkebury, forty helped to ferry cattle between the Tsomo River area and 
Butterworth, and one hundred and thirty aided Smith in the Tsomo mountains in 
late April. 3" Quite a number acted as messengers,35 and the others were 
particularly effective in capturing cattle. 36 It seems unlikely that these men 
merely appeared, as the military reports claimed; the British army was not in 
the habit of summarily adopting untrained, untrusted locals to aid in its 
operations. There is very little evidence to point to the history or identity 
of these people. 
But, if they needed to be trusted and trained, it is possible that they were 
Ghona or Rharhabe auxiliaries, who moved east with the army in April. At least 
seventy Ghona men from the Kat River Settlement were used in the army.J) There 
were a number of Fingo living and working in the Colony before 1835, who 
could have been commandeered, and there are references to unnamed auxiliaries 
and volunteers (separate from the Khoi), who joined the troops. 38Halse reported 
that the Provisional Battalions, the Khoi divisions used in the army, included 
many Africans,J' and T.H.Bowker described a party of Fingo and two 'Caffers' 
that was sent out to spy on the Gcaleka in late April; they were armed with 
short muskets. 4o The 'military Fingo' accompanying the 'rescued Fingo' moving 
into the Colony in May had been issued with rifles,41 and Theophilus Shepstone 
noted in June that the Fingo needed more guns. 42 That Africans were armed at 
all is particularly significant, as they must have had training. All 'Fingo' 
34 (NA) A95, Shepstone Diary, p.31. 
35 (CA) A519/1, p.201, Somerset to D'Urban, 25 April 1835. 
36 (NA) A95, Shepstone Diary, entries for 24-8 April 1835. For Smith's view on 
the cat tIe-capturing ability of the Fingo, see If. Brinton, History of the 
British Regiments in South Africa (1977), p.51. 
3) BPP 503 (1837), p.84, List of men in army. 
38 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H . Bowker, entry for 23 April 1835 . 
3. (CL) PR 3553, Reminiscences of Halse, p.15. 
40 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 30 April 1835. 
41 (CL) MS 15,543, Sketch of Fingo history, p.80. 
42 (NA) A95, Shepstone Diary, p.28a. 
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who joined the army were initially placed in the 2nd Division under 
Somerset ,43 although Fingo were then used in various parts of the army 
throughout 1835. 44 A number of Tswana men - who are never otherwise mentioned 
- fought as well. 45 The number of African auxiliaries killed in 1835 is 
impossible to compute, as they were not regarded by the colonists as important 
enough to note. Why has this evidence on the u"e of Afr i cans in the army in 
1835 not been commented on? 
The Fingo military group was given land at King William's Town after 
hostilities ceased and was settled under the charge of William Fynn, who 
received a farm on the Keiskamma River in payment. 46 D'Urban said that he had 
promised them half the Ceded Territory in April in exchange for their help. 
There were also Fingo from the Kat River Settlement who were used to augment 
the defending forces before the commando left in March. Armstrong, who was in 
charge of them, found them troublesome and thieving, and most refused to go to 
Graham's Town to help Jarvis herd the cattle captured from the Rharhabe. 47 
Stretch complained that the Fingo used in early June in the 3rd Division in 
the Amatole Mountains were cruel to the Rharhabe women, stripping and flogging 
them. 4s In a particularly gruesome assault, a Fingo attacked a pregnant 
Rharhabe woman on 21 August, and slit her from the throat down . 49 Who were 
these men, who were willing to fight for the Europeans , and who were so 
vicious against the Rharhabe and Gcaleka? Were they trained mercenaries? 
The group that chiefly assumed what was to become the identity of the Fingo 
was a 'collaborator' group. Most of them were from the trans-Fish mission 
stations, and they formed the basis of the settlements at Tyhume and Peddie . 
43 (CAl LG 420, pp.124-7, W,Fynn to D'Urban, 1 November 1836. 
44 For example in the 3rd Division in the Amatole Mountains in August; see 
Butterfield, Journal of Cox, p.19 . 
45 Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief', p.87. 
46 (CAl LG 420, pp . 124-7, W.Fynn to D'Urban, 1 November 1836. 
47 (CAl 1/AY/8/86, Armstrong to Campbell, 2 May 1835 . 
4S Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.87. Dutton, Official Notice, 15 June 1835, 
said that the Rharhabe had 'just cause to dread' the Fingo military. 
49 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.123. 
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Ayliff claimed that all 16 , 800 Fingo were settled at Peddie in May 1835, where 
they remained. The Peddie location, according to D'Urban. was to encompass 
almost half the Ceded Territory, 50 and ac t as a buffer between the white 
colonists and their neighbours. D'Urban made a further suggestion in July that 
all the land between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers, between Fort Willshire and 
Peddie, be allocated to Fingo in small fortified villages. He indicated that 
a list had been made of all Fingo settled there, and their locations, although 
I have not been able to find this list. 51 Somerset reported that he had 
followed orders and placed the Fingo in the entire area . 52 
But the statements differed from what was happening on the ground. The Peddie 
location consisted in reality, not of an extensive buffer system, but of a 
small settlement of less than forty square miles, clustered around the 
protection of the fort and the Boers stationed there. 53 An 1835 map places the 
Fingo specifically on the Clusie (near Peddie) and Tyhume Rivers, not in any 
extended settlement. 54 Very few Fingo actually ended up in the Ceded 
Territory. The assumption of all subsequent historians has been that D'Urban's 
intentions were fulfilled. Crais, for instance, who has in most respects a 
very perceptive grasp of the eastern Cape in the 1830s, accepted that 1835 was 
particularly destructive to the settlers, and believed that the Ceded 
Territory was filled with a chain of peasant Fingo villages. 55 There was no 
such chain, and few 'villages'. In 1855 more Fingo were granted land around 
Peddie, which tripled the size of the 1835 settlement. Yet even this was less 
than half the size of that claimed to be populated by Fingo in 1835. 56 Any 
50 (CA) GH 19/4, p.953, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835; (CA) A519/17, pp . 25-
31, D'Urban to 1, 12 July 1835; BPP 279 (1836), pp.38-40, Somerset to D'Urban. 
51 (CA) A519/17, p .28, D'Urban to 1 , 12 July 1835. 
52 BPP 279 (1836), p.39-40 , Somerset to D'Urban. 
53 (CA) Map M3/379; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Ske tch of Fingo at Peddie ; (CA) 1/AY/8 / 86, 
J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835; BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to 1, 12 
July 1835. 
~ (CA) Map M1/2728 . 
55 Crais, 'Ambiguous Frontiers', p .38. Peires, 'British and the Cape ' , p.489, 
also assumes that seventeen thousand Fingo were settled at Peddie. 
56 For the extent of the locations in 1835 and 1855 see (CA) Map M3/379; see 
also (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of the Fingo at Peddie, for the distribution of 
the Fingo from the missions. 
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idea of a buffer seems to have been ruined by the rapid dispersal of the 
Fingo left at Peddie, leaving only a skeletal and troublesome group. 57 By 
October 1835 there were a mere six hundred and ninety eight 'Fingo' at 
Peddie. 58 
One of the most important findings of this thesis relates to the identity of 
these Fingo at Peddie . Not only was there a very small settlement, but hardly 
any of these 'Fingo' at Peddie came from Natal. In late April, Captain Warden 
had been despatched to Clarkebury with a patrol (which also included military 
Fingo) on a two-fold mission. He was to organise a Thembu attack on the 
Gcaleka, and he was to fetch the trans-Kei missionaries and traders gathered 
there. The Europeans (including Ayliff) were brought to the British camp on 
the Ndabakazi on 5 May, along with 524 'station people'. The larger, but quite 
separate mass of 'Fingo' had already been collected there by the 1st and 2nd 
Divisions in the previous week. Whiteside's claim that Ayliff organised the 
'rescue' of the Fingo is incorrect. The whole Clarkebury group tagged along 
with the 'Fingo exodus', which left on 9 May, and arrived at Peddie on the 
14th . These 524 'station people' came from the missions at Morley, 
Buntingville, Clarkebury and Butterworth,59 where they had been faced in 1835 
with the choice of white or traditional allegiance, and chose the more 
powerful. Given the low success rate of the missions, very few were likely to 
have been actual converts .60 It is vital to note that this group from 
Clarkebury was enumerated on the official list specifically as Gcaleka, Mpondo 
and Thembu. 
57 The Fingo commissioners complained to D'Urban about this from Peddie - (CA) 
A519/3, pp.26-8, 5 October 1835. 
58 (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of Fingo at Peddie, 5 October 1835. 
59 BPP 279 (1836), p.38, List of persons removed from Clarkebury, 3 May 1835. 
60 For a report on the state of the missions and conversions, see (CL) MS 
15,704, Minutes of the AGMs of the Wesleyan Methodist preachers in the Albany 
District. In 1834 there were 22 converts at Butterworth and 92 attending 
school. At Clarke bury there were 12 converts and 29 at school; at Morley there 
were 24 converts and 330 at school; and at Buntingville there were 11 converts 
and 329 at school. Laing noted (CL) MS 16,579, entry for 28 December 1834, 
that many Ngqika who used to reject the station were coming to him for 
protection, or to get the advantages it offered. 
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It was this small group that was settled around Fort Peddie on the Clusie 
River, under government agents John Mitford Bowker, Captain Halifax, 
Lieutenant Moultrie and Ayliff. 61 But in the population census of October 
1835, these same people were no longer described as Thembu, Mpondo or Gcaleka. 
They now came under the designation 'Fingo,.62 To this group there had been 
added sixty-two Hlubi, thirty Bhele and thirty-two Relidwane. Of all the Fingo 
at Peddie, there were, therefore, only one hundred and thirty-four men, women 
and children from Natal. Vmhlambiso, chief of this Hlubi group, with a mere 
sixteen male followers, had been appointed overall chief, on the orders of 
D'Vrban, from a recommendation by J.M.Bowker. 63 Ayliff's attempt to create a 
Fingo history is clearly exhibited here. In May 1835 he correctly described 
the people at Peddie as 'Native Inhabitants to the number of 500, who from 
attachment to the Missionaries, or dread of the Kafirs, had accompanied them 
[Warden]. ,64 Yet in his restructured notes of 1851, he described this same 
group as Fingo who had lived for many years with the Thembu. 65 Ayliff and 
D'Vrban were wholly mis l eading in their descriptions of Peddie. The majority 
of the small settlement was 'Caffer', who had been 'formed' or 'altered' by 
the missionaries. A small Natal group was placed with them, and a loyal chief 
was appointed by the government. This was only a fraction of those who were 
designated 'Fingo'; but Whiteside described all Fingo as living here. 
Many of the Fingo at Peddie in May left under four of the chiefs, soon after 
their arrival, and squatted at Tyhurne,66 where they were used in August as the 
61 (CA) A519/3, pp .26-8, Fingo Commissioners to D'Vrban, Peddie,S October 
1835. 
62 (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of the Fingo at Peddie by Fingo Commissioners, 
5 October 1835. But cf. (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Sketch of Fingo at Peddie, where they 
are still described as Gcaleka, Mpondo and Thembu, and the land apportioned to 
them is indicated. 
63 (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Vrban, 2 July 1835. 
64 Graham's Town Journal, 22 May 1835. The collaboration between D'Urban and 
the missionaries is evident in the fact that D'Vrban had described the same 
event in precisely the same words a week previous; see (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban 
to Campbell, 15 May 1835. A similar description had been given by Davis, BPP 
503 (1837), p.225, 19 April 1835. 
65 (CL) PR 3826, Rough notes of Ayliff, p.14. 
66 (CA) A519/3, p.29, Fingo census, 5 October 1835; A519/4, p.41, Armstrong to 
D'Vrban, 2 February 1836. 
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core of a formal settlement. The Peddie settlement was never stable, and by 
October, Umkwenkwezi was left with a mere thirty followers. Of the rest some 
became labourers on Dutch farms, others moved to Graham's Town. and the rest 
moved either to Tyhume or King William's Town. 67 The exodus from Peddie seems 
to have been occasioned largely by general malnutrition, dying ca ttle, 
dysentry and the exposed position of the settlelnent to Ndlambe attack. 68 Even 
Phato's people stole from the Fingo. 69 D'Urban gave the impression that the 
Fingo wanted for little, largely as a result of twenty thousand cattle which 
he claimed they had stolen from their • Gcaleka oppressors' in May. Again, 
D'Urban was not truthful. These cattle were not taken by the Fingo, and 
certainly did not end up in Peddie. 
There were at least twenty thousand cattle,70 but they had been 'captured in 
Hintza's country [by the colonial troops] during the five days of operations 
which had preceded the treaty of the 30th April,.7l D'Urban's records make it 
clear that they were cattle seized from the Gcaleka by the 1st Division in 
late April and from the Ndlambe along the Buffalo River by Somerset earlier 
between 8 and 17 April. They were sent into the Colony to be placed by J arvis 
with the other captured cattle.72 Somerset's orders were to take 'all the 
captured cattle collected at the time of his movement, and all the Fingoe race 
who shall have collected at the same time' into the Colony. 73 In 1837 the 
Fingo chiefs denied ever having stolen Gcaleka cattle.'4 The simple 
observation that the censuses for Fingo at Tyhume and Peddie in October 1835 
67 Ibid., p. 30. 
68 Graham'S Town Journal , 17 September 1835, Ayliff article; (CA) 1/AY/8/86, 
J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835. 
69 (CA) A519/3, p.103, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835. 
70 (CA) A5l9/18, pp.82-3, D'Urban to Campbell, 5 May 1835; cf. Chapter 5, 
pp.181-3, and especially footnote 89. 
71 Theal, Documents relating to the Kaffir war, D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 
1835. 
72 Theal, Documents relating to the Kaffir war, p.217. Ayliff, (CL) MS 15,543, 
Sketch of Fingo history, first claimed that the Fingo had acquired twenty 
thousand cattle through judicious trading. He later said that these same 
cattle were stolen from the Gcaleka in May. 
7) (CA) LG 596, pp.42-5, D'Urban's instructions to Somerset, 5 May 1835. 
74 Bowker, "Speeches, Letters and Selections", pp.39-41, Statement of Fingo 
chiefs, Bowker to D'Urban, 5 September 1837. 
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together totalled less than two thousand cattle, and that the Fingo had to be 
supplied with goats and provisions by the British two weeks after they arrived 
because they had no cattle, 75 is enough to prove this point. Again it was 
denied that the motor for destruction and theft came from the Europeans. 
Historians have explained the aggression between the Fingo at Peddie, and the 
local Rharhabe as resulting from this alleged theft of Gcaleka cattle. But the 
tension came rather from the fact that the Colony had stolen the Rharhabe land 
around Peddie, and settled it with • Caffer' colla bora tors, not from some 
imaginary theft of cattle three hundred kilometers away. The Fingo did not 
take the cattle. The British did. 
A second settlement, along the lines of that at Peddie, was created in the 
Tyhurne River area in late August 1835, under government commissioners Captain 
Armstrong, Thomson and Dr Minto. 2,014 men, women and children were settled 
around Fort Thomson, with adjacent land reserved for European farmers, as well 
as a possible Khoi settlement and an area for Fingo from the Kat River 
Settlement. 76 Jantjie of the Kat River Settlement asked D'Urban for land on 
the west bank of the Tyhurne,77 and there were a nurnber of applications in late 
1835 from colonists hoping for allotments between the Fingo locations at Block 
Drift on the Gaga River, a tributary of the Tyhurne. Captain Bain and Charles 
Miller were singled out for preference on the recommendation of Armstrong; and 
the latter had a farm surveyed for him there in November because of his 
'usefulness with the Fingo in May,.78 The area around the Tyhurne was a wooded, 
particularly fertile one with a moderate climate and good rainfall - superb 
farm land. Brownlee described it in 1822 as a densely populated region with 
the best pasturage throughout Ngqika territory,79 It formed the geographical 
axis of the expulsions of 1829, 1833, 1834 and 1835 and was the heartland of 
the Ngqika. It was the area from where much of the impetus for the Rharhabe 
75 (CAl 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835, 5 June 1835. 
76 (CAl 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Thomson, Armstrong & Minto, 24 July 1835; (CAl 
A519/3, p.73, D'Urban to Fingo commiss10ners; 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners 
to D'Urban, 29 August 35. 
77 (CAl CO 3979, Jantjie to D'Urban, no date. 
78 (CAl CO 4381, Armstrong to Smith, 10 November 1835. 
79 Thompson, Travels and Adventures, Vol . 2, p.215. 
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response sprang. 
O'Urban claimed that his original plans were to use the Fingo as a buffer, 
with an extensive settlement covering both sides of the Tyhurne to all the way 
south of the Keiskamma/Tyhurne confluence. But land had to be apportioned to 
Matwa - the senior loyal Ngqika chief, who had been staying in Graham's Town -
as well, as O'Urban had promised him land on 16 June. 80 O'Urban wanted to use 
the Ngqika and Fingo loyalists, as at Peddie to cushion against possible 
Rharhabe attacks. Within a month the actual Fingo settlement consisted only of 
a cluster around Fort Thomson on the west bank of the Tyhurne. 81 It is possible 
that Tyhurne consisted mainly of mission collaborators like those at Peddie, as 
two of the Fingo chiefs, Umhlambiso and Umkwenkwezi, were placed in charge of 
Peddie, and the other four, Matomela, Ungwana, Umbilasi and Makalima, were 
recognised at Tyhurne. The Fingo at both locations: some as collaborators and 
buffer,82 and others as labourers, were provided with goats, implements, food 
and seed corn until 1837,83 and were encouraged to plant gardens and establish 
themselves. 
Although Fingo were only organised at Tyhurne in August, it is clear that the 
land was earmarked for Fingo settlement well before any Fingo arrived in 
Peddie in early May, and most of the Fingo moved to the Tyhurne area before 
August. At a meeting in the Amatole Mountains with Lieutenant Granet on 13 
May, Maqoma (who was plied with brandy until drunk) was threatened that areas 
of his confiscated land would be given to Fingo. 84 When D'Urban first decided 
to grant land to Fingo is uncertain. Maqoma retaliated against the Fingo who 
had moved onto his land at the Tyhurne by attacking them on 4 August, killing 
80 (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entries for 26 June, 4 Aug 1835; BPP 503 
(1837), p.177, Laing to D'Urban, 4 February 1835, for Matwa's request; (CA) GH 
34/5, D'Urban to Bain, 14 October 1835, for D'Urban's grant of land. 
81 (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Thomson, Armstrong, Minto to D'Urban, 29 August 1835. 
82 As outlined in BPP 279 (1836), p.16, D'Urban to 1; (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban 
to Thomson, Armstrong, Minto, 24 July 1835. 
83 (CA) CO 4381, Fingo commissioners' letters 21 August to 21 November 1835; 
(CA) LG 14, pp.173-4, Palmer to Campbell, 2 November 1835; (CA) A519/7, p.21, 
Bowker to Campbell, 20 October 1835. 
84 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.76. 
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some and taking their cattle. 85 He did not have it all his own way, though. 
Smith blamed the Fingo in November for the ill-feeling on the Tyhume; he noted 
it was they who were aggressive and stole cattle . 86 Maqoma offered in late 
August to hand over the Cape Mounted Rifles Khoi deserters who had joined him, 
in exchange for his 'Hottentot' deserters - the Fingo. 87 This implies that he 
regarded many of the Fingo as traitors to their own people. With the Fingo 
installed on the' Tyhume as a new buffer, the area between them and the Kat 
River in the west became safe for the settlement of colonists, and in October 
Campbell was already supervising its surveying for farms. 88 
There was a separate Fingo location at Fort Beaufort on the town commonage, 
although the size is unknown. Some Fingo waited at Fort Beaufort until land 
could be apportioned to them at Tyhume, while others waited to be sent to 
farms to work, and this transitional location was growing by late 1835. 89 It 
is strange that the Fingo locations there and at King William's Town were not 
included in the detailed maps of the towns, drawn in late 1835. 90 Were the 
locations excluded from official records because they were labour camps? The 
Fingo commissioners at Fort Beaufort reported in November that the Tyhume 
settlement was growing, with huts erected, crops sown and more people, and 
suggested that more land be allotted to Fingo at Tyhume. 91 A similar progress 
report was made three months later. 92 By July 1836 Laing was describing sixty-
seven 'Fingo hamlets' in the area around Fort Thomson, where Lovedale was to 
be placed. 93 
The Fingo settlement on the west bank of the Tyhume was, by October 1837, 
twice as densely populated as when the . Ngqika lived there. The precise 
85 Ibid., p.113. 
86 (CA) A519/3, p.173-181, Smith to D'Urban, 22 November 1835. 
87 F.Rex to father, 20 August 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, 
p.l77 . 
88 (CA) A519/3, p.73, Campbell to Campbell, 23 October 1835. 
89 (CA) A519/3, pp.154-5, Armstrong to D'Urban, 14 November 1835. 
90 See (CA) Maps M1/2729 and M1/2730 respectively. 
91 (CA) A519/3, p.156, Minto & Thomson to D'Urban, 13 November 1835. 
92 A519/4, pp.38-41, Fingo Commissioners to D'Urban, 2 February 1836. 
93 Cory, Rise of South Africa, p.197. 
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identity and role of these Fingo is unclear. but it seems that many were 
collaborators. who were given land. With the disannexation of the Queen 
Adelaide Province in early 1837,9' the Colony needed to bolster its buffer 
regions, the most important of which was in the Tyhume area. The population 
had risen to approximately three thousand, with well over three thousand 
cattle and a similar number of goats. It is plain that the Fingo were 
accul turating rapidly to colonial farming techniques and cuI ture, as they 
worked particularly hard in clearing and cultivating the area, selling a corn 
surplus after their first year. The shedding of any remaining traditions is 
particularly obvious in the way in which men and women had begun to share in 
agricul tural opera tions by 1837. 95 In 1835 Fingo women had done the work 
alone, as custom dictated. 96 The Fingo had expressed a desire for a missionary 
and D'Urban appointed James Weir at Tyhume, ahead of Ayliff. The latter had 
fallen from grace, despite his protestations that he qualified for the post,97 
and wanted to be transferred from Peddie. 
Like Tyhume and Peddie, King William's Town in 1835 and 1836 had the dual role 
of supplying land and labour. Fingo were being distributed well into the 
Colony from King William's Town (see below). The Fingo chiefs Jokweni and 
Mabanthla moved there voluntarily in August, but other Fingo were kept in 
transit before being indentured in the eastern districts as labourers. By 
October there were over five hundred Fingo families (about two thousand 
people) at King William's Town,98 where W.Fynn was made superintendent of all 
Fingo in the Queen Adelaide Province. They were attacked in August by the 
local Ndlambe men, who were repulsed by the soldiers guarding the Fingo. 99 
Fynn complained in October that the King William's Town Fingo were not getting 
9. See Chapter 6, pp.191-203. 
95 The information on the Fingo in 1837 comes from an informative report from 
Thomson to D'Urban, A519/7, pp.176-8, 23 October 1837. 
96 The sex delineation was commented on by the Fingo commissioners, (CA) LG 14, 
pp.15-6, Fingo commissioners to Hudson, 11 November 1835. 
97 (CA) A519/4, p.41, Armstrong to D'Urban, 2 February 1836. 
98 (CA) LG 13, p.165, W.Fynn to Hudson, 29 October 1835. 
99 Cory, Rise of South Africa, p.196. 
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enough supplies, 100 and needed more land, and D'Urban responded immediately 
with seed corn. 
What was the plan behind these three Fingo locations? As can be seen, the 
evidence on Fingo in 1835 is scanty and piecemeal. It does show distinctive 
categories within the term 'Finga', and it does give glimpses of movement and 
hints of a general policy. But there remain huge gaps in the jig-saw, and 
especially on the activity in these three settlements. There are ce rtain 
consistencies between and features common to Tyhume, Peddie and King William's 
Town. Each settlement had elements of each type of Fingo: labourer, 
collaborator (peasant farmer) and military . The Tyhume complex included Fort 
Beaufort, where there was a large Fingo camp on the commonage, from where 
Fingo were distributed as labourers in southern Somerset and northern Albany. 
There were land-owning collaborators around the Tyhume, and a military 
contingent in Fort Thomson, in the centre of the settlement. Peddie regularly 
sent labourers into the Colony; it had a gradually weakening collaborator 
settlement; and a military force in Fort Peddie. King William's Town provided 
many labourers for the Colony, as far west as Knysna (see below), and had its 
share of collaborators with land. Because it was furthest into African 
territory it had the largest military force, with a fort, Khoi soldiers and 
most of the Fingo military. Each of the settlements was attacked on a number 
of occasions by local Rharhabe. 
A further feature common to all three was the placing of settler farms in 
their immediate vicinity in 1835, after the annexation of the Queen Adelaide 
Province. A substantial number of farms were granted along the Buffalo River, 
near King William's Town, and the Fingo commissioners at both Tyhume and 
Peddie had instructions to intersperse the Fingo land grants with European 
farms, which were surveyed in late 1835. It is unlikely that African peasant 
farmers would be set up in direct competition with white farmers, so what was 
the point of the Fingo locations? Were they specifically engineered as 
100 (CA) LG 13, p.165, W.Fynn to Hudson, 29 October 1835 . 
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agriculturally self-supporting and militarily self-defending units situated 
strategically in the newly conquered territory, to extract local labour for 
the colonial market, and to provide the adjoining new settler farms with a 
permanent labour supply? In other words, were they the basis of a 
consolidation of the expanded settler farm land, in terms of both security and 
labour, and a rural labour pool for colonial farms? 
Because there was no such thing as a 'Fingo tribe' before and during 1835, it 
was impossible for there to be natural chiefs. If the Fingo were being 
amalgamated and tribalised, there had to be African men in charge of them, 
apart from the white commissioners. Whiteside claimed that the Fingo chiefs 
were all from Zizi, Hlubi, Bhele and Reledwane royal lineages, and that they 
had pretended not to be chiefs when with the Gcaleka, to avoid victimisation. 
But the evidence suggests that they were collaborators and opportunists, who 
were prepared to follow British orders on the management of the Fingo. The 
collaborators from the missions were placed under them, and it was claimed 
that the labourers who had disappeared as farm labourers also fell under their 
control. The chiefs in 1837 claimed the history which Ayliff wrote in the 
Graham's Town Journal in 1835, as their own. But was this genuine or were they 
supporting a myth? The chiefs changed fairly rapidly. In May 1835 Ayliff said 
that the chiefs were Umhlambiso, Matomela, Jokweni, Umkwenkwezi, Ucwana, 
Uhliso, Umkwali, Unontshatsho and Umkuzongwe;101 D'Urban gave land to 
Umhlambiso, Matomela, Jokweni, Umkwenkwezi, Ungwana, Umbilasi, Amandoda, 
Makalima and Mabanthla. 102 In 1845 the recognised chiefs of the 'Fingo tribe' 
were Jokweni, Matomela, Umkwenkwezi, Mabanthla, Kaulela, Pahla and Jama. 103 
In 1854 the only two left of the original nine were Jokweni and 
Matomela. 10' Within two decades, the entire chief hierarchy had changed, 
presumably as a result of the dismissal of chiefs not meeting British 
expectations. 
101 (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, Clarkebury, 1 May 1835. 
102 (CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Census of Fingo at Peddie, 5 October 1835; (CA) 
1/AY/8/24, Thomson to D'Urban, 29 August 1835 . 
103 (CA) GH 19/5, Treaty between Maitland and the Fingo chiefs, January 1845 . 
10' Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.595-8. 
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There seems to have been indecision in 1835 as to who was to be appointed as 
chiefs. The chiefs at Tyhume 105 were not those whom Ayliff had listed as 
chiefs in May 1835. 106 They in turn differed from Theophilus Shepstone's list 
of April , 107 where the Fingo totalled merely 1,120 . Shepstone had said on 19 
April that there were only three Fingo chiefs, and that it was they who 
offered nine hundred and seventy military men. lOB Jokweni, who by the 1850s 
was one of the wealthiest Fingo chiefs, was no hereditary chief, but because 
of his post-1835 importance, ethnographers like Bryant inserted him into the 
Zizi royal genealogy.109 He clearly had the support of the British in 
1835,llO although he moved from Peddie to King William's Town, and finally 
settled back at Peddie. 111 Makalima had lived near Ayliff for a while before 
1835, and his loyalty could thus be trusted. ll2 It is significant that when 
Ayliff listed the 'Fingo chiefs' in May 1835, Makalima was not among them. 113 
It was decided to appoint him as a chief only once he had arrived in the 
Colony. Mabanthla was also recognised as a chief for the first time when 
inside the Colony . Both became Fingo chiefs with British backing. Veldman 
Bikitsha later commented that Umkwenkwezi, Jokweni and Umhlambiso did not 
appear in the respective Bhele, Zizi and Hlubi royal genealogies. 114 If this 
is correct, not one of the men given land in 1835 and appointed as chiefs had 
any claim to a position, apart from their loyalty to the British. They were 
all collaborators. Bouch has also found British appointments of Fingo chiefs 
in the Queenstown area in the 1850s and 1860s.115 
105 (CA) 1/AY/8/24, p.129, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 1835. 
106 (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D'Urban, 1 May 1835. 
107 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.90c. Moyer, Ibid., p . 190, commented on 
the dissimilarities in the various lists of chiefs made between 22 April and 
9 May, which is when D'Urban was choosing whom he was to recognise. 
lOB (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 19 April 1835. 
109 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.184n. 
110 As stressed by Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections', pp. 20-1. 
111 (CA) A519/3, p.103, J . M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835 . 
112 (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, 29 August 1835. 
113 (CA) A519/2, Ayliff to D' Urban, 1 May 1835. 
114 (CA) NA 623, Evidence of Veldman Bikitsha to the Lagden Commis s ion, 1905. 
115 R.Bouch, '"Clan segments" and economic stratification amongst the 
Queenstown Mfengu, 1850s to late l870s', Seminar Paper, Rhodes University, 
1989 . 
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It is hardly surprising that the chiefs had little power and less respect,l16 
as there was little bond between the newly created tribe and the appointed 
collaborator leaders . Less than a month . after their settlement, J.M.Bowker 
sent a batch of letters complaining about the Fingo at Peddie, and the way in 
which they were divided and fighting - even killing - each other. There were 
clearly problems in getting the Fingo to unify and accept the chiefs, and some 
Fingo refused to acknowledge chiefly authority and remained independent . 
Bowker had to arrest and remove a Khoi, Hermanus, as he was attracting Fingo 
away from the chiefs .117 This view is far from the mystical tale of 
spontaneous Fingo unity and joy given by Veldman Bikhitsha and Whiteside later 
in the century . 118 In order to entrench the appointed chiefs as leaders, they 
were given suits and knives by the British; 119 they also received and 
distributed land, which their followers were unhappy about . 120 
Rivalry between the Fingo chiefs to create a following began immediately, and 
continued throughout the century, with the power of the chief depending less 
on his claim to hereditary chieftaincy, than on his ability to ensure colonial 
support and land grants . Whites also became involved in the chiefly rivalries. 
James Read junior accused Henry Francis Fynn of organising the murder of 
Makalima in 1843. 121 At Peddie Theophilus Shepstone took over from J .M.Bowker 
in 1839 as agent. By 1845 he was the self-proclaimed paramount chief of the 
Fingo . The fortunes of the Fingo chiefs can be easily charted over twenty 
years by seeing who was officially recognised by the Colony.122 
The Fingo chiefs fulfilled the role of sub-magistrate, under the Fingo 
116 (CAl 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835 . 
117 (CAl 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 5 and 9 June, 20 October 1835; (AMl 
SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835. 
118 (CAl NA 623, Evidence of Veldman Bikitsha to Lagden Commission, 1905 . 
119 (CAl A519/3, p.103, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 10 November 1835. 
120 Graham's Town Journal, 17 September 1835, AyUff article. They were also 
given cattle to distribute to their followers, see (CAl GH 34/5, p.21, 
Campbell to D'Urban, 14 July 1835. 
121 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p. 200. 
122 Ibid., pp.595-8 for an analysis of the Fingo population and property in the 
1850s. 
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commissioners, in order to create a structure of control over the Finga. as 
suggested to O'Urban by Bowker. '23 In 1836 Makalima was appointed Veld 
Commandant at Tyhume, and Mhlambiso at Peddie. Others were appointed to the 
posts of Veld Cornet 124 on the recommendation of the Fingo commissioners in 
order that the chiefs 'would possess a more defined authority over their 
people than they do at present' .'25 This system of co-optation became 
increasingly wide-spread in the Stockenstrom period after 1836. and had proved 
an effective method of subjugation by the 1850s. 
The Fingo. then. can be seen as a case of intentional tribalisation - a 
disparate group of mainly Rharhabe and Gcaleka. with Mpondo. Thembu and a few 
Ngwane, Hlubi, Bhe1e. Zizi and Reledwane. given the identity and name of a 
small minority, who were imposed as leaders. with a manufactured history. 
Ranger has described how the British set up systems and traditions which those 
Africans who wished to ingratiate themselves with the authorities or gain 
power through them, adopted and followed. These alien systems and traditions 
were later accepted as customary, and their origins forgotten. 126 
O'Urban made it clear that a chief reason for bringing Fingo into the Colony 
was of • furnishing a supply of hired servants to the colonists' .'27 A 
substantial percentage of Fingo ended up as labourers .'28 That there was a 
labour shortage in the 1820s and 1830s (especially in the Eastern Cape) is 
indisputable. Bathurst in 1833 had a mere one hundred and forty Khoi and 
Mantatees to provide labour for the nine hundred Europeans,'29 although this 
was an improvement from the complete lack of servants in 1824. The population 
figures for the late 1820s show the eastern Cape with 86 non-whites (42 in 
123 (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to O'Urban, 2 July 1835. 
12' Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p.197. A similar system was applied to the 
Ndlambe; Mhala and Mqhayi became Field Commandants, and Siyolo and Qasana 
Field Cornets. 
125 (CA) A519/4, p.40, Fingo commissioners to O'Urban, 2 February 1836 . 
126 T.Ranger, 'The invention of tradition in colonial Africa' in E.Hobsbawm & 
T.Ranger. The Invention of Tradition (1989). 
127 (CA) l/AY/8/24, O'Urban to Campbell, 14 October 1835. 
128 (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1835. 
129 (CA) LG 7. Population returns for Bathurst, 1833. 
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Albany) to every hundred whites, compared with the Western Cape median of 134 
to a hundred. 130 The labour shortage was regularly a subject of concern to 
the eastern colonists: 'W.G' wrote to the Graham's Town Journal in 1833 to 
describe the scarcity of labour as 'the cause of all our troubles' .131 The 
1836 Cape Blue Book is vague as to the number of 'aliens' (Fingo, Mantatee and 
Bechuana) in Albany and Somerset, but makes it clear that: 'Great numbers of 
these are in the service of the farmers. 0132 It lists 1,575 aliens working 
for farmers in Graaff-Reinet. By 1838, there were officially over six thousand 
Fingo in the Colony (3,517 in Albany), which inverted the figures to 134:100 
in the East, and 119:100 in the West. In summary, in Albany in 1828 there was 
a ratio of forty-three non-whites (potential labourers) to every hundred 
whites. In 1838 there were one hundred and forty-one to every hundred whites. 
The war of 1835 completely inverted the labour situation in Albany. 
The 'arrival of the Fingoes, , wrote Ayliff, 'conferred an invaluable boon on 
the Colonists, who at that time were greatly suffering from the want of 
labour' .133 The missionary at Bethelsdorp commented in 1837 that 'there has 
not been the same demand for labourers as formerly, a great number of Fingoes 
having come into the Colony, who are employed at lower wages than those 
usually given to Hottentots. ,134 In the same year a group of eighty Fingo 
(with families) were prepared to sell their cattle in order to ensure 
employment at Slaai Kraa1. 135 Moyer noted the large number of Fingo workers 
in Port Elizabeth in the 1840s who were ousting the Kboi as cheap labour. 136 
By 1842 there were several thousand Fingo and Tswana working in Cradock 
alone .137 It is significant that the myth of the Fingo was generated in the 
130 For a population analysis, see Appendix 2, population of the Cape etc. 
131 Graham's Town Journal, 14 February 1833, Letter from 'W.G.'. 
132 Cape Blue Book, 1836, p.201. 
133 (CL) PR 3826, Rough Notebook of Ayliff, p.2. Ayliff pinpoints Ordinance 50 
and the Emancipation of the slaves as most harmful to the labour situation, 
but says that the abundant Fingo labour solved it. 
134 Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, p . 253 . 
135 (CA) 1/AY/8/50, Hudson to Campbell, 22 July 1837. 
136 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', ch.4. See Chase, Cape of Good Hope, p.238, 
for Fingo surf labourers at Algoa Bay. 
137 Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p. 261. 
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region which stood to gain most from their arrival - Albany - and received 
generous support from the whole eastern Cape, to which they were such a boon. 
The first extensive group of Fingo brought in to work was that accompanying 
Somerset (who had organised the Mbolompo affair) in May 1835, who were, 
according to the Ayliff/Whiteside myth, settled at Peddie. Some were retained 
at Fort Wellingtonl3• and Fort Warden'" to work on the buildings, and at 
least two hundred accompanied Somerset to Graham's Town, where they were 
immediately indentured.I'o In his attempt to explain why there were Fingo 
employed in the Colony, Ayliff wrote that most of the Fingo at Peddie wanted 
to work in the Colony.I'1 It seems that virtually all the 16,800 Fingo moved 
immediately to Graham's Town, where a location was set up on the outskirts of 
town. Fingo awaiting employment were to reside there, from where the Graham's 
Town residents eagerly took labourerS .1'2 There were so many Fingo entering 
into contracts in Graham's Town with colonists, that an extra clerk was 
appointed in July to countersign the service contracts. I'3 In the same month 
Godlonton complained that the area around Graham's Town was 'teeming' with 
unemployed Fingo. I" The influx of labourers influenced the evolution of a 
sub-culture of Fingo, other Africans, and Khoi, whose ribald behaviour in High 
Street led to regular arrest. I'5 
When the Fingo were brought under military escort to Graham's Town in May, 
Colonel England took a list of their names and those of the Boers to whom they 
138 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 22 May 1835. There were twenty 
men, forty women and fifty children. 
13. Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, Vol. 2, p. 215; (CL) MS 951, Diary of 
T.H.Bowker, entry for 10 May 1835. There was still a large number there in 
1836, see (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1835. 
1'0 Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.209; see also (CA) 
CO 2756, Jarvis to Campbell, 26 May 1835. 
1'1 Graham's Town Journal, 17 September 1835, Ayliff article . 
1'2 (CA) CO 2756, Jarvis to Campbell, 26 May 1835. 
1'3 (CA) 1/AY/9/62, W.Smith to Campbell, 4 July 1835. Aldwin was appointed . 
I" Graham's Town Journal, 28 July 1835, Godlonton editorial. 
1<5 See (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Graham's Town Magistrate's Records, 1835-6, for numerous 
examples. 
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were being indentured, and distributed it to all Civil Commissioners. l46 This 
list has not been found, which is particularly suspicious. At least ten copies 
must have been made, but none of them have survived. One list of Fingo 
labourers would have completely undermined D'Urban's explanation of their 
origins if it had somehow come to the attention of the Colonial Office. Did 
D'Urban order them to be destroyed? The majority of the Fingo were employed on 
farms as far afield as Graaff-Reinet, but the magistrate's records do show 
Fingo women working as domestics in Graham's Town. 147 
An important insight into the status of the Fingo and rare impartiality of 
colonial law - which was in practice a racially-tiered system - is the case 
of Macapella, a Fingo, who in December 1835 took his master Norris of Assegai 
Bush to court for maltreatment. After hearing oral testimony from the colonist 
and his servant, the magistrate found in favour of Macapella .148 The Fingo, 
as British subjects,I49 and despite their social status, were accorded access 
to the law, and even justice. The court records show Fingo working in Graham's 
Town and its surroundings at average wages, in the line of three heifers a 
year . Some were also working for money by July, implying an early immersion in 
the colonial economic system. Some of these Fingo had been labouring in Albany 
since early 1834, but most came in 1835. 150 As early as February 1835 there 
was a convict labour party of twenty Fingo working outside the Graham's Town 
146 England wrote to D'Urban from Graham's Town on 10 May 1835 - (CA) A519/2, 
p.24 - saying that he had made lists and made them available. Despite an 
extensive search, I have not been able to locate one copy in the Cape 
Archives . 
147 For example, (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's Records, Graham's Town, 11 January 
1836. 
148 (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's Records, 22 December 1835. For other examples 
of Fingo access to the law, see the cases of (CA) CO 2756, November 1835. 
149 The question of what Fingo were entitled to as British subjects, and how 
the authorities responded to the unique situation, is dealt with in Chapter 6, 
pp.210-212. 
150 See the examples of earlier indenture in (CA) 1/AY/1/4, Magistrate's 
Records, Graham's Town, 21 and 28 July, 15 and 24 August 1835, 8 February 
1836. For Fingo working near Graham's Town, see also (CA) 1/AY/8/86, 16 May 
1835. 
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gaol, some of whom had joined the invasion of the Colony. 151 At the outbreak 
of hostilities, a considerable number of Bechuana and Fingo servants were sent 
with their masters' cattle to the safety of Theopolis .152 Alderman was 
appointed superintendent of the Fingo in Graham's Town in November, with a 
salary retroactive to 20 May, where he had been supervising all the many 
'Fingo' looking for employment in Graham's Town. 15] By November Campbell waS 
noting that 'the Fingo people [are) continuing to arrive in Graham's Town from 
the new [Queen Adelaide) Province in greater numbers than can find employment 
with the farmers here' ,154 and promised to send fifty families to Uitenhage 
immediately. It is significant that these Fingo were coming from Ndlambe and 
Ngqika territory where the colonial army had destituted the Rharhabe. It was 
these people who formed the fourth category of Fingo - destitute Rharhabe. 
Of crucial importance in determining the identity of the Fingo, is the manner 
in which they entered the Colony. Circumstantial and empirical evidence 
indicates ' that a good percentage of the Fingo who ended as labourers came 
involuntarily . There was, as outlined in Chapter 2, an extensive precedent of 
colonial seizure of aboriginals for labour purposes. This leads to obvious 
questions about the maintenance of co-ercion after indenture, and the ensuring 
of the secrecy of the action. Ayliff' s fantasy of leading the Fingo into 
salvation, like Moses and the Israelites, is untenable; he had little to do 
with the movement of the Fingo. Henry Dugmore in the 1850s extended this 
biblical metaphor, likening the Fingo to the exodus of the Children of Israel 
from Egypt, whereby the Kei became the Red Sea and the Colony the land of 
promise. 155 Ayliff's theological impositions on the history of the Fingo are 
151 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Graham's Town gaol report, Statement of Umjojo, 22 February 
1835. There were a number of Fingo who fought against the Colony in 1835: (CL) 
MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 5 September 1835, where Bowker talks of 
Fingo fighting for Gasela. 
152 BPP 503 (1837), p.180, Barker to Campbell, 13 January 1835. 
IS] (CA) 1/AY/8/24, W.Smith to Campbell, 12 November 1835. 
154 (CA) 1/AY/9/19, Campbell to Uitenhage Civil Commissioner, 6 November 1835. 
155 H.H.Dugmore (ed. van der Riet & Hewson), The Reminiscences of an Albany 
Settler, (1958), p.87. A.M.McGregor, 'A History of the Fingoes 1835-1879', 
B.Ed Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1930, is based on the extended metaphor 
of the Jews and Fingo having parallel histories and characters. 
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also evident in the way in which, as noted, he arbitrarily decided that there 
must originally have been twelve tribes (each sixty thousand strong) from whom 
the Fingo were descended .156 But disregarding Ayliff' s explanation leaves 
open the question as to how the Fingo did enter the Colony, and to what extent 
they came to labour voluntarily. Whenever there is mention of Fingo movement 
in 1835 there is an armed guard or escort with them . This clearly needs an 
explana tion. 
During the attacks on the Amatole Mountains in early April a number of 
Rharhabe women were captured and brought into camp,157 but very little was 
said of them, as was the case with women and children captured in the Fish 
River bush.158 T.H.Bowker reported that fifty women joined the British during 
the attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda on 7 April, and that the following day many women 
- apparently Nqeno's people - came to the camp.159 No further mention is made 
of them, and they were presumably either employed for the pleasure of the 
troops or taken into labour. The Rharhabe women around Burnshill were advised 
by the 3rd Division to move out of the bush, but they refused, as those who 
had fled to D'Urban's camp had been raped,160 On 7 April Smit.h led a patrol 
into the bush around the Pirie mission where he 'captured 2500 cattle[,] 15 
women and a hottentot of the name of Lewis Arnoldus',161 T.H.Bowker's diary 
provides oblique references to the capture of Gcaleka women and children in 
late April while his patrol was hunting for Hintza. 162 
1~ (CL) MS 15,276, Papers of John Ayliff, p.5. 
157 Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.94-5; Alexander, Narrative of a voyage, 
Vol.2, p.80. 
158 Harington, Sir Harry Smith, p. 30. 
159 (CLl MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 7 and 8 April 1835 . 
160 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p. 6l. 
161 (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 7 April 1835. See also Alexander, 
Narrative of a voyage. p.SO. A similar description is given by Goldswain. 
Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.94-5, who mentions that one of the women had 
given birth the previous day but had been forced to walk five miles. 
162 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entries for 26 April 1835: 'catch several 
horses, and some Kafir women and children, these latter were let go as 
useless'; they moved on and 'find some more women and children'; 28 April 
1835 : shot a woman by mistake 'and return without taking her'; 6 May 1835: 
'Maqoma and Tyali's cattle and women and children have not been found and 
taken' . 
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The evidence for the seizure of Rharhabe women and children west of the Kei in 
1835 is clear, but that for the taking of captives east of the Kei more 
circumstantial. The fact that there was definitely capturing of Rharhabe by 
the troops t and yet the evidence for it has always remained intentionally 
hidden, merely emphasises the extent to which this illegal behaviour was 
taking place and being covered up. There was no question that the Colonial 
Office would have launched a high level enquiry, with very serious 
consequences for the Cape authorities, had it been known that Africans were 
being captured and forced to labour and that the British administrators were 
actively involved in planning this. D'Urban had planned for the invasion of 
the innocent Gcaleka before April, and by May he brought seventeen thousand 
'Fingo' into the Colony, most of whom were labourers. Had he planned a general 
labour seizure to deal with the colonial demand? It was not co-incidental that 
this solved the acute labour shortage in the eastern districts . There had been 
a .long precedent for the capture of African women and children outside the 
Colony and brought in under euphemistic explanations to work. Labourers were 
being captured west of the Kei in 1835. The reasonable conclusion is thus that 
most of the 'Fingo' were Gcaleka (and Rharhabe) women and children captured 
illegally, and that the methods and accounts of capture were censored in 
official documents and excluded from private papers. 
The seizure of women continued. Bailie returned to King William's Town from 
the Pirie area on 21 June with a large patrol (just before he was killed), 
having killed eight Rharhabe and 'captured 100 Caffre women with as many 
children' . 163 Was his death in the same area three days l ater164 retaliation 
for these captures? Godlonton described this patrol as 'most judiciously and 
spiritedly conducted'. but neglected to mention the captives .165 A second 
patrol was sent out westwards from King William's Town to the Debe Flats, also 
on 21 June, under Sutton and Granet. They returned with four women and sixteen 
163 
16. 
165 
Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.98, 22 June 
See Chapter 5, p.170. 
Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, p.196. 
1835. 
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children. 166 A party of military Fingo chasing the Ndlambe eight miles 
outside King William's Town on 2 July seized twenty women, who were brought 
back with the other plunder. 167 They were presumably sent to Boer farms as 
forced labourers. Stretch received a complaint from an elderly Ndlambe man in 
1836 that his son had been forcibly seized from his garden on the Keiskamma by 
D'Urban's forces returning to the Colony, and made to work on the farm of a 
Boer named 0 .Niekerk. 168 
It is important to remember that women and children formed the majority of the 
labour seizures in the Caledon valley, and were the preferred captures, as the 
women were pliable and the children young enough to be subdued and inculcated 
to fulfill colonial labour demands . Men could defend themselves .169 Newton-
King provides similar explanations for why the majority of labour captives in 
the Graaff-Reinet district were women and children. l7O Eighty-eight percent 
of the May Fingo were women and children. Were they not mainly captured 
labourers? It is probable that the British seizure of cattle in Rharhabe 
territory - from the Ama thole, Keiskamma and Buffalo areas - and Gcaleka 
territory (especially in the week of 17-24 April in Butterworth) was 
accompanied by the capture of Africans, who were brought back to work. Why 
else would the Fingo have needed the entire 2nd Division (including military 
Fingo) to 'protect' them on their journey into the Colony, when Warden needed 
only a small patrol to ferry six hundred people through Gcaleka territory? A 
fake history would then have been necessary to cover the actions. 
Between 24 April and 14 May there were a number of attacks on the main group 
166 Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, p.197. 
167 (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 2 July 1835. 
168 (CA) LG 420, p.57, Report of Stretch, 1836. 
169 See for example the arguments proposed by the Advisory Council in 1827, BPP 
252 (1835), p.12, when discussing the implementation of Ordinance 49 . The 
civil commissioners from around the country had suggested that children be 
used as the main labour supply because of their obedience and inability to 
protest or rebel. 
170 Newton-King, 'The enemy within'. 
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of Fingo, by Gcaleka in Butterworth,l71 and by Ndlambe on their way into the 
Colony. There were also innumerable attacks on the Fingo who were aiding the 
Europeans militarily.172 Most of the attacks occurred after the capture of 
Hintza, and D'Urban responded by threatening to hang Hintza and kill two of 
his entourage for each Fingo killed, unless the attacks ceased. lll What was 
happening? There are various explanations for these attacks, each of which 
depends on the identity of the mass of Fingo gathered by the army. Godlonton's 
explanation (reflecting Fingo orthodoxy) was that the attacks resulted from 
the anger of the Gcaleka at the loss of their Fingo slaves, and their theft of 
twenty thousand Gcaleka cattle. This has been shown to be incorrect. A second 
possible interpretation is one based on the suggestion that most of the Fingo 
were collaborators - Gcaleka traitors - and that they were being attacked in 
anger by their countrymen for their rejection of their people. A third 
possibility is that the attacks on the mass of Fingo resulted not from anger, 
but from frustration and fear. If the troops were capturing Gcaleka women and 
children and herding them into a fortified compound, the Gcaleka men would 
have been in a panic to rescue them. Likewise with the Ndlambe when the train 
of Fingo, surrounded by an armed division of colonial soldiers, marched from 
the Kei into the Colony. Somerset had spent two weeks in eastern Ndlambe 
territory in April - was he not collecting labourers? 
Somerset claimed that the Fingo near the Winterberg Mountains were selling 
their children to the Boers as servants, or abandoning them,I74 as was 
apparently happening at Peddie in June .175 T.H. Bowker also described Fingo 
mothers throwing away their children. 176 Somerset's explanation of this 
phenomenon was that the Fingo were greatly concerned to provide for their 
171 See for example (CA) A5l9/I, p.201, Somerset to D'Urban, 26 April 1835; 
(CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 24 April 1835. 
172 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T. H.Bowker, entries for 28 April, 2 and 4 May 1835. 
173 Graham's Town Journal, 15 May 1835; Whiteside, History of Abambo, pp.31-2; 
Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffirs, pp.155-6. D'Urban is depicted heroically 
in each c ase as the humanitarian saving the poor Finga. 
17' (CA) A519/3, p.68, Somerset to D'Urban, 23 October 1835. 
115 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to Campbell, 2 June 1835. 
116 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 10 May 1835. 
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children by selling them as labourers, and that if the Boers would not take 
them as apprentices they would have to be abandoned, and would die, The 
explanation is an obvious non sequitur: the Fingo supposedly wished to sell 
their children into virtual slavery because they cared for them greatly, and 
if they could not, they would be forced to abandon them. Somerset's father had 
used precisely the same argument to support his legalisation of the 
apprenticeship of young San children in the 1817 Hottentot 
Proclamation. 177 This is much like the explanation used to cover the illicit 
seizure of labour that had been occurring on the Orange River for years. Under 
the guise of philanthropy, the Albany settlers were able to use the existing 
legislation, allowing for the apprenticeship of orphans, to .legitimise their 
labour captures. The Boers apparently refused to take any of the Fingo 
children, unless a mandatory apprenticeship to the age of eighteen was 
imposed. This was because they wanted legal authority to secure their labour 
for an extended period. 
The 'labour Fingo' were supplemented in mid -May by one thousand 'Fingo' taken 
by Smith. He claimed that they were under Gcaleka oppression, 'who, from their 
remote situation, had been unable to join their country men now under British 
protection' .178 Smith's raid on the Bomvana has been discussed in the 
previous chapter ,179 and the pursuit of these Fingo seems to have formed an 
important reason for his attack past the Mbashe. These Fingo were gathered at 
Smith's camp on the Guada River on 14 May and little information is offered as 
to their identity or background. Given the general use of the term 'Fingo', 
and the fact that on the 13 and 14 May, while Smith was chasing cattle within 
sight of the Mtata River, most of his force had remained at the mouth of the 
Mbashe,I80 as well as the precedence of labour seizure, it can be reasonably 
assumed that these were Bomvana and eastern Gcaleka, taken by a whirlwind 
commando to work in the Colony. Har_ington has shown that D'Urban and Smith 
177 BPP 50 (1835), pp.167-8, Proclamation of Lord Charles Somerset, 1817. 
178 General Order No .18, Smith, Fort Waterloo, 21 May 1835; Cory, Rise of South 
Africa, Vol.3, p.157. 
179 See pp.119-121. 
180 For Smith's description of the patrol, see BPP 279 (1836), pp.48-51, 18 May 
1835. 
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lied when they said that it was Hintza who suggested the patrol . It was on 
this same patrol that Hintza was murdered, after which Smith constructed a 
false explanation of events. There is no reason whatsoever to believe Smith's 
report on the identity of these Fingo. Dutton, D'Urban's aide, recorded only 
that Smith returned with a thousand cattle, making no mention of Fingo. 181 
There was no trumpeting of this 'rescue', as in the case of the Butterworth 
'emancipation', and it was kept very quiet. 
These people were called 'Fingo' and most were placed temporarily in the King 
William's Town Fingo location where Smith found them useful. '82 From here a 
number were distributed in the Colony. Frederick Rex, Assistant Quarter-Master 
at King William's Town, sent a group of ten Fingo to his sister in Knysna in 
August, taken to her by some Khoi taking leave, and another twenty to his 
parents, also in Knysna, in September, after his father had written to him in 
June to ask for Fingo labourers .'83 Rex had chosen his group because they 
were the 'best-tempered' of the many available in King William's Town. He felt 
'that having them driven to the Island [at Knysna] and back again once a day 
may have a good effect upon their scabby old legs. ,184 He also contemplated 
sending some to a friend as a present, with the warning that some Fingo needed 
to be flogged to ensure productivity.'85 In September, after reports from the 
town of George about the laziness of Fingo, George Rex asked that his son send 
him only women and children, with the explanation that civilisation would 
thereby be spread. 186 These facts all point to the assertion that forced 
labour was being distributed throughout the Colony from a base in King 
William's Town . 
181 BPP 279 (1836), p.48, Dutton, Official Notice, 18 May 1835 . The same 
occurred in (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker. 
182 BPP 279 (1836), p.109, D'Urban to Smith, 12 November 1835. 
183 Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.195, G.Rex to son, Knysna, 11 June 
1835; pp.174-7, F.Rex to sister, King William's Town, 28 July 1835; F.Rex to 
father, 28 August 1835. 
184 Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.177, F.Rex to father, 28 August 
1835. 
185 F.Rex to Duthie, 25 September 1835, in Ibid., p.180. 
186 G .Rex to son, 18 September 1835. in Ibid., pp .195-6. 
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With Graham's Town and Fort Beaufort acting as bases, Fingoes were distributed 
wherever they were needed. Three hundred and fifty-two women and five hundred 
and sixty-seven children were taken from Graham's Town to King William's Town 
in June, against their will.18' The Civil Commissioner for Graaff-Reinet 
complained in October of a labour shortage, whereupon surplus Fingo from 
Albany, Somerset and Uitenhage were sent there. 188 Part of a group of thirty-
three Fingo families being transported to work in Uitenhage in November 
escaped in the night and returned to Graham's Town. 189 Most of these Fingo 
movements were accompanied by armed military patrols, which indicates that the 
Fingo were not moving voluntarily . With this threat of enforced removal to 
farms, any unemployed Fingo in Graham's Town rapidly found service , if only 
carrying firewood and water in town. 190 A prospective Cape Town employer, on 
the advice of J .C.Chase, asked Campbell to send him sixty to eighty male 
Fingo, aged twelve to twenty. 191 In 1837 there were a thousand applica tions 
for Fingo workers from Cape Town alone. l 'z 
These applications were to government, which seems to have had a hand in 
controlling Fingo in much the same way it had helped control Mantatees in the 
previous decade. 193 A good percentage of the Fingo in 1835 seem to have been 
distributed amongst the Boers, who were set to lose their slave apprentices 
within three years. This raises questions as to the real motives for the Great 
Trek. 194 These examples emphasise the manner in which the colonial 
authorities were responding to settler demands. 
187 (CA) A519/23, p.269, D'Urban to Smith, 30 June 1835. D'Urban commented that 
'many of the women are by no means willing to come.' I am grateful to Julian 
Cobbing for this reference. 
188 (CA) A519/17, p.156, W,Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835; (CA) CO 2756, 
Orders from Campbell, 4 December 1835; A519/6, p.98, Campbell to Graaff-Reinet 
civil commissioner. 
189 (CA) A519/3, pp.189-190, Campbell to D'Urban, 27 November 1835; (CA) l/AY/ 
9/19, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 November 1835. 
IN (CA) I/AY/9/8, Campbell to D'Urban, 11 March 1836. 
1'1 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Letter to Campbell, 30 October 1835. 
l'Z Webb, 'Agricul tural development of 1820 set tlement', p. 209 . 
193 See Chapter 2, pp.45-6. 
1" See Chapter 6, pp.205-6. 
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Fingo numbers, because of the nature of their identity and the different 
categories, are difficult to determine. According to Trotter, who alleged he 
took a count of the Fingo while they were moving en bloc through a mountain 
pass in May, there were 16,800 (2,000 men, 5,600 women and 9,200 children), 
with 20,000 cattle. 195 However, D'Urban initally described the Fingo as 
totalling 6,000, then 5,000 and finally 10,000 at different times in May 
1835,196 but in 1836 his estimate had risen to 15,000. 197 The latter number 
was that which was used by the colonists when praising D'Urban for his 
policies. 198 Either three of the numbers are wrong, or an extra 10,000 Fingo 
were added to the original group between the Kei and Peddie, or there was 
never a count of the Fingo. 'Fingo' numbers were increasing as the definition 
broadened, and as more labourers were added. Were there 16,800 labourers, or 
did this number include the collaborators? Or were there 5,000 collaborators 
and 10,000 labourers? Dugmore later claimed that he saw the column of Fingo 
near the Keiskamma River, and the Fingo stealing cattle to supplement their 
'spoils' .199 Dugmore, who only wrote his memoirs in the 1870s, was probably 
confusing the Fingo identities. 
By October 1835 there were two thousand Fingo at King William's Town, two 
thousand at Tyhume and seven hundred at Peddie. 200 There were hundreds in 
Graham's Town and an unknown number labouring on farms. The Blue Books 
indicate that there were up to eight thousand Fingo west of the Fish by 1837, 
although it is unlikely that even the majority will show in the official 
statistics. As Neumark pointed out, the opgaaf figures were used for tax 
195 BPP 279 (1836), p.37, Estimate of Trotter, 14 May 1835. 
196 Respectively: (CA) CO 4381, D'Urban, General Order, Ndabakazi, 3 May 1835. 
Two ~ays later he said there were 5,000 - (CA) A5l9/18, p.82, D'Urban to 
Campbell, 5 May 1835; this number was corroborated by (CA) LG 596, pp.64-6, 
Somerset to Campbell. In his General Order, 23 May 1835, D'Urban claimed there 
were 10,000 Fingo. 
197 D'Urban, 'Public Documents', p.ll. 
198 For example, BPP 503 (1837), p.181, Address from Port Elizabeth residents, 
1835. 
199 Dugmore, Reminiscences of Albany settler, pp.88-9. 
200 (CA) LG 13, p.165, W.Fynn to Hudson, King William's Town, 29 October 1835; 
(CA) 1/AY/8/24, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, Fort Beaufort, 29 August 1835; 
(CA) A519/3, pp.29-34, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, Peddie, 5 October 1835. 
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purposes, and were therefore subject t o understatement . 201 Illegal labourers 
would need to be similarly hidden. Duly, in studying Ordinances 49 and 50 
(1828), commented that the official channels to record or regulate labour 
contracts were generally bypassed or ignored. 202 This is shown in 1835 when 
in September the clerks of the peace for Georg~ and Uitenhage claimed that no 
passes or contracts had been issued since the previous October, and Albany had 
recorded only 143 passes since the previous September. 20) These figures are 
nonsensical when they are compared with how many Africans were actually coming 
into these districts to work. There are likely to have been thousands of Fingo 
working in the Colony who do not appear in any records . A likely estimate of 
the number of Fingo working in the Cape by 1836 is double that officially 
stated, that is, approximately fifteen thousand (D'Urban's estimate). This 
number could easily have been accommodated in the labour starved Colony. 
What does this reconstruction of Fingo history mean for John Ayliff? His 
description of 1835 contained many clear inaccuracies, as shown above. He has 
retained an unblemished historical record as the humanitarian and spiritual 
guide of the Fingo, although Majeke's accusations that he conspired with the 
colonial authorities are worth noting. 204 The fact that Ayliff was present 
with the Fingo in 1835, and yet made such simple errors as describing the 
Fingo as Gcaleka slaves, who were all settled at Peddie, can lead to only one 
conclusion. He must have been consciously involved in the construction of a 
cover-story for the Fingo. Ay1iff's actions, and especially his diary entries 
in his period at Butterworth from 1830 to 1835, provide a key to his 
situation . His intention, integral to mission philosophy,205 was to divide 
201 Neumark, Economic Influences, p.74. 
202 Duly, 'Revisit with Hottentot Ordinance'. 
20) (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Judge Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835. 
204 Majeke, Role of the missionaries, pp . 34-5. Dora Taylor is not given 
sufficient credit for the importance of her ideas. Whilst there are 
overstatements and weak empiricism, her insight and intuition are 
revolutionary. 
205 Majeke, Role of the missionaries; Williams, When races meet j Cochrane, 
Servants of Power, ch.2. 
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the Gcaleka by undermining Hintza' s power, 206 and offering an al terna tive 
(European) power source. He attracted Gcaleka opportunists and social misfits, 
and the mission 'proved itself an asylum for not only the destitute and 
afflicted, but it has proved itself a refuge for those appointed to die' .207 
The few converts 20B whom he attracted were largely Gcaleka (Caffers).209 
Ayliff's diary makes it clear that he had little contact with 'Fingo': there 
are but twelve mentions of the word in his daily diary entries between 1830 
and 1837. Only four of these occur before July 1834. He makes no mention of 
Fingo in his annual reports on the state of the mission and conversions. 210 
Why does the 'father of the Fingo' not talk about his charges? How can it be 
claimed that Ayliff had a close relationship with the Fingo? Moyer commented 
disappointedly on the lack of detail on the Fingo in Ayliff's pre-1835 diary, 
but did not question their alleged relationship with Ayliff. An inexcusable 
fault in Moyer's work is his numerous misquotations from Ayliff's diary, which 
makes it seem as though Ayliff spoke more about the Fingo than he did. On many 
occasions he imposed the term 'Mfengu' onto Ayliff's diary when the latter 
actually referred to 'station people' or something similar. 211 One cannot 
assume that Ayliff was talking about Fingo when he does not specifically say 
so. This resulted from Moyer's acceptance of Whiteside's paradigm, and its 
imposition onto the source material. The difference between Ayliff's diary -
his unwitting comments at the time - and his articles of 1835 and essays of 
1851 and 1853 do not correspond. The diary reveals little more than a passing 
awareness of the existence of 'Fingo', and no knowledge of their past . Yet 
206 Clearly stated in (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entries for 24 August 1832, 9 
September 1833; 11 July 1834. 
207 (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entry for 12 June 1837. 
20B As noted by Ayliff, Ibid., entry for 26 January 1834. By February 1834 he 
had a total of 22 converts and 92 attending his school. 
209 Examples of Gcaleka conversions: Ibid . , entries for 14 April 1831, 25 June 
1831, 25 June 1832, 7 August 1833,. See also J.V.B.Shrewsbury, Memorials of 
Rev. William J.Shrewsbury (1868), p.334, who comments, 25 December 1827, that 
there had been· numerous Kafir converts, but only one Fingo. 
210 (CL) MS 15,704, Minutes of AGMs of Wesleyan preachers. He also made no 
mention of Fingo in 1837, when summarising his achievements at the station, 
see (CA) A80, Ayliff Diary, entry for 12 June 1837. 
211 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.133, 142, 145, 149, ISO, 189, 520, for 
instance. 
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Ayliff subsequently wrote convoluted and lengthy 'histories' of the Fingo, 
based almost solely on secondary sources. The inference is clear. 
But who thought of applying the general Fingo story to the labourers? O'Urban? 
As shown, there were occasional references to Fingo refugees in the late 18208 
and early 1830s. When Ngwane women and children were captured at Mbolompo in 
1828 and taken 1nto the Colony to work, they were called Fingo. A precedent 
was thereby created where people seized illegally to labour were described as 
Fingo. By the early 1830s there were a number of 'Fingo' working in Albany and 
Somerset . The equation of the Fingo with labour came again in 1833, when 
Godlonton complained of the labour shortage . He suggested that the 'Fingoos' 
and 'Mantatees', who were living 'under the most despotic control of the 
Caffers', should be enc ouraged to enter colonial service, as their 'industry 
is almost proverbial' .212 O'Urban was centrally involved with the Fingo in 
1835: he was at the head of the invading forces in April and May, he appointed 
th'e Fingo chiefs, he organised the creation of the collaborator settlements. 
And it was he who first described the Fingo as slaves of the Gcaleka in April 
1835. By portraying the Fingo as slaves being rescued by the British, it would 
be possible to escape Colonial Office censure. He and the colonists, in their 
public statements, constantly equated the 'Fingo rescue' with 'the true spirit 
of the sweeping emancipation made by the mother country',213 thereby 
inverting the identity of the captured labourers. 
The only feasible explanation is that Ayliff then intentionally wrote the 
'Fingo history', probably with the aid of O'Urban and Godlonton . The initial 
stories of Natal refugees were taken , and interwoven with the contemporary 
myths of the destruction of Shaka. 214 To this was added elements of each 
category of Fingo: that some fought in the army , some settled at Peddie, and 
some were refugees . All of this was amalgamated into one history, so that 
212 Graham's Town Journal, 16 May 1833, Godlonton editorial. 
213 For examples, see (CA) CO 4381, O'Urban, Official Notice, 3 May 1835; BPP 
503 (1837), pp . 181-207, Addresses to O'Urban from residents of Port Elizabeth, 
Cape Town, Caledon, Graham's Town residents, and others. 
214 See Chapter 1, pp.15-19. 
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every Fingo supposedly had the same origins. Automatically, the thousands of 
illegal labourers had an identity that was acceptable to London. The story was 
polished when Ayliff was in Graham's Town - not ministering to the Fingo, as 
Whiteside claimed - between May and September. He published the new history in 
August and September, and reworked it again in the 1850s. Ayliff never met 
D'Urban's expectations, and D'Urban (who in 1835 and 1836 had control of 
mission appointments) removed him from both of the important Fingo 
settlements, P.eddie and Tyhume. His confused efforts at explaining Fingo 
history seem to have annoyed D'Urban, who complained to Smith that 'Mr Ayliff 
was a very improper person to send to Butterworth, imbecile, timorous and 
weak. Mr Boyce and Mr Palmer [actively pro-settler Wesleyan missionaries] both 
described him thus to me, and said that he was unfit for any post of 
trial. ,215 Ironically, Ayliff's 'history' was so effective that it has not 
been challenged for a century and a half. 
This reassessment of the Fingo identity places a number of issues in a new 
light. The invasion of Hintza's territory was not aimed merely at cattle and 
subjugation: it was planned to supply forced labourers. At precisely the same 
time that the Cape's slaves were being emancipated (with a short 
apprenticeship), a new labour supply was ensured. It explains the missing 
information on Fingo movements in 1835, and the reason why Ayliff and Davis 
stopped writing their diaries. It also explains why there are so many 
inconsistencies and rank inaccuracies in Ayliff's and Whiteside's histories. 
The orthodoxy has elements of accuracy, but is otherwise misleading. Different 
groups of people were described as having the same identity. This new 
interpretation of the evidence makes it clear how the labour shortage was 
solved so rapidly in 1835, and that the arrival of the Fingo was not co-
incidental. And the fact that this could have taken place at all, and has 
since been covered up so completely, bears witness to the immense power and 
dominance which the British enjoyed on the eastern frontier in 1835, and their 
apologists have had since. 
215 (CL) MS 2033, D'Urban to Smith, 10 June 1836. See also A.T.C.Slee, 'Some 
aspects of Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District between 1830 and 1844', 
MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1946, p.49. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RESULTS OF THE WAR 
By mid May D'Urban's objectives had been satisfied, and the colonial effort 
decreased. D'Urban wrote to Bell in early May, saying that 'I shall now 
speedily wind up matters with the border tribes - it may cost me the trouble 
of a few desultory inflictions, but the result I think is certain and not 
distant'.' The 'war' continued to be merely the advance of the Europeans. The 
Boers were sent home at the end of May to sow their crops, and the remaining 
troops were reorganised into more defensive groupings. Maqoma asked for peace 
on 3 and 12 May, but D'Urban's offer was rejected, despite the critical state 
of Rharhabe munitions and food, and their complaints of the shooting of 
Rharhabe women. 2 The demand that they move over the Kei River was considered 
far too harsh. By agreeing to D'Urban's peace, the Rharhabe would have been 
forced to give up all their land and move onto foreign territory, where they 
would be overpopulated and dependent upon the goodwill of the Gcaleka. After 
Maqoma's refusal of the May proposals, Cox was thus ordered on 11 May to 
continue the hostilities, and 'spare neither age nor sex,.3 
D'Urban's plan in May, which was the one sent to London, was to for ce all the 
Rharhabe east of the Kei River. The new boundary would then be patrolled by 
the increased troops that he recommended the Colonial Office send to the Ca pe. 
Between May and August the troops were employed in forcing Rharhabe - mainly 
women - eastwards out of the Queen Adelaide Province, with the object of 
implementing D'Urban's plans to clear the area of its inhabitants.' This plan 
(CA) A519/2, p.33, D'Urban to Bell, 12 June 1835. 
2 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.65. 
3 Ibid ., p. 73. 
, Smith to D'Urban, 7 June 1835, as quoted in Godlonton, Irruption of the 
Kaffir ; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.77. Given t he colonial actions in 
1835 it seems that the calls of the 'Graham's Town faction' for the 
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was completely impractical. The Queen Adelaide Province was an enormous area 
of land whose boundaries would, given the Cape budget, be impossible to 
patrol. The anger caused by the seizure of all Rharhabe land would lead 
inevitably to further conflict. By September D'Urban had realised that he must 
allow the Rharhabe to remain in designated areas. 
After May the situation remained much the same, with patrols in the Amatole 
and Buffalo areas, many led enthusiastically by Smith. These concentrated now 
more on destroying crops and stored food than capturing cattle, as there was 
little livestock left. Five thousand cattle were captured from between the 
Buffalo and Kei Rivers in June, 5 an area that had hardly been raided 
previously . Bowker described two patrols of Boers and military Fingo from 
Peddie and Fort Willshire who were ordered on 4 June to burn all huts in their 
path between the Keiskamma and Buffalo - prime Ndlambe land. They returned the 
following day having burned three hundred and two huts . 6 
Laing felt in mid July that D'Urban was giving in too much to the Graham's 
Town settlers and that the destruction that continued was unnecessary. The 
goats being taken were particularly unnecessary, as they were of little value 
to the colonists, but it was all that the Rharhabe had left to live on . ' With 
the capture of cattle and the burning of crops and stored food the Rharhabe 
depended on goats to survive. 8 The Debe/Buffalo River area seems to have been 
devoid of people by May, with troops marching around empty ravines shooting at 
nothing. 9 Cox and his 3rd Division remained, from April to August, based on the 
Debe Flats between the upper reaches of the Keiskamma and Buffalo Rivers. 
'extermination' of the Caffer meant just that . All Rharhabe must be removed 
from their land - those who refused must be killed. 
5 BPP 279 (1836), pp.100-5, Dutton, Notices. 
6 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 4 June 1835; see too (NA) A96, 
Shepstone Diary, entry for 6 June 1835, where Shepstone said that Smith was 
taking a cannon on his patrols and shelling any area where there was a fire. 
7 (CL) MS 16,579, Diary of Laing, entry for 11 July 1835. 
8 For examples of the extent of the slaughter of goats see Le Cordeur, Journal 
of Stretch, p.56. 
9 Ibid. p.63 . 
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Almost daily patrols of fifty to two hundred burghers and troops were sent 
into the Buffalo, Amatole and Tyhume mountains in order to kill Rharhabe and 
harass and fatigue the survivors. Fort Cox was set up in a pivotal position. 
in order to control the Amatole Mountains. The possibility that labour was 
being gathered here too should not be excluded. The diary of Cox (written 
after 1835) shows reticence about his success in the mountains, and almost 
gives the impression that the troops had little effect in their four months 
there. A much clearer view of the power and actions of the whites is to be 
found in the diary of his subordinate, Stretch. He gives much detail on the 
atrocities committed by the colonial forces. 
This indecisive guerilla warfare lasted much longer than D'urban had expected 
or intended. This was cause for concern financially, and with regard to the 
home government, as lengthy hostilities against the indigenous peoples of the 
Colonies was against Colonial Office policy. Erasmus complained in mid-June of 
the number of Rharhabe in the Kaga mountains eighty kilometers north-west of 
Graham's Town, some of whom had been shot. IO Tensions also began to 
arise within the white force, as evidenced by the fight between some Scotsmen 
and Boers, wherein D'Urban and Smith delighted in seeing the latter beaten. 11 
It is difficult to assess whether the tensions were chiefly between the Boers 
and the British troops, or whether the English settlers were also hostile to 
their fellow Dutch colonists. There was both a sense of unity and one of 
opposition between the English and Dutch settlers: they shared the same land 
and aims, but had different cultures. 
Part of D'Urban's plan for the subjugation of the African polities was the 
incorporation and control of their chiefs. 12 There were three young boys who 
in 1835 were heirs to the chiefta incies of the three important 'Xhosa' groups: 
Sandile of the Ngqika, Siwane of the Ndlambe, and Sarhili of the Gcaleka. If 
10 (CA) I/AY/8/35, Report of Erasmus, 18 June 1835. 
II Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.98-9. Smith commented that the Boers were 
inferior to the Khoi. 
12 (CA) A519/2, p.63, Bell to D'Urban, 12 June 1835. 
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D'Urban could support them and make them subject to British control, he would 
have only three chiefs to deal with. 1J Sutu and Nonube, respectively mothers 
of Sandile and Siwane, were supportive of D'Urban's intention to control their 
sons in return fo r support, and hoped to prevent any possible succession 
dispute . Sutu supported the Colony,14 and hoped to use the whites to fend off 
her son's uncles. Maqama and TyaIi, during the Ngqika interregnum so as to 
secure the Ngqika chieftaincy for Sandile. After D'Urban declared his support 
for Sandile in May, Maqoma hid him from Sutu, who wanted to bring him to the 
British camp at King William's Town for protection. 15 The first condition of 
peace with the Ngqika in August was that Sutu and Sandile be given over to the 
care of Warden. 1. Sandile was to be recognised as chief. 'I hope,' said 
D~Urban, 'to make him in that capacity, a powerful instrument of our 
views' .17 
Nonube was in a similar situation, with Qasana and Siyolo and their Ndlambe 
followers openly hostile to the Colony in 1835. She was the Great Wife of 
Mdushane, and prided herself on her descent from a shipwrecked white woman, 
claiming kinship with the English on the basis of her light skin. In response 
to D'Urban's promi se to recognise her son as chief of all the Ndlambe (and 
Sandile as chief of the Ngqika),18 she and Siwani moved to Mount Coke where 
they remained with the missionary Dugmore. 19 
13 Colonial control of an African chief was obviously an important step in 
controlling his people physically and psychologically, and was attempted on 
various occasions. The most notable was Grey's education of the sons of 
Sandile; Mhala; Anta; Khama; and several granchildren of Maqoma at his Kaffir 
College (Zonnebloem) in Cape Town in the 1850s. Lobengula's sons, Njube and 
Njuboenja, were also sent there in the 1890s. The intention was to turn the 
heirs apparent into black Englishmen. But none of the schemes worked, as the 
people rejected the educated chiefs, and succession crises resulted. See 
Peires, Dead will arise, p.265. 
14 For a summary of her actions in support of the Colony see A519/1, pp.100-1, 
Laing to D'Urban, 24 February 1835 . 
15 (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 5 June 1835. 
16 (CA) A519/17, pp.54-5, D'Urban instructions. 
1) (CA) A519/18, p.100, D'Urban to Bell, 2 June 1835; see also A5l9/1, p.100-1, 
Laing to D'Urban, 24 February 1835, where Laing urged D'Urban to support Sutu, 
and thus get early influence with Sandile. 
18 (NA) A96, Diary of Shepstone, entry for 4 June 1835. In the 1830s there was 
an Ndlambe succession dispute, see Peires, 'History of the Xhosa', p.191. 
19 See Dugmore, Reminis cences of Albany settler, pp.73-4, for information on 
Nonube. 
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Hintza's son Sarhili was imprisoned with his father and uncle Burhu. As soon 
as D'Urban heard of the death of Hintza he crowned Sarhili ceremoniously as 
heir at Fort Warden on 19 May, claiming control of a title which the British 
had never had a say in. 2o Sarhili and Burhu were held in the Graham's Town 
prison until late July as hostages for their people, which emphasised the 
power of the Briti sh to control the chiefs. Sarhile's mother, Nomsa, had been 
ostracised by the Gcaleka, and his smooth succession to the chieftaincy was 
hampered by the increasing independence of his father's councillors. His power 
could possibly have been consolidated with help from the Colony, but he chose 
to earn his position, becoming eventually a particularly revered chief.21 The 
groundwork of control set up by D'Urban in 1835 was disrupted by the 
disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province, although by 1855, at least, 
Siwane was a long-time colonial ally and despised by his people. 22 
The Rharhabe resistance morale was boosted in late June with the killing of 
Bailie and his patrol near the Pirie mission station. 23 The hagiography of 
Baillie's death by apologists such as Godlonton is nothing but propaganda. 24 
It was claimed that Bailie and his followers were ambushed, but managed to 
defend themselves in a group until their ammunition ran out. There were no 
colonial survivors to describe what was supposedly a heroic stand akin to that 
of Custer. 25 The patrol was in fact captured; and Maqoma had ordered the 
sparing of Baillie's life for the diplomatic advantage it would afford. But 
the anger of Baillie's captors overruled him. 26 Bailie and his patrol had 
attacked this same area merely three days previously, and had captured two 
20 (NA) A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 19 May 1835; Cory, Rise of South 
Africa, Vol.3, p.167. 
21 Peires, House of Phalo, pp.l15-7. 
22 Peires, Dead will arise, p.68. 
2J Le Cordeur, J ournal of Stretch, ch.4 . for evidence of new motivation amongst 
the Rharhabe and descriptions of Bailie's patrol. 
24 Godlonton, Irruption of the Kaffir, pp.l95-202. 
25 The descriptions of the Bailie patrol a re very similar to those on the 
Wilson patrol in Matabeleland in 1893. which occupi es a more pronounced 
position in Rhodesian settler historiography . 
26 (CA) A5l9/27, pp.65-70, Information of Fingo women, 23 July 1835 . 
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hundred women and children. 27 It is likely that he was returning to collect 
more labourers, and was attacked. Yet settler historiography has highlighted 
Bailie's death as a prime example of African savagery and the bravery of the 
colonists. 
The Rharhabe were still receiving some weapons at this stage. Smith blamed 
James Read and his servant Andries Stoffel for supplying guns to the Rharhabe 
from the Kat River Settlement. 2B This was merely calumny of Read whose ideas 
on racial integration were regularly blamed for any Rharhabe hostility. The 
Rharhabe were getting guns instead from the Boers outside the Colony, and from 
a schooner 'James', which landed at Chalumna on 9 July.29 Cory suggested that 
the Griqua were also supplying guns. This led to an unsuccessful attempt to 
storm Fort Wellington. 30 The Rharhabe continued to be always on the defensive. 
After December 1834, there were only four real attacks on a colonial base. 
This defensiveness was partly of necessity, and partly tactical, in order to 
prove to D'Urban and the Colonial Office that their intentions were not 
aggressive. The diaries of Cox and Stretch indicate a degree of communication 
between the 3rd Division and the Ngqika, as there were regularly verbal 
exchanges in the bush . In each case the Ngqika answered in English or Dutch, 
which again implies prior contact with the Colony. It is likely that the 
Rharhabe who resisted were those who had had to work in the Colony when they 
were dispossessed, and who realised that colonial expansion, once achieved, 
was irreversible. 
By August it was clear that a final offensive was needed to force the Rharhabe 
into submission. A large co lonial force therefore gathered on the Debe Flats 
in early August to launch a decisive attack on the chiefs in the Amatole 
27 See Chapter 4, pp.154. 
28 Theal, Documents relating to Kaffir war, p.282; Cory, Rise of South Africa, 
Vo1.3, p.192; BPP 503 (1837), p .266 , Evidence of Majecco; Ibid., p.91, 
Atherstone to Campbell, April 1835. 
29 BPP 538 (1836), p.256; BPP 503 (1837), pp.74, 88; Cory, Rise of South 
Africa, Vol.3, p.201. 
30 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 20 July 1835. 
171 
Mountains. Very little was actually needed, as the Rharhabe who still resisted 
lacked food, ammunition and motivation,31 and wished to plant their crops 
before it was too late.If they continued to fight they would not be able to 
sow a new harvest to replace that de s troyed by the troops. It took merely a 
few hours of fighting after a large night attack on 14 and 15 August,32 to 
convince the Rharhabe of the need for peace , and hostilities officially 
ceased. Warden ~as called in specially to parlay with the chiefs, as he was 
trusted by them and had been for years. In mid August Smith sent a 
confidential note to D'Urban saying that if he could get hold of Maqoma and 
Tyali he was sure that he could get them to actually recommend the occupation 
of the Queen Adelaide Province by whites. But he needed special, diplomatic 
men - 'no Moultries or Bowkers' - to help him. 33 If D'Urban and Smith could 
get the 'Caffers' to agree with the annexation of the Province, they would 
have plenty of ammunition with which fight Glenelg's opposition to their anti-
policy actions. 
Thus the missionaries Boyce and Shepstone, with the collusion of D'Urban, were 
sent with messages to Maqoma, Tyali and Mhala urging them to accept the peace 
terms offered. They warned of a possible second invasion which was to be more 
aggressive. 34 Duff argues that it was they who helped persuade D'Urban that 
his May intentions were too severe and impractical, and proposed the September 
offer to bring about peace. 35 Maqoma asked for peace initially on 15 August, 
and accepted the conditions of the treaties on 17 September . D'Urban's 
conditions were that Sutu and Sandile and all Khoi had to be handed over; and 
that the Rharhabe must evacuate the country of the Amatole, Tyhume, Keiskamma, 
31 (CA) A519/27, pp.65-70, Information of Rharhabe women, 23 July 1835. It was 
a situation directly comparable to that in Zululand in 1879 and in 
Matabeleland in 1896. 
32 For a description see F.Rex to father, 18 August 1835, in Long, Index to 
Unoffic ial manuscripts, p . 176; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch; Butterfield, 
Journal of Cox . 
33 (CA) A519/2, p.171, Smith to D'Urban, 18 August 183S . Smith did manage to 
coerce Rharhabe support for the British actions and occupation in 1836 . cf. 
Chapter 3, footnote 208, p.11S. 
34 (CA) AS19/2, pp.130-1, Boyce to D'Urban, 28 July 1835 . 
35 Duff, 'Some aspects of Wesleyan Methodism', pp.85-90. 
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Buffalo Mountains and Debe Flats, and move to King William's Town. There they 
were to hand over all guns and ammunition and be settled as British subjects 
under three commis s ione rs (Smith, Warden and W.Shepstone) in the area between 
the Kabousie River and the coast, and the Gonube and Kei Rivers,J6 
The real agenda of the September treaties is evident in D'Urban's confidential 
notes on them. The Rharhabe were to be distributed under magistrates, with a 
Rharhabe subordinate, appointed by government. Smith held an elaborate 
ceremony in King William's Town in November to appoint Maqoma, Tyali and Mhala 
as special magistrates under British supervision. 'Meanwhile, their system of 
clanship, by this very arrangement, will be at once broken up; and its spirit 
and feeling will be rapidly subdued and forgotten, as the power of the chiefs 
shall be seen to have ceased and passed away', and British control would be 
easily imposed. Again D'Urban's concern to provide for a labour supply is 
evident when he stressed that this system was the only method 'of converting 
a Savage and vexatious Enemy into peaceable and useful servants I. He went 
further to say that the Rharhabe would thereby be 'civilised', and that it 
would improve trade. 3' The blueprint for this policy seems to have come from 
J.M.Bowker in July, who suggested that precisely this structure be applied to 
the Fingo. 38 
Stretch complained that D 'Urban's harsh peace terms were a result of the 
influence of the Graham's Town faction, which continually proposed 'war and 
extermination,.39 They wanted all Africans removed from the area of the newly-
claimed settler farms. The Rharhabe must either be driven off their land, be 
36 (CA) A519/17, pp.54-60. For the specific treaty with the Ndlambe, see BPP 
279 (1836), pp.97-8. 
37 (CA) A5l9/5, pp.55-63, D'Urban to 7, 17 September 1835; Ibid., pp.52-3, 
D'Urban to 7, 30 September 1835; (CA) GH 34/5, pp.114-7, D'Urban to 7, 17 
September 1835. 
38 (AM) SM 1176, J.M.Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835. As Lancaster pointed out 
the system of British indirect rule was derived from their Indian model. But 
this was its first application in Africa. It was a system which was then to 
spread throughout Africa in the nineteenth century, as a means of subjugation 
and control. 
3' Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.128. 
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turned into servants, or must be killed . Throughout 1835 the people of 
Graham's Town, led by Godlonton and his newspaper, retained their nervousness 
and denunciation of the Caffers. Laing disliked the settler and official 
descriptions of the Africans as savages; he felt that such language could 
excuse their extermination. 'The feeling in this town,' he wrote, 'against the 
black and yellow people is bad indeed. Surely people so much under the 
influence of prejudice are unfit for the enjoyment of that power which they 
seek. ,40 The feeling in Graham's Town in October was that peace had been made 
too easily and that not enough punishment had been meted out. The seizure of 
all Rharhabe land, most of their cattle, many of their women and children, and 
the destruction of substantial amounts of their food supplies was not 
sufficient . The Journal was the chief propagator of racial tension and 
negrophobic propaganda. In November Laing commented exasperatedly that the 
latest edition showed 'a spirit of no ordinary stupidity, or of no ordinary 
honesty. I wonder that the people here are so easily duped. ,41 
The Rharhabe began to take cattle from the colonists immediately, raids which 
increased steadily, largely because of the lack of food east of the Fish 
River. D'Urban claimed incorrectly that the area had never been so peaceful. 
Stockenstrom noted that depradations had increased; and the official reports 
show the same. 42 J .M.Bowker reported to D'Urban in October 1836 that cattle 
thefts had increased because of the massive devastation and starvation that 
40 (CLl MS 16,579, Diary of Laing , entry for 5 June 1835; see also entries for 
1 and 8 June, 7 July, 30 October, and 6 November 1835. 
41 Ibid., entry for 6 November 1835; see also (CAl A1480, Philip to Buxton, 1 
May 1835, in which Philip complained that De Zuid-Afrikaan and the Graham'S 
Town Journal continued 'to spit venom against the Caffers; they are 
represented as crafty savages; as monsters who have placed themselves beyond 
the pale of humanity.' Stretch had complained in April that Godlonton' s 
reports concerning ca ttle theft 'as usual are very highly coloured' and 
grossly exaggerated (reference lost - probably in (CAl ASO/4l. 
42 (CAl A519/15, p.62; Long, Index · to Unofficial manuscripts, pp.179, 184, 
F.Rex reported in September and December that there were many cattle thefts; 
A519/3, p.189, Campbell to 1; 1/AY/8/55, Report of Erasmus, 11 September 1835, 
reported that cattle were still being stolen in the Winterberg by small 
groups; (CAl GH 14/1, Halifax, June 1836, complained that there was as much 
theft as before 1835. 
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had been caused. 43 Stock theft had reached epidemic proportions by the late 
1830s. There was little real fluctuation in the numbers stolen throughout the 
1820s and 1830s. 44 Somerset reported from Shiloh in October that the 
Winterberg Thembu felt that the Rharhabe made peace in order to cultivate, and 
intended to fight again after the harvest, and that Gamba (brother of Mhala) 
intended going beyond the Orange to elicit the aid of the Coranna against the 
Colony.45 These, it seems, were just rumours. 
There was an obvious problem with D'Urban's September settlement. How was the 
Colony to control thousands of Africans within its borders? And as they were 
all to become 'subjects', what political standing and legal rights did they 
have? As Bell said, 'I confess I have not the least notion how this instant 
conversion of recent enemies into fellow subjects is to work in practice,.46 
How could the Africans suddenly become British subjects? The settlement was 
the first time that still-powerful African groups had been incorporated within 
a colonial state. The settlers did not really have the option of exterminating 
the Africans, as in America and Australia, as there were too many. They had 
thus somehow to be brought under British control and rule. Somerset was sent 
on a tour of the Winterberg and northern districts in October, to inspect the 
implementation of D'Urban's policies and to give a show of force to eliminate 
unrest. 
The Rharhabe were never dominant in the hostilities, and apart from some minor 
skirmishes spent the time on the defensive . The hostile factions in the Ngqika 
and Ndlambe managed to survive in mountain strongholds, while the British 
troops moved freely through the territory across the Keiskamma River. The 
43 Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections', p.24, Bowker to D'Urban, 30 
October 1836. (CA) LG 420, miscellaneous letters, indicates that cattle theft 
in Albany and Somerset increased throughout 1836. 
44 In 1812 Cradock had announced that the Zuurveld had been cleared of 
Rharhabe, yet in 1813 cattle raiding increased; see Maclennan, Proper degree 
of Terror, p.154. 
45 (CA) A519/3, p.87, Somerset to D'Urban, 24 October 1835. 
46 (CA) A519/3, p.4, Bell to D'Urban, 25 September 1835. 
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British philosophy was clear: 
Well do we know the number of milch-cows and goats we have taken, 
and the enormous quantities of corn we have destroyed. We have 
made them congregate and reduce their possessions to one general 
stock, and experience in war teaches us that when the prospect of 
a scarcity of food is before us, no one can possess or destroy 
enough. 47 
The labour is, as usual, left out. Smith suggested to the trader 
Driver after the war that if he wanted to make a lot of money he obtain a 
trader's licence and sell goats to the Africans around King William's Town, 
who were nearing starvation. 48 The tactics of burning huts and crops , 
attacking women and children, and taking cattle on a large scale had been 
pioneered by John Graham in 1812, and was copied, with a larger force and more 
effect, by Willshire in 1819. 49 The commando system turned it into a common 
expectation for colonial raids. But never had it been carried out so 
extensively - in respect of the size of the force, the area decimated, the 
time period it covered, and the damage it caused - as in 1835. The Queen 
Adelaide Province made the Rharhabe aliens in their own land. At no stage did 
the Rharhabe pose any real threat to the Colony in 1834 and 1835. 
This destruction of Rharhabe livelihood was one of the keys to the increase in 
Fingo numbers from the end of 1835. Apart from the three categories of Fingo 
in 1835 - collaborator, military and labourer - there were many Africans who 
came into the Colony to seek work as the only means of survival. They either 
called themselves Fingo or were subsumed by the colonial authorities within 
the name. Apart from the Fingo forced to become labourers, there were a number 
of African peoples who moved into the Colony, either attracted by employment , 
or forced by poverty in 1835 and the period following it . The immense 
47 Smith to D'Urban , 30 August 1835, in Theal, Documents relating to Kaffir 
War, p . 358 . 
48 (CA) A1653, Military Board papers, Smith to Driver, 10 October 1835. 
49 For a discussion of these methods, see Maclennan, Proper Degree of Terror. 
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destruction of Rharhabe food and livelihood by the troops in 1835, coupled 
with the seizure of the Queen Adelaide Province, produced landlessness and 
poverty, to be solved by colonial indenture. LMS missionary Kayser noted in 
1836 that the formerly well-populated areas around the Keiskamma were poverty-
stricken, and that 'the Kaffers are now very much seeking work to get only 
food for payment. ,50 Even some of Phato's people undertook indenture. 51 While 
1835 was not on the scale of the dislocation caused by the Cattle-Killing of 
1856-7, it forced a large number of Rharhabe into the Cape. Because of the 
multi-faceted, vague nature of the 'Fingo' these people were easily subsumed 
as members of it. 52 
There is notable confusion in the sources relating to 1835 as to whether the 
Fingo should be referred to as a single tribe or as an amalgamation of 
peoples . Very soon the tribalisation process became active, and the Fingo 
began to be referred to as a tribe. 53 Beinart noted that the Nxasana of the 
Qumbu district, who fought as Fingo against the Mpondomise in the late 
nineteenth century, were actually associated with the Mpondomise chiefs before 
the 1820s, and came originally from the same region, despite Bryant's error in 
claiming that they came from the southern Natal region. 54 It was as a result 
of the incorporation of Africans from beyond the Fish into the 'Fingo', that 
the Fingo 'nation' grew. In Peddie, for instance, there were 8,650 Fingo in 
1854. 55 Three years later, there were 13,048. In the 1837 and 1839 population 
censuses there were large numbers of 'aliens' working in Albany, described as 
50 Kayser to Ellis, 4 January 1836, quoted by Crais, 'Ambiguous frontiers', 
pp.43-4. 
51 F.Rex to Duthie, 25 September 1835, in Long, Index to Unofficial 
manuscripts. 
52 The mechanics of the process of tribalisation - and specifically that of the 
Fingo - have not been sufficiently explored here. It is a vital aspect of the 
growth of the 'Fingo', and needs to be re sea rched. 
53 For example (CA) GH 19/4, Treaty with the Fingo tribe, 10 December 1836. But 
see (CA) CO 2756, Bowker to Campbell, 14 July 1835, where Bowker described 
himself as the agent to the Fingo tribes. 
54 W.Beinart & C.Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (Johannesburg, 
1987), p.101. 
55 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp.595-8. 
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Fingo. Yet the 1838 census refers to this same group as 'Kafirs' ,56 showing 
the confusion and relation between the two identities. According to Whiteside 
there were 350,000 Fingo in the Colony in 1904. It is quite impossible for an 
increase of this sort to have resulted from a natural birth rate . In his 1935 
census, van Warmelo found only 15,000 people who termed themselves Fingo in 
the old Colony, all of whose lineage and origins were unknown. 57 Many of the 
terms used in 'the nineteenth century to identify people are vague and 
unclear. 58 
From July 1835, the eastern civil commissioners complained of 'Fingo 
vagrancy,59 - Fingo moving around armed with assegais and refusing service. 
Over six hundred were reported in the Winterberg area in August,60 although 
it is unclear whether they originated outside or inside the Colony. As early 
as July, Ziervogel had complained to Campbell that there were Fingo, armed 
with assegais, wandering around Somerset district, to which Campbell replied 
that they were to be arrested and transported to Graham's Town. 61 A complaint 
came from the Graaff-Reinet civil commissioner that there were many Fingo, 
Bechuana and Mantatee wandering around his district, and causing a disturbance 
by stealing cattle and refusing to enter service under the Boers. 62 The civil 
commissioners of Uitenhage and George reported similar situations. 63 The 
possibility exists that these 'wanderers' were Rharhabe who refused to become 
labourers. Integral to D'Urban's plans for the Colony was that there were to 
be no unemployed Africans in the Colony, as they would pose a security threat 
- much the same argument used in favour of vagrancy ordinances. The pass laws 
for 'Caffers' were to remain the same, and all Fingo must be controlled too. 
56 Blue-Books for the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1837-9. 
57 N.J.van Warmelo, A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa 
(Pretoria, 1935), p.65. 
58 For instance, in 1864 there were 3,540 'Bhele' in Natal, of whom 3,256 were 
'collections' from other tribes'; see Bird, Annals of Natal, Vol.1, p.142. 
59 (CA) 1/AY/8/24, O'Reilly to Campbell, Cradock. 22 September 1835; 1/AY/9/19, 
Campbell to D'Urban, Graham's Town, 24 July 1835. 
60 (CA) I/AY/8/86, Report from Field Cornet , Winterberg, 7 September 1835. 
61 (CA) A519/6, p.95, Ziervogel to Campbell, July 1835. 
62 (CA) A519/3, p.194, Bell to D'Urban, 4 December 1835. 
63 A5l9/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835. 
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He thus ordered the 'apprehension' of all wandering, unemployed Fingo, 
Bechuana and Caffers, to be sent to Fort Beaufort or Cradock, from where they 
were to find employment, settle in a location near a town or in the new Ceded 
Territory locations, or leave the Colony.6~ 
Although D'Urban's orders were carried out and many Fingo arrested, there were 
still disturbances throughout 1836 from wandering Fingo and Mantatees, and 
from armed Africans from the interior. 65 Armstrong was in charge of placing 
the captured Fingo in the Fort Beaufort location, from whence many were 
distributed as labourers. Noted Armstrong: 
I have held out every encouragement to the farmers to take the 
Fingos into their service and have already disposed of about 20 
families in this way. I have also apprenticed several children to 
the farmers. The Graff Reynet and Beaufort burghers are desirous 
of taking a number of Fingos to their districts as servants, and 
I hope to dispose of a good many of them in this way." 
The Fort Beaufort/Tyhume area thus became a vital source of 
labour, with a fluid, large population of controlled prospective workers.' 7 
O'Urban spoke approvingly in November 1835 of the agricultural progress of 
Peddie and Tyhume, and how many of these Fingo were becoming contract 
labourers throughout the Colony. 68 It can be argued that the origins of 
controlled labour migration lie here - Fingo men moved into the Colony for a 
year at a time, in exchange for livestock and upkeep,69 and returned to their 
land on the Tyhume. Sometimes their families accompanied them, as in the case 
64 A519/17, pp.121-4, D'Urban to all civil commissioners, 14 October 1835. 
Somerset was sent out to oversee the implementation: see A519/3, p. 65, 
Somerset to O'Urban, 23 October 1835; A519/3, pp.97-100, Somerset to O'Urban, 
October 1835. 
65 (CA) A519/6, p.99, Campbell to Hudson, 16 April 1836; LG 420, p.105, Report 
of Bradshaw, Bathurst Field Cornet, 21 September 1836; 1/AY/8/49, Hudson to 
D'Urban, 19 November 1836; 1/AY/8/50, Report of Stockenstrom, March 1837; 
1/AY/8/56, Ziervogel t o O'Urban, 15 November 1836. 
66 (CA) CO 2756, Armstrong to Campbell, 19 October 1835. 
67 See Chapter 4, pp . 144. 
68 BPP 279 (1836), p . 109, O'Urban to 1, 12 November 1835. 
69 For examples of the contracts entered into between masters and servants 
(Fingo contracts were much like any other), see (CA) 1/UIT/14/11-4 . 
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of the one hundred and three Fingo under Amandoda at Tyhume. They went to seek 
service in Graham's Town in August 1835, on the recommendation of Armstrong. 
who promised to reserve land for them on their return. 70 The Fingo locations 
were clearly designed in 1835 to provide the eastern Cape towns and farms with 
labourers. 
There was a certain state of flux between the Fingo locations in 1835, Of the 
Fingos brought to Peddie in mid-May to settle, a large number deserted 
immediately to squat at Tyhume, where they were later given land . Jokweni and 
Mabanthla and some followers went at the same time to King William's Town. On 
11 October Mabanthla and eighty followers (mainly women and children) returned 
to Peddie, and five days later sixty of Jokweni's followers did the same. 
Jokweni remained in King William's Town until 1836. There was a constant flow 
of Fingo men and families between King William's Town and Peddie, 71 and a 
hundred Fingo moved from King William's Town to the Gaga River area in 
No'vember . 72 There were also many Fingo, looking starved and wretched, moving 
to Fort Wellington near the Gonube River, from King William's Town. 73 They 
were obviously not escaping indenture, as they were moving to another colonial 
settlement, so they were presumably unhappy with the land and provisions 
granted at King William's Town. But Fingo were encouraged or forced to remain 
wi thin their allot ted locations. 74 This was requested by the colonists, who 
needed a permanent labour population. 75 J .M . Bowker was unhappy with the 
.movement of the Fingo describing them as an 'unsettled race' . He suggested to 
D'Urban in July that no Fingo be allowed to leave their locations without a 
pass issued by the resident agent. 7• D'Urban was unhappy with the parties of 
70 (CA) 1/AY/8/24, Thomson, Armstrong, Minto to D'Urban, 29 August 1835. 
71 (CA) 1/AY/8/86, Bowker to Campbell, 20 October 1835; (NA) A96, Shepstone 
Diary, entry for 3 June 1835. 
72 (CA) LG 14, pp . 15-6, Fingo commissioners to Hudson, 11 November 1835; 
A519/3, pp . 154-6, Fingo commissioners to D'Urban, November 1835. 
73 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 17 September 1835. 
74 (CA) GH 34/5, p.33, D'Urban to Armstrong, 25 July 1835; (CA ) CO 2756, 
Armstrong to Campbell, 19 October 1835. 
75 For example the request from Field Cornet van Wijk of Cradock, A519/2, 
pp . 161-2, 19 September 1835. 
76 (AM) SM 1176, J.M . Bowker to D'Urban, 2 July 1835. 
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Fingo moving northwards and westwards from Peddie without permission. and 
ordered Armstrong to apprehend them, take them to Fort Beaufort and place them 
at Tyhume. 77 
The war of 1835 was not a 'frontier war' or an attack by the 'Caffers' in 
general, but an explosive continuation of creeping colonial conquest. 
Stockenstrom criticised the D'Urban system of direct conquest and rule 
(supported by most of the colonists)78 against his own. 79 He claimed that the 
British were lucky to secure peace in September, and that the cattle seized 
and destruction caused by the Colony had been vastly exaggerated by Smith and 
D'Urban. 8o Stockenstrom claimed that the British had not been successful in 
that they had failed to subdue the Fish River bush area and Amatole 
permanently; it took eight months to bring peace; and not much lasting impact 
was made on 'Gaffer' power and independence, as the determined resistance in 
the wars of Mlanjeni and the Axe showed. Peires has argued the same line, 
saying even that the Ndlambe emerged from 1835 virtually unscathed, and that 
D'Urban had to modify his plans to dispossess the Rharhabe completely, because 
they were not defeated. 8l 
The evidence presented in Chapter 3 and below makes it clear that the British 
had an overwhelming military superiority in 1835. It is shown in the land and 
cattle taken from the Rharhabe, from the number of Africans killed in 
comparison with the number of Europeans, and in the ease with which the 
colonial forces swept through Rharhabe and Gcaleka territory. The failure of 
77 (CA) 1/AY/8/24, D'Urban to Armstrong, 25 July 1835. 
78 See the petitions in R.Godlonton, 'Sunshine and cloud; or, light thrown on 
a dark page of Frontier History' (1855). 
79 See Chapter 6, p.199. 
80 Sir A.Stockenstrom (ed. Hutton), The Autobiography of the late Sir Andries 
Stockenstrom (Cape Town, 1887), Vol.2, p.328, This was supported by (AM) SMD 
948, Reminiscences of B. E.Bowker, pp.63-4. Lancaster, 'Governorship of 
D'Urban', p.189 agrees. He quotes Dr A.Smith in 1851 (p.287) as saying that 
some Rharhabe felt they had been duped into peace by the missionary 
delegation. 
8l Peires, House of Phalo, pp.112-3. Le Cordeur argues the same in Le Cordeur, 
Journal of Stretch, p.115 . See also Harington, Sir Harry Smith. 
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D'Urban's initial intentions is not surprising, considering its enormity. His 
plan had never been feasible, and modification of it was inevitable. The fact 
that he did seize large areas of prime Rharhabe land for settlement by the 
Gqunukhwebe, Fingo, Mqhayi, other collaborators and colonial settlers and 
for~he Rharhabe into demarcated areas, makes Stockenstrom's argument a non -
sequitur . The failure of the troops to dislodge a few dissenters from the very 
dense bush and steep ravines of the Amatole Mountains is little reflection on 
colonial mi l itary strength . Smith actually tendered his resignation in 
November over what he felt was D'Urban's soft attitude towards the Rharhabe in 
allowing them to have peace, and not permitting him to kill everyone in the 
Amatole. 82 
Smith was prone to exaggeration but the records show that D'Urban's estimate 
of sixty thousand cattle seized from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka in 1835,83 is 
merely the number sold and given to settlers in claims in the public auctions 
held between July and September. 84 The auctions were really just occasions for 
settlers to collect Rharhabe cattle. Settlers who put in claims for lost 
cattle (be they strayed, eaten or stolen) were given a certificate to the 
amount of fifteen percent of what they had supposedly lost. These could be 
exchanged for captured cattle at one of the weekly sales. 85 Settler claims 
were based on the estimation of six cattle to the pound. Twenty-three thousand 
cattle had been taken from the Ndlambe in 1819, of which half were sold to 
defray war expenses. This set the example for 1835. 86 The pattern that 
developed in 1835 was that cattle were taken by the invading colonists 
throughout the year. The cattle were then transported under Khoi or Fingo 
guard to the holding pounds in Bathurst, Salem and the Bushman's river. 
82 (CA) A519/3, pp.173-181, Smith to D'Urban, 22 November 1835 . 
83 (CA) GH 1/108, p . 123, D'Urban to Glenelg. 
U (CA) LG 47, Lists of losses and captured cattle, shows that a total of 
59,797 cattle were sold at the weekly auctions, most in July. There were a 
total of 820 claims, worth £8539. Webb, 'Immediate consequences of Sixth 
Frontier war', p.40n. gives a neat summary of this system. 
85 (AM) SM 5502, Papers of T.H . BowkH: (CA) LG 595, pp.104-S, Records of 
Jarvis, Pound master for captured cattle. 
86 Reyburn, 'Studies in Cape Frontier History', February 1935, p.l08. 
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D'Urban said that cattle should not be sent to Graham's Town, as they would be 
&a source o f cons iderable embarrassment, . 87 Jarvis was put in charge of the 
cattle, and their auctioning, and had pound masters at the various cattle 
holdings . 
Throughout 1835 batches of captured cattle of varying numbers were sent to 
him,·· the biggest of which came with Somerset after the raids on the Buffalo 
and the Gcaleka. According to D'Urban, he sent forty thousand cattle on this 
occasion; they were distributed in groups of a few thousand at ho l ding areas 
in the Cowie/ lower Fish/ Kadega/ Bushmans area.·' Rharhabe and Gcaleka 
cattle were originally held in Bathurst, but with the continuous influx, new 
pounds had to be created as the pasturage was running out.'o Cattle were even 
sent to Tsitsikamma and Uitenhage for safe-keeping. All the cattle had ben 
distributed by October, mostly free to settlers who had certificates detailing 
the losses which they claimed to have suffered. 
The number of cattle taken from the Rharhabe and Gcaleka, including tho s e 
lost, killed for military consumption or syphoned secretly onto the farms mus t 
have been much greater than just the sixty thousand given to settler s . Cory 
adopted Boyce's argument that no more than thirty thousand cattle were taken, 
but that the number was exaggerated by the inability of the military to count 
large herds.' 1 This is a feeble argument. Commandant Beyers, a member of 
Somerset's division, suggested in April that the two thousand cattle seized on 
the Buffalo River be distributed immediately to farmers in the Fish, Koonap 
and Kat River areas, rather than suffer the inconvenience of foll owing the 
.7 (CA) A519/18, p.46, D'Urban to Smith, 14 February 1835. Quite what he meant 
is unclear . 
•• For example (CA) LG 596 , Lists of cattle re c ieved by Jarvis; (CA) CO 2756 , 
p.152 , Report of Jarvis, 17 June 1835; 1/AY / 8/86, Hudson to D'Urban, 24 June 
1835 . 
• 9 (CA) GH 19/4, pp . 951-3, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835; (CA) LG 596, p.49, 
D' Urban to Somerse t , 5 May 1835; A519/27, pp . 46-7, Smith to Campbe l l , 3 May 
1835 , provide the details of these forty thou sand cattle, and where they were 
to be distributed. 
'0 (CA) A519/18, pp.74-7, D'Urban to Campbell, 4 May 1835. 
'1 Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.129n. 
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official procedures. 92 A group of burghers under Erasmus deserted from the 
force in May, taking with them one hundred and thirty-eight captured cattle. 
This upset D'Urban far more than the death of Hintza, and he issued orders for 
their court-marshall. 93 Cox felt in August that Maqoma and Tya1i had generally 
been treated unfairly, citing an instance where seven thousand cattle were 
taken from Maqoma and then merely distributed among the Boers and Khoi by 
Somerset. 94 The Gcaleka around the Tsomo River fared no better, and more than 
four thousand cattle were captured there on 26 April alone. 95 There are 
copious examples of the troops of the colonial force regularly killing 
substantial numbers of captured livestock to eat. The mania exhibited by the 
invading forces in capturing cattle (at which the 'military Fingo' especially 
excelled) 96 makes startling reading, 97 and shows clearly the extent of 
dislocation caused in 1835. 'You gallop in,' enthused Smith, 'and half by 
force, half by strategem, pounce upon them (the Kaffers), wherever you find 
them, frighten their wives, burn their homes, lift their cattle, and return 
home in triumph. ,98 The war of 1835 provided the opportunity for probably the 
biggest cattle raid in African history. 
The psychological and physical impact produced by an armed force of the size 
employed in 1835 cannot be overstated . Whilst the Rharhabe were continuously 
losing warriors, the 1st Division, for instance, had lost only four men by 
late May - two through alcohol-induced accidents, and one Boer in a shooting 
accident. 9' D'Urban made it clear to Fynn in September that he considered 'the 
92 (CA) A519/1, pp.177-180, Somerset to D'Urban, 17 April 1835. See also (NA) 
A96, Shepstone Diary, entry for 3 June 1835, where Shepstone said that Phato 
and Mqhayi were receiving cattle for their help. 
93 (CA) GH 19/4, p.956, D'Urban to Campbell, 15 May 1835. cf. A519/18, p.89, 
D'Urban, 15 May 1835. D'Urban was particularly upset that burghers were taking 
cattle that had been captured at such pains. 
'4 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.127. 
95 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker, entry for 26 April 1835. 
96 Brinton, History of British regiments, p.51. 
97 For the extent of cattle seizure see the BPP military records, and the 
diaries of Shepstone, Halse, Andrews, T.H.Bowker and Alexander. 
98 Quoted in Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.130. 
99 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H.Bowker . 
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coercive effects' of the colonial force to be responsible for their 
victory. 100 Success should not be judged relative to total annihilation and the 
complete depopulation of the land west of the Kei; it must be gauged with 
regard to the damage done. The Rharhabe were clearly the losers in 1835 . 
The settlers claimed to have lost enormous numbers of cattle in the 
'irruption', and D'Urban appointed Hougham Hudson to investigate the claims. 
Hudson's estimate of 111,000 cattle lost by colonial farmers is completely 
inaccurate .101 Hudson himself acknowledged that most of the claims were 
exaggerated. The Board of Relief had registered claims for just over fifty 
thousand lost cattle by the end of 1835 . Hudson voiced his suspicion of 
Campbell, whom he said was backing the false claims of the farmers. Robson 
noted in 1836 that he knew many Boers who had claimed remuneration for losses 
they had never suffered,l02 and G. Palmer of Bathurst, for example, claimed 
for the loss of twenty-eight cattle that were later found to have wandered off 
through his own negligence .103 Nevertheless, Hudson's report still claimed 
that damage worth 288625 had been done to the Colony in 1834-5: Ill, 000 
cattle, 5,438 horses and 156,878 sheep and goats were stolen, and 455 houses 
burnt. 10' These claims are still accepted as accurate inventories of the war 
in the two latest publications on the topic,l05 
Webb makes it clear that these figures were unfounded , and based upon claims 
impossible to verify.106 He gives good reasons why the enormous figure of 
sheep and goat losses is so vastly incorrect. The only reason why the Rharhabe 
would steal sheep - which had little value in their society - was to eat. 
There was little history of sheep theft prior to 1835; sheep could not be 
driven far; and the wool trade was hardly affected by 1835 and in fact took 
100 (CAl A519/7, p.107, D'Urban to H.F.Fynn, 27 September 1835. 
101 (CAl LG 13, p.7, Hudson to D'Urban, 1 December 1835. 
102 A519/4, p . 100, Robson, 3 March 1836. 
103 (CAl LG 13, p.169. (CLl MS 923, Letter from Hudson, no date, acknowledged 
that many cattle were lost merely through straying. 
10' LG 46, List of Losses in the war, 1835. 
Ie Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.489; Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, 
p.160, n.182. 
106 Webb, 'Immediate consequences of the Sixth Frontier war', pp.38-48. 
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off immediately afterwards. Webb surmises that the majority of sheep and goat 
losses that were suffered would have been through straying or the depradations 
of wild animals because they were unattended . 107 The Bowkers at Tharfield 
(near Waai P1aats) had been told by Campbell on 25 December 1834 to abandon 
their farm and ·leave all their stock - amounting to seven hundred cattle and 
twelve hundred sheep - as these would be compensated after hostilities .IOB 
It is possible that the colonial authorities turned a blind eye to the 
exaggerations of the colonists in the hope of getting money from the British 
Treasury to pay the war expenses, and in support of D'Urban's argument that 
the Colony had been unjustly and massively attacked. D'Urban probably hoped 
that an exaggeration of the size of the alleged 'irruption' would justify his 
dramatic and anti-policy annexation and retaliation. The scanty records for 
Albany and Somerset in 1835-7 which do exist are in such a mess that the 
precise impact on those districts is impossible to calculate, and the lack of 
records might not be altogether innocent. Even the 1835 records are in a mess . 
At any rate, a comparative analysis of the stock losses during the fighting of 
1834-5 is virtually impossible. If there were no records, there could be no 
criticism of settler claims.l~ 
In comparison with the scorched-earth policy of the Colony, the Rharhabe seem 
to have waged a genteel war, killing only one white woman, Mrs Trollipllo (an 
accident for which Maqoma apologised), and not burning crops. On numerous 
occasions women and children were allowed to escape to safety, such as the 
Rogers' near Tyali,llI the Hendersons and Mahoneys at Clay Pits,lIZ and the 
107 Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', pp.150-9; 'Immediate 
consequences of Sixth Frontier war', pp.144-S. 
lOB (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B. E.Bowker, p.50. 
109 Ziervogel in Somerset could not understand why no 
Albany for the period, as all other districts 
1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 21 June 1835 . 
110 Heavyside, ' Abstract of Board of Relief". 
statistics were 
were analysed; 
taken for 
see (CA) 
III Ibid., p. 85. De Kock and Delport were killed near the Koonap, but their 
wives and children were allowed free, see Ibid., pp.15-7; see also Cory, Rise 
of South Africa, Vol.3, p.73. 
liZ Ibid., p.85; (CL) MS 7131, Journal of Stubbs, p.27. 
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Forbes' at Waai Plaats. 113 They were fighting a defensive war, attempting to 
protect their own land, women and children. The concept of 'total war', as 
carried out by the Colony, was foreign to the Rharhabe, who were without the 
weapons to produce destruction on the same scale, and were not used to the 
indiscriminate killing of the British . The Rharhabe had little reason to trust 
the Colony . Stretch, for example, described how in early April a Rharhabe 
messenger arranged to come unarmed and peacefully to the colonial camp to 
talk, but was seized and held on his arrival, although he managed to escape 
'to relate this instance of our perfidy. ,114 Stretch gave many more examples 
of atrocities, especially against women,llS who preferred the risk of being 
shot to coming near the Christians. When the forces crossed the Keiskamma 
River in early April T.B.Bowker noted that the men, when resting for half an 
hour, 'amuse themselves by firing the Kaffir huts. 0116 Because of their own 
guns, and their attitude towards the Africans as animals, the colonists (more 
than the British soldiers) regarded 1835 almost as an extended partridge 
shoot. This was evidenced by Frederick Rex's comments when on patrol in early 
January on the Rharhabe as the 'game' of which he hoped to 'bag a brace or two 
before the season's over' .117 
Godlonton claimed in mid May that 'it is not the character of British troops, 
notwithstanding the example of the enemy, to put them [Rharhabe) to death when 
not actually in arms against us. ,liB This whitewashing of the colonial forces 
is obvious propaganda, but it is the version which has survived. 119 Stretch 
bewailed in his diary the fact that the British were not, by mid-1835, 
shooting in self-defence, but at starving people who were always running away. 
Be wrote of a lone man who was seen on the Debe Flats on 10 June who ran at 
113 Graham's Town Journal, 25 Dec 1834; Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp . 78-84. 
114 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.49. 
115 Ibid. I pp.59-62. 
116 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.B.Bowker, entry for 1 April 1835. 
117 F. Rex to father, 16 January 1835, in Long I Index to Unofficial manuscripts I 
p.164. 
lIB Graham's Town Journal, 15 May 1835, Godlonton editorial. 
119 cf. Cobbing, 'Mfecane as Alibi', pp.513-4. 
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the sight of the whites and hid in a hole at the side of a river. Sixty troops 
followed and burnt the grass until he emerged, whereupon he was 'shot as a 
sportsman (or rather a poacher) would his game. This is British colonial 
warfare. ,110 Settler society wa s in many ways rather violent. In a 
particularly macabre scene, the three Cape Corps deserters responsible for the 
death of Lieut. Crowe in May provided the pretext for a show of discipline. 
After their arrest and interrogation in Graham's Town, they were marched to 
the Provost, dressed in grave clothes and accompanied by a firing squad, a 
band playing funereal music, and a crowd of onlookers. They were placed at the 
foot of three newly-dug graves, and ceremoniously shot into them, whereupon 
the band struck up a lively tune and everybody left. 121 The respective 
attitudes and practices of the two sides leads one to wonder who really 
deserved the title of 'irruption of the savages'. 
Settler historiography has bemoaned the destruction which the savages caused 
to the Colony. But it was the Africans who were the losers. The Europeans 
suffered a mere forty-three civilianl22 and twenty-nine military deaths 
throughout the period of hostilities. Only twelve of the military deaths 
occurred in action;123 the rest were as a result of accidents and illness, 
such as the ten Britons and Boers of the 1st Division shot in March by their 
own men,I24 or the men killed in April when Somerset's sentries fired at a 
group of horses, thinking they were being attacked . In comparison with the 
approxima tely four thousand Rharhabe and Gcaleka deaths ,125 the number is 
negligible. Little deference to women was shown by the whites. But the fuss 
120 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.91-4. 
121 See (CL) MS 7131, Journal of Stubbs, p.30, for a description. 
122 BPP 503 (1837), p.336. J.Cappon, Britain's Title in South Africa (London, 
1901), ch.16, drew attention to the imbalance between the losses suffered by 
the Colony, and those caused by it . 
123 Scott, 'British soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', p.213. 
124 (CL) MS 951, Diary of T.H . Bowker, entry for 21 March 1835; corroborated in 
(CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse. p.18. See also (NA) A96 , Shepstone 
Diary, entry for 2 April 1835. 
125 Calculated from the Ngqika and Ndlambe census in October, BPP 279 (1836), 
p.89. The number of deaths is probably much higher . More importantly, this 
figure excludes Gcaleka deaths. 
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made of a single white death, and the total disregard for 'barbarian' deaths, 
are crucial in understanding the manner in which the results of 1835 have been 
inverted. The 3rd Division alone killed fifty-five Rharhabe (including two 
women) in April and May and wounded many more,126 taking six thousand cattle 
just between 10 and 19 April. 'We have long been tired of this war,' was the 
message from Maqoma in August; 'all our best men are dead, there are no more 
Caffers left. You have had some soldiers killed, but our loss has been very 
great. 0127 The Colony did suffer a loss of agricultural manhours, with the 
farmers and the Khoi labourers fighting and Mantatee servants escaping, but in 
comparison with the losses of the Rharhabe, colonial losses were negligible. 
Rather than suffering enormous losses, many of the settlers seem to have 
gained more than they lost in 1835. The settlers argued that because their 
houses were made of stone they were more permanent and therefore more of a 
home which it was morally reprehensible to attack. Yet the many thousands of 
huts which the troops burnt were as much homes to their inhabitants. The 
Relief Board claimed that by February there were between fifteen hundred and 
two thousand destitute colonists gathered in Graham's Town - who had to be fed 
from the Disaster Fund - and that opthalmia, dysentry and fever were rife. 128 
Whilst there were certainly many genuine cases of need, a number of the 
settlers used the opportunity to enrich themselves at colonial expense. Many 
Boers in 1835 'claimed relief from Mr Heavyside both in cloth and food, when 
their kraals were well stocked with cattle and sheep'.129 
George Wood (a subsequent Graham's Town luminary), for instance, made a 
substantial profit by overpricing his clothing supplies to the Khoi 
auxilliaries, and Cock managed a similar deal.l30 Halse made £150 profit in 
a week by selling horses to the army.l31 Stretch mentioned that 'Colonel 
126 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, ch.2. 
127 (CA) A519/2, pp.156-9, Maqoma to Cox and Warden, 15 August 
128 Heavyside, 'Abstract of Board of Relief'. 
129 
130 
(CA) A519/4, p.l00, Robson to Campbell, 3 March 1836. 
Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.196, n.68. 
131 (CL) PR 3563, Reminiscences of Halse, p.1S. 
1835. 
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England strongly suspects Mr Godlonton [who was appointed to the Board of 
Relief to allocate relief funds] has his finger in the public chest 'secret 
service money". ,132 The costs of the war were borne by the Cape Treasury. 
which was in turn largely supplied with money by grants and loans from the 
London Treasury. 'It is therefore not surprising', remarked Stretch 
sarcastically, £these Graham's Town worthies ~ere desirous the "war should 
proceed. The Caffres were not sufficiently punished" .133 The incidence of 
settler destitution caused in 1835 was largely localised and minimal, and 
occurred in December 1834. 
While some settlers made a profit from 1835, much of the advantage gained 
would have been potential, with the extended gains in land and labour. As Webb 
has pointed out, the Colony rapidly recultivated, rebuilt and revived. The 
Graham's Town Journal even protested against the free land granted in the 
Queen Adelaide Province as payment for service in 1835, complaining that it 
was 'nonsense to talk of persons not having the means to pay for farms t .134 
Hudson's comment in November 1835 was that the Boers around the Koonap were 
still suffering, but that in general the eastern Cape was fairly well off and 
reaping the harvest. 135 The Rharhabe had no harvest to reap, and little 
stored food to rely on. Stretch was forceful in his condemnation of the 
actions of 1835: 
The year 1834 may be described as one of unremitting plunder. 
Indeed, it seems to me that it was the expressed object of some 
persons in the colony about this time to provoke the Caffres to a 
war, anticipating that the result of such a movement would end in 
a still further seizure of the territory of the Amakosae[sic] . . . 
and when I find that immediately after the war - and indeed before 
the sword was quite sheathed - numerous applications were made for 
extensive grants of the conquered country, it seems to me certain 
132 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.141. 
133 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, p.196; cf. (CL) MS 7131, Journal of Stubbs, 
pp.27-8 for an account of Woods' profiteering. 
134 Graham's Town Journal, 3 December 1835, Godlonton editorial; see also Webb, 
'Immediate consequences of Sixth Frontier war', p.47. 
135 (CL) MS 921, Letter from Hudson, 27 November 1835. 
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that the unremitting provocations by the colonists at this time 
were, in fact, a speculation to enric h themselves with large and 
fertile domains. 136 
136 Le Cordeur, Journal of Stretch, pp.17-8. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE D'URBAN SYSTEM OVERTURNED 
By the end of 1835 the year, for D'Urban, had been a success. British hegemony 
had been secured: the Rharhabe had been subjugated and the Gca1eka punished 
for refusing to side with the Cape. The murder of Hintza, D'Urban felt, was 
unfortunate only because the London humanitarians might exploit it. Large new 
areas of land had been secured for settler farm settlement, and an entire 
labour force the Fingo - was available. D'Urban had thus created a 
completely new dispensation for the settlers, which he expected to remain in 
force. All he needed to do was to convince the Colonial Office of its 
efficacy. But here lay the undoing of his scheme. A new Whig government 
returned to power in April 1835, determined to continue trimming colonial 
expenses. A new colonial policy had been devised in 1833 by the Whigs: the 
spread of indirect British rule, and the cutting of the cost of the colonies. 
D'Urban failed completely to follow this policy - his military advancement and 
increased financial requirements were the opposite. Further, he had 
deliberately misled London as to his objectives and actions. It was inevitable 
that his system would be overturned. All Rharhabe land was returned to them in 
1837, by order of Glenelg in London. 
But D'Urban still managed to keep the Fingo secret. London failed to see the 
true identity of the Fingo, and they remained as an eastern Cape labour 
source. This led to legal problems, though. The Cape law system made specific 
differentiation between subjects of the Colony, who came under Masters and 
Servants legislation; and African foreigners, who came under influx control. 
The Fingo were suddenly British subjects, the first time that Africans had 
fallen under Cape rule. They should te chnically have come now under colonial 
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legislation, but it was decided, paradoxically, to maintain control over 
them under influx control . The legislative difficulties were magnified by 
the retrocession of the Queen Adelaide Province in 1837. How were Fingos to 
be designat ed now? 
D'Urban annexed the Queen Adelaide Province and brought the Fingo into the 
Colony with the knowledge that the British Whig government had just fallen, 
and in the belief that the new Tory government l - a more conservative, 
imperialist group - would overlook what amounted to a direct breach of his 
instructions to renew relations and peace on the frontier and trim the 
financial excesses of the Cape . D' Urban's actions might have been accepted had 
it not been for the fall of the Tories in April in a snap election, news of 
which reached D'Urban only in July 1835. 2 The brief Tory Colonial Secretary, 
Lord Aberdeen, had seemed in March 1835 to support D'Urban's actions, 
stressing the need for frontier security, which gave D'Urban reason to feel 
that his actions were permissible. 3 The Whig Colonial Secretary Stanley's 
orders on Cape frontier policy in 1833 had distinctly outlined London's 
intention to infiltrate across the border slowly with agents and increasing 
control of the chiefs, and not through direct force as Wade, D'Urban and the 
settlers wanted.' Stockenstrom's treaty system of the late 1830s - so hated 
by the Albany settlers - was merely a return to Stanley's policy after 
D' Urban's refusal to follow orders . 5 
1 The Whigs under Lord Melborne fell in December 1834 , The Tories came to 
office under Sir Robert Peel, but fell in turn in April 1835. Mel bourne 
returned to power, and the Whigs remained until 1841. The Whig Colonial 
Secretaries had been Stanley until December 1833 , who was succeeded by Spring-
Rice. His Tory replacement for four months was the Earl of Aberdeen . Glenelg 
took over on 18 April 1835 . 
2 Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', p.203 . 
3 GH 1/104, pp . l09-110, Aberdeen to D'Urban, 20 March 1835. D'Urban waS 
surprised when Glenelg took over and criticised him . 
, GH 1/97, pp.122-3, Stanley to D'Urban , 27 November 1833. 
5 See below, pp.199-200. Brookes, Native policy, pp.14-15 , argues that Glenelg 
was merely maintaining the status quo in his castigation of D'Urban. 
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Galbraith suggested that O'Urban realised in mid-1835 that the fis cal 
strictures imposed on the Cape would undo the Province. But as Lancaster shows 
he continued to try to persuade Glenelg that the Province could pay f or 
itself, though with no hope of success . " There were rumours amongst the troops 
in King William's Town in July (that Smith attempted to stamp out) that the 
Province would be lost. 7 It is possible that D'Urban hoped that if he took 
long enough the -Tories would return to power and sanction his actions. BeU, 
O'Urban and the settlers saw opposition to the annexation and concern over the 
death of Hintza as a political matter . To them, the issues had nothing to do 
with philanthropy or colonial economics. They showed great concern for the 
ammunition which it could provide for the Whigs and Exeter Hall against Tory 
colonial policy, and accused Glenelg of exploiting the issues to gain home 
support. 8 Beresford was sent to London to argue O'Urban's case for his policy 
steps of May . He met initial support, especially from King William IV, who had 
the capital of the new province named after him, and the district after his 
consort. But soon Beresford became aware of the antagonism of the humanitarian 
movement and Glenelg, as well as British public opinion. 9 
Aberdeen's replacement as Secretary for State and the Colonies in April 1835 
was Charles Grant (Lord Glenelg) who was a well-informed and intelligent 
minister, an active member of the humanitarian movement, and who supported the 
Whig trimming of imperial obligations. 10 His policy for the Cape was similar 
to that which was being pursued in New Zealand: to extend British 
responsibility without the extension of her sovereignty.ll Whilst commending 
" Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p . 115 ; Lancaster , 'Governorship of O' Urban' , 
ch.6. 
7 For example, Long, Index to Unofficial manuscripts, p.173, F . Rex to his 
fathe r, 14 August 1835. 
8 (CA) A5 19/2, p . 36, Bell to O'Urban, 29 May 1835; A519/18, p . 95, O'Urban to 
Bell, 15 May 1835; Boyce, in 'Notes on South African Affairs', made similar 
conunents . 
9 J .G. Pretorius, 'Lord Glenelg's Four Visitors ', Historia, Vol . 14, No . 2, June 
1969, gives a good description of the machinations of Major Cloete and Captain 
Beresford (O ' Urban's spokesmen), and the philanthropists vying with them for 
the sympathy of Glenelg . See also Lancaster, 'Governorship of O'Urban ' , ch . 6 . 
10 Edwards , 1820 Settlers, p . 11. 
11 G.Martin, 'Two cheers for Lord Glenelg', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, January 1979 . 
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D'Urban's repulsion of the Rharhabe attacks in his first communication, in 
December 1835, he was critical of the unnecessary violence of the oversized 
colonial force, of the 'acts of retaliation, injustice and spoliation' 
committed by commandos prior to 1835, of the unwarranted attack on the 
Gcaleka, of the introduction of the Fingo, and of the economic burden of the 
new Province . Glenelg's information came, indirectly, from James Read . Glenelg 
was briefed on Cape affairs by Buxton , a parliamentary member of the 
philanthropic movement, and later by Philip. Buxton was provided with 
information by Philip. And Philip in turn derived much of his detail through 
correspondence with Read. Philip and Buxton managed to institute an inquiry 
into 1835 and the treatment of the aborigines. This thesis in many ways echoes 
Glenelg's disagreements with the actions of the settlers. Glenelg was given 
the opposite view of affairs by the despatches of D'Urban, but he gave very 
little real information. 12 
Within two years of the declaration of peace, D'Urban was unemployed, having 
been dismissed as governor, ostensibly for his insubordination and petulance 
in the series of diatribes that passed between himself and Glenelg. The real 
reason, though, was because his aggressive notions of expansion and military 
control were incompatible with the objectives of the London Government. It is 
important to note that, even when the Tories returned to power in 1841, he was 
never trusted with an important posting again. He had completely misled the 
Colonial Office when he wrote to Aberdeen in March 1835, promising a cessation 
of hostilities within a month, but neglecting to mention the massive onslaught 
planned for two days later. He then wrote nothing more for three months, 
leaving Glenelg to assume that the war was over. He complained to Glenelg that 
his force had not been large enough, that he had faced forty thousand savages, 
that frontier control had been very benevolent before 1835, that the Sparkes 
12 For a complete record of their correspondence, see BPP 503 (1837). 
Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', ch.6, points out that D'Urban wrote only 
two letters in 1835, and took an inordinately long time to answer Glenelg's 
questions, hoping for a second fall of government . Lancaster provides a good 
summary of the dispute. See also J.E.Holloway, 'The Glenelg-D'Urban Dispute', 
Historia, Vol.18, No.2, June 1973. 
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and Sutton patrols had been well-behaved, and that the settlers had been the 
victims of a long-fomented plan of aggression . 1J 
These deliberately fallacious claims are vital to an understanding of 1835 . 
They provide the foundations for the central myths of the settler version of 
the war - that the settlers were innocent and justified in punishing a huge 
invading force. "This shows how closely O'Urban was involved in the creation 
and spread of the myth. One of the main reasons for the longevity of the 
settler version has been the 'official' corroboration it received from 
O'Urban, who was supposedly a neutral imperial official. 
There was much common ground between the views of O'Urban and the settlers, 
and he was popular at the Cape. He left behind him a Colony seething with 
anger at London and its representatives, and it supported him virtually 
unanimously, as his policies had been designed to answer their needs. The 
Rliarhabe had been decisively beaten (although they continued to raid the 
settlers for cattle); a barrier of co-operative indigenous peoples had been 
established; a 'free labour' alternative had been provided; and new land, 
vulnerable as it was, was available. O'Urban had dealt with the three concerns 
of the Colony - their provision with land, labour and security. His subsequent 
attempt in April 1836 to pass an ordinance indemnifying any person acting 
under his authority for the duration of martial law,14 though, was overturned 
by Glenelg. He shared to quite an extent the views and attitudes of the 
settlers. This was especially so with regard to the Africans . In May 1835 he 
commented that 'in good truth I am not aware that any two living things more 
perfectly resemble each other than the wolf and the Kaffir' .15 This was a 
remark which led Glenelg to reconsider seriously O'Urban's suitability for his 
colonial posting. O'Urban was a military man; he was not a politician or 
diplomat . He favoured expansion of colonial control into Natal, in order to 
13 BPP 503 (1837), pp . 62-3, O'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1835. 
14 (CA) LCA 7, Minutes of Legislative Council, April 1836. 
(CA) A519/2, p.34, O'Urban to Bell, 4 May 1835 . 15 
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pre-empt foreign designs on the area, [6 an idea that was anathema to the 
Colonial Office, but welcomed by the settlers. 
In mid 1835 there was a sudden flood of petitions from allover the Colony in 
support of D' Urban and his polic ies. Most of them had similar wording. In all 
there was a reference to the release of 'ten to fifteen thousand Fingoes' and 
the invariable attack on the 'misrepresentation of events in 1835' by Philip. 
This seems ·to have been part of an orchestrated attempt by the 'Gr aham's Town 
faction' to place D'Urban in a good light and show colonial support for his 
actions. 17 Godlonton and William Boyce were his most vociferous supporters, 
and continued to argue publicly in his favour for decades. Godlonton so 
admired him that he named his son Benjamin D'Urban Godlonton in his honour. 
Boyce, although a Wesleyan missionary, was also a land owner with a farm on 
the Koonap, which he began to stock with sheep in late 1835. 18 D'Urban 
obsessively collected evidence in support of his policies until his 
appointment to Canada in 1847. He continued to give advice to the Cape 
Governors Napier and Maitland and when Smith finally annexed the land west of 
the Kei in 1847 he claimed it as the resolution of D'Urban's policy.19 
In the minds of many of the colonists, the Province had been annexed since 
16 Campbell suggested the settlement of the entire area up to and including 
Natal, see (CA) CO 2756, Campbell to D'Urban, 29 January 1835; Lancaster, 
'Governorship of D'Urban' , p.280. 
17 See the list of petitions, mainly from the eastern districts but even from 
Cape Town in D'Urban, Public Documents. Godlonton, Sunshine and Cloud produced 
another list of particularly partisan supporters from the Legislative Council, 
government agents, Gqunukhwebe and other colonial allies. D'Urban certainly 
had rural support, but it is unclear to what extent he was supported in Cape 
Town, where De Zuid-Afrikaan favoured him , but the Commercial Advertiser was 
critical. Philip I surprisingly I was in favour of retaining the Province in 
1836, but as a means of civilising the Africans, see BPP 538 (1836), p. 625. 
18 (AM) SMD 948, Reminiscences of B.E.Bowker, p.65. Boyce can surely not be 
taken as a serious corrunentator, as he describes Smith as liberal and 
benevolent I see 'Notes on South African Affairs', p . 59. 
19 Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', pp.12, 346, agrees with this. But 
1848 was not a vindication of D'Urban I s policy - it was proof of British 
might. Lancaster's strong support for D'Urban and his policies leads him to 
brush lightly over the fact that D'Urban was never again trusted with office 
because of the lack of confidence in him. 
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February 1835. Boyce informs us that the planned annexation was common 
knowledge in Graham's Town in January, although D'Urban told Glenelg that he 
had announced his plans for annexation for the first time on 8 May.20 On 18 
January Smith argued that the only way to afford future security to the Colony 
was 'to include within our future boundary line a large portion of the country 
which is now occupied by treacherous and murderous savages'.2l 
This seizure of land was seen by most settlers as justified . D 'Urban's 
explanation for the annexation was that it was the 'only measure that could 
promise to repay the expenses of the war ... and place a defensible barrier 
between the heart of the colony and the savage tribes of Central Africa, 
provide security for the future, and a just indemnification for the past . ,22 
Only once did he claim the Queen Adelaide Province by right of conquest (the 
argument which Smith adopted); he usually justified the annexation as a 
retributive measure, or because it extended 6 c ivilisation,.23 D'Urban claimed 
that the Kei was a more easily defensible frontier than the Fish, that it 
would take fewer troops to patrol, and would therefore be less expensive to 
maintain. Whether this was strategically accurate or not, he omitted to 
mention the number of extra British troops that would be needed to retain 
control of the vast expanses of newly-annexed territory. 
Land began to be apportioned to soldiers and settlers in the Queen Adelaide 
Province (chiefly along the Buffalo River) and in the Ceded Territory in lieu 
of war compensation. Different criteria were used to those applied to the 
distribution of the captured cattle. Charles Michell, who was in charge of the 
20 Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.113; Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs' , 
p.48; BPP 279 (1836), p.44, Shrewsbury to D'Urban, 16 January 1835, suggested 
that the area be annexed, but his views were, however, disowned by the 
Wesleyan London office. 
21 BPP 252 (1835), p . 134, Smith to D'Urban, 18 January 1835. 
22 BPP 279 (1836), D'Urban to Aberdeen, 19 June 1835. 
23 (CA) A519/18, p.100, D'Urban to 7, 2 June 1835. He said that the Rharhabe 
had conquered and driven away the Khoi, and therefore had no hereditary right 
to the land . Campbell, like Smith, used this argument, see (CA) CO 2756, 
Campbell to D'Urban, 29 January 1835. 
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'topographical squad' and was with O'Urban at Warden's Post, told Frederick 
Rex in May that land would be apportioned to 'young heroes' who had fought 
well. 24 Stanton received a plot of three thousand morgen in the Ceded 
Territory from O'Urban for services rendered by fighting in the army, although 
he was only able to retain it for six months. Scanlen was similarly granted a 
large farm on the west bank of the Keiskamma as compensation for war losses 
and as reward for fighting. 25 Within a year there were four hundred and thirty 
claims for land, most of them put in by Boer soldiers in May and June 1835. 26 
By November 1835 farms were being surveyed along the Fish for Lieutenant 
Moultrie and other soldiers in return for their service and help with the 
Fingo.27 Old soldiers, like the Fingo collaborators, made good buffers. Giving 
them land in disputed areas, such as had been done in 1829 at the Kat River 
Settlement with retired Khoi soldiers, rewarded them for their service and 
provided protection for the Colony. 
Whilst D'Urban was wrangling with Glenelg, Smith had set himself up as 
egomaniacal 'king' of the Rharhabe, with his seat of power in King William's 
Town. 28 A series of forts were set up throughout the new Province in late 
1835, most of which were removed after the disannexation of 1836. 29 All was 
not well in the new Province. Despite his boast that after three months all 
his charges had come to regard him as their father, Smith, who was known to 
have been involved in the murder of Hintza, was struggling. Although the 
Rharhabe had been beaten, he had at his disposal a force of fourteen hundred 
troops to control an area the size of Somerset and Albany together, with a 
24 Charles Michell to F.Rex, Warden's Post, 18 May 1835, in Long, Index to 
Unofficial manuscripts, p.143. 
25 (AM) SM 5502, Papers of T.H.Bowker, pp.2-4. The land grants in Queenstown 
in the 1850s were also dependent upon service in commandos and the wars, and 
on losses suffered in hostilities. 
26 (CA) BK 32. Applications for farms in the Queen Adelaide Province; Chase, 
Natal Papers, p.298, provides statistics on the applications for land. 
27 (CA) A519/3, pp.142-4, Bowker to D'Urban, 10 November 1835. 
28 Harington, Sir Harry Smith; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.113-4. 
29 Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', map on p.197. 
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hostile population of around 55,000. 30 He burned seven hundred huts in one 
week, and nearly caused another war when he seized the cattle of two chiefs. 
Smith's fantasies about his effectiveness made him oblivious to the faults of 
the system, and the fact that it depended purely on force. 3! 
The disannexation of the Queen Adelaide Province was ordered by Glenelg in 
1835 (a direct censure of D'Urban's policies) and Stockenstrom was sent back 
to the Cape to take control of the eastern districts as Lieutenant-Governor . 
His task was to implement more subtle ideas of conquest through a treaty 
system and informal British control and influence outside the Colony, as had 
been ordered in 1833. Rather than destroy the power of the chiefs, as D'Urban 
had intended, Stockenstrom wanted to use their influence to govern their 
people. 32 His emphasis was on market expansion rather than military offence. 
Stockenstrom was immediately thereby against the settlers. The emphasis of 
government in the eastern districts changed from military to civil. The 
frontier administration consisted of the Lieutenant-Governor, Agent- General 
(Hudson) and four agents (Stretch, J .M. Bowker, H.F.Fynn, W.Fynn) in the 
neighbouring polities. A 'Native Police' force began to be recruited,33 which 
was to become an important method of controlling the African population by 
means of Africans. 
Stockenstrom's job was made virtually impossible from the beginning. D'Urban 
dismantled the systems of control (specifically martial law in the Province) 
before Stockenstrom arrived in order to undermine his ability to organise the 
new system. 34 The colonists strongly opposed any system opposed to D'Urban's 
(which benefitted them most); and they regarded Stockenstrom (born and bred in 
30 BPP 503 (1837), p.9, Census of Caffer tribes, October 1835; see Scott, 
'British soldier on Eastern Cape Frontier', pp . Z15-7, for troop distribution 
in the Province. 
3! Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.1Z0; BPP 503 (1837), pp.Z51-Z, Smith report . 
He made incredible claims about his effectiveness in completely destroying 
the traditional customs and social system, see Ibid., pp.Z59-Z53. 
32 Stockenstrom, Autobiography of Stockenstrom, Vol.Z, p.34. 
33 Lancaster, 'Governorship of D'Urban', p.153. 
34 Ibid., p.Z49. 
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Graaff-Reinet) as a traitor. 35 He met the full force of the power and fury of 
the Graham's Town faction, especially of Godlonton, who accused him of jumping 
on the philanthropic bandwagon for promotion. 36 He symbolised opposi tion to 
settler demands . . Faced with the non-cooperation and anger of Graham's Town 
with its media and leaders against him, his scheme, whatever its merits, had 
no chance of success. He sued Campbell unsuccessfully in 1838 for conspiring 
against him, believing that he was instigating the settler antagonism against 
the treaty system. Given Campbell's record, it is most likely that he was 
undermining him, but there was no real proof of it. Godlonton successfully 
alienated Stockenstrom from the settlers, and petulantly retained his personal 
animosity towards him. Much like the status accorded to the death of the 
discredited Kruschev in Pravda in 1967, all that the Graham's Town Journal had 
to say of Stockenstrom's death in 1864 was: 'The death of Sir Andeas 
Stockenstrom is reported by telegram. The Colony paid deceased a pension of 
750, which will now be saved.' 37 
There has long been confusion over what constituted the boundary of the Colony 
between 1819 and 1835 - whether it was to be the Fish or Keiskamma River. 
After his meeting with Ngqika and a verbal treaty in October 1819, Lord 
Charles S·omerset described the newly-acquired land as the Ceded (not Neutral) 
Territory, and proclaimed the Keiskamma River, not the Fish, to be the 
boundary of the Colony.38 (See Map 5, p.134). White farmers were not to be 
allowed east of the Fish, and Africans were not permitted west of the 
Keiskamma, but it was the latter that formed the official boundary. The terms 
35 Godlonton, Sunshine and Cloud, is a very strong attack on Stockenstrom, 
wherein he is accused of self-interest and of trying to undermine D'Urban. 
Godlonton inverted the actual process of disannexation, claiming that . 
Stockenstrom moved first and destroyed D'Urban's system before the latter was/ 
ready. 
36 Urie, 'Study of evidence of Stockenstrom', provides a convincing defence of 
Stockenstrom; see also Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism, Ch.4. 
37 Graham's Town Journal, 17 May 1864. The alienation of Stockenstrom was 
reinforced by the writing of J.C.Chase see McGinn 'J.C.Chase 1820 
settler' . 
38 Cape Town Gazette. and African Advertiser, 30 October 1819, Somerset Report, 
14 October 1819. Somerset described the area specifically as the Ceded 
Territory. 
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of reference to the boundary have caused considerable confusion, with each 
subsequent delineation differing from the previous, and most maps providing a 
different interpretation of the boundary . There was no official accompanying 
map in 1819 and the terms of the treaty were very vague. The expulsions of 
1829, 1833 and 1834, according to the treaty demarcations, were not extensions 
of the boundary, but enforcements of it . The colonial vagueness was echoed by 
Rharhabe confusion. Philip wrote to D'Urban in January 1835 to obtain clarity 
on the precise line of the boundary; he drew attention to the fact that the 
chiefs were under the impression that they held the entire Tyhume area, but 
that apparently the British were claiming otherwise. 3• Why was the boundary 
not clearly delineated? The lack of a definition gave more lee-way to settler 
interpretations of what land they possessed. 
The continued confusion is evident in 1836 when D'Urban ordered the 
retrocession of the annexed land. Article 29 of the December 1836 treaty with 
the Ngqika makes specific allowance that the Fingo on the west bank of the 
Tyhume outside the Ceded Territory be allowed to remain unmolested until their 
crops were harvested,40 which would have been early 1837 . This treaty states 
that the boundary of the Colony was to be Somerset's boundary of 1819 - the 
Keiskamma/Tyhume - but that the area between the Fish and Keiskamma was to 
remain neutral territory . Again the border was not drawn. This left the Colony 
the option of creating its own interpretation of where it lay. Stretch, Cory, 
Whiteside and Slee described the entire Tyhume Fingo settlement as being 
destroyed by mid 1837 ~ecause it fell outside the colonial boundary . The map 
delineating the posit~on of all African groups in March 1837 surprisingly 
makes no reference t o any Fingo at Tyhume, although showing the Peddie 
settlement . 41 
Yet the Fingo commis s ~oner Thomson refers to a growing, successful Fingo 
3. (CAl A519/1, p . 68, ?hilip to D'Urban, 18 January 1835 . 
40 Government Gazette, 9 June 1837, Treaty between Stockenstrom and Sandile, 
Maqoma, Tyali, Botman and Eno, 5 December 1836 . 
41 'Map of the Eastern Frontier', 18 March 1837, Wits Africana Library. 
202 
settlement on the Tyhume in October 1837, after there had been a dispersal of 
some of the Fingo in July 1836. 42 Colonel Somerset corroborated Thomson in 
August 1837 by saying that the Tyhume Fingo were nervous, but that an effort 
must be made to keep them in a group, near Fort Beaufort. 4J The implication 
seems to be that the boundary, in being restored to its 1819 state, bisected 
the Fingo settlement on the Tyhume, dispersing half and leaving the rest. The 
treaties stipulated that the boundary ran along the foot of the ridge leading 
up to Juanasberg, from where it was to be taken below Fort Beaufort on the Kat 
River in the west, and to the Tyhume River in the east. This is supported by 
the fact that in 1834, after being expelled from the Ceded Territory, TyaU 
settled in what became Auckland, in the Tyhume valley north of the mission and 
the line between the Tyhume and the Juanasberg ridge. 44 
The disannexation of 1837, which gave the land east of the Tyhume back to 
Maqoma and Tyali,45 caused a setback for the idea of a Fingo labour reservoir 
in the Ceded Territory, and the Fingo locations disintegrated to a large 
extent. 46 Fort Beaufort was retained; and Fingo could still be congregated 
there, to be distributed to Albany farmers. Of the Fingo who left the west 
bank of the Tyhume, three hundred moved in mid-1837 to the Winterberg Tembu of 
Mapasa, some went to Boers on the Riet river, and the vast majority placed 
themselves voluntarily under Maqoma. 47 Most of the Fingo who amalgamated with 
the Rharhabe did so, according to W.Fynn, because of a sense of ill-treatment 
at the hands of the Colony.4s Stretch noted that this quiet dispersal greatly 
angered 'the faction' in Graham's Town. Stockenstrom placed a number at 
42 (CA) A519/7, pp.176-8, Thomson to D'Urban, 23 October 1837. 
43 (CA) A519/12, p.129, Somerset to D'Urban, 3 August 1837. 
44 The Tyhume area continued to be one of discord: in 1848 three hundred 
settlers were placed in military settlements at Juanasberg, Woburn, Auckland 
and Ely. Their presence was a cause of war in 1850. Today the valley is still 
fertile, but increasingly overpopulated as a result of the "homelands' policy. 
45 Moyer, "History of the Mfengu', p.199. For the text of the disannexation, 
see D'Urban's proclamation in the Government Gazette, 3 February 1837. 
46 Cory, Rise of South Africa, Vol.3, p.196. 
47 (CA) A50/4, Stretch to Fairbairn, 4 July 1837. 
4S (CA) LG 420, pp.124-7, Report of W.Fynn, 1 November 1836. 
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Tsitsikama,49 and most of these ended as labourers in the Co l ony. The rest 
were brought back to Peddie by Napier in 1838. Some Fingo even moved to 
Butterworth with Ayliff,50 which further contradicts the idea that the Fingo 
had been oppressed by the Gcaleka. Stockenstrom commented that the Fingo who 
remained under Maqoma or moved eastwards were safe and comfortable, whilst 
those who came into the Colony continued to be objects of persecution. 51 For 
those who moved back east across the Keiskamma/Tyhume boundary line, they no 
longer had to work or be regarded as traitors. 
The Peddie settlement suffered a similar disintegration, as did King William's 
Town, which was well into Ndlambe territory. The Fingo land around Peddie (a 
very small area) was delineated in a treaty in December 1836. 52 The entire 
area was officially given to the Gqunukhwebe (apportioned after the treaties 
of December 1835), but the local people of Siyolo and Nqeno resented the Fingo 
presence on what had been their land until 181 9, and which t hey had been 
trying to regain sinCe. 53 A young Fingo herd boy was murdered in January 1837, 
and a destructive attack was launched on the Fingo in August 1837. A permanent 
military force of Boers and the 72nd Regiment had to be retained in the fort 
to protect the Fingo and keep the peace with the Gqunukhwebe . 54 Richard 
Southey reported that after the attack in August, which seems to have been 
sparked by Fingo actions, the area was particularly tense. Maqoma, Siyolo, 
Nqeno and even the colonial ally Mqhayi made it clear that as long as there 
were Fingo in the Ceded Territory there would be trouble, and that they must 
be punished, or the Gqunukhwebe and then the Colony would be attacked. 55 The 
Fingo who were at Peddie were African collaborators, who were regarded by 
49 Whiteside, History of Abambo, p.39; Boyce, 'Notes on South African Affairs', 
pp .139-140. 
50 Sl ee, 'Aspects of Wesleyan Methodism', p.49. 
51 (CA) A519/12, p.132, Stockenstrom to D'Urban, 3 August 1837. 
52 (CA) LG 602, p.68, Treaty between Stockenstrom and Jokweni and Umhlambiso, 
10 December 1836 . It was stressed (Article 2) that the land in the Ceded 
Territory was on loan. 
53 (CA) A519/12. p.129, Somerset to D'Urban, 3 August 1837; Bowker to D'Urban, 
3 July 1827, in Bowker, "Speeches, Letters and Selections", p.26. 
54 (CA) A519/5. p.84. Report of Lowen, 27 September 1836. 
55 (CA) A519/7. p.56. R.Southey to Campbell, August 1837. 
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their own people as traitors. It was too much to expect there to be no 
reaction to their provocative settlement. 
As Galbraith and Peires have proposed," it· was unfortunate that at this 
period the tension was eased by the removal of some of the Fingo to Tsitsikama 
and the retrocession of Rharhabe land, as this disguised the complete 
unviability of the D'Urban system, and allowed the settlers to reminisce on it 
as a Golden Age. With the disannexation, Bowker's position at Peddie changed 
from commissioner to the more advisory Diplomatic Agent. As a buffer, Peddie 
was not a success in the mid-1830s - unlike Tyhume, which grew steadily in 
popu1a tion and agricultural produce57 and by October 1836 the Peddie 
population had slumped to a mere four hundred and ninety.58 
It was largely the increase of labour that heralded the economic take-off of 
the eastern Cape. 59 Wool production, for instance, increased significantly in 
the eastern districts during 1835 and 1836,60 despite its labour intensive 
nature. 61 Merino sheep had been slowly acclimatising to Cape conditions in the 
1820s and 1830s. Wqol was a lucrative product, in demand by the large textile 
industry in Britain, but farmers needed a large labour force: semi-skilled 
workers for shearing, and unskilled labourers for herding and menial jobs. As 
a result of its inability to produce a proper labour system in the 1820s, the 
Cape had lagged behind on the international export market. Australia, with its 
access to endless cheap convict labour, had streaked ahead in wool production 
during the 1820s and 1830s. 62 The Cape economy had for decades been dependent 
on wine and wheat for its exports. These crops did not flourish in the eastern 
56 Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p.122; Peires, House of Phalo, p.115. 
57 (CA) A519/7, pp.176-8, Thomson to D'Urban, 23 October 1837 . 
58 Bowker, 'Speeches, Letters and Selections', p.22, Bowker to D'Urban, 3 
October 1836. There were 120 men, 140 women and 230 children, with 640 cattle. 
59 As described by Le Cordeur, Eastern Cape Separatism; Crais, 'Beasts of 
Prey'. This proposal needs closer examination than has been given in this 
thesis. The impact of 1835 on the economy of the eastern districts requires 
further research. 
60 Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.48. 
61 Ibid., p.210; Peires, House of Phalo, pp.120-1. 
62 Neumark, Economic Influences on Frontier, p.166. 
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districts, and sheep-farming was thus tried as an alternative . The sudden 
increase in labour in 1835 - with the apportionment of large numbers of 
unskilled Fingo labourers to eastern farmers - gave the region the impetus to 
gain a foothold in export markets. For the first time the eastern Cape economy 
began to rival that of the west. 
The war of 1835 cost the colonial treasury more than D'Urban had intended, and 
the Colony was only rescued from bankruptcy by three shiploads of silver from 
London in 1837. 63 This in effect meant, though, that the British Treasury paid 
for the war, which was against its policy of making all colonies self-
sufficient. An important question is why D'Urban embarked on a full-scale 
campaign when the Colony was already in financial straits. Did he expect to 
make a profit? The war was waged between colonial harvesting and sowing, and 
this meant that the settlers were able to leave their farms without 
agricultural loss. The colonists also stood to make a profit if they could 
ca·pture enough cattle. Those settlers who were genuinely stricken in 1835 were 
helped with funds from the Storm Fund. The local economy of Graham'S Town was 
stimulated simply by the presence in the area of a full colonial army for six 
months. Graham's Town merchants were able to make a profit, despite the 
condi tions .64 
The complaints from Boers in 1835-6 (which reflected the reasons for the Great 
Trek) were concerned not with a shortage of labour, as they were being 
provided with Fingo by the colonial authorities, but with the lack of 
legislation to control the labour, and the curbs on the maltreatment of 
workers. 65 A good percentage of the Fingo labourers went to the Boers. Agar-
Hamilton suggested that the Boers, in their movements and the setting up of 
their states, employed the forms (and legal explanations) of labour 
63 Lancaster, "Governorship of D'Urban", p.86. 
64 As described in Chapter 5, pp.188-9. 
65 (CA) A519/3, pp.48-50, Robson to ?, 14 October 1835; (CA) 1/UIT/15/16, 
Complaints from Uitenhage, 11 Augus t 1835; A519/ 7, pp. 38-44, P. Uys to ?, 7 
August 1837, outlined the grievances of the Boers who had left. One was that 
O'Urban spoke sense, but was being ignored by London. 
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procurement learnt in the eastern districts. 66 Crais s uggests that the Boer 
treks resulted from an increasing threat to the maintenance of Boer control 
over land and labour, both by the accession to control of the eastern 
districts by the British, as well as by . the growing autonomy of 
proletarianised and emancipated free blacks. 57 De Kiewiet pointed out tha t 
when the direct route to Natal was blocked by the retrocession in 1837, the 
Boers opted to skirt the area and conquer the land to the north instead. 68 It 
is possible that the Great Trek was not a Boer attempt to escape British 
humanitarian encroachment, but an extension of white dominance as a result of 
the demonstration of colonial military power in 1835. 69 The way was now open 
for the conquest of the entire sub-continent. 
The introduc tion of the Fingo in 1835 , coming in the year following the 
emancipation of the slaves, played a crucial role in the transition from a 
slave-based economy, to one based on 'free' labour. Fingos were restricted 
largely to the eastern districts. This meant that the farmers of the western 
Cape whose ec onomy rested on slave labour had to find ways of 
incorporating and controlling the released slaves after 1838 through 
legislation. Fairbairn argued for the advantages of a free labour force and 
the capital that would be released in slave emancipation. But even he stressed 
the right of the colonists to the retention of labour discipline and control 
in the new system. Peires argues that the preconditions of a capitalist free 
market the revamping of the judiciary, civil service, currency, 
administration and the labour situation - were being met in the 1820s, and 
that this gave the Cape economy the freedom to evolve after 1835. He sees the 
economy in the 1820s and 1830s as hamstrung by its roots in 'a close 
association between government and commercial enterprise, coupled with a 
poorly capitalised productive sector reliant on coerced labour t. 70 Crais 
66 Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, ch . 10. 
67 Crais, . Some thoughts on slavery I I p. 38. 
68 De Kiewiet, History of South Africa, p.53. 
69 Suggested by Julian Cobbing , personal communication. 
70 Peires, 'British and the Cape', p.490; see also pp.510-1. 
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argues that the growth of the state in the 1820s and 1830s began not in the 
areas of greatest capitalist development, but in the towns and mission 
stations of Albany and Uitenhage. 71 It was 1835 that provided a further major 
catalyst to this capitalist transition, especially with regard to labour. 
The Colony continued to expand throughout the nineteenth century, as did its 
methods of controlling what was by mid-century a sizeable labour supply. The 
Fingo in 1835 solved the immediate labour shortage, but the rapid growth of 
eastern Cape capitalism outpaced the rate of worker influx in the 1840s, so 
that the government soon had the same problem to solve again. In 1848 twenty 
of the twenty-one Cape districts reported a scarcity of unskilled workers. Ten 
of these districts claimed a chronic shortage . Smith, then Governor, 
introduced a vagrancy law and apprenticeships to deal with it, although a 
permanent solution was only achieved a decade later after the Cattle 
Killing.72 This thesis proposes that the labour situation underwent a series 
of peaks and troughs, the peaks manifesting themselves after periods of 
increased hostility and the troughs during economic development . 73 
Dispossession and war produced a surplus of labour.74 The period immediately 
following the colonial offensive of 1835 was a peak, but the rapid growth of 
the region and the expansion of its borders in 1848 caused a second shortage. 
Crais stresses the manner in which increased wool production spurred the need 
for workers: the Cape exported 586,000 pounds of wool (mostly from the eastern 
districts) in 1839, and 5,500,000 pounds in 1850. 75 This labour need soon 
outstripped the Fingo supply and the number of Rharhabe entering the Colony. 
71 Crais, 'Beasts of Prey' . 
72 Peires, Dead Will Arise, pp.246-7 . 
73 Webb, 'Agricultural development of 1820 settlement', p.211, also argues that 
the labour influx was particularly erratic from the 1820s to the 1840s. 
M See the analyses of Bundy, Rise and Fall of Peasantry; Crais, 'Beasts of 
Prey' . 
75 Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'; see tables in Webb, 'Agricultural development of 
1820 settlement', p.214. 
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Whilst the problem in the eastern districts in the 1820s and 1830s had been 
the chronic shortage of workers, and the development of subsequent methods to 
procure them, the huge amount of Fingo labour obtained in 1835-7 meant a shift 
in the labour problem from one of shortage to one of the control and retention 
of workers, in this way bringing the eastern Cape into line with the west. For 
the Africans, the change from forced to I free I labour was not necessarily 
advantageous. A slave, as a material possession, had to be cared for to an 
extent; but the indentures of the Khoi and Africans made no provisions for 
illness. retirement or capital accumulation. 76 Forced labour occurred on a 
large scale in 1835, and continued periodically throughout the century, but it 
was not a viable long-term solution. 
Essential to the philosophy of free labour is the psychological conditioning 
of the worker. Optimum production could only be attained if the worker chose -
for whatever reason to seek employment. The Colony opted for the 
attenuation of the African land base through dispossession. Further, Africans 
after the 1840s were forced to enter the money economy through the payment of 
hut taxation, and the need to earn colonial wages to survive. The discipline 
that had to be maintained in the system derived from economic rather than 
physical forces. Integral to the socialisation of the workers was the 
imposition of the capitalist notion that hard work is morally and socially 
beneficial, and the entire process of colonisation stressed this notion. Under 
Ordinance 49, African workers had labourered for a year and had then returned 
home. This was counter to the farmers' need for periods of lengthy contract, 
which later legislation attempted to ensure. 
Taxes and cattle pounds were imposed on the African population from the late 
l830s, gathering momentum in the 1840s, to ensure that people were driven into 
employment as the only means of survival and paying their taxes. 77 Hut 
taxation, the universal symbol of imperial domination, came into existence for 
76 As suggested by Cock, Maids and Madams, p.176. 
)) Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'; Peires, Dead Will Arise, p.291. 
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the first time in Africa in the Cape and British Kaffraria (what had 
temporarily been the Queen Adelaide Province) and Natal in 1849. This forced 
all Africans within the colonial ambit to pay a specified tax - in colonial 
currency - in proportion to the number of huts they owned . Any livestock found 
'straying' - and many merely taken from homesteads - were put in a pound, for 
whose release the owner had to pay a lump sum in colonial money. The Boers in 
Natal and north of the Orange introduced a system of 'labour tax' in the 
1850s, whereby Africans performed an annual period of work as a form of 
taxation. 78 This in effect set the Boer republics up in competition with the 
Cape for enrolment of 'free' labourers, as the latter insisted on the payment 
of tax in money, to feed its economy. 
An important inducement for Africans to enter the Colony was the destruction 
caused in their territory by colonial invasion and the seizure of their land, 
as had happened in 1835, and was to happen again in 1847 and 1850-3. The 
Cattle Killing provided a new chance for Africans to become labourers. 
Africans entering the Colony were forced into growing locations, either in the 
Fingo locations or around all the eastern Cape towns, where they remained in 
a separate, accessible concentration. These locations, created for the Fingo, 
thus soon incorporated all African labourers because, as the missionary Elliot 
commented in 1844, the object of forcing people into locations 'is to force 
persons of colour into contract service,.79 
The control of labour was a dominant concern throughout the nineteenth 
century. With the decision in 1828 to introduce African labour to the Colony 
came two complementary laws, Ordinances 49 and 50. The first was designed to 
control the entrance of African labourers - foreigners - into the Colony. The 
other was intended to control the actions of those subjects (specifically 
Khoi and later Fingo) already within the Colony.80 They had two distinct 
78 Agar-Hamilton, Native Policy, ch.10. 
19 Crais, 'Beasts of Prey'. 
80 See Chapter 2, p.48. 
210 
lines of descent through the century and into the next. Ordinance 49 was the 
original influx control law, and was expanded in Article 4 of Ordinance 2 of 
1837, to regulate incoming labour81 and prohibit unauthorised rural or urban 
10cations,82 although there were insufficient police to enforce the law . 
Subsequently there came Acts 23 and 27 of 1857, Act 24 of 1859, Act 23 of 1860 
and Act 17 of 1864 all of which provided amendments to Ordinance 49. 83 
Ordinance 49 remained the essential measure of influx control until Act 22 of 
1867. This, coming after the incorporation of British Kaffraria in 1865,84 
amalgamated the past legislation and remained in force for the rest of the 
century. Each amendment to the influx control measures of 1828 was as a result 
of the expansion of the Colony, and the subsequently increased supply of 
available destitute Africans for labour. With a growing potential labour 
supply, the law had to become more wide-reaching and powerful. 
Ordinance 50 provided the roots for the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 
March 1841. This type of legislation defined the legal rights of employers and 
employees and the method and terms of contracts and apprenticeships. But as 
Macmillan pointed out, the 1841 ordinance merely gave increased power to 
colonial employers and provided sureties and controls on the labour force. 85 
Duly added that it gave local magistrates much wider powers and laid the 
system of justice for labourers open to abuse, allowing oral contracts of up 
to a year . 86 This important ordinance of 1841 was amended by an Order in 
Council in 1842 and Act 4 of 1855, and in 1856 was revamped to form the 
seminal Act 15. This act remained in force (in tandem with the influx control 
Act 22 of 1867) for the rest of the century, with a few minor amendments. The 
81 Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, pp.255-7. 
82 Crais, 'Beasts of Prey I • 
83 For the texts of all the legislation, see Tennant & Jackson, Statutes of the 
Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1895 (1896). 
84 See T.R , H.Davenport, South Africa: a modern History (Johannesburg, 1987), 
map on p.126, for a clear view of the advance of the frontier through the 
nineteenth century. 
85 Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, pp,255-7, 
86 Duly, 'Revisit with Hottentot Ordinance'; see also C,Armstrong & N,Worden, 
'The Slaves, 1652-1834', in Elphick & Giliomee, Shaping of SA Society (1989), 
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Masters and Servants legislation Act 15 (1856) was extended in 
Proclamation 206 (1893) and Proclamation 340 (1894) to cover all Native 
Territories and East and West Pond o land. Peires has shown clearly how the 
destruction of the war of M1anj eni and the subsequent Cattle Kil ling, combined 
with Grey's opportunism. ensured the Colony of a cheap and constant source of 
workers ,87 and Act 15 was clearly intended to control this labour force within 
the Colony. 
This dichotomous legislation led to confusion as to which should be applied to 
the 'Fingo' in 1835. 88 A clear distinction was always made between 
foreigners/'Caffers' , who fell under the influx control legislation, and the 
Khoi and free blacks who came under the Masters and Servants control . In 1835 
for the first time, Africans came potentially under the latter legislation, 
when the Fingo became British subjects. This confused the previously simple 
colour distinction between the application of the two laws. 'Fingos' were 
those people who lived in the Colony, in employment. 'Caffers' were foreigners 
outside the Colony. Thus the confusion in late 1835 when O'Urban ordered the 
expulsion of all Caffers and Basuto,8' and the collection of all Fingo to be 
placed in employment . 'o What he was really demanding was that all unemployed 
Africans leave the Cape. 
The civil commissioners naturally had great difficulty in differentiating 
between who should be placed in the two groups. O'Urban made it clear that 
Ordinance 49 was to be enforced, but as Ziervogel, the assistant civil 
commissioner for Somerset, queried, how could it be applied to the Fingo, as 
British subjects?'1 As such the Fingo should have fallen not under Ordinance 
49, but Ordinance SO. Yet Ordinance 49 was, somewhat illogically, still 
87 Peires, Oead Will Arise, p.297. 
88 An explanation derived in dis cussion with Julian Cabbing. 
8' (CA) A519/3, p.98, Somerset to O'Urban, 26 October 1835. 
'0 (CA) A519/3, p.71, Somerset to O'Urban, 21 October 1835; S.van der Horst, 
Native Labour in South Africa (1942), p.15. 
91 (CA) GH 34/5, pp.155-7, O'Urban to Campbell, 14 October 1835; (CA) 
1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to D'Urban, 22 July 1835. 
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applied to the Fingo. Robson in Graham's Town contracted the Fingo Ungxokezela 
in August, who was in the Colony with a pass granted under the ordinance. 92 
The confusion arose partly as a result of the lack of a specific Fingo 
identity, partly because of the confusion as to the colonial boundary line, 
and partly because of D 'Urban's unclear pronouncements on expulsions. His 
policy was clear, but could not be publicly stated and had to be phrased in 
ambiguous language. 
The Fingo entering into contracts in Graham's Town in 1835 were doing so under 
Ordinance 49. 93 The chief justice of the Colony, Judge . Menzies, declared in 
October 1835 that the Fingo, and those pretending to be Fingo, should be dealt 
with under this law. 94 As British subjects, the 'Fingo' had access to 
advantages not available to 'Caffers', and controls had thus to be set up on 
those being incorporated within the 'tribe'. William Smith, D'Urban's 
secretary, complained in Uitenhage that the Caffers were pretending to be 
Fingo, but that he was managing to place all the Fingo in service, and to 
evict all the Caffers. 95 As early as July Ziervogel was struggling to identify 
Fingo and worrying about Caffers slipping into the Colony as Fingo. 96 The 
confusion in deciding identity arose not only from the physical and cultural 
similarity (to the Europeans) between all Africans, but on the looseness of 
the definition of 'Fingo'. Africans had little option once within the Colony: 
either they entered employment, moved to a Fingo location, or were labelled 
Caffer and evicted. 
The idea of Fingo reserve labour pools in the Ceded Territory, which had 
fallen apart after 1837, was reintroduced ten years later after the re-
annexation of the territory in 1848 to form British Kaffraria, and the Fingo 
92 (CA) 1/AY/8/56, Ziervogel to 1, 4 May 1836; (CA) LG 420, p.24, Campbell to 
Hudson, 16 April 1836. 
93 (CA) 1/AY/9/62, W.Smith to Campbell, 4 July 1835. 
94 (CA) LG 420, pp.28-9, Menzies to D'Urban, 3 October 1835. 
95 (CA) A519/17, p.156, W.Smith to Campbell, 1 December 1835. 
96 (CA) 1/AY/8/55, Ziervogel to Campbell, 22 July 1835; note a similar 
complaint from 1/AY/8/86, Winterberg Field Cornet to 1, 7 September 1835. 
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locations were enlarged. The Fingo locations outside all the eastern Cape 
towns grew apace as loca l labour pools with the progressing capitalism. 97 
Specific regulations were laid out for the Fingo locations to ensure the 
control of the labour supply and its Europeanisation. Fingos had to pay 
quitrent, headmen were appointed, passes were issued, and awards were given in 
such categories as 'most respectable and decently clothed' and 'best and 
largest quantity of European produce,.9s The chiefs in these locations created 
their own power bases and competed for followers by distributing land within 
the locations. By 1854 the lower Albany area was completely dependent on Fingo 
labour, as it had been largely for the previous two decades. The labour 
divisions within the Colony were not split purely on racial distinction, as by 
1842 the richer Khoi inhabitants of the Kat River Settlement were employing 
Finga, Mantatee and 'Xhosa' as domestic se rvants. 99 
By the late 1840s and 1850s most Fingo had been confined to specified 
locations in the newly-established Victoria and Fort Beaufort districts, where 
they remained as available workers. Calderwood in 1855 reported on a Fingo 
location near Peddie 'of from seventeen to twenty families, with the view to 
a supply of labour'.IOO The two lines of labour control are reflected clearly 
in modern South Africa - the dual tenets of apartheid legislation rest on 
homelands and migrant labour in the rural areas, and racial separation and 
influx control in the urban. Theophilus Shepstone, who shaped the reserve 
system which is regarded as the basis of the modern homelands policy,lOI was 
a nineteen-year old aide to D'Urban in 1835, and witnessed at first hand the 
implementation of D'Urban's policies. It was D'Urban, not Shepstone, who posed 
the idea of African reserves away from the European towns so as to provide 
97 See Blue Book GIS (1855), pp.401-2, Report of Calderwood, March 1855, f o r 
distribution of Fingo, number of locations. and communal wealth. 
9S Goverment Gazette, 15 February 1849, Regulations for Fingo locations in the 
Victoria district. 
99 Crais I 'Beasts of Prey I. 
100 Blue Book GIS (1855), p.406, Calderwood report. 
101 For an analysis of the system see D.Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native 
Policy in colonial Natal (1971). He pays little attention to the early 
influences on Shepstone, though. 
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migrant labour. The areas set up in the Ceded Territory by D'Urban as Fingo 
locations form the heart of the modern Ciskei homeland. The Fingo locations 
which he placed outside Graham's Town, Fort Beaufort, Cradock, Somerset East 
and Uitenhage laid the basis for the policy of urban segregation. The D'Urban 
system of 1835, regularly supported by settlers and historians, formed the 
roots of both of the cornerstones to the modern apartheid system . 
The policy of creating concentric concentrations of 'friendly' Africans who 
doubled as a buffer and labour supply that D'Urban had created in 1835, was 
reintroduced in 1847 with the extension of the boundary of the Colony to the 
Keiskamma and the enlargement of the Fingo locations .102 In 1845 Maitland 
granted land on loan (not perpetuity) to the Fingo chiefs in certain areas 
between the Kat and Keiskarmna Rivers .1 03 He proposed in 1846 that thirty 
thousand Fingo, Bastards, Khoi and Tswana be settled in military villages 
between the Fish and Buffalo Rivers in order to form a buffer as had been 
envisaged in 1835. 104 The area was instead distributed to European settlers 
(mainly Irish and German) between 1848 and 1855, leaving areas for Fingo 
locations . The settlements at Tyhume and Peddie were reconstituted and a new 
group of Fingo locations near Whittlesea - Kamastone and Oxkraal - were set 
up. After 1853 the Fingo locations in the entire area from Tarkastad to East 
London were enlarged, as Moyer points out, to provide a barrier and a labour 
pool. 105 The Fingo population of the new loea tion at Healdtown, where a 
school and industrial college were set up for Fingo in 1855, was already 5,255 
within two years . 
The pattern of placing Fingo on the periphery of newly-declared areas was used 
again in 1865 when the Cape boundary became the Kei, and thirty thousand Fingo 
were immediately pla ced in what had been Gcaleka teritory. This time, though, 
the Fingo were outside the colonial boundary. This was an extended repeat of 
102 See (CA) Map M3/379, allocation of Fingo land, 1836, 1855 . 
103 (CA) GH 19/5, Treaty between Maitland and Fingo chiefs , January 1845. 
104 Blue Book G15 (1855), pp.43-50, Calderwood report. 
105 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', p. 225. 
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1835, with African collaborators given newly-annexed territory as the vanguard 
to European settlement. The region of British Kaffraria in the period 1848-65 
had been merely under British jurisdiction, and thus fell under the Ordinance 
49-type influx legislation, rather than Ordinance 50-type Masters and 
Servants. Fingo were given land in exchange for loyalty to the Colony, but at 
the same time this placement set up a pattern of colonial control of Africans. 
In 1854 loyal Xhosa and Fingo who had fought for the Colony were given land in 
the new Crown Reserve, part of which had been the Ceded Territory. But it was 
distributed on the proviso that they group themselves into units of not less 
than twenty huts and each pay a quitrent of ten shillings per annum. 106 
The Fingo began to amalgamate in the nineteenth century such that twentieth-
century anthropologists termed them a tribe. With the loose definition that 
denoted a Fingo, the population grew rapidly, at a rate many times in excess 
of a natural birth rate. In 1854 there were 8,650 Fingo in Peddie and 17,059 
in the eastern Cape. 107 Three years later there were 13,048 in Peddie alone. 
There were two thousand Fingo in Graham's Town by 1847, before Fingo Village 
was granted. By the end of the nineteenth century there were Fingo living as 
far afield as the Orange Free State, Bulawayo and Windhoek. 
In 1853 Reverend F.Gladwin, accompanied by a military column, brought seven 
thousand 'Fingo' and fifteen thousand cattle out of Butterworth and settled 
them in the Fingo locations. The official explanation was that this was the 
long-awaited emancipation of those Fingo left behind in 1835. 108 The 
explana tion, so reminiscent of that provided for 1835, seems remarkably 
similar to that offered for the raid on the Bomvana by Smith . Twenty years 
after the 'emancipation' of the Fingo, the likelihood exists that Africans 
were still being seized and incorporated within what was by this stage an 
increasingly unified group. 
106 Pollock & Agnew, Historical Geography, p. 89. 
107 Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', pp. 594-8 . 
108 Whiteside, History of Abambo, pp.50-1. Blue Book GIS (1855), p.412, 
Calderwood report, said that there were four thousand Fingo. 
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CONCLUSION 
A reasessment of the history of 1835 and the Fingo is long overdue. For a 
century and a half the voices of the settler apologists have dominated eastern 
Cape historiography. Many of their assertions were deliberately inaccurate, 
but have become accepted. The writings of Godlonton and Whiteside have been 
adapted; their central claims remain integral to South African history. Both 
of these texts are not only misleading; they actually inverted the events of 
1835. The Rharhabe were not the unprovoked aggressors who attacked the Colony. 
The Colony had been attacking the Rharhabe for decades, and then in January 
1835 launched a full-scale war as soon as the Rharhabe responded. This war 
included the seizure of Africans to solve the colonial labour shortage. They 
were called Fingo. This process of capture was invertedly described as the 
humanitarian emancipation of a maltreated slave class that had been oppressed 
by the Gcaleka. 
Nineteenth-century texts have for too long been uncritically retained as 
mainstays of historical interpretation in South Africa. Caution, and an 
extensive revision of these texts is needed to prune South African history of 
its mythologies. Wright has shown the serious shortcomings in the work of A.T . 
Bryant, whose authority was unchallenged; and Wylie has similarly 
deconstructed Nathaniel Isaacs. Richner and Maloka have found many pr oblems in 
the writing of Ellenberger . Godlonton and Whiteside may be added to the list 
of discredited authorities. Many more need to be examined. 
This interpretation has important ramifications for the theory of the 
'mfecane' : the assumption that Shaka lay at the root of almost all African 
movement and devastation on the sub-continent in the 1820s and 1830s. The 
'mfecane is merely mythology - its status as orthodoxy and longevity of 
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acceptance do not heighten its accuracy. The Fingo had nothing to do with 
Shaka. They had much to do with colonial expansion. The adaptation of the 
Shaka myth was vital to explaining the presence of the Fingo in 1835, the 
justification of the actions of the troops in Gcaleka territory during the 
war, and the subsequent validity of the historical concept 'mfecane' . The 
theory takes the 'history' of the Fingo as a pillar, so what does the removal 
of this central myth mean for the orthodoxy? Cobbing (see introduction) 
proposed that the Fingo were largely Gcaleka and Rharhabe, who ~ere captured 
in 1835 to solve the colonial labour shortage, and given a false identity. 
This hypothesis was derived as a necessary part of his case against the 
'mfecane' orthodoxy. This thesis to a large extent vindicates this intuitive 
suggestion, and his counter-hypothesis is thus valid in this sphere . The 
accuracy of the rest of his proposals also needs testing. 
The knowledge that the settler interpretations of the events of 1835 are 
untenable leads to a brief summary of the findings of this thesis . The key to 
understanding the war lies in the power of the Cape Colony to expand and the 
ability of the Cape authorities to answer the needs of the colonists, which 
were largely for land, labour, and security. During the 1820s and 1830s there 
was a severe labour shortage in the eastern districts . The authorities 
attempted to alleviate this through legislation tying the Khoi to the land, 
and then through permission to employ Africans in the Colony. The colonists 
supplemented the labour supply with the illegal seizure of Africans beyond the 
frontier on commando raids, but neither measure was sufficient. In tandem with 
the need for labour came a settler desire for land . This was obtained with the 
help of British troops in 1812, 1819, 1829, 1833 and 1834, during which 
process the frontier Rharhabe were evicted from their land. The biggest land 
seizure, however, came in 1835. 
By the end of 1834 the Rharhabe had little option but to respond. For two 
decades they had been repeatedly forced off their land, their cattle had been 
raided, women and children captured, their possessions and dwellings burnt by 
218 
commandos, and their auton omy threatened. Griqua and Sotho raiders to the 
north, powerful neighbours to the east, and the advancing Colony in the west 
put increasing pressure on the Rharhabe to defend themselves and assert their 
independence. A counter-attack on Albany was thus launched in December 1834 by 
groups of the Rharhabe most affected by colonial mistreatment. The attacks 
centred on two areas: the Koonap River and lower Albany regions, where cattle 
were taken and houses burnt. Relatively few Europeans were killed, and they 
were mainly traders and Boers against whom the Rharhabe had grievances. The 
attacks were not extensively premeditated, and nor were they a mass IGaffer' 
onslaught. 
Boer and settler patrols retained control in most areas throughout the period 
of the 'irruption'. Smith, D'Urban and extra British troops arrived in Albany 
in January, not to protect the colony, but to launch an invasion of the 
Rharhabe. The armed response of the Rharhabe provided the opportunity for the 
amelioration of the settler demands for land and labour. It also provided a 
chance to ensure the recognition of British hegemony by all 'Caffer' chiefs. 
The Rharhabe had not accepted the authority of the Colony, and had therefore 
to be militarily subjugated. The Mpondo and Thembu were prepared to 
acknowledge and aid the British. But the Gcaleka were recalcitrant. After a 
period of planning in Graham's Town a massive force of British soldiers, 
colonists and Khoi made its way through Rharhabe territory, burning huts and 
crops, taking cattle, killing men and capturing women and children. Hintza was 
commanded to side with the British. But he vacillated, and the army continued 
straight into his territory in April. The failure of Hintza to meet D'Urban's 
ultimatum for the Gcaleka actively to aid the Colony led to a full-scale war 
on the Gcaleka. They, too, had their homes destroyed, their cattle taken, and 
their women and children captured. After surrendering to the overwhelming 
power of the British, Hintza was imprisoned and murdered two weeks later. 
The most significant aspects of the invasion of the Rharhabe, Bomvana and 
Gcaleka was the capture of women and children to solve the colonial labour 
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crisis. These people were called Fingo, and distributed secretly amongst the 
colonists in the eastern districts. They were elided with two other groups 
with the same name military auxiliaries and refugees and mission 
collaborators. The 'Fingo' were not a homogenous group, settled together at 
Peddie as D'Urban and Ayliff claimed. There were Fingo locations at Peddie, 
King William's Town and Tyhume which contained groups of collaborators, 
militia and labourers. There were also locations at Graham's Town, Cradock, 
Fort Beaufort and Somerset whose purpose was to provide Fingo labourers for 
the eastern Cape. These were two very different t ypes of Fingo. In the Fingo 
locations , certain British loyalists were appointed as chiefs to ensure that 
the settlement followed instructions. And al} 'Fingo' were described in terms 
of the same history and identity created by D 'Urban and Ayliff, which was 
intended to mask the highly illegal fact that the Colony was capturing African 
labourers. 
The colony made substantial gains in 1835. Large new areas of land were opened 
up as settler farms. Thousands of cattle taken from the 'Caffers' were given 
to settlers. Seventeen thousand la bourers were made available t o eastern Cape 
farmers. D'Urban found that he could not drive the Rharhabe across the Kei and 
exterminate the remainder. and his final peace settlement allowed them to 
remain in designated areas. But their autonomy was undermined as they were 
under British control. For various reasons the settlers exaggerated the threat 
of the 'irruption' and the losses they had suffered: they wished, firstly, to 
portray themselves as innocent victims of barbarous aggression, ensuring them 
of the moral high ground in analyses of the war; secondly, they wanted as much 
financial compensation from London as possible; and thirdly, they wanted their 
own losses to compare with the number of stock taken from the 'Caffers' so 
that it would appear that they had fair justification for attacking the 
Rharhabe. 
The notion that there was a Colony-wide conspiracy to hide the large-scale 
illegal seizure of thousands of African workers for indenture in the Eastern 
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Cape seems highly implausible. Further, that the secret could remain unnoticed 
for a century and a half is virtually unbelievable. But there were good 
reasons why nothing was said about these illegal practices. It has been shown 
how the investigating commission into the death of Hintza, which reached 
rather inconclusive findings, was completely misled by the planned 
misinformation of Smith (with the co-operation of O'Urban) and the fearful 
departure of Stubbs, the witness who refused to follow Smith's lie. The 
motivating force behind the commission and the informant on colonial 
misdemeanours - Philip - left the Cape in early 1835 and remained in London 
f.or two years . The media outlet for colonial philanthropy and exposure of 
wrongs was provided by Fairbairn, who took a back seat in 1836 and 1837 after 
years of tribulations. By 1837 he was involved in lengthy libel suits with 
Moodie and Chase for his championing of Stockenstrom's case. 
The third member of the trio vilified by the Settler School - James Read - had 
provided Philip and Fairbairn with much of their knowledge of injustices in 
the 1820s and early 1830s. In early 1835 he was removed from the Kat River 
Settlement (Smith and O'Urban falsely accused him of inciting the attacks of 
1834 and of supplying the Rharhabe with guns) and he moved to Bethelsdorp. His 
application to return across the Fish in July 1835 was turned down by O'Urban 
on the grounds of private 'information acquired'.l Thomas Pringle, who had 
also publicised frontier misdemeanours, died in 1834. Thus in 1835 and the 
years following, the men who had come to champion indigenous rights were not 
present. The fact of the sitting of the Aborigines Commission, inconclusive 
though its findings were, covered the need for further exposure, which no 
'Justus' rose to fill. The eastern Cape settlers and farmers, who benefitted 
from the increased labour, had no reason to publicise events, and the Fingo 
themselves, alienated on the white farms, had no means to. 
The problem of tampering with evidence is a most important one. Crucial 
1 (CA) A519/17, p.14, Read to O'Urban, July 1835; A519/17, p.149, O'Urban to 
Read, 11 November 1835. 
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evidence about 1835 and the Fingo is unfortunately missing. Attention has 
already been brought to the two separate lists (with a number of copies) of 
Fingo indentures and settlement which cannot be found. 2 D'Urban, who was 
normally a prolific correspondent , wrote little in February and March (his 
period of planning) and that which he later wrote on the Fingo contains quite 
blatant fallacies. Ayliff's writings generally display such enigma, vagueness 
and inaccuracy that it is difficult to take him seriously. More importantly, 
while he was a conscientious diarist, he has no diary entries for March to 
September - the crucial months. Davis similarly stopped in January and began 
again in September. Why? In the early nineteenth century Theal copied three 
volumes of documents on 1835 for publication - two of which were refused for 
publication. An analysis of (CL) MS 2033 (his copies) shows clear censorship 
by him of the copies made by his students. 3 It is not impossible - given 
Theal's period of employment in the Cape Archives and his work on the relevant 
documents - that he tampered with the sources. If it was not he, then D'Urban 
may have ordered a purge of any incriminating documents and a censorship on 
any connnents. 
A good percentage of the sources have to be approached carefully, as they were 
written well after the events, although they often purport to be contemporary. 
The 'diary ' of Cox (written in late 1835), and the reminiscences of Halse 
(written for his grandchildren in the 1870s), of Goldswain (1870s), Stubbs 
(1850s) and Andrews (1877) are likely to be tainted and anachronistic . 
Goldswain, for instance, regularly transcribed sections of the Graham's Town 
Journal or Godlonton' s Irruption of the Kaffir Hordes into his diary. 4 As 
Ayliff and most others did, he used Godlonton's description of the Fingo at 
Butterworth in April, despite being there himself. The papers of Philip and 
Read were unfortunately lost in the University of the Witwatersrand library 
2 References to the missing lists are in (CA) A519/2, p.24, England to D'Urban, 
20 May 1835; A519/17, p.28, D'Urban, 12 July 1835. 
3 Pointed out to me by Jeff Peires. For an analysis of Theal , see Saunders, 
Making of South African Past . 
4 Long, Chronicle of Goldswain, pp.91-101; cf. Godlonton, Irruption of the 
Kaffir, pp.138-145. 
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fire of 1931, and a re-examination of Read's comments is thus impossible. 
It must be stressed that the orthodox history of 1835 and the Fingo is based 
largely on uncritical interpretaions of military reports, and of the writings 
of settler apologists. Yet there are numerous proven cases of these reports 
and accounts being not only factually inaccurate, but specifically designed to 
mask the real events. O'Urban, in a colourful overstatement, described Albany 
as a barren and devastated desert before he had even arrived in the district. 
He blamed Hintza for organising the attacks of Oecember before he could have 
had any evidence of it. The report on the Smith patrol past the Mbashe River 
in May lied about the intentions of the patrol, about who suggested it, about 
the circumstances of Hintza' s death and about the identity of the 'Fingo' 
taken. O'Urban later claimed that he had only decided to annex the Queen 
Adelaide Province on 8 May, when it had been planned since January. O'Urban 
regularly alleged that the Fingo were slaves of the Gcaleka, when he knew that 
th'ey were not. He also said that he had settled 16,800 Fingo around Peddie, 
which was incorrect. He deliberately misled the Colonial Office about the size 
of the 'Caffer' force, about the effectiveness of his own troops, and about 
the length of the hostilities. The settlers, with the collaboration of O'Urban 
and the Cape colonial authorities, exaggerated their losses and the 
destruction of late 1834. These are all crucial aspects of the war and the 
identity of the Fingo, and are demonstrably incorrect. 
The year 1835 is not yet fully understood. The avenues for questions and 
uncovering mysteries and myths are merely opening. This thesis has attempted 
to answer some, but many remain unanswered, and a number of new questions have 
arisen. What was in O'Urban's mind in l835? Was he an arch-conservative with 
long-standing plans for expansion, was he a weak governor captured by the 
Graham'S Town settlers, or was he an ambivalent expansionist, who formulated 
his plans in conjuction with the settlers as he went along? What happened in 
Gcaleka territory between 15 and 24 April, when the large invasion force was 
camped in Butterworth for ten days? Were they capturing 'Fingo'? How many 
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Fingo were there in 1835, and, more specifically, how many of them were 
labourers? How were the Fingo labourers controlled once within the Colony? 
Forced labour implies manacles, labour distribution camps and armed guards. 
Were these in use? How were Fingo retained once on the farms? Who were the 
'wandering Fingo' in late 1835: were they es'Oaped labourers or destitute 
Rharhabe? What was happening in the Fingo locations, and what was their 
purpose? 
Significant areas of research are affected. The origins of the Great Trek need 
to be reviewed. Nineteenth-century labour history, and the beginnings of 
African proletarianisation are affected by this interpretation of the identity 
and function of the Fingo . The theory of the 'm fecane' is likewise in need of 
ressessment. The entire history of the Fingo and their role in the eastern 
Cape requires revision. Fingo case histories need to be found in order to 
trace the movements and origins of Fingo labourers . Analyses are due on the 
power and authority of the Graham's Town faction, on the growth of the eastern 
Cape economy based on the gains of the war and the Fingo labour, and on why 
settler historiography has maintained its psychological hegemony. 
It is clear that the year 1835 was of crucial importance both for the settlers 
and the Rharhabe. For the Europeans, contrary to their claims, the year led to 
the meeting of many of their needs. For the 'Caffers' it was disastrous. As 
D'Urban said, the Rharhabe loss in 1835 
amounted to 4000 of their warriors or fighting men, and among them 
many captains. Our's [sic 1 fortunately has not in the whole 
amounted to lOa, and of these only 2 officers. There have been 
taken from them also, besides the conquest and alienation of their 
country, about 60 , 000 head of cattle, almost all their goats , 
their habitations every where destroyed, and their gardens and 
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cornfields laid waste . They have, therefore , been chastised not 
extremely , but sufficiently.5 
5 (CA) GH 1/108, pp.122-3, D'Urban to Glenelg. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Chronology of the war of 1835 
1829 
August 
Maqoma and his people expelled from the Kat River area. 
1832 
July 
Somerset leaves for England. Colonel England takes over and tries to expel 
Tyali and his people from the Mancazana River area. 
1833 
September 
1 Tyali forced to leave the Mancazana area. 
4 Col. England burns all Ngqika huts south of Gaga River area. 
October 
Junior officer, Isaacs, takes all Tyali' s cattle and threatens him . Cox 
returns the cattle. 
November 
Armstrong orders Tyali to evacuate Gaga River area. All huts burnt. 
1834 
January 
20 Somerset returns; gives land at Gaga back to Tyali. 
March 
5 Tyali chased out of Gaga area; all corn destroyed. 
De cember 
2 Sparkes patrol. 
5 Somerset gives Nqeno ultimatum to move across Keiskamma. 
12 Sutton patrol. 
21 First attack on a settler . 
28 Attack on Salem. 
29 Bathurst burnt. 
1835 
January 
3 Martial law declared in the eastern districts. 
Tyali sent peace proposals - were refused. 
8 Martial law declared in whole Colony. 
13 Smith arrives from Cape Town - Board of Safety disbanded. 
12 Attack on Nqeno's kraal by Cox. 
16 All huts and kraals in Tyhume valley burnt. 
20 Mounted Burghers of Albany formed. 
27 Military Board set up for recruitment. Board of Relief, under 
Heavyside, set up. Missionaries fetched from Burnshill. 
31 Attack on Fort Willshire. 
February 
11-15 Chief advance on Fish River bush, in three columns. 
19 Attack on Kat River Settlement . Attack on Fort Armstrong. 
March 
6 Effective atta ck on Trompetter's Drift by Caffers. 
9 Smith leads Boers in battle in Fish River bush. 
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26 Smith leads raid from Fort Willshire. 
31 Invasion force leaves Fort Willshire. 
Apri l 
1 Smith and Somerset c amp on Debe Flats. 
2 Night march to Ntaba ka Ndoda. 
3 Attack on Ntaba ka Ndoda. 
7 All forces attack Ntaba ka Ndoda. Louis Arnoldus captured. 1 st and 2nd 
Divisions move toward s Buffalo River. 
8-9 Attack on Buffalo Poorts by 1st, 2nd and 3rd. 
10 1st moves towards Kei, 2nd down Buffalo, 3rd remain in Buffalo 
Poorts, 4th to Tyhume. 
15 1st crosses Kei, camps at Ndabakazi. 
17 1st reaches Butterworth, Phato arrives. 
Surpri s e attack by 3rd on the Amatole, capture 5,000 cattle. 
18 Hintza sends white ox to Butterworth as present. 
20 2nd arrives in Butterworth. 
22 Armstrong found murdered. 
23 Warden sent to Clarkebury. 
24 War declared on Gcaleka. 
25-7 Troops wreaking havoc in Tsomo River area. Warden and Vadana attack 
eastern Gcaleka. 
29 Hintza comes to D'Urban's camp . 
30 Peace terms agreed upon. War declared to be over. 
May 
3 Maqoma sends plea for peace. 
5 Warden and missionaries with 524 "station people" arrive at 
Ndabakazi from Clarkebury. 
6 Messengers from Hintza to Maqoma arrive in Amatole. Maqoma offered peace. 
9 Fingo procession leaves Ndabakazi . 
10 Queen Adelaide Province annexed. Smith leaves on patrol with Hintza . 
D'Urban moves to set up Fort Wellingt on. 
12 Granet met Maqoma and Tyali for peace talks. Terms r e fused. 
Hintza killed. 
13 Whit e killed. Smith i n sigh t of Mtata River. 
14 Fingo arrive in Peddie. Allegedly swear allegianc e to the King . 
Smith's 'Fingo ' suddenly appear near Mbashe River . 
23 D'Urban arrives in King William's Town to make it HQ. 
25 Beresford left for London, taking Burhu and Sarhi1i to Graham's Town. 
28-7 Smith and Cox sweep through entire area between Chalumna and 
Keiskamma, Amatole and sea. 
June 
Patrols sent throughout Queen Adelaide Province for whole month. 
27 Bailie party killed near Pirie. 
July 
20 Attack on Fort Wellington with guns . 
August 
14-5 Large force atta cks Amatole. 
15 Maqoma and Tyali talk to Warden and Cox. Hostilitie s cease. 
September 
5 Ga sela and Mhala make peace at Fort We llington. 
17 Pea ce treaties signed. 
19 Maqoma appointed chief magistrate of Ngqika. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Population of the Colony, 1810-18391 
Western Cape Uitenhage Albany Somerset Graaff-Reinet 
1810 
Whites 22055 2817 5865 
Non-White 39160 3462 7563 
Ratio2 100:176 100:123 100:129 
1827 32284 3066 5156 5990 9531 
43153 4377 919 5401 10333 
100:146 100:141 100 :.!!!!. 100:90 100:108 
1828 34449 3397 4200 5370 7939 
46248 4166 1786 5139 6862 
100:134 100:123 100:.41. 100:96 100:86 
1829-18363 
1837 4 41032 5128 8001 5169 8808 
51207 6487 3216 6525 6814 
100:125 100:127 100 :!±.Q 100:126 100: 77 
18'38 44997 5128 6608 5096 7213 
53341 6487 93125 7022 9837 
100:119 100:140 100:141 100:138 100:136 
1839 44777 4628 6608 5025 7072 
50669 6487 9312 5359 9283 
100:113 100:140 100:141 100:107 100: 131 
1. The population records of the eastern districts are in a mess for the period. 
But I have attempted to give an indication of the potential labour force of the 
eastern districts by comparing total white population to the total non-white 
population, The Western Cape figures have been included as a median. 
2. The ratio is of Whites to Non-Whites. 
3 . For the years 1829 to 1836, the figures for 'Whites' and 'free blacks' were 
elided, making a comparison of population sizes impossible. This has implications 
for studies of the effects of both Ordinance 49 (1828) and the war of 1835, 
4. The figures for 1837 - which were taken at the start of the year - are 
muddled. The figure for whites in Albany, especially, seems incorrect. 
5. This is a very important figure. Why did it suddenly increase? Was there an 
influx of Africans? The more likely explanation is that the Fingo were only at 
this stage being officially registered, and that there was a time-lag between the 
entrance of Fingo labourers - many illegally - and their appearance in the 
official records. The statistics for 1838 were taken at the start of the year, 
and this figure is in effect that for 1837. cf. Chapter 5, p.185, footnote 109, 
for Ziervogel's comments that the records for Albany for 1835 and 1836 were non-
existent. 
LIST of the N A>l1l8 of PERSONS, not belonging to the AR>lT, who lo.t their Lives during 
the late Caffre War, in the Years 1 8~4 and 1835. 
No. N AM E. OCCUPATION. DATE. PLAC E. 
1804: 
1. Albert Kirkman - trader - - - 2~ Dec. Tron;rctter's Drift. 
~. Stephen Buys -
-
farmer - - -
" 
Kat iver. 
3. -- Creamer-
-
labourer 
- -
~3 Dec. near the Clay Pits. 
4. / H. W. Henderson - merchant - - 24 Dec. Clay Pits. 
5. Thomas Mahoney 
-
builder 
- -
" 
- ditto. 
6. John Shaw - clerk Kat River. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
::!4. 
2.j, 
26. 
:":!7. 
~~ . 
:!9. 
:3lI. 
:11. 
:l~. 
:1-1 . 
:1;'). 
, 
I 
I 
; 
I 
, 
- - - -
" Alexander Forbes 
-
farmer -
- -
" 
Irish Part~. 
F. Sil verhoorn -
-
ditto 
- - -
~5 Dec. Espa~s, ish River. 
Piet de Fager - - ditto - - -
" 
New ear's River. 
N. Van der Meulen 
-
schoolmaster -
" 
- ditto. 
James Blakeway 
-
farmer -
- -
" 
Koonap. 
--Warren -
-
trader - - -
" 
Missionary Station. 
F. Dougal -
-
mason - - -
" 
Zuurberg. 
--Newman ... 
-
labourer - - December Woodlands. 
------- - - -
deserter, 75th 
" 
- ditt". 
regiment. 
-- Kent 
- -
trader -
- -
" 
near Chumie. 
-- Budding- - ditto - - -
" 
- ditto. 
John Stamford - ditto - - -
" 
near King\Villiam's Town. 
R. Hodges. - - ditto - - - Eno's Country. 
" J. F . FerfCIra - - farmer - - - 26 Dec. Kowie Bush. 
G. II., - - - trader - - - December. 
Robert Rogers - ditto - - -
" 
Tyali's Country. 
S. Turner 
- -
farmer -
- -
" 
Lnshington Valley. 
RobertShaw - - ditto - - -
" 
Trompetter's Drift. 
-- Cane - - ditto - - -
" 
Caffreland. 
-I 183.j: John Brown. al;f~n1. J alluary Clay Pits . - - - -
. . 1 P1HiJp 'rilltak(~ r - II ma;-;oll - - - H I - dlttl) . 
~aIllurl \\' (;hher, JUIl. - - - - " J ~l1ndav Ri\"er. 
-- I..{!win'.Ecld - ! li'om Orange Ri" cr 7 Jannan ' I ncar \\'hite's Farm. 
Car!'l "Tatthy:-; - -I' t:trmcr - - i !) Janu;u:,, ! Zuurbf'rg-. 
\rilliillll ~latthrs - dittL> - - ' 12Jalluar~· i - (/itt,).-
Corneli1ls EIIg-f ~'IIJrccht I ditto : " ' ! ditto. 
:\. II. 1)('. I.ang'l! - I ditto - I -l1\l al'<.:h I K"Oll ap. 
~lr;. Trollip I :\[u y Collett', Farm. 
.T . .Juhher.,1ull.- ~ j 1.) Jl~lle Datilur;; t. 
- - Chippcrti!'hl farme!' - - I ,. Ileal' BatIiu1':-. t. 
J. Hentlt'Y - I dith) - - 1 " - Jiw). 
-- FalicT labollrcr i Klip Plaat;-;. 
J. JC'nkin:; i dittn - - f Howard':.; Part\'. 
- - Jbwl ill:-:' - t tr;HIt'r - - ! - Talllhonki(:l:IIHr. 
-- Tittcrtt.H\ - I carpl,'ntt-r I TrullIpctter's Drift . 
.T. nilson - - i - - I - dittu. 
T. Thnrrat - l llI e:-;~e ll :;cr - J :-::l'ptcmbcr I Butita':-, Hill. 
-------
(signcJ) D. COII/phdl, 
Ci,·il Conuui!'sioncl' for :\lbuny anu ~ol1lcrsct. 
Civil C(Jullni ~~ i O IlI'r' :, Officp. Graham':; TI)wll. 
Ii :\lay 18;31;' 
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